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Abstract

In recent years, the financial status of pension schemes has attracted a great deal of attention from the national press and policy makers.  Despite the resulting increase in regulation, many authors maintain that the governance of UK pension schemes remains opaque.  This thesis analyses the accountability relationships that are evident in the governance mechanisms of UK pension schemes and investigates how accountability is discharged therein.  It finds that trustees are central to the governance of UK pension schemes and that the following stakeholders are accountable to the trustees: (i) sub-committees to the trustee board; (ii) the fund manager; and (iii) the actuary.  The evidence suggests that accountability is fully discharged in these relationships.  Conversely, trustees are accountable to (i) the auditor; (ii) the PR; (iii) the sponsoring employer; and (iv) the members/beneficiaries of the pension scheme.  The evidence suggests that a variety of documents are used to discharge the trustees’ accountability including: (i) the annual report of the pension scheme; (ii) the annual report of the sponsoring employer; (iii) the Statement of Investment Principles; (iv) the Summary Funding Statement; (v) the Popular Report; (vi) and other pension scheme media such as pension scheme booklets, the pension scheme web-site and annual benefit statements.  In doing so, the evidence suggests that, in terms of Stewart’s (1984) model, accountability for probity and legality, process, performance and policy accountability is discharged.  The evidence also suggests that, with the exception of the pension scheme members/beneficiaries, the trustees are held to account in all of their accountability relationships.  The main finding of this thesis is that pension scheme members/beneficiaries fail to engage in the governance processes of the pension schemes on which they rely so much; if they wish to preserve their future pension benefits, they will need to find a voice.  

Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, the financial status of pension schemes has attracted a great deal of attention from the national press and policy makers (Klumpes, 2000).  The debate regarding the regulation of UK pension schemes has intensified since the 1990’s, when several pension scheme abuses were discovered (see Chapter 2).  Since then, pension scheme deficits have become the focus of much discussion; these deficits have arisen for a variety of reasons: (i) a decline in the income generated from pension scheme assets since 2000 and the associated decline in their market values (Davis, 2004); (ii) a decrease in bond yields over the same period (Bezooyen, 2002); (iii) an increasing pensioner population as children born in the post-World War II baby-boom period reach retirement age (Turner, 2004); (iv) the increasing longevity of pensioners due to medical advancements (Pickering, 2003) and (v) the continued relationship between retirement income and inflation (Morley, 2002).  By the end of 2004, the financial press were reporting that the FTSE 100 pension scheme deficit was £75bn (Cohen, 2005); by December 2005 the total deficit for all UK companies was estimated to be £130bn (Burgess, 2005).  Around the same time, reports emerged of the closure of some Defined Benefit (DB) schemes, not only to new members, but also to existing members; for example, Rentokil Plc was one of the first large companies to make such a move, it was subsequently followed by Arcadia, the Co-operative (Cohen, 2006) and Scottish Power (Bream and Taylor, 2006) to name but a few.            



1.1	A Topic Worthy of Research
Although, as a university lecturer, I had often taught students how UK sponsoring employers should account for their employee pension schemes, I had never thought about the subject from a personal perspective; as I read the financial press reports of the time, I suddenly became very interested in the funding status of the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS).  I visited the USS web-site for more information and found the annual reports dating back to 2002.  Having never looked at the annual report of a UK pension scheme before, I expected to be able to judge the funding position of USS by comparing the assets of the pension scheme to the corresponding liabilities in the Statement of Financial Position; however, I was puzzled to find that there was no Statement of Financial Position in the traditional sense but merely a Statement of Net Assets.  In the 2002 annual report of USS I found the following, rather nebulous, statement by the pension scheme’s actuary:
“Overall, the funding level of the scheme was at a level similar to that revealed in the 1999 valuation.  The conclusion from the review as at 30 September 2001 was that, although the funding position of the scheme had fallen from its level at the last valuation, the scheme nevertheless remained in surplus.” (p. 61)

This statement did nothing to reassure me that the scheme was sufficiently funded to pay its pension scheme liabilities and, although the USS annual reports of 2003 to 2005 were an improvement (they, at least, attempted to quantify the funding position​[1]​), the information provided was out of date and less than clear.  It seemed to me that there was a very obvious lack of accountability – I had no idea if USS was in a position to meet its pension promise to me (other than the assurance given by the actuary above) nor did I understand what governance processes USS had in place to ensure that the pension promise would be met.  

Since 2004, there has been an increase in the amount of information provided in the annual report of USS, however, information relating to the pension scheme’s funding position is not any clearer.  Table 1.1 is an extract from the USS annual report for the year ended 31st March, 2009:

Table 1.1: USS Funding Position at 31/3/09 

(Source: USS annual report, 2009, p. 84)

This information provides a very confusing picture of the scheme’s funding position and it still remains one year out of date.

Since 2004, the movement in the deficits (surpluses) of UK pension schemes has been very fluid; this picture is often complicated by the fact the numbers and the sub-set of companies reported are often measured on different basis ​[2]​, ​[3]​.  The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) (see Chapter 2) currently produces monthly reports (known as the PPF 7800 index) of the total deficit (surplus) for all of its members (now almost 7,400 companies)​[4]​ and Figure 1.1 is an extract from the PPF’s July 2010 report:    

Figure 1.1: The PPF 7800 Index

(Source: PPF, 2010, p.1)
Although the numbers reported in the above excerpt are clearly prepared on a more conservative basis than those cited in the financial press (compare for example the December 2005 £130bn deficit reported by Burgess (2005) with the above graph), the PPF claimed that, by June 2009, the PPF 7800 index reached its maximum deficit of £200.1bn (PPF, 2009); by July 2010 the deficit had been reduced to £21.8bn (PPF, 2010).  In its July 2010 report, the PPF claimed that 4,420 schemes, representing 65.5% of all DB schemes, were in deficit (PPF, 2010).  These deficits have undoubtedly impacted on the continued provision of DB schemes in the UK; in January 2009, The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) reported that the UK faced the prospective closure of nearly 50% of existing DB schemes over the next five years (NAPF, 2009).  By February 2010, only 23% of all UK pension schemes remained open to new members compared to 88% ten years ago (NAPF, 2010).  It is perhaps not surprising then that pension schemes attract so much attention; “[f]or most people, their pension rights are likely to be one of the most valuable assets they have” (Pension Law Review Committee​[5]​, 1993, p. 358).  The Office for National Statistics reported that, in 2008, an estimated 27.7 million people in the UK​[6]​ were members of occupational pension schemes; thus, the performance of UK pension schemes has significant welfare and social implications.  

Wolf (2005) claims that, in today’s climate, pensions are neither trusted nor understood and therefore it makes sense that recent pension reforms, such as the establishment of the Pensions Regulator (the PR) (see Chapter 2), and the issue of both Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 17 Retirement Benefits (ASB, 2000) and International Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 Employee Benefits (IASB, 1998) (see Chapter 3), have addressed issues of governance and accountability​[7]​.  Indeed, FRS 17 has proved to be a very controversial topic for UK standard-setters; Morley (2002) claims that rarely has an accounting standard faced such criticism outside the professional press.  The objective of FRS 17 is to ensure that the financial statements of sponsoring employers reflect the market values of their pension fund assets and liabilities.  However, prior to its implementation, many employers claimed that the movements between the year-end valuations of their pension scheme surplus (deficit) would become volatile, out-with their control and affect their share prices (Hinks, 2002)​[8]​.  As a result, the ASB relented to a very public lobbying campaign and delayed the full implementation of FRS 17 until 2005 (see Chapter 3).  The accounting treatment and disclosure requirements for UK pension schemes are important because it has been suggested that they impact on business decisions; in its Discussion Paper The Financial Reporting of Pensions (PAAinE, 2008), the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) acknowledged that pension scheme deficits have impacted on share valuations and corporate transactions such as takeovers​[9]​ and disposals.  Thus, a large variety of stakeholders, both from a social welfare and a business perspective, have an interest in the performance of company pension schemes.  

Consequently, it is not surprising that there is a growing body of academic research which addresses different aspects of pension schemes​[10]​, ​[11]​, ​[12]​.  Despite this extensive body of work, I have been unable to find any academic​[13]​ research which addresses my original queries that related to the governance and accountability of UK pension schemes.  Indeed, several authors have commented on the obscurity of pension scheme governance mechanisms (Epstein, 2001; Clark, 2004; Evans et al., 2008) that will ultimately impede the development of pension scheme governance as a discipline.  Consequently, this thesis attempts to answer the following research questions (RQ):

RQ1	What accountability relationships are evident in the governance mechanisms of UK pension schemes? 

RQ2	How is accountability discharged in UK pension schemes?

1.2	Scope of the Research
Thus, the primary objective of the thesis is to investigate the governance and accountability of UK pension schemes.  To do so, a variety of UK pension scheme stakeholders are interviewed to establish how these schemes are governed in practice; they are asked: (i) to explain the governance and accountability that operate in UK pension schemes; and (ii) to describe how accountability is discharged within these relationships.  The annual report of the sponsoring employer is deemed to be one of the main documents that discharges accountability, and so a content analysis of a sample of these documents is also utilised to establish how the accountability is discharged therein. 

1.3	Thesis Content
The thesis is organised into seven chapters: following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 investigates how pension scheme governance is currently regulated in the UK.  Indeed, much of this regulation is based on existing corporate governance practices (The Myners Report, 2001; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2002) and accordingly these corporate governance practices are given brief consideration at the beginning of Chapter 2 (Appendices 1, 2 and 3 provide more detail).  The chapter then explains the nature of UK pension schemes and provides a summary of the regulatory developments in that context.  The PR’s codes of practice and regulatory guidance are summarised, compared to corporate governance practices (Appendix 4 provides more detail) and the chapter provides a summary of existing pension scheme governance research.  The chapter concludes by suggesting potential governance relationships that might exist in UK pension schemes.

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to propose a theoretical framework that can be used to make the governance mechanisms of UK pension schemes more transparent; it argues that this can be done by analysing the accountability relationships that are generated by any governance mechanisms that can be shown to exist.  The varying definitions of accountability are examined and, in particular, that of Gray et al. (1987).  A discussion then follows which addresses the stakeholders to whom companies are traditionally accountable and how annual reports are typically used to discharge that accountability; however, the chapter proposes that the organisational context of an entity will ultimately impact on who these stakeholders are and the mechanisms used to discharge accountability to them.  Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability is then utilised to show the different types of accountability that can be discharged in different organisational contexts.  A theoretical framework which combines the theories of Gray et al. (1987) and Stewart (1904) is used for the analysis.  Thus, the potential accountability relationships (which are generated from the potential governance relationships identified in chapter 2) are summarised.  As both Chapters 6 and 7 make reference to the annual reports of UK pension schemes and those of their sponsoring employer, Chapter 3 concludes by providing a review of the accounting standards that apply to both of these reporting entities.

Chapter 4 considers the research design that is used to investigate the governance and accountability of UK pension schemes.  In doing so, the philosophical assumptions of Burrell and Morgan (1979) are considered; these include assumptions relating to ontology, epistemology, human nature, methodology and those about the nature of society.  Different combinations of these assumptions result in different research paradigms and explanation is provided as to why the current research is placed in the interpretive paradigm.  The objectives of the research are re-visited and consideration is then given to appropriate research methods that can be used to fulfil the research objectives.  This chapter links the interpretive nature of the research with the selected research methods: interviews and content analysis; a summary of these two research methods is subsequently provided.

Chapter 5 is the first of two empirical chapters; the results of 21 semi-structured interviews with a variety of UK pension scheme stakeholders are presented here.  The first part of this chapter seeks to establish what governance mechanisms exist in UK pension schemes and the resulting accountability relationships therein (RQ1).  The second part of this chapter analyses the stakeholders’ views about how the accountability in each of these accountability relationships is discharged (RQ2).  Consequently, the empirical work in Chapter 5 is used to apply “flesh” (Laughlin, 1990, p. 110) to skeletal theories of accountability and “to provide a vehicle to clarify their nature and accuracy in particular situations” (ibid, p. 110); in this case, the organisational context of UK pension schemes.  This approach answers the call by several authors for context specific studies of accountability (Otley, 1984; Scapens 1984; Laughlin, 1991).

In Chapter 5, many of the interviewees suggest that the annual reports of the sponsoring employer are used by many pension scheme stakeholders​[14]​.  Consequently, Chapter 6 uses content analysis to examine a selection of annual reports of UK sponsoring employers to establish if, in a period of regulatory change, these disclosures have changed; if so, how they have changed by reference to the second part of the theoretical framework (Stewart (1984)) proposed in Chapter 3 (RQ2) and what might be driving these changes.

Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the main findings of the thesis.  It offers some limitations of the current empirical work and suggests potential areas for future research. 

1.4	The Contribution to Knowledge
This thesis makes three distinct contributions to knowledge.  First, it contributes to the topic of pension scheme governance and accountability; the inputs and outputs of UK pension schemes are well defined (see Figure 2.1), however, their governance and accountability mechanisms operate in a ‘black box’ and are unknown, opaque and under-researched.  The empirical work in Chapter 5 rectifies this situation by describing and illustrating the pension scheme governance and accountability mechanisms that operate in practice in the UK.  Second, the thesis also contributes to knowledge from a theoretical perspective; Chapter 3 suggests a theory of accountability (Figure 3.3) which is a combination of the existing models of Gray et al. (1987) and Stewart (1984).  Chapter 5, and specifically Table 5.5, demonstrate that the theory explained in Figure 3.3 can be appropriately used to investigate accountability relationships and conclude if ‘full accountability’ (see Section 3.6) has been discharged; it also permits the identification of different types of accountability that are discharged.  Finally, one of the most important findings to emerge from Chapter 5 is that the annual report of the sponsoring employer is a very important source of information that is used to discharge accountability for UK pension schemes.  This conclusion is used to plan the empirical work presented in Chapter 6, the third contribution of the thesis.  This chapter uses content analysis to examine the different types of accountability that are discharged in the annual report of the sponsoring employer and how it has changed since 2000.  Overall, the thesis seeks to investigate the accountability relationships that are evident in the governance mechanisms of UK pension schemes and how that accountability is discharged.


Chapter 2 
The Development of UK Pension Scheme Governance 

2.1	Introduction
Institutional investors, such as pension schemes, have recently increased their calls for improvements in the governance of those companies in which they invest (Keasey et al., 1997; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007). Despite these requests, the governance practices of pension schemes have been accused of being opaque and less than transparent (Epstein, 2001; Clark, 2004; Evans et al., 2008).  Yet, the governance of pension schemes is an important issue because of the significant impact that pension schemes have on numerous individuals (such as pension beneficiaries) and ultimately the performance of the financial markets in Anglo-American countries​[15]​ (Clark, 2004; Evans et al., 2008).  The current chapter examines how UK pension scheme governance is currently regulated in the UK.

Unfortunately, unlike corporate governance, the academic literature on and research into pension scheme governance has been slow to evolve; it is therefore sparse (Ammann and Zingg, 2008; Evans et al., 2008)​[16]​.  Indeed, Evans et al. (2008) claim that their book is “the only collection of academic work on pension fund governance to date” (p. 3).  Due to this gap in the literature, the current chapter draws on the extant corporate governance literature when examining the background to the topic.  The latter part of the chapter subsequently identifies characteristics that are similar in both the corporate and pension scheme governance contexts.  Such an approach is not unique, indeed similar comparisons were drawn by the OECD​[17]​ when it published its Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance (OECD, 2002).  In developing these principles, the OECD acknowledged that it had “drawn much inspiration from the existing ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’” (OECD, 2002, p. 1).  Likewise, the Myners Report (2001)​[18]​ suggests that the governance of a pension scheme could be considered similar to that of a company and that trustees could “…treat their responsibilities very much like the job of running a company” (p. 16).  

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 addresses the purpose and potential definitions of corporate governance (Appendices 1, 2 and 3 are also used to: (i) summarise the development of corporate governance codes of practice in the UK; (ii) the principles and provisions of the Combined Code (2006); and (iii) global perspectives of corporate governance respectively).  Section 2.3 describes the nature of UK pension schemes and the governance roles that the various pension scheme stakeholders might adopt.  Section 2.4 provides a summary of the regulatory developments in the governance of UK pension schemes and highlights the international principles that have also been influential in this area.  Section 2.5 summarises the codes of practice and guidance issued by the Pensions Regulator (the PR); whilst Section 2.6 considers the extent to which corporate governance principles have been applied in the pension scheme context.  Section 2.7 provides a summary of the existing research that relates to pension scheme governance, thus establishing a gap in the current literature and, Section 2.8 suggests potential governance relationships that might exist in UK pension schemes.  Finally, Section 2.9 summarises and concludes the current chapter.

2.2	The Purpose and Potential Definitions of Corporate Governance
Although there has been a great deal of corporate governance debate for many years, academic research in this area has only developed in the last decade (Mallin, 2007).  As early as 1932, Berle and Means (1932) argued that the divorce between ownership and control of a company gave rise to questions of how the owners of a firm controlled the behaviour of those employed to manage it.  Typically in the UK and the US, public companies have a large number of small shareholders who delegate the day-to-day control of the company to the board of directors; the board then appoints management to administer the company on the owners’ behalf.  As dispersed shareholders have little incentive to monitor management, there is a risk that managers will act to benefit themselves at the expense of these shareholders (Hart, 1995).  Therefore, rules and incentives have been developed to align the behaviour of managers (agents) with the goals of owners (principals)​[19]​.  Turnbull (1997) argues that, in such circumstances, corporate governance issues should ideally be addressed by a contract between shareholders and management stating how the latter should act under all conditions.  However, Hart (1995) suggests that contracting is not a costless activity​[20]​ and, in reality, such contracts are impractical, the end result being that any contract is incomplete (i.e. it will not be able to define how managers should act under all circumstances).  Due to incomplete contracts, the governance structure within companies is seen as a mechanism for decision-making in circumstances that have not already been specified in the original contract.  Consequently, Turnbull (1997) suggests that the board of directors has become the centrepiece of corporate governance reform, acting as the link between shareholders and executive management.  

Whilst there is a general acceptance that the objective of corporate governance is to prevent corporate collapses and financial scandals​[21]​, there is no singularly accepted definition of what is meant by the term.  Thus, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance in very narrow terms: 
“…corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” (p. 737)

By contrast, the definition given in OECD (2004) is much broader in scope:
“…a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.  Corporate Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives, and monitoring performance, are determined.” (p. 11)

Early definitions of corporate governance tended to emphasise the notion of control, for example, Cadbury (1992) described it as “…the system by which companies are directed and controlled.” (para 2.5).  Fama and Jenson (1983) also discuss governance in terms of control mechanisms put in place to protect the interests of shareholders.  Although there is unlikely to be a single definition that is approved by all academics and practitioners in this area, most authors would agree that corporate governance is concerned with the company structures as well as the processes relating to decision making and aims to align the interests of shareholders, other stakeholders and management (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Tricker, 1994; Turnbull, 1997).  For example, Mallin (2007) explains that corporate governance should:
“…ensure that an adequate and appropriate system of controls operate within a company and hence assets may be safeguarded; …prevent any single individual having too powerful an influence; it is concerned with the relationship between a company’s management, the board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders; it aims to ensure that the company is managed in the best interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders [and]; it tries to encourage both transparency and accountability which investors are increasingly looking for in both corporate management and corporate performance.” (p. 4)

Therefore, there are many different opinions in the literature as to how companies should be governed.  Since the commission of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: Final Report (Cadbury, 1992) (hereafter referred to as the Cadbury Report), the development of corporate governance regulation in the UK has been determined by the publication and consolidation of a series of influential reports including: (i) the Greenbury Report (1995); (ii) the Hampel Report (1998); (iii) the Combined Code (1998); (iv) the Turnbull Report (1999); (v) the Higgs Report (2003); and (vi) the Smith Report (2003) (Appendix 1 summarises the development of corporate governance codes of practice in the UK).  Although the first version of the Combined Code (1998) was issued by the London Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has since adopted the responsibility for maintaining an effective code on corporate governance; the Combined Code was subsequently revised by the FRC in 2003, 2006 and 2008.  The latest revision to the code was made in May 2010 and the code’s name was changed to the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010).  A detailed analysis of the contents of the Combined Code (2006)​[22]​ is provided in Appendix 2.  These UK corporate governance codes generally address: (i) the responsibilities, behaviour and accountability of the board of directors; (ii) the remuneration committee; (iii) the audit committee; and (iv) the relationship between the board of directors and company shareholders.  In doing so, they make little reference to other company stakeholders​[23]​ and are generally constructed to address the agency problem that exists due to the separation of company ownership and control (Mallin, 2007)​[24]​.

Many authors argue against the principal-agent model of the firm (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995) by maintaining that it is not a reflection of how large British companies are run in practice (Kay and Silberton, 1995).  These authors suggest that large UK companies are in fact social institutions that are not owned by anyone.  Solomon (2007) states that companies are so large and their impact on society so pervasive “that they should discharge accountability to many more sectors of society than solely their shareholders” (p. 23).  As such, the alternative stakeholder view of the firm supports the notion that the purpose of the firm is not only to create wealth for its shareholders but also to improve the welfare of all its various stakeholders​[25]​; therefore, stakeholder involvement in corporate governance mechanisms is required (Turnbull, 1997).  Consequently, Appendix 3 provides examples of corporate governance mechanisms that have been developed in countries other than the UK where a wider stakeholder perspective is often employed. 

The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010) is an example of the more formal elements of corporate governance regulation in the UK; Aguilera (2005) suggests that other, more informal mechanisms also operate in practice and she maintains that the majority of these can be classified as either internal or external to the company.  Internal, informal mechanisms are likely to include: managerial incentive plans; internal monitoring; corporate bylaws and charters; and the internal labour market​[26]​.  She identifies the equity markets​[27]​ as an example of an external corporate governance mechanism; if shareholders are not content with the performance of management, they are encouraged to sell their shares (i.e. exit) as opposed to participating in a forum to discuss their concerns (i.e. voice)​[28]​ (Parkinson, 1995).  Management behaviours are therefore also controlled by the share pricing mechanisms that exist in the capital markets and the external labour market for managers; these informal mechanisms direct management behaviour towards models of governance based on market expectations and national legislative requirements.  Bushman and Smith (2001) suggest that external corporate governance mechanisms also include: (i) competition in the product market; and (ii) the national legal and judicial systems that protect investors’ rights (La Porta et al., 1998).  However, some argue about whether these governance mechanisms can be effective​[29]​ (Monks, 2008).  Whilst an awareness of the existence of informal mechanisms of governance is required, the empirical work in this thesis concentrates on the more formal, regulated, mechanisms of governance; as Section 2.5 demonstrates, UK pension scheme governance is comprehensively regulated and thus informal governance mechanisms may be less applicable to UK pension schemes.

All of the above developments in corporate governance regulation have undoubtedly influenced the governance regulations of UK pension schemes (Myners, 2001; OECD, 2002; Clark et al., 2008) and Section 2.6 provides an analysis of the extent to which this is the case.  First, however, Section 2.3 describes the nature of UK pension schemes and provides a context for the subsequent discussion of the development of UK pension scheme governance which follows in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.

2.3	The Nature of Pension Schemes in the UK
Section 2.2 has demonstrated that, in the UK, the board of directors is the main focus of the corporate governance codes of best practice (also see Appendix 2); in the context of UK pension schemes, the board of trustees has a comparable role.  This section discusses the objectives of pension schemes and their governance structures of which a central feature is the role of trustees.  The aim of most pension schemes is to provide the beneficiaries with income on their retirement (Clark, 2008).  This is often referred to as the pension promise and, to fulfil that promise, Clark (2008) suggests that pension schemes have three main functions: (i) administration​[30]​; (ii) determination of benefit eligibility and value​[31]​; and (iii) asset management​[32]​.  Historically, in the UK, companies have provided two types of pension scheme for the benefit of their employees: defined contribution (DC) schemes​[33]​; and defined benefit (DB) schemes​[34]​.  Regardless of whether a pension scheme is DC or DB, similar characteristics exist in terms of their administration, governance and the stakeholders involved.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the flow of funds in a UK pension scheme and the wide variety of stakeholders who are involved in its control (BPP, 1999).  This diagram, which was originally sourced in 1999, has been adapted to reflect current practices; the Pensions Regulator and Sub-committees to the Trustee Board have been added to provide a more current description of UK pension scheme stakeholders. 






Figure 2.1: The Nature of Pension Schemes in the UK










Funds are initially generated by: (i) employee wage deductions; and (ii) employer contributions to the pension scheme.  The employer usually deducts the employees’ pension contributions from their wages and pays them directly to the pension scheme, although employees can also pay additional voluntary contributions.  In consultation with sub-committees and actuaries (onto which professional advisers are often co-opted), the trustees decide upon the investment strategy for the pension scheme contributions and allocate the funds to appropriate fund managers who invest them in accordance with the chosen investment strategy​[35]​.  The fund managers are therefore usually responsible for managing a variety of assets including bonds, equities, gilts and property.  A contract normally exists between the trustees and the fund managers to determine how the investments should be managed (The Myners Report, 2001).  The return earned by these investments and any liquidated assets are used by the pension scheme to: (i) pay pensioners; (ii) make transfers to other funds on behalf of employees that leave the pension scheme and become deferred members; (iii) or return any surplus to the sponsoring employer​[36]​.  The administration of the scheme can either be out-sourced to a third party or can be conducted in-house, either by dedicated staff or by the Human Resources department of the sponsoring employer (The Myners Report, 2001).  

Pension schemes are based on trust law (Clark, 2006; NÖcker, 2001) and, as far as the governance of the pension scheme is concerned, the trustees administer the pension scheme and safeguard its assets in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, which regulates the pension scheme.  The Pension Law Review Committee (PLRC) (1993), which was commissioned in the aftermath of the Maxwell scandal in 1991, was the first authority to clarify the fiduciary duties of trustees stating that they should include: (i) a duty of good faith and loyalty to the trust beneficiaries; (ii) a duty not to profit from their position; (iii) a duty to preserve the trust assets and to deal with them in what they honestly believe to be the best interests of the beneficiaries; (iv) a duty to act impartially; (v) a duty to fairly balance the interests of different classes of beneficiary; and (vi) a duty to exercise care in the performance of their functions.  Clark (2008) explains that the trust relationship is neither a contractual nor a commercial relationship but is a form of obligation.  This obligation is usually specified in the trust deed, however, these are not usually publicly available documents.  Cocco and Volpin (2007) suggest that trust deeds usually: (i) address procedures for the appointment of trustees; (ii) describe the powers of the trustees in relation to the financial record-keeping of the scheme; (iii) outline the process for the appointment of advisers; (iv) specify the investment strategy of the scheme; and (v) establish of a schedule of contributions by the sponsoring employer.  Therefore, the trustees perform a crucial role in the governance of UK pension schemes and the trust deed is an example of a formal governance mechanism that is internal to the pension scheme.  

The sub-committees to the trustee board and the actuaries are also stakeholders in UK pension schemes in that they provide advice on issues such as the use of fund managers and the investment strategy of the scheme (The Myners Report, 2001).  In addition, the actuaries play an important role in the determination of the contributions required to be paid by the sponsoring employer to maintain the solvency of the scheme.  The assessment of these contributions is usually based on assumptions such as: (i) the value of the fund; (ii) its expected rate of growth; and (iii) the profile of the current employees in the scheme (The Myners Report, 2001).  Likewise, the auditors are pension scheme stakeholders in so far as they audit the annual report of the pension scheme (and possibly those of the sponsoring employer) and provide professional advice on issues such as internal audit and internal control.  An analysis of Figure 2.1 confirms Solomon’s (2007) suggestion that UK pension schemes have a “complex web of ownership” (p. 112) and that pension scheme beneficiaries not only:
 “…have to worry about the possibly divergent objectives of investee company management but they also have to worry about the activities of the pension fund manager” (p. 112).  
  
In addition to its pronouncements on the fiduciary duties of trustees, the PLRC (1993) also made governance recommendations involving other stakeholders including that: (i) the solvency of the scheme requires certification by the actuary; (ii) the scheme actuaries and auditors are required to report any irregularities to the Regulator​[37]​; (iii) the fund managers must be explicit regarding who they are acting for and from whom they should take instructions; (iv) the fund managers must be provided with a well defined brief of their duties and investment strategy; (v) the scheme administrator should provide the Regulator with an audited statement that pension fund contributions have been received and invested in a timeous fashion; (vi) a bank account must be maintained separate from that of the employer; (vii) there should be a statutory requirement to keep proper books and records; and (viii) the trustees should submit an annual return to the Regulator.  Clearly, from a very early stage, the actuaries, advisers, auditors, fund managers, scheme administrators and the PR were identified as having a role to play in the governance mechanisms of UK pension schemes (see Figure 2.1).  The following section demonstrates the importance of these stakeholders to the development of UK pension scheme governance and summarises the equivalent international regulations.

2.4	The Development of Pension Scheme Governance Mechanisms and their Regulation

2.4.1	UK Pension Scheme Governance
On the 5th November 1991, the body of Robert Maxwell, the millionaire publisher of the Mirror newspaper group, was found in the sea off the coast of Tenerife.  Shortly after Maxwell's death, it emerged that, amongst other things, there were large deficits in the Mirror Group's pension schemes:
“…some £298 million of assets…[were] missing from CIF [the Mirror Group’s pension scheme] and a further £155 million from individual pension schemes.  Of the total losses of about £453 million, some £248 million represented assets disposed of through … private companies.  The balance consisted of securities used as security for loans from banks to the private companies.” (Pension Law Review Committee, 1993, p. 359)

This deficit affected almost 30,000 Mirror Group pensioners who thereafter mounted a three year campaign for compensation​[38]​.  A subsequent Department of Trade and Industry report, Mirror Group Newspapers (Thomas and Turner, 2001), claimed that Robert Maxwell was, in the main, responsible for the financial scandal​[39]​ and evidence presented to the subsequent PLRC (1993) drew attention to the following flaws in the governance of the Maxwell pension scheme:
“…a number of accounting control weaknesses: the absence of formal authorisations or review of investment transactions by the board; the lack of a formal system or procedures to review or monitor the external fund managers’ activity; the absence of formal documentation of certain stock lending arrangements administered by LBI [the manager of the Maxwell pension scheme]; and the fact that there was no formal regular review of the level of stock lending transactions or of the level and quality of collateral provided for them.” (Pension Law Review Committee, 1993, p. 360)

Stiles and Taylor (1993) provide a detailed analysis of the Maxwell case and attribute the scandal to a failure of governance in three main areas: (i) the lack of intervention by regulatory bodies; (ii) Maxwell’s dominance of the board of directors; and (iii) poor investor relations and meaningful debate​[40]​. 

The Maxwell case illustrates the risk whereby trustees, the sponsoring employer, or fund managers can act to benefit themselves at the expense of employees and pensioners.  Although corporate governance for UK companies has managed to avoid statutory regulation, the same cannot be said for the regulation of UK pension scheme governance which is grounded in both statute and professional self-regulation.  

Following the Maxwell scandal in 1991​[41]​, the then Secretary of State for Social Security, Peter Lilley, commissioned a report under the chairmanship of Professor Roy Goode with the following terms of reference:
“To review the framework of law and regulation within which occupational pension schemes operate, taking into account the rights and interests of scheme members, pensioners and employers; to consider in particular the status and ownership of occupational pension funds and the accountability and roles of trustees, fund managers, auditors and pension scheme advisers; and to make recommendations.” (Pension Law Review Committee, 1993, p. iii)

The report was motivated by concerns over:
“…the qualification and disqualification of trustees; the degree of employer control over their appointment and removal, and the composition of the trust board; the distribution of powers between the employer and the trustees; trustees’ conflicts of interest; outdated restrictions on the power of trustees; their inability to meet claims against them for loss caused by their breaches of duty; and the level of knowledge of trustees about their role and responsibilities.” (Pension Law Review Committee, 1993, p. 17)

Thus, the purpose of the Pension Law Review (1993) was to ensure the adequate governance of UK pension schemes and to protect the interests of scheme members and beneficiaries.  

The PLRC (1993) recommended that: (i) the grounds for trustee disqualification should be similar to those of company directors; (ii) auditors, actuaries and administrators should not be permitted to act as trustees; (iii) employers should not have sole power to appoint or veto a trustee; (iv) pensioner trustees and member-nominated trustees (MNT) should be encouraged; (v) members should be entitled to appoint at least one third of the trustee membership; (vi) there should be no minimum or maximum term of office recommended for trustees; and (vii) the sponsoring company should not be able to remove member-appointed trustees.  Further, an investment standard was required of trustees; it was recommended that they would:
 “…exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the fund, the same degree of care and diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise in dealing with property of another for whom the person felt morally bound to provide and to use such additional knowledge and skill as the trustee possesses or ought to possess by reason of the trustee’s profession, business or calling” (Pension Law Review Committee, 1993, p. 30)  


The PLRC (1993) also permitted the incorporation of the trustee board as a limited company to administer the pension scheme.  
Table 2.1: A Summary of the PLRC (1993) Recommendations
1.	The enactment of an Occupational Pensions Schemes Act
2.	The appointment of a Pensions Regulator
3.	The statutory regulation of the primary duties of the trustees in relation to the pension promise
4.	The introduction of a minimum solvency requirement for all funded schemes​[42]​
5.	The empowerment of the Regulator to give consent to and oversee scheme amendments and wind-ups
6.	The adoption of specific rules regarding early leavers from the pension scheme
7.	The implementation of flexible guidelines
8.	The disclosure in the annual report by the trustees that they have carefully considered the investments and are satisfied that they conform to the statutory criteria
9.	The required contribution by the employer to secure the scheme’s liabilities where a pension scheme is in deficit
10.	The establishment of a compensation scheme to protect members against the defaults of those dealing with pension fund assets
11.	The enactment of specific rules regarding disputes; the assignment and loss of pension rights; retirement on grounds of ill health, public sector pension schemes; the establishment of pension rights on divorce; and Inland Revenue and Social Security requirements.
Note: this table summarises the recommendations of the PLRC (1993).


The effect of incorporation of the pension scheme is that the trustees become directors of the pension company which is then subject to corporate law and corporate governance requirements​[43]​.  The remaining recommendations of the PLRC (1993) are summarised in Table 2.1.  Most of these recommendations have since been included in a number of subsequent statutory instruments (including the Pension Schemes Act 1993, the Pensions Act 1995, the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 and, most recently, the Pensions Acts of 2004, 2007 and 2008), a discussion of which now follows.

The Pensions Schemes Act (1993) saw the creation of the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB) whose main function was the registration and certification of occupational and personal pension schemes.  This board had a monitoring role whereby, once registered, schemes had to apply to the board to modify, or to wind up, their operations.  There was also provision made for the protection of scheme members in the event of them leaving their scheme early or in cases where the sponsoring employer was insolvent.  The office of the Pensions Ombudsman was also created by this legislation to investigate and determine any complaint made by a stakeholder who had sustained injustice as a result of maladministration by the trustees or managers of an occupational pension scheme or personal pension scheme.  Thus, the 1993 Act was the first to engage external parties, the OPB or the Ombudsman, in monitoring the behaviour of trustees.

The Pensions Act (1995) created the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) which replaced the OPB.  OPRA reported directly to the Secretary of State and its main aim was to increase the supervision and direct monitoring of schemes and their trustees.  Whilst the 1993 Act concentrated on pension schemes themselves, the 1995 Act addressed the eligibility (and exclusion) of individuals to act as trustees - including member-nominated and independent trustees - and clarified their functions and duties.  The 1995 Act also created the Pensions Compensation Board to whom applications for compensation could be made where an employer became insolvent or the value of the pension assets diminished.  Thus, pension scheme monitoring became more formalised as the 1995 Act reinforced trust law affecting how pension schemes were administered and increased the security of members’ benefits (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(a)).  The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act (1999), which followed four years later, concentrated less on the governance of pension schemes and addressed the protection of pension contributors, creating provisions to be applied in the event of divorce and other welfare issues.  

The Myners Report, which was published in 2001, was a seminal piece of work that reviewed institutional investment in the UK and focused on the governance of the investing activities of UK pension schemes in particular.  It was motivated by the increasing concentration​[44]​ of pension schemes among the institutional investors​[45]​ grouping and aimed to encourage shareholder activism.  Thus, the Myners Report (2001) was commissioned to investigate whether the investing decisions of institutional investors such as pension schemes are “…rational, well-informed, subject to the correct incentives and, as far as possible, undistorted” (The Myners Report, 2001, p. 4).  It also sought to explore any barriers to equity investment and whether institutional investors have a preference for certain kinds of risk, indicating sub-optimal decision-making.  The Report made several recommendations which influenced the legislation that subsequently followed.  Most significantly, in relation to governance, it recommended a review to clarify who owned any pension scheme surplus and highlighted that, although the expertise of trustees was a key governance issue, there was no legal requirement for them to develop the skills needed for investment decisions.  These concerns were based on evidence that:
 “…62 per cent of trustees have no professional qualifications in finance or investment; 77 per cent of trustees have no in-house professionals to assist them; more than 50 per cent of trustees received less than three days’ training when they became trustees; 44 per cent of trustees have not attended any courses since their initial 12 months of trusteeship; and 49 per cent of trustees spend three hours or fewer preparing for pension investment matters.” (The Myners Report, 2001, p. 5) 

The report therefore recommended that:
“…there should be a legal requirement that, where trustees are taking a decision, they should be able to take it with the skill and prudence of someone familiar with the issues concerned, as in the US.  If trustees do not feel they possess such a level of skill and care, then they should either take steps to acquire it, or delegate the decision to a person or organisation who they believe does.” (The Myners Report, 2001, p. 14)​[46]​ 

It also recommended eight principles which it believed codified best practice for pension scheme investment decision-making and these are summarised in Table 2.2 below.  This table highlights that, in 2001, the governance of pension schemes was being scrutinised at a micro-level.  The Pensions Act 2004 re-focused attention on UK pension scheme governance at the macro-level and contained provisions to create the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) and the PR to replace OPRA.  
Table 2.2: A Summary of the Myners Report (2001) Principles for Investment Decision-making
1.	Decisions should be taken only by persons or organisations with the right skills, information and resources needed to take them effectively.
2.	Trustees should set out an overall investment objective for the fund, in terms which relate directly to the circumstances of the fund and not to some other objective such as the performance of other pension funds.
3.	The attention devoted to asset allocation decisions should fully reflect the contribution they can make to achieving the fund’s investment objective.
4.	Decision-makers should consider a full range of investment opportunities across all major asset classes, including private equity.
5.	The fund should be prepared to pay sufficient fees for actuarial and investment advice to attract a broad range of kinds of potential providers.
6.	Trustees should give fund managers an explicit written mandate setting out the agreement between them on issues such as the investment objective, and a clear timescale for measurement and evaluation.
7.	In consultation with their investment managers, funds should explicitly consider whether the index benchmarks they have selected are appropriate.  Where they believe active management to have the potential to achieve higher returns, they should set both target s and risk controls to reflect this, allowing sufficient freedom for genuinely active management to occur.
8.	Trustees should arrange to measure the performance of the fund and the effectiveness of their own decision-making, and formally to assess the performance and decision-making delegated to advisers and managers.
Source: The Myners Report, 2001 (p. 15)



All companies that have a pension scheme now pay a levy to the PPF, and employees can claim compensation from the PPF in the event of the insolvency of the sponsoring employer (McCarthy and Neuberger, 2005).  

Whilst the Pensions Act (2007) addressed arrangements to be put in place to resolve potential disputes between the pension scheme and its beneficiaries, the Pensions Act (2008) concentrated more on the employer’s responsibilities as far as its employees were concerned.  Although the 2008 Act addressed some issues of compliance in relation to unpaid contributions, it concentrated mostly on encouraging greater private saving.

In summary, the statutory regulation of pension scheme governance has been significantly altered since 1993. This alteration has occurred on an on-going basis possibly highlighting the difficulties which the various governments have faced when attempting to regulate UK pension scheme governance.  The most significant governance developments were the recommendations of The Myners Report (2001) and the creation of the PR by the Pensions Act (2004).  However, the governance of pension schemes has not been an issue that is exclusive to the UK.  Indeed in 2002, the OECD issued its Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance (OECD, 2002) (hereafter referred to as the OECD Pension Guidelines) suggesting that this topic is important among most developed countries.  These guidelines are summarised in Section 2.4.2 below.



2.4.2	A Global Perspective of Pension Scheme Governance
The OECD maintains that:
“The governance of [pension] plans consists of all the relationships between the different entities and persons involved in the functioning of the pension plan.  Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the pension plan are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.  It is the mirror image of the corporate governance of a public limited company, which consists of the set of relationships between the company’s management, board, shareholders, and other stakeholders.”  (OECD, 2002, para. 1)


The OECD Pension Guidelines confirm that they are based on the OECD’s Principles for Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999) (see Appendix 3); indeed Clark (2008) comments on the similarities in form and logic between these two sets of principles, suggesting that both demonstrate common concern for financial performance and stability.  The purpose of the OECD Pension Guidelines is to provide guidance to countries on the regulation of pension scheme governance, including the legal form of such schemes and the relationship that they should have with their various stakeholders (OECD, 2002).  In doing so, the OECD Pension Guidelines provide twelve high-level principles that relate to both pension scheme governance structure and potential pension scheme governance mechanisms.

In relation to the governance structure of the pension scheme, the OECD Pension Guidelines state that the:
 “…governance structure should ensure an appropriate division of operational and oversight responsibilities, and the accountability and suitability of those with such responsibilities.” (OECD, 2002, p. 4)

As far as governance mechanisms are concerned the OECD Guidelines state that:
“Pension funds should have appropriate control, communication and incentive mechanisms that encourage good decision making, proper timely execution, transparency, and regular review and assessment.” (OECD, 2002, p. 6)

Table 2.3: The OECD Guidance for Pension Scheme Governance 
Panel A: Principles for the Governance Structure of Pension Schemes
1. Identification of responsibilities: There should be a clear identification and assignment of operational and oversight responsibilities in the governance of a pension scheme.  The following should therefore be documented: the legal form of the entity, its internal governance structure and its main objectives.
2. Governing Body: Every pension scheme should have a governing body vested with the power to administer the scheme, who is ultimately responsible for ensuring adherence to the arrangement and who will protect the interests of beneficiaries.  Delegation of certain tasks should not absolve the governing body from its responsibilities.
3. Expert advice: The governing body may rely on expert advice where it lacks sufficient expertise.
4. Auditor: An auditor who is independent of the pension scheme, governing body and sponsoring employer should be appointed to the pension scheme.  The auditor should report to the governing body, and where appropriate remedial action is not taken, the competent authorities.
5. Actuary: An actuary should be appointed to the pension scheme.  If the fund does not comply with the appropriate statutory requirements, the governing body should be informed and where appropriate remedial action is not taken, the competent authorities.
6. Custodian: The custodian of the pension fund assets may be the pension entity, the financial institution that manages the pension fund or an independent custodian.
7. Accountability: The governing body should be accountable to the pension beneficiaries, the competent authorities and in certain circumstances the sponsoring employer.
8. Suitability: The governing body should be subject to minimum suitability standards in order to ensure a high level of integrity and professionalism in the administration of the pension fund.
Panel B: Principles for Governance Mechanisms of Pension Schemes
9. Internal Controls: There should be a clear identification and assignment of operational and oversight responsibilities in the governance of a pension scheme.  The following should therefore be documented: the legal form of the entity, its internal governance structure and its main objectives.
10. Reporting: Every pension scheme should have a governing body vested with the power to administer the scheme, who is ultimately responsible for ensuring adherence to the arrangement and who will protect the interests of beneficiaries.  Delegation of certain tasks should not absolve the governing body from its responsibilities. 
11. Disclosure: The governing body may rely on expert advice where it lacks sufficient expertise.
12. Redress: An auditor who is independent of the pension scheme, governing body and sponsoring employer should be appointed to the pension scheme.  The auditor should report to the governing body, and where appropriate remedial action is not taken, the competent authorities.
 Note: this table summarises the recommendations of the (OECD, 2002).


The twelve guiding principles for pension governance identify those pension scheme stakeholders that it considers important for governance and these principles are summarised in Table 2.3.  Clark (2008) suggests that three core principles underpin the OECD Pension Guidelines: (i) that the pension scheme decision-making is consistent with its mandate; (ii) that internal rules and procedures are coherent; and (iii) that pension schemes adopt high standards of behaviour.  Clark (2008) also criticises the OECD Pension Guidelines claiming that they are insufficient because: (i) they do not give powers or responsibilities to sponsoring employers or beneficiaries; and (ii) that the organisational form of the pension scheme is not sufficient to drive its performance.  However, that criticism might be countered by the argument that the delegation of pension scheme powers and responsibilities as well as the details about the organisational form of the scheme are not included in the stated objectives of the OECD Pension Guidelines; these are high-level principles whose interpretation and application is left to the discretion of the pension schemes, associated stakeholders and regulatory authorities of individual countries.  It would appear, however, that an equivalent of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) (formerly the Combined Code – see Appendices 1 and 2) is missing from the UK pension scheme context.  Whilst the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) provides detailed guidance that builds upon the OECD’s Principles for Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999), there is no equivalent document to provide detailed guidance based on the OECD Pension Guidelines.  Instead, in the UK, the provision of such detailed guidance for pension scheme governance is remitted to the PR; consequently, a detailed analysis of the guidance offered by that regulatory body now follows. 



2.5	The Pensions Regulator 
The Pensions Act (2004) established the PR as a regulatory body responsible for issuing codes of practice and regulatory guidance.  These guidance documents give practical information about compliance with statutory requirements and set desired standards of conduct; they are indicative of how a well-run scheme should be administered.  The PR claims to be a risk-based regulator whose objectives are achieved by a process of education and enablement and, where necessary, enforcement (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(a)); this regulator also argues that governance underlies all of its statutory objectives (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(b)).  To date, twelve codes of practice and 22 pieces of regulatory guidance (see Table 3.1) have been issued to support the PR’s three main objectives which are: (i) to protect the benefits of the pension scheme members; (ii) to encourage schemes to develop administration practices that are of high quality; and (iii) to minimise claims on the PPF (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(b)).  In relation to the first objective the PR states that:
“Trust-based pension schemes have a separation of beneficial ownership and day-to-day control of assets…Potential risks to member’ benefits arise from this separation.  In well-governed schemes, however, where trustees or managers act in accordance with their fiduciary obligations to members…the separation of ownership and control means that a level of skill may be brought into the management of assets beyond that which the beneficiaries could provide on their own behalf.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(b), p. 11)

With regard to the second objective, the PR maintains that “[a] well-governed scheme will have systems in place to achieve a high standard of administration” (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(b), p.11) and, as far as the third objective is concerned, the PR argues that:
“In a well-governed scheme the trustees will be aware of the scheme’s funding position and of the employer covenant; they will be taking action, where appropriate and possible, to address these.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(b), p. 11)

Thus, the PR recognises that pension scheme governance is a significant issue and in April 2007 a discussion paper titled The governance of work-based pension schemes (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(b))​[47]​ was issued; whilst that document referred to a definition of governance that was previously used by the National Council for Voluntary Organisations​[48]​, it acknowledged that pension scheme governance is not easy to define and that it is often difficult to distinguish governance activities from other activities in pension schemes.  Instead, it chose to identify several component parts of the pension scheme that the PR considered to be part of its governance.  Firstly, it highlighted the appropriate composition of the governing body, the supply of trustees and the requirements made of member-nominated trustees/directors.  Secondly, it considered trustee knowledge and understanding to be important to the governance of the scheme.  Thirdly, it identified: (i) the sponsoring employer; (ii) advisers; (iii) administrators; (iv) scheme members; (v) regulators; and (vi) investment managers as important stakeholders in pension scheme governance.  Fourthly, the procedures required of the governing body were also considered to be central to the effectiveness of its governance practices.  These procedures included: (i) how trustees carry out their work; (ii) how the scheme is administered; (iii) the frequency and effectiveness of meetings; (iv) recording decisions; and (v) the management of risks as well as internal controls.  Finally, the constitution of the governing body, including keeping an up-to-date trust deed, set of rules and other key documents, were also identified as being key components of governance.  Therefore, although the PR does not define pension scheme governance, the discussion document was used to illustrate fundamental areas of pension schemes that the PR considered to be important to their governance.

Forty responses to the discussion document were received​[49]​ and, in October 2007, the regulator’s response How the regulator will promote better governance of work-based pension schemes (The Pensions Regulator, 2007 (c)) was published.  In its response to the discussion paper, the PR confirmed that it would prioritise its future work agenda in relation to pension scheme governance.  It identified eight areas where resources would be focused including: (i) knowledge and understanding​[50]​; (ii) conflicts of interest​[51]​; (iii) monitoring the employer covenant​[52]​; (iv) relations with advisers​[53]​; (v) administration​[54]​; (vi) processes for investment choice​[55]​; (vii) governance during wind-up; and (viii) contract-based schemes (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c)).  The PR also stated that a three-pronged approach would be used to address these priorities: (i) education, guidance and enabling​[56]​; (ii) working in partnership​[57]​; and (iii) intervention​[58]​ (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c)).  Although the PR has a strategic approach to the regulation of UK pension scheme governance, these regulations are not contained in a single document as with the Combined Code (2010) for companies (Evans et al., 2008)  (see Appendices 1 and 2); they are however published in a variety of codes of practice and regulatory guidance documents.  These publications are available on the PR’s website and are summarised in Table 2.4.

Appendix 4 provides a detailed comparison of the principles identified in the Combined Code (2006) with pension scheme regulatory instruments (including the PR codes of practice and guidance documents as identified in Table 2.4) to establish if any similarities or differences between these two governance frameworks exist.  However, before such a comparison can be made, it is first necessary to compare the stakeholders involved in both governance frameworks; this issue is addressed in Section 2.6.1 below.

  
Table 2.4: A Summary of the PR’s Governance Pronouncements
Panel A: Codes of Practice
1.	Reporting breaches of the law.
2.	Notifiable events.
3.	Funding defined benefits
4.	Early Leavers
5.	Reporting the late payment of contributions to occupational money purchase schemes
6.	Reporting late payment of contributions to personal pensions
7.	Trustee knowledge and understanding 
8.	MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place
9.	Internal controls
10.	Modification of subsisting rights
11.	Dispute resolution – reasonable periods
12	Circumstances in relation to the material detriment test.
Panel B: Regulatory Guidance
1.	Abandonment of DB pension schemes
2.	Clearance 
3.	Conflicts of interest
4.	Contingent assets
5.	Corporate transactions
6.	Cross-border schemes
7.	DC schemes Q&As
8.	Effective member communications
9.	Inducement offers
10.	Lump sum death benefits
11.	Member retirement options
12.	Mortality assumptions
13.	Multi-employer withdrawal arrangements
14.	Record keeping
15.	Relations with advisers
16.	Scheme funding and clearance case studies
17.	Scheme funding FAQs
18.	Transfer values
19.	Trustee guidance 
20.	Trustee knowledge and understanding
21.	Voluntary employer engagement
22.	Winding up
Note: this Table summarises the Codes of Practice and Regulatory Guidance issues by the PR as at 14/7/10.



2.6	Application of Corporate Governance Principles in a Pension Context
2.6.1	Corporate and Pension Scheme Governance: similar stakeholders
Thus far, this chapter has established that the provision of detailed guidance for pension scheme governance in the UK is not contained in a single document and has been remitted to the PR and various statutory instruments.  Thus, the current section considers a comparison between the principles and provisions of the Combined Code (2006) and other regulatory instruments (including those issued by the PR as detailed in Table 2.4) to investigate the extent to which corporate governance principles have been applied in a pension scheme context.  To do so, it is first necessary to draw comparisons between the stakeholders involved in corporate governance and those associated with the governance of UK pension schemes.

In a corporate context, the board of directors makes strategic decisions and is ultimately responsible for all company activities; in the pension scheme context, the board of trustees provides similar direction and has similar responsibilities for the pension scheme.  Consequently, the board of directors in the corporate context can be thought of as comparable with the board of trustees in the context of pension schemes (Myners, 2001).  It might also be argued that, in the corporate context, the shareholders are the main beneficiaries​[59]​ of a limited company and that these individuals are therefore comparable with pension scheme members and beneficiaries​[60]​.

The Combined Code (2006) distinguishes between executive directors (EDs) and non-executive directors (NEDs); this distinction is important because the code requires NEDs to provide an objective input into board decisions (Higgs Report, 2003).  In the pension scheme context, a similar distinction can be made between professional trustees and nominated trustees (whether employer-nominated trustees (ENTs) or member-nominated trustees (MNTs)).  Like NEDs, professional trustees have a wide range of experience in many different organisations; they are not exclusively tied to any one pension scheme and can offer advice on a wide variety of matters.  Furthermore, professional trustees are paid for their services in a professional capacity whereas ENTs and MNTs are unlikely to be remunerated (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c))​[61]​.  Alternatively, ENTs and MNTs are unlikely to be involved in more than one pension scheme at a time and are likely to have a full-time job with the sponsoring employer.  Indeed, it might be argued that MNTs are in a better position to provide a more objective view than ENTs because MNTs are not nominated by the employer.  Consequently, on the basis of the objectivity they provide, MNTs are considered to be more like professional trustees (despite the differences identified above); a likeness can therefore be drawn between these two types of trustee and NEDs in the corporate context.

In the Combined Code (2006), a distinction is also made between the chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) of a limited company.  Appendix 2 shows that the role of the Chairman is to lead the board of directors and to ensure its effectiveness whereas the CEO’s responsibility is to oversee company business.   In the context of a pension scheme however, the trustee board is operated as a collective​[62]​ and the PR is very specific that the duties and responsibilities required of any individual trustee are the same as those required of all other trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(a) and 2009 (b)).  Therefore, it is not possible to identify stakeholders similar to the company chairman and CEO in the pension scheme context.

The Combined Code (2006) also identifies the company secretary as an individual who is responsible for advising the board on all corporate governance matters; in the context of pension schemes, the Pensions Act (2004) allocates that responsibility to the PR.  Therefore, no one individual pension scheme stakeholder has responsibilities that are similar to those of the company secretary.

Finally, the Combined Code (2006) requires the establishment of a Nomination Committee, Remuneration Committee and Audit Committee.  The main responsibilities of these committees are to ensure that the processes for the nomination of directors, the setting of their remuneration and the audit process and internal controls function are formalised and transparent.  Although the PR regulates the nomination process for MNTs, the formation of a nomination committee is not required.  With the exception of professional trustees, the trustee role is not generally remunerated and so there is no real need to establish a Remuneration Committee.  Whilst the PR acknowledges that larger pension schemes will sometimes have a Remuneration Committee and/or an Audit Committee (The Pensions Regulator, 2008 (c)), there is no direct requirement to establish such a committee in the pension scheme context.  

Table 2.5: A Comparison of the Stakeholders involved in Corporate and Pension Scheme Governance 
Limited Companies	UK Pension Schemes
Directors	Trustees
Shareholders	Pension Scheme Members and beneficiaries
Non-executive Directors	Professional trustees and MNTs
Chairman	No direct equivalent
Chief Executive	No direct equivalent
Company Secretary	No direct equivalent 
The Nomination Committee 	No equivalent formally required
The Remuneration Committee	No equivalent formally required
The Audit Committee 	No equivalent formally required
Note: this table summarises a comparison of the stakeholders identified in the Combined Code (2006) as being important to the governance of a corporate entity with equivalent stakeholders in a pension scheme context.

Table 2.5 summarises a comparison of the stakeholders involved in both the governance of limited companies and pension schemes; it is acknowledged that other stakeholders, such as actuaries, the PR and fund managers (see Figure 2.1), also feature in the governance of pension schemes, but do not appear in Table 2.5 above.  The PR has been very explicit that the participation of these stakeholders in the governance of UK pension schemes is vital (see Section 2.5) and many of the codes of practice and regulatory guidance issued by the PR make direct reference to them.  Thus, their absence from Table 2.5 does not reflect their obsolescence in the pension scheme governance framework; it merely shows that pension scheme governance relies on a wider pool of stakeholders than those required in the corporate context.   

Having identified the stakeholders involved in both the corporate governance and pension scheme governance contexts, it is now possible to compare the regulations of both governance frameworks.  However, it should be noted that, if the pension scheme is administered by a corporate trustee, then that limited company will be expected to comply with corporate law in all respects and apply the Combined Code where necessary.  The following comparisons are based on the assumption that the trustee board is not incorporated​[63]​.

2.6.2	A Comparison of the Combined Code (2006) and the Regulation of UK Pension Scheme Governance

Appendix 4 reports a detailed comparison of the principles and provisions of the Combined Code (2006) with UK pension scheme governance regulations (including the codes of practice and regulatory guidance issued by the PR as detailed in Table 2.4); such an analysis was deemed necessary to highlight any similarities and differences that may exist between these two governance frameworks.  A summary of the results from this comparison is reported in the current section and reference should be made to Appendix 4 for further details on the content of the PR’s regulatory guidance or codes of practice.

Table 2.6 is a summary of the analysis conducted in Appendix 4 and Panel A demonstrates that the detailed guidance for pension scheme governance, equivalent to that contained in the Combined Code (2006), can be found in: (i) three pieces of regulatory guidance, four codes of practice, and one pronouncement made by a special committee (the Investment Governance Group) of the PR; (ii) the Statement Of Recommended Practice (SORP): Financial Reports of Pension Schemes (PRAG, 2007); (iii) the Pensions Act (2004); and (iv) the trust deed.  The potential contents of the trust deed and the main provisions of the Pensions Act (2004) have already been discussed in Section 2.4; similarly Chapter 3 discusses the disclosure requirements of the SORP.  Consequently, the remainder of the current section summarises the contents of the PR’s pronouncements on pension scheme governance and considers the differences between the corporate and pension scheme governance frameworks that have been identified in Panel B of Table 2.6.     

Appendix 4 demonstrates that the two main documents that are used to regulate the behaviour of trustees are (i) regulatory guidance: Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(a)); and (ii) code of practice: Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a)).  Whilst the former document addresses the collective responsibility of the board of trustees and their fiduciary duties, the latter specifies the tasks that might be required of trustees and, consequently, the level of knowledge and skills required to allow them to complete these tasks.  Appendix 4 also notes that, whilst both of these documents have been written in the same spirit as the corporate governance principles, it might be argued that they are more prescriptive and thus more demanding than their equivalent corporate governance requirements.




Table 2.6: A Comparison of the Combined Code (2006) and the Regulation of UK Pension Scheme Governance
Panel A: PR’s codes of practice and other forms of regulatory guidance that are considered to be equivalent to the Combined Code (2006)
Regulatory guidance: Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(a))
Regulatory Guidance: Relations with Advisers (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(c))
Regulatory Guidance: Effective Member Communication (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(b))
Code of Practice 1: Reporting Breaches of the Law (The Pensions Regulator, 2005)
Code of Practice 7: Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a))
Code of Practice 8: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (b))
Code of practice 9: Internal Controls (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (c))
The Investment Governance Group’s six principles for the governance of institutional investment (The Pensions Regulator, 2009 (b))
Statement Of Recommended Practice: Financial Reports of Pension Schemes (PRAG, 2007)
The Pensions Act (2004)
Trust Deed
Panel B: Differences/gaps between the Principles of the Combined Code (2006) and the PR’s codes of practice and other forms of regulatory guidance 
Principle A.1 details the role of company directors; Regulatory guidance: Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(a))is far more prescriptive and thus more demanding of the role of the pension scheme trustee.
Principle A.2 allocates different roles to the chairman and chief executive of a company; the PR makes no attempt to allocate different roles to different trustees and the same duties and responsibilities are bestowed upon all trustees equally in the pension scheme context.
Principle A.3 requires a balance of skills and knowledge amongst company directors; Code of Practice 7: Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a)) requires a far more prescriptive and demanding level of knowledge and understanding from pension scheme trustees.
Principle A.4 requires the establishment and operation of a nomination, audit and remuneration committee in a corporate context; the PR does not require the establishment of a nomination or audit committee, not even a remuneration committee for professional trustees.
Principle A.4 requires specific criteria to be formulated and met before the appointment of a director can be made; the PR does not require the formulation of such criteria in a pension scheme context.
Principle A.4 is based on the premise that a director’s post in a limited company is full-time and remunerated; with the exception of a professional trustee a pension scheme trustee’s post is likely to be part-time and voluntary and thus the PR makes no attempt to provide equivalent guidance in a pension scheme context.
Principle A.5 requires a meeting between major shareholders and non-executive directors; there is no equivalent requirement in the pension scheme context.
Principle A.7 addresses the re-election of company directors and the provision of biographical details; there is no equivalent requirement in the pension scheme context.
The main principles in Section B of the Combined Code (2006) relate to directors’ remuneration; with the exception of the professional trustee, the trustee role is mainly a voluntary one and thus there is no equivalent requirement in the pension scheme context, not even for professional trustees. 
Principle C.2 requires the board of directors to maintain a sound system of internal control; in a pension scheme context Code of Practice 9: Internal Control (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (c))  is very prescriptive about how this should be done.
Code provision C.3.4 relates to all kinds of formal and informal whistle-blowing activities; Code of Practice 1: Reporting Breaches of the Law (The Pensions Regulator, 2005) addresses formal whistle-blowing procedures only. 
Section D of the Combined Code (2006) attempts to foster open communication with shareholders; Regulatory Guidance: Effective Member Communication (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(b)) relates to written formal communication only and there is no equivalent of the AGM in the pension scheme context.
Note: this table shows the results of a comparison made in Appendix 4 between the principles and provisions of the Combined Code (2006) and pension scheme governance regulations (including the codes of practice and regulatory guidance issued by the PR as detailed in Table 3.1)



However, other codes of practice are also used to regulate the behaviour of trustees; for example, Code of practice: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (b)) regulates how MNTs should be nominated and selected to comply with the requirement that they constitute at least one-third of the trustee board.  As ENTs are appointed by the employer, the PR makes no attempt to regulate their nomination and selection; likewise there is no guidance regarding the appointment of professional trustees to the board.  Unlike the Combined Code (2006) which distinguishes between and allocates different roles to the company chairman, the CEO and non-executive directors, the PR requires the same duties and responsibilities from all trustees and this represents a difference between the two governance frameworks.  The role of the trustee and their contribution to UK pension scheme governance is analysed in detail in Section 5.3.3.  Similarly, with the exception of the professional trustee, the role of the trustee is voluntary and part-time in comparison to that of a company director which is full-time and remunerated; consequently there is no requirement for: (i) a pension scheme nomination or remuneration committee; (ii) specific appointment criteria to be met before a trustee appointment can be made; or (iii) a trustee rotation policy.  

Likewise, there is no requirement for an Audit Committee in UK pension scheme governance regulations.  However, regulatory guidance: Relations with Advisers (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(c)) provides trustees with issues to consider in their relationship with the auditor (and other advisors).  This document aims to help trustees to understand the contribution that the auditor (and other advisors) makes to the governance of the pension scheme and to maintain a good working relationship with the auditor (and other advisors).  Thus, the corporate governance principles relating to the Audit Committee are addressed to some extent in the pension scheme context.  This regulatory guidance also re-enforces the importance that the PR attaches to the governance role adopted by the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.1.

The Combined Code (2006) requires that the board of directors assess its own performance and that of its individual directors.  Whilst there is no direct requirement for this in the governance of UK pension schemes, the PR’s Investment Governance Group requires that: 
“[t]rustees should…periodically make a formal policy assessment of their own effectiveness as a decision-making body and report on this to members” (The Pensions Regulator, 2009 (b)).  

Thus, trustees are also required to self-assess and report the results of this exercise to the scheme members/beneficiaries.  Likewise, company directors are required to maintain a sound system of internal controls and report on its effectiveness to shareholders; Code of practice: Internal Controls (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (c)) provides trustees with guidance about the nature of internal controls, why they are needed, how to assess risk, and how to adopt a proportionate approach.  It gives examples of key risks and the type of internal controls that might be appropriate in these circumstances.  It also states that trustees may wish to confirm in the annual report that they have assessed the key risks and have implemented appropriate internal controls to deal with them (The Pensions Regulator, (2006(c)).  Whereas the Combined Code (2006) provides little detail as to how a sound system of internal control is maintained, the code of practice provided by the PR is far more prescriptive and hence more demanding of pension scheme trustees.  

Finally, the Combined Code (2006) requires companies to make arrangements for staff to raise any concerns that they may have; this requirement appears to be relatively informal and does not attempt to measure how significant these concerns might be.  This issue has been addressed, to some extent, in the Code of Practice: Reporting Breaches of the Law (The Pensions Regulator, 2005).  In this regulatory document, the PR acknowledges that whistle-blowing is an important part of the regulatory framework, however, individuals are required to report to the PR only where they have reasonable cause to believe that a breach in the law has taken place and where that breach is likely to be of material significance to the PR.  Thus, it would appear that the PR has a different approach to whistle-blowing than that adopted by the Combined Code (2006).  

Thus far, the discussion has demonstrated that the majority of UK corporate governance principles contained in the Combined Code (2006) have been incorporated into pension scheme governance regulations; indeed some of the equivalent pension scheme governance regulations are more prescriptive for trustees than they are for company directors.  The exceptions are, in the pension scheme context: (i) different roles are not allocated to trustees as they are with company directors (chairman, CEO etc); (ii) there is no requirement for a Nomination, Remuneration or Audit Committee​[64]​, and (iii) the whistle-blowing requirements relate to significant breaches in the law, whereas in the corporate context they relate to any concerns that staff might have.       

Despite these similarities, there appears to be one significant difference between these two governance frameworks; whereas the Combined Code (2006) attempts to foster open and face-to-face communication between major shareholders of a corporate entity and its board of directors (see Tables 4 (principle A.5.1), 9 and 10 in Appendix 4), there is no such requirement about the communication of information from the trustees of UK pension schemes to their members/beneficiaries (NAPF, 2005).  Although regulatory guidance: Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(a)) clarifies the trustee’s duty to provide information that is requested​[65]​ and regulatory guidance: Effective Member Communication (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(d)) highlights examples of good practice in member communication​[66]​, neither of these two documents require a UK pension scheme to engage in two-way communication with its members​[67]​; in fact the guidance document leans towards the provision of written communication.  Indeed, there is no equivalent of the AGM in the pensions scheme context.  The identification of these similarities and differences is interesting because it provides a rich opportunity for potential research; thus the following section summarises prior research relating to pension scheme governance.

2.7	Prior Research Relating to Pension Scheme Governance

As institutional investors, UK pension schemes are dominant in the global financial markets (Useem and Mitchell, 2000) and therefore have an important role to play in the governance of the companies in which they invest ((Keasey et al., 1997; OECD, 2004; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007; Evans, 2008).  In this context, a plethora of research exists (see for example Pike et al., 1993; Barker 1998; Bell and Jenkinson, 2002) and authors such as Short and Keasey (1997) and Solomon (2007) provide excellent summaries of the academic work conducted in this area.  However, Epstein (1992) claims that this influence is ironic, given that pension schemes do not “practice what they preach” (p. 60) suggesting that the governance of pension schemes is less than robust.  Evans et al. (2008) suggest that there is a gap in academic research relating to pension scheme governance but propose that most of the work which does exist originates from outwith the UK and is a mixture of theoretical and empirically-based investigation.  Clark (2008) argues that the UK trust institution has no equivalent in much of continental Europe​[68]​, and so only some of the existing pension scheme governance research is relevant to this study.  It is this sub-set of the literature which is summarised below.

Evans et al. (2008) categorise existing pension scheme governance research into the following four areas: (i) the frameworks within which pension schemes operate; (ii) global governance practices and expertise; (iii) country-specific matters; and (iv) the role of government guarantees.  Whilst the latter three categories are perhaps less relevant to this study, the first category includes a theoretical discussion of the organisational structures of Anglo-American corporate pension schemes (Clark, 2008)​[69]​.  This author identifies a lack of trustee expertise as being a fundamental problem for pension scheme governance.  Whilst he supports the use of codes of practice to evaluate the performance of pension schemes and to improve the cost efficiency and consistency of their decision-making, he argues that the only real solution to poor pension scheme governance is their transformation into large multi-employer pension schemes.  These conclusions are based on similar work by Clark and Urwin (2008) which suggests that the following two topics are also important pension scheme governance issues: (i) that beneficiaries are not able to monitor those who manage the pension scheme; and (ii) due to the complex network of principals and agents within a pension scheme, it is often difficult to align and observe motivations and rewards.  

Clark (2006) identifies three models of pension governance: (i) the first is based on trust law but is assisted by statutory protection (the Anglo-American model); (ii) the second is also based in trust law but the market replaces statute in ensuring that the welfare of stakeholders is maximised; and finally (iii) the third model relies on statute to support market solutions. He concludes that, in practice, no one model is applicable and a mixture of all three models is more likely.  Likewise, Clark (2000) argues that pension schemes are organised in a variety of forms and suggests four models of investment management: (i) the first is a small fund; (ii) the second is a large fund that is internally managed; (iii) the third is a large fund where there is extensive delegation; and (iv) the last is a large fund where there is intensive delegation.  Clark (2000) advocates that the third model is the most common in practice.  However, he subsequently claims that these internal structures have resulted in poorly managed schemes (Clark, 2004).

Whilst the majority of Clark’s work is theoretical, discursive and descriptive in nature, other research exists which is arguably more empirically-driven and therefore has a more focused approach, concentrating on various component parts of pension scheme governance.  For example, the role of trustees has proved a popular governance topic for investigation.  Kakabadse et al. (2003) attempt to clarify the trustee’s role and report the results of twenty interviews with a selection of UK-based trustees.  These authors conclude that trustees see their role as strategic; they are confident that they make informed decisions and that they believe that they have an appropriate mix of skills.  In contrast, Clark et al. (2006) question the competence of trustees’ investment decision-making in practice, concluding that it varies dramatically from scheme to scheme; the lack of a common approach has significant implications for pension scheme governance.  Alternatively, Cocco and Volpin (2007) concentrate on the role of ENTs and discover evidence to suggest that: (i) ENTs act in the interests of the shareholders of the sponsoring employer and not necessarily the pension scheme members/beneficiaries; and that (ii) more-leveraged companies, which have a larger proportion of ENTs, make smaller contributions to the pension scheme and higher dividend payments to their shareholders.

Some studies have attempted to associate good pension scheme governance with superior asset performance.  For example, Useem and Mitchell (2000) argue that pension scheme governance impacts on the investment decisions that are made which, in turn, influence the performance of the pension scheme.  Analysing the governance policies of a sample of US pension schemes they conclude that, whilst the relationship is complex, there is a positive association between pension scheme governance and performance.  Likewise, Ammann and Zingg (2008) found that, using a self-designed index​[70]​ as a proxy for the governance of Swiss pension schemes, better governance was associated with improved pension scheme performance.  Other studies, however, have opted to investigate the governance of pension schemes within specific contexts.  For example, Albrecht and Hingorani (2004)​[71]​ and Impavado (2002)​[72]​ investigate the governance practices that exist in state/local government and public pension funds respectively, whereas Helbronner (2005)​[73]​ and NÖcker (2001)​[74]​, adopt a country-specific perspective.  

Some professional research has also been commissioned in this area.  For example, the PR has conducted four telephone surveys of pension scheme governance (PR, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009).  All four of the PR’s surveys were highly structured in terms of the questions asked; the first three surveys recorded the participation of approximately five hundred trustees; by 2009 the number of participants had increased to 795.   As these surveys are used as a longitudinal tool for analysis by the PR, it is perhaps not surprising that they report similar themes.  For example, they document that better governance is associated with the provision of more trustee training, and the existence of adequate risk management processes.  Further, bigger schemes​[75]​ are found to be better governed than their smaller sized counterparts​[76]​.  However, the 2009 survey offered some interesting conclusions regarding schemes’ use of the PR’s guidance on communication with members.  Despite this being an area where pension scheme governance has been found to be lacking (see section 2.6.2) the PR’s 2009 survey reported that only one in five of the interviewed trustees had made use of this guidance and that only one third of the schemes included in the survey had assessed their member communications in the last year.  Whilst all four surveys paint a rich picture regarding extant governance practices, they focus on the views of trustees and the Chairs of the pension scheme only and omit the perceptions of the other stakeholders detailed in Figure 2.1.  Also, due to the limitations of the structured research instrument used, they do not allow interviewees to expand on their own views of governance matters.   

2.8	Potential Governance Relationships in UK Pension Schemes
Thus, there is no current research that uses the views of a variety of pension scheme stakeholders to investigate the governance practices that exist in both small and large UK-based pension schemes.  Yet, Figure 2.1 has demonstrated the importance of these stakeholders to the governance of UK schemes.  Consequently, Figure 2.2 is based on the key stakeholders identified in Figure 2.1 and the subsequent discussion in Sections 2.3-2.7 and summarises potential governance relationships that exist between the various UK pension scheme stakeholders.  Figure 2.2 shows that trustees are central to the governance of UK pension schemes; whilst they govern the sub-committees to the trustee board, the fund manager and the actuary, they in turn are governed by the scheme auditor, the PR, the sponsoring employer and the scheme members/beneficiaries.  Although Figure 2.1 shows the members and beneficiaries as two distinct stakeholders, the former paying contributions to the pension scheme and the latter receiving payments from the pension scheme, Figure 2.2 treats them as one stakeholder group because both seek information to make a judgement about whether or not the pension scheme has enough resources to meet the pension promise.  



Figure 2.2: Potential Governance Relationships in UK Pension Schemes 

Note: based on the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.1 and the subsequent discussion in Sections 2.3 - 2.6, this Figure summarises the potential governance relationships that are likely to exist in UK pension schemes.



2.9	Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that corporate governance mechanisms have had a significant influence on the regulation of UK pension scheme governance.  After some consideration of the nature of UK pension schemes and the stakeholders involved in their governance, the development of UK pension scheme governance mechanisms and their regulation was also reviewed.  A comparison was then made between the guidance issued by the PR and the Combined Code (2006) to establish similarities and differences between the corporate and pension scheme contexts.  Existing research relating to pension scheme governance was also reviewed to demonstrate that the current research fills a gap in that literature.  Finally, Figure 2.2 summarised potential governance relationships that might exist between the various UK pension scheme stakeholders; it showed that the governance of UK pension schemes is a complex issue which involves the participation of a number of individuals.  

Brennan and Solomon (2008) suggest that agency theory, and the separation of ownership and management, links corporate governance to accountability because companies are required “…to discharge their accountability to the dominant stakeholder group, the shareholders” (p.886).  Likewise, Short et al. (1998) argue that “…[a] system of corporate governance requires that a board of directors be accountable” (p. 151).  Thus, each of the governance relationships suggested by Figure 2.2 is likely to also result in a corresponding accountability relationship; consequently, this thesis uses an analysis of these accountability relationships to make the governance of UK pension schemes more transparent.  However, it is first necessary to establish: (i) whether or not the relationships identified in Figure 2.2 exist in practice; and (ii) if Figure 2.2 is complete.  As such, interviews with each of the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.2 were deemed necessary and the results of these are reported in Chapter 5.  Initially, these interviews are used to establish the governance mechanisms that currently operate in UK pension schemes and the resulting accountability relationships; once established, these accountability relationships can be analysed using an accountability framework and this literature is consequently considered in Chapter 3.


Chapter 3
Accountability and UK Pension Schemes

3.1	Introduction
Chapter 2 examined the current regulation of UK pension scheme governance and explored the extent to which its development has been influenced by corporate governance principles.  Chapter 2 also established that UK pension scheme governance is important due to the wider implications that pension scheme failures have on society (Section 2.4); yet UK pension scheme governance mechanisms remain opaque (Epstein, 2001; Clark, 2004; Evans et al., 2008).  Section 2.9 suggested that an analysis of accountability relationships that exist in UK pension schemes can be used to make their governance mechanisms more transparent.   This strategy is supported by the suggestion that accountability can be viewed as a sub-set of governance (Keasey and Wright, 1993); for example, Solomon’s (2007) book highlights the importance of accountability in corporate governance frameworks.  Likewise, in the latest version of the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010) and the OECD’s (2002) Guidance for Pension Scheme Governance, accountability features highly​[77]​.  Others argue that disclosures in annual reports have a particular role to play in the accountability of an entity (OECD, 1998; Goodwin and Seow, 2002).  Consequently, this chapter investigates: (i) the nature of the accountability relationships that exist between UK pension scheme stakeholders; and (ii) the disclosures required in the annual reports of both the pension scheme and its sponsoring employer. 

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 contains a general discussion of some definitions of accountability and specifically that of Gray et al. (1987); Section 3.3 considers the potential stakeholders to whom an organisation might be held accountable whilst Section 3.4 demonstrates how annual reports are commonly used to discharge any accountability that exists.  Section 3.5 assesses how an entity’s organisational context can impact on the type of accountability discharged and explores the use of Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability as a tool for analysing the discharge of accountability; in particular it examines a technique used by Laughlin (1990) which combines a model similar to that of Gray et al. (1987) with Stewart’s (1984) model to illustrate the accountability relationships in specific organisational contexts.  Section 3.7 identifies potential UK pension scheme accountability relationships whilst Section 3.8 explores the use of the pension scheme’s annual report, and that of its sponsoring employer, as a mechanism for discharging accountability.  Section 3.9 concludes. 

3.2	Definitions of Accountability
The existing literature provides a range of definitions about what the term accountability means (for example, see Stewart, 1984; Gray, 1992; Sinclair, 1995; Roberts, 1996).  Some of the definitions offered in the literature are very general and have a broad focus, whilst others are very narrow and concentrate on a specific issue of accountability.  For example, Willmott (1996) argues that although accountability need not necessarily be formal, it is endemic to our lives.  He describes it as: “…the sense of rendering intelligible some aspect of our lives” (Willmott, 1996, p. 23).  Likewise, Munro and Hatherly (1993) describe accountability as: “…the willingness and ability to explain and justify one’s acts to self and others” (p. 369).  An alternative view is provided by Jackson (1982) who narrows the focus of accountability by suggesting that it is merely a giving of information.  However, Dunsire (1978) argues that the giving of information must also be accompanied by an evaluation of that information so that an assessment can be made about whether the accountability has been discharged.  In addition, Stewart (1984) argues that a full concept of accountability involves both the rendering of an account and the making of a judgement upon the information rendered (holding to account).  The issue of accountability within a governance context is specifically addressed by Keasey and Wright (1993); they argue that the main aim of an accountee is to monitor​[78]​, evaluate and control the behaviour of organisational agents in order to ensure that they behave in the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.  On the whole, most definitions of accountability discuss issues such as the parties involved in the relationship, the nature of the relationship itself, and how the accountability can be discharged; however there is no universally accepted definition of accountability and it is a concept that means different things to different people.

In their seminal text on the subject, Gray et al. (1987) define accountability as:
“…[a] responsibility to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of the actions for which one is held responsible.” (Gray et al., 1987, p. 2)

Figure 3.1 represents a graphical illustration of the Gray et al. (1987) model of accountability; it clearly identifies the parties involved in the accountability relationship (accountee and accountor), the relationship itself (the rights and responsibilities of both parties), and the requirement to discharge the accountability​[79]​.  Gray et al. (1987) acknowledge that, whilst their model is similar to the principal-agent model devised by Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is far simpler because it is not subject to the many assumptions contained in the latter.  Based on that reasoning, they replace the more traditional term of principal with that of accountee and agent with accountor.

Figure 3.1: The Accountability Relationship (Gray et al., 1987)

Source: Gray et al., 1987 (p. 3) 
Given the variety of definitions available in the literature, Gallhofer and Haslam (2003) claim that the Gray et al. (1987) model of accountability adopts a middle ground amongst the alternatives available.  Describing any relationship in terms of an accountee and accountor, Gray et al. (1987) maintain that a contract (either implicit or explicit) between these parties determines the rights and duties afforded to both.  The contract, whether explicit or implicit, gives instructions on what actions are expected of the accountor and confers power on the accountor over the resources that can be used to undertake these actions and details of any consideration that is to be paid.  In doing so, two responsibilities are placed upon the accountor: (i) a responsibility for various actions; and (ii) a responsibility to account for those actions.  Reflecting on the link between the contract and accountability, Broadbent et al. (1996) argue that, as the accountee suffers from information asymmetry in the above situation, the optimal contract should incentivise the accountor to further the objectives of the accountee whilst at the same time constraining the actions of the accountor.  The accountee can use the contract to control the actions of the accountor, however, the level of control will depend upon the trust between the parties.  Broadbent et al. (1996) maintain that, where there are high levels of trust, expectations are likely to be ill-defined and ex-post reporting accepted; this, ultimately, has weaker implications for control (Laughlin, 1990).  However, where levels of trust are low it is likely that expectations will be made more explicit and ex-ante reporting required.  Gray et al. (1996) argue that Figure 3.1 is very flexible and that the accountee and accountor may be individuals, organisations or groups.  Indeed, either party may have several different relationships and may be an accountee in one and an accountor in another (see Section 4.7).

Gray et al. (1991) maintain that an account, which states whether the objectives for which the resources are entrusted have been achieved, is required for accountability to exist​[80]​.  Indeed, Tricker (1983) observes that, unless the accountor can be called to account and the contract enforced, then accountability does not exist at all.  In this sense, Gray et al. (1996) suggest that the central focus of the accountability model is the relationship between the parties because it determines the responsibilities and the rights to an account in the form of information.  Broadbent et al. (1996) state that the relationships will influence the supply and demand for information to discharge accountability.  Whilst many accounts will contain financial elements, Gray et al. (1987) also state that the majority will in addition involve varying degrees of non-financial or social components.  Further, the rights in these relationships can be legal or non-legal, moral or natural.  Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) suggest that accountability can be placed on a continuum whereby, at one end, the accountee directly controls the behaviour of the accountor, such as unequivocal expectations as to the use of money, the nature of the accountor’s actions are clearly specified and the discharge of this accountability can be clearly monitored.  At the other extreme, the accountors may have a great deal of discretion whereby they determine the extent to which any accountability is discharged​[81]​.

However, Laughlin (1990) challenges the simplicity of the Gray et al. (1987) model; he argues that it assumes that the accountee has a certain amount of power and that “…those with resources and with the power to transfer these to others can dictate terms, information etc.” (Laughlin, 1990, p. 111)​[82]​.  He argues that in some organisational contexts there is not always a clear distinction between formal and informal mechanisms of accountability; the neat divisions in Figure 3.1 are possibly “demarcated too precisely” (p. 111).  Despite these criticisms, the Gray et al. (1987) model has been extensively used​[83]​ in the literature.

3.3	Stakeholders to whom Organisations are Accountable
Although there is no singularly agreed definition of the term accountability, the topic has been discussed in the literature for many years.  For example, Gallhofer and Haslam (1993) adopt a historical perspective and suggest that texts from the late 18th and early 19th century can provide insights into current debates on the issue.  They maintain, that as early as 1797, Bentham was one of the first authors to challenge the established belief that organisational accountability was due solely to the owners of a business​[84]​.  More recently, Benston (1982a) identifies three groups to whom a business​[85]​ can be held accountable: shareholders, other stakeholders and the general public.  The stakeholder category includes: creditors; customers; employees; and any others involved in a direct contractual relationship with the company (Benston, 1982a).  He further suggests that the interests of all these groups can be protected by market forces including the market for: (i) managerial services; (ii) borrowing costs; (iii) consumer goods and services; and (iv) labour whereby employees can protect themselves by varying their work efforts in relation to their total compensation​[86]​.  

An alternative view is offered by Donaldson (1993) who argues that organisations only exist through the co-operation and commitment of society and that, although no written contract exists, there is an implicit social contract.  This perspective is extended by Goodpaster (1993) who suggests that:
“…responsible management…includes careful attention not only to stockholders but to stakeholders generally in the decision-making process” (p. 205)

In the wider context of organisations, such as pension schemes, there is an argument that trustees may also be accountable to a wide range of stakeholders, even if there is no written agreement between the parties.  There has been much debate over the degree of accountability due to different parties and how it can be discharged in practice.  Consequently, it is unlikely that it can be applied to all parties at all times as needs will alter in response to changing conditions.  In this sense, Mouck (1994) suggests that:
“…the precise nature of the accountability relationship must be hammered out in a democratic communicative process in response to conditions and perceived needs as they arise.  No precise form can be delineated that can be presumed good for all times and all circumstances.”  (p. 28)​[87]​.

Based on the above, and due to the wide variety of UK pension scheme stakeholders identified in Figure 2.1, this thesis adopts a stakeholder approach to accountability; it assumes that the accountability of UK pension schemes extends beyond the contractual relationships between the trustees and the members/beneficiaries and sponsoring employer to all of those identified in Figure 2.1.

3.4	Discharging Accountability
The annual report is commonly regarded as the primary means of discharging financial accountability (Hopwood, 1990;).  Indeed, Benston (1982a) suggests that the actions of managers are adequately monitored by external auditors and that the publication of the annual report discharges accountability in a free market system​[88]​.  Conversely, Mouck (1994) argues that “…corporate financial accountability, in and of itself, is woefully inadequate for the protection of the public interest.”  (p. 18).  However, Puxty (1986) maintains that accounting information must be:
“…understandable…contain true information…be expressed in the appropriate way and…be communicated by a party that has valid claims to legitimacy and trustworthiness.” (p. 99)

He concludes, however, that financial statements may not satisfy all of these requirements; technical terms are not well understood by users (Lee and Tweedie, 1979) and the information reported may represent the interests of management and not the priorities of the entity itself.  

Perhaps inevitably, advances in technology are also likely to impact on the use of financial reporting within accountability relationships.  For example, Baker and Wallage (2000) suggest that the current financial reporting model focuses on investment decision-making, made on-line and in real time, for example using XBRL reporting mechanisms.  A number of authors have suggested that financial reporting should not be restricted to the needs of investor decision-makers but should be viewed in relation to more general concerns about governance and to the wider needs of various stakeholder groups (Baker and Wallage, 2000).  

Nonetheless, the UK Companies Act (2006) currently establishes the minimum levels of corporate disclosure and requires directors to supply shareholders with annual accounts that show a true and fair view; these reports should also include a view of the company pension scheme.  Specifically, the Companies Act confirms the principle of stewardship​[89]​, ​[90]​ and Gray et al. (1987) maintain that statute reflects the areas in which society demands responsibility and, therefore, the issues upon which organisations should report in order to discharge that basic level of accountability​[91]​.  Although Gray (1992) maintains that an account need not necessarily be financial in nature, Boyce (1995) suggests that the conventional view of giving an account through annual reports is one of a numerically-based, objective form of identification, measurement and communication of economic information​[92]​.

This conventional form of accounting has become increasingly important in society and, in addition to its economic role, commentators have noted that it also has a social and political dimension (Gray et al., 1997)​[93]​.  Financial statements impact on the decisions made by investors and the allocation of capital in society.  They also affect many other aspects of economic life including labour negotiations, trade policies, anti-trust activities and fiscal policies (Baker and Wallage, 2000).    In this sense, the organisational context of the reporting entity has a significant impact on all accountability relationships; the following section explores these issues.


3.5	Accountability in Different Organisational Contexts
The questions of ‘who’ is accountable ‘to whom’, for ‘what’, and ‘how’ accountability should be discharged are, to some extent, answered by reference to law and by what Gray (1992) describes as quasi-law​[94]​.  However, Gray also suggests that additional rights and accountabilities are open to interpretation in different contexts; indeed, several authors have called for context specific studies of accountability (Otley, 1984; Scapens 1984; Laughlin, 1991).  As such, prior work has identified two main systems of accountability that have developed within different organisations: a hierarchical form of accountability which tends to adopt formal systems of accountability (Gray’s middle of the road model is an example of this form of accountability); and a social form of accountability that considers informal systems of accountability.  

Munro and Hatherly (1993) claim that the concept of hierarchical accountability and vertical reporting is not without its problems; they cite various criticisms of the notion including: the existence of both formal and informal reporting​[95]​ within organisations and the difficulties which hierarchical accountability has in addressing informal reporting mechanisms (Berger and Luckmann, 1966); the tendency for perceptions of accountability to be shaped by dysfunctional or ineffectual accounting-based controls (Roberts & Scapens, 1985; Laughlin, 1990); and the rights and responsibilities of various stakeholders with respect to ethical issues that require horizontal, and not vertical reporting (Gray et al., 1987).  

This critique is further discussed by Roberts (1996) who maintains that communication within hierarchies is inhibited by power and that participants in the hierarchical system of accountability form a personalised sense of self as well as displaying a lack of dependence on others.  She also claims that financial concerns are given more consideration in organisations and that:
“…the shift in attention from accounting to accountability is thus a shift from a preoccupation with technique and its refinement to social practices and their consequences.”  (p. 41)

Instead, Roberts (1996) maintains that socialising forms of accountability are best facilitated in lateral relationships where there is less demonstrable power.  She contends that there is not merely a requirement to account for one’s actions, but also to show how these different actions interact with one another, the consequences of any actions for others and how these consequences gives rise to future actions.  The socialising notion of accountability requires participants to express themselves to each other which has the potential to overcome temporal and spatial barriers.  Roberts (1996) links the hierarchical and social forms of accountability to the formal and informal systems of accountability respectively.  Adopting a similar perspective, Laughlin (1990) suggests that the hierarchical accountability adopts formal, more accounting-type information flows whereas the social form of accountability does not.  In the more informal systems of accountability, the identification of the accountee and the accountor is less clear and, in such circumstances, an impartial third party may balance the needs and wishes of the two groups and design an account to meet the needs of all (Herbert, 2005).

Stewart (1984) developed a particular model of accountability for application in the public sector.  Hannah (2003) clarifies Stewart’s model in the form of a diagram which is reproduced in Figure 3.2.  Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability explains the progression of accountability from a very objective perspective (which is determined by reference to standards) at the bottom of the ladder to a much more subjective type of accountability at the top which is determined by judgement.  Whilst the Gray et al. (1987) model concentrates on the more generic relationship between the accountee and accountor, Stewart’s model addresses the different types of accountability required of the accountor. 

Figure 3.2	Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability (1984) 
		Accountability by judgement
	Policy Accountability	
	Programme Accountability	
	Performance Accountability	
	Process Accountability	
	Accounting for Probity and Legality	
		Accountability by standards
Note: This diagram illustrates the 5 levels of Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability (Hannah, 2003).

At the bottom end of the ladder, Stewart (1984) suggests that accounting for probity is concerned with the avoidance of misconduct, whereas accountability for legality attempts to ensure that any powers given by law are not exceeded.  Alternatively, Laughlin (1990) describes this base of accountability as ensuring the proper use of funds in the manner authorised.  Thus, accountability at this level has a stewardship focus and seeks to ensure that funds have been spent as agreed between the accountee and the accountor, or in accordance with any other applicable regulation.  

In this context, Wanyama (2005) suggests that financial information provided in approved budgets and audited financial statements can be used to examine probity.  Legal documents can be studied, and expectations compared with what actually happens in practice, to verify that only legal actions were taken.  Stewart (1984) suggests that evidence provided by officers of an organisation can be used as a basis upon which to judge whether this type of accountability has been discharged, but this evidence will not in itself constitute a discharge of that accountability.

Moving up the ladder, process accountability seeks to ensure that adequate procedures are used, or that appropriate processes are followed by the accountor (Laughlin, 1990).  At this second level, accountability is required to ensure that adequate systems are put in place to achieve desired outcomes.  Laughlin (1990) argues that it is the first two levels of the ladder (probity and legality and process) where a formal accountability relationship is likely to exist.  Initially, therefore, accountability is assessed by reference to standards that are objective and measurable; in this sense, the accountability can easily be applied to managerial activities (Herbert, 2005)​[96]​.  

On the third rung of the ladder, performance accountability considers whether the output from a process meets the required standards that have been put in place; it evaluates the performance of the officers of the organisation.  On that basis, Wanyama (2005) suggests that performance accountability has an important role to play in an organisation’s governance because it is the strategic responsibility of the board to monitor whether or not management has achieved the goals that were set for them.  However, Stewart (1984) comments that not all stakeholders will be aware of an organisation’s goals; therefore, any assessment of management performance and any attempt to hold them to account for their actions, will not be easy.  Performance accountability is very similar to Programme accountability which was advanced by Laughlin (1990); both are concerned with whether or not the output has achieved its objectives and addresses whether or not the accountor’s work has met the goals set for it.  

Finally, at the top of Stewart’s ladder, policy accountability seeks to ensure that those who pursue (or chose not to pursue) certain policies are accountable for them by addressing whether or not the course of action taken by the accountor is the best one available​[97]​.  Laughlin (1990) maintains that policy accountability relates to relationships where the goals and the processes are undefined and uncertain​[98]​.  Thus he suggests that it is a difficult level of accountability to evaluate.  However, Wanyama (2005) argues that within an organisational context, policy accountability can be indirectly evaluated; policies manifest themselves in organisational behaviour and can often be evaluated by reference to various documents produced or comments made on organisational web-sites. 

It can therefore be seen that each step of Stewart’s ladder represents a different type of accountability: progression up the ladder changes the nature of the accountability relationship being studied; and it becomes more judgement-based as the ladder is climbed.  Stewart (1984) suggests that, whilst a financial account may be adequate to discharge the accountability for probity and legality, progression up the ladder renders financial accounts by themselves insufficient.  Despite developing his model in the public sector, Stewart (1984) acknowledges that his Ladder of Accountability is applicable in many different contexts.  For example, he states that:
 “This framework has been constructed for the analysis of public accountability, but can be used for other forms of accountability, such as managerial accountability and commercial accountability” (Stewart, 1984, p. 18). 

Stewart’s approach may therefore offer potential for the analysis of the complicated accountability relationships which characterise the UK pension scheme sector.  

Employing many of Stewart’s themes, Laughlin (1990) analyses accountability practices in the organisational context of the Church of England.  Using financial accountability, Laughlin fleshes out a skeletal model (similar to that of Figure 3.1) and argues that, although a rich accountability literature has produced many theories, not many detailed case studies have been conducted which apply these theoretical lenses in practice.  He argues that his paper is not an attempt to draw theoretical conclusions but to explore the nature of accounting in its organisational and societal context; Laughlin (1990) suggests that his paper:
 “…is intended to make some amends for this [lack of detailed case studies] by trying to provide the current ‘skeletal’ theories of accountability with some empirical ‘flesh’ not only to provide a much needed complement to those theories but also to provide a vehicle to clarify their nature and accuracy in particular situations” (p. 110).

In his exploration, Laughlin identifies four accountee/accountor accountability relationships within the Church based on the transfer of financial resources.  Accountability relationships were found to exist between: the congregational members (accountee) and the Parish (accountor); the Parish (accountee) and the Diocese (accountor); the Diocese (accountee) and the Central Board (accountor); and the Diocese (accountee) and the Church Commissioners (accountor).  He defines the context of each of these relationships in terms of their formality, identifying situations where the parties are contractually bonded, or otherwise, as a result of the financial dependency of the accountor on the accountee.  He finds that different parties dominate the accountability relationships based on an ability to allocate resources and delegate authority.  He argues that the analysis produces a confusing set of relationships which “disturb the seemingly all-powerful view of the principal” (Laughlin, 1990, p. 107).  He also comments that the financial independence of the accountor could also produce similarly confusing results.

From this work, Laughlin (1990) suggests that, as a result of the different contexts and structures of the accountability relationships, various expectations and demands for information are made of accountors.  In the context of the Church of England, expectations and demands made of accountors vary in the different accountability relationships ​[99]​, however, Laughlin finds it difficult to categorise all relationships in terms of the rungs of Stewart’s ladder, especially where these relationships lack structure​[100]​.  As the relationships become more structured, Laughlin (1990) is able to identify examples of accounting for probity and legality​[101]​ , programme​[102]​ and performance accountability​[103]​.  He offers several conclusions from his exploration, namely: (i) that context and structure have a significant impact on the accountability relationship; (ii) that power within the relationship and specific practices must be understood before prescriptions for future accountability relationships can be made; and (iii) he calls for more studies to be conducted into the way that accountability relationships function in particular situations before the future development of skeletal theories (such as that in Figure 3.1) can take place.

3.6	The Concept of Full Accountability
Thus, Laughlin (1990) uses a combination of a model of accountability (that is similar to Gray et al. (1987)) and Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability to analyse the accountability practices that exist in the organisational context of The Church of England.  The model of accountability is used to establish: (i) the parties involved in the accountability relationship (accountee and accountor); (ii) how the relationship is regulated (the rights and responsibilities of both parties); and (iii) how the accountability is discharged; it is this final part of this model of accountability that coincides with many features of Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability.  Consequently, Stewart’s (1984) ladder can be employed to establish the various types of accountability that are discharged by the accountor (for example, accountability for probity, legality etc).  Laughlin (1990) argues that this technique can be used to bring the skeletal theories of accountability to life in particular organisational contexts by applying “empirical flesh” (p. 110).  



Figure 3.3: A Concept of Full Accountability using both Gray et al. (1987) and Stewart (1984)        
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Note: this figure is based on the Gray et al. (1987) model of accountability and Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability which are represented by Figures 3.1.and 3.2 respectively.  These figures are combined and a requirement to hold the accountor to account is added to illustrate how full accountability can be deemed to exist in a particular organisational context.     


Consequently, Figure 3.3 combines the attributes of Figures 3.1 (component 1) and 3.2 (component 2).  Stewart (1984) also maintains that, before full accountability can be deemed to exist, the rendering of an account by the acountor must be followed by the accountee’s judgement upon the information rendered; consequently this requirement has also been embedded into Figure 3.3.  As such, Figure 3.3 provides an up-dated model of accountability that can be used in different organisational contexts to analyse and illustrate relationships of accountability.  

Several studies have responded to Laughlin’s (1990) call for further work in this area employing Stewart’s model in contexts other than the public sector.  For example, Hannah (2003) considered it in the case the NHS in the UK, Wanyama (2005) used it in a corporate context in Uganda, whilst Crawford et al. (2008) employed the model in their exploration of the Scottish charitable sector.  These studies demonstrate that the consideration of different accountability relationships which may exist on different rungs of Stewart’s (1984) ladder is a useful technique for analysis.  Further, different kinds of accountability can be identified for various relationships within the same organisation.  Thus, although this thesis is not a direct replication of Laughlin’s (1990) study, the model illustrated in Figure 3.3 is extended to the organisational context of UK pension schemes and the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.1; if all component parts of the accountability relationship depicted in Figure 3.3 can be shown to exist, then full accountability can also be deemed to exist.  Thus, the following section uses the 1st component of the model described in Figure 3.3 to identify: (i) the accountee; (ii) the accountor; and (iii) the mechanism that regulates each of the accountability relationships that are created by the governance relationships suggested by Figure 2.2.  Subsequently, Chapters 5 and 6 explore how the accountability is discharged in each of these relationships and whether the accountor is held to account by the accountee (i.e. component 2 in Figure 3.3).
 
3.7	Accountability in the Organisational Context of UK Pension Schemes
This section considers potential accountability relationships in UK pension schemes; using the accountability relationships that result from governance relationships identified in Figure 2.2, it explores the first component of Figure 3.3 in the organisational context of UK pension schemes.  Subsequently, the empirical work reported in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis investigates the existence of the second component in Figure 3.3 and these chapters conclude whether or not full accountability is deemed to exist.  

Table 3.1	Potential UK Pension Scheme Accountability Relationships 
Figure 3.3: Component 1 
Accountee	Accountor	Regulation of the Accountability Relationship
Board of Trustees	Sub-committees	Trust Deed
Board of Trustees*	Fund Manager	Letter of Engagement
Board of Trustees	Actuary	Letter of Engagement
Auditor	Board of Trustees	Statute and Letter of Engagement
The PR 	Board of Trustees	Statute
Sponsoring Employer*	Board of Trustees	Trust Deed
Members/beneficiaries*	Board of Trustees	Trust Deed
Note: * signifies those accountability relationships that are determined by the transfer of resources from the accountee to the accountor; Laughlin (1990) uses this transfer of resources to establish a relationship of accountability.  All of the potential relationships of accountability identified in this table, including those that are established on the basis of the transfer of resources, are suggested on the basis of the information flows identified in Figure 2.2. 


Although Solomon (2007) acknowledges that the relationships between pension scheme stakeholders are very complex, Table 3.1 begins the analysis of the potential accountability relationships (that are based on the governance relationships identified in Figure 2.2) by establishing (i) the parties involved in the accountability relationship (accountee and accountor); and (ii) how the relationship is regulated (the rights and responsibilities of both parties).

As discussed earlier, many of the relationships identified in Table 3.1 are less than transparent and very little is known about how they operate in practice.  However, the literature thus far would suggest that, when considering the trustees’ relationships with sub-committees to the trustee board, fund managers and actuaries, the trustees assume the role of the accountee and the other parties assume the role of accountor.  Whilst the relationship between the trustees and the sub-committees to the trustee board is likely to be regulated by the trust deed, the trustees relationship with the fund manager and the actuary will be determined by the respective letters of engagement.  When considering the trustees’ relationships with the auditor and the PR, the latter parties assume the role of the accountee and the trustees assume the role of the accountor.  These relationships are both regulated by statute, and in the case of the auditor, a letter of engagement is also used to determine the relationship.  As these relationships are so opaque, discussions with these stakeholders are required to investigate if, and how, accountability is discharged therein.  

Perhaps two of the most obvious accountability relationships that exist in the UK pension scheme context are those which exist between: (i) the sponsoring employer of the pension scheme and the board of trustees; and (ii) the members and beneficiaries of the pension scheme and the board of trustees.  In these relationships the members and beneficiaries as well as the sponsoring employer assume the role of accountees and the trustees assume the role of accountor.  The trust deed is the document that regulates the relationship between these parties in both cases; and the mechanisms used to discharge the accountability in these relationships are also likely to be specified in this trust deed​[104]​.  In practice, most communication between the trustees and the scheme members/beneficiaries (either as individuals or as a stakeholder group), or the trustees and the sponsoring employer, will address a wide variety of accountability issues.  Some of this communication will take the form of public documents, while most of it is likely to be in the form of private communication​[105]​.  The Pension Law Review (1993) suggested that the information required by members and beneficiaries falls into five categories: (i) formal scheme documentation; (ii) basic pension scheme information in the form of an explanatory booklet; (iii) information relating to individuals for example, benefits on death, retirement, exit or on wind-up; (iv) annual reports and audited accounts to be prepared within 1 year and made available within 1 month of request (though not automatically distributed); and (v) actuarial valuation reports which should be available within 3 months of receipt from the actuary.  However, only the financial statements of the pension scheme and the actuarial reports will provide information about whether or not there are sufficient assets in the scheme to pay the pension promise​[106]​.  As the actuarial valuation is only carried out only once every three years, the financial statements of the pension scheme represent the most public and systematic example of the discharge of accountability to both the members/beneficiaries and the sponsoring employer.  However, as discussed previously, the financial statements of the pension scheme are only publicly available if the scheme is administered by a corporate trustee.  Thus, discussions with stakeholders are necessary to establish what, if any, accountability mechanisms are used in addition to both the financial statements of the pension scheme and those of the sponsoring employer to discharge the trustees’ accountability.  Once these documents have been identified, it will then be possible to identify the different types of accountability that are discharged therein in terms of Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability.  The stakeholders should also be able to substantiate if the accountor is held to account and thus if a full relationship of accountability exists.     

Using this technique, Chapters 5 and 6 clarify the extent of the accountability relationships among pension scheme stakeholders in an attempt to make UK pension scheme governance mechanisms more apparent.  Chapter 5 reports the results of a number of interviews with a wide variety of UK pension scheme stakeholders relating to: (a) the governance mechanisms that currently exist in UK pension schemes; and (b) how accountability is discharged within these mechanisms.  The annual report of the pension scheme is discussed as a mechanism used to discharge trustees’ accountability, alongside a variety of other documents that the interviewees cite, including the annual report of the sponsoring employer.  This is perhaps not surprising as Section 3.4 highlighted the common use of annual reports to discharge accountability.  Indeed, Chapter 6 develops these findings by reporting the results of a content analysis of the pension scheme disclosures made in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers between 2000 and 2005.  Consequently, a summary of the pension scheme reporting requirements, and those of the sponsoring employer, is deemed necessary and now follows in Section 3.8.

3.8	The Different types of UK Pension Scheme Accountability
Figure 3.4 demonstrates how pension schemes, and their sponsoring employers, report externally to their respective stakeholders (including those identified in Figure 2.2); an appreciation of the external reporting process is important for the analysis of accountability relationships that follows in both Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.  Pension schemes are required to produce annual reports in accordance with the Statement of Recommended Accounting Practice (SORP) Financial Reports of Pension Schemes (PRAG, 2007) (hereafter referred to as the SORP).  The production of these annual reports will discharge accountability to the pension scheme’s stakeholders including its sponsoring employer.  The sponsoring employer also requires information from the pension scheme to allow it to complete the pension scheme disclosures in its annual report​[107]​ in accordance with FRS 17 or IAS 19.  The publication of the annual report of the sponsoring employer discharges accountability to its corporate stakeholders.  However, the annual report of the pension scheme is not automatically available to pension scheme stakeholders and, therefore, unless the pension scheme is administered by a corporate trustee​[108]​ and its annual report lodged with Companies House, a stakeholder must make direct contact with the pension scheme to obtain a copy of their results.  



Figure 3.4: The Reporting Mechanisms of a UK Pension Scheme and its Sponsoring employer

Note: this figure demonstrates how the accountability of UK pension schemes is discharged.




Thus, the annual report of the sponsoring employer, which are readily available from Companies House or the company’s web-site, represent one of the few easily accessible sources of information for pension scheme stakeholders​[109]​.  Although the financial statements of the pension scheme are not publicly available, their use is considered in Chapter 5 and consequently, Section 3.8.1 explores their required content.  Section 3.8.2 addresses similar issues relating to the pension scheme disclosures in the annual reports of the sponsoring employer.

3.8.1	The Annual Reports of UK Pension Schemes 
The content of the annual reports of UK pension schemes is regulated by the SORP: Financial Reports of Pension Schemes (Pensions Research Accounting Group, 2007).  The SORP states that the users of the annual reports of the pension scheme are: trustees; members and prospective members; deferred pensioners; pensioners; spouses and beneficiaries; participating employers; regulators; and professional advisers (Pensions Research Accounting Group, 2007).  Thus, this list supports the various stakeholders suggested by Figure 2.2 and demonstrates that the trustees also use the information that they prepare for the annual report of the pension scheme.  The SORP requires the annual report to include: a trustees’ report​[110]​; an investment report​[111]​; a compliance statement; statements by the actuary and auditor; the financial statements and other disclosures in the annual report.  Interestingly, the SORP does not currently mandate the liabilities of the pension scheme to appear on the Statement of Financial Position​[112]​, it merely requires the pension scheme to produce a list of its assets and liabilities other than those required to pay pensions and benefits.  

The disclosure of pension scheme liabilities on the Statement of Financial Position of the pension scheme has recently been a controversial issue; in 2002, the ASB commissioned the Pensions Research Accounting Group (PRAG) to conduct a consultation process regarding the issue.  During that consultation process, PRAG acknowledged that the financial statements of pension funds had historically been used by trustees to demonstrate how they had managed the assets, collected the contributions and other income and settled benefits and other expenditure.  Thus a stewardship view of the financial statements emerged from this work.  The information supplied was deemed necessary to meet the regulations of the day and show a true and fair view of:
“…the amount and disposition of the assets…and the liabilities of the scheme, other than the liabilities to pay pensions and benefits after the end of the scheme year.” (The Occupational Pension Schemes Regulations, 1996, p.3)​[113]​ 

However, because the actuarial liabilities of the pension scheme were not required to be included on the Statement of Financial Position of the pension scheme, PRAG (2002) concluded that:
“…pension scheme accounts fail to meet the fundamental purpose of accounts, which is the use by readers of accounts in economic decision making.  The demonstration of stewardship is increasingly viewed as a secondary purpose by accounting standard setting bodies, which is in conflict with the traditional primary purpose of pension scheme accounts.” (PRAG, 2002, p. 2)

The disclosure requirements were unsatisfactory due to the format and presentation of the formal actuarial reports.  The PRAG consultation document concluded that this situation was very disappointing for scheme members, prospective members, employers, shareholders of the employer, trustees, regulators and accounting standard setters, given the crucial role that pension scheme accounts play in presenting financial information to all of these parties.  The majority of the respondents to the PRAG (2002) consultation concluded that the primary focus of a pension scheme’s financial statements should be to meet the needs of scheme members and that the most important need of members was the security of the promise to pay the pension benefits.  Many of the respondents to the consultation process also argued that the pension scheme financial statements were not the best medium to communicate this information because the existing disclosures were very technical, provided little information and were typically out of date by the time that they were published.  Thus it is possible that the discharge of accountability for the pension promise may not be fulfilled using the annual reports of the pension scheme itself.  These criticisms are reflected in the fact that during the period 1996 to 1998 few pension schemes distributed annual reports to their members and few received requests to do so (Klumpes and Manson, 2000).  

The contribution of useful information towards the discharge of trustee accountability provided by the annual reports of pension schemes has also been assessed by the Pension Law Review (PLR).  The PLR (1993) was also concerned about the adequacy and understandability of pension scheme information supplied to scheme members and beneficiaries in addition to that contained in the financial statements; it therefore commissioned an investigation by Social and Community Planning Research (SCPL) into the degree of comprehension by scheme members of the information provided in relation to their pension schemes.  The findings were disturbing as there was: (i) a widespread ignorance of scheme details; (ii) a perception that although the provision of information had improved, much of it was not understandable; (iii) a general feeling of powerlessness amongst members not knowing what questions to ask or what to do with the information once provided; and finally (iv) a preference for one-to-one communication.  Employers intimated that they too wanted to provide useful information to members and beneficiaries and desired to strike the balance between comprehensive and comprehensible communication with members and beneficiaries about pension issues.  Consequently, it is possible that because the information provided in the annual reports of the pension scheme is too complex, there is a resulting lack of understanding amongst pension scheme stakeholders which leads to an inability to hold the accountor to account (as required by Figure 3.3) which in turn means that a full relationship of accountability does not exist.  If these issues exist with the annual reports of the pension scheme, it is also possible that stakeholders have similar issues with the annual reports of the sponsoring employers; consequently, the following section describes how UK pension scheme accountability is currently discharged in the annual reports of the sponsoring employer.


3.8.2	Accounting for Pension Schemes in the Annual Reports of UK Sponsoring Employers

UK pension scheme accounting numbers and disclosures made in the annual reports of the sponsoring employer are currently regulated by IAS 19 for EU listed companies and FRS 17 for all other UK firms.  However, the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 24 Accounting for Pension Costs (ASC, 1988) was the first accounting standard to regulate UK pension scheme accounting in the annual reports of the sponsoring employer.  The remainder of this section summarises the changing accounting and disclosure requirements made of UK sponsoring employers for the pension schemes they provide to their employees; the relevant accounting standards are summarised from 1988 to the time of writing.
 
3.8.2 (a) SSAP 24 Accounting for Pension Costs
Prior to SSAP 24, companies charged the Income Statement​[114]​ with their annual pension scheme contributions; no distinction was made between DC or DB pension schemes.  Therefore, depending on the pension scheme contributions suggested by scheme actuaries, the charge to the Income Statement was volatile and profits varied accordingly.  SSAP 24, which was introduced in 1988, forced companies with DB pension provision to examine the underlying financial position of their schemes and to expense their long-term costs over the working lives of the employees.  Consequently, the Income Statement charge for pensions became less susceptible to fluctuations.  Seven years later, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) initiated the reform of pension scheme accounting by issuing a discussion document, Pension Costs in the Employer’s Financial Statements (ASB, 1995).  The preferred approach of the ASB, and the majority of respondents to this document, favoured the retention of the SSAP 24 philosophy (Wilson et al., 2001): 
“…but to limit some of the options available to preparers when applying the standard and improve the disclosure requirements” (p. 1516).

However, simultaneous amendments to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 Employee Benefits (IASB, 1998) persuaded the ASB to consider the capitalisation of the pension scheme asset/ liability on the face of the Statement of Financial Position.  

3.8.2 (b) FRS 17 Retirement Benefits
Consequently, in 1998, the ASB issued a further discussion paper, Aspects of Accounting for Pension Costs (ASB, 1998); this resulted in the issue of FRS 17 Retirement Benefits (ASB, 2000) in 2000 which required radical changes to the accounting treatment for defined benefit schemes.  Specifically, FRS 17 stated that:
“Assets in a defined benefit scheme should be measured at their fair value at the [year end and that] defined benefit scheme liabilities should be measured on an actuarial basis…” (ASB, 2000, para. 14 and 20).

Therefore, FRS 17 was the first UK accounting standard to require a pension scheme assets/liabilities to be recognised on the Statement of Financial Position of the sponsoring employer.  

The ASB rationalised this controversial accounting treatment by arguing that a surplus gives rise to an asset in the Statement of Financial Position of the sponsoring employer because its use can be controlled and that control arises as a result of past events (ASB, 2000, para. 38).  The ASB also argued that the pension scheme trust deed normally contained a legal obligation that the employer would make good any deficit in a DB scheme.  Even if a trust deed was not that explicit, an employing company was likely to have created a constructive obligation to make good a deficit as a result of its past actions and statements​[115]​ (ASB, 2000, para. 39).  Recognition of the pension scheme assets/liabilities in the financial statements of the employer is, therefore, the primary objective of FRS 17 (ASB, 2000, para. 1).  Other stated objectives of FRS 17 include the recognition of the pension costs in the Income Statement and the actuarial gains and losses in the Statement of Recognised Income and Expenditure (SORIE) and “…to ensure that…the financial statements contain adequate disclosures of the cost of providing retirement benefits and the related gains, losses, assets and liabilities” (ASB, 2000, para. 1).

However, many employers claimed that the movements between the year-end valuations of their pension schemes would be volatile, outwith their control and affect their share prices (Hinks, 2002).  This expected volatility was attributed to two sources.  First, the valuation of pension scheme assets was dependent on the performance of the capital markets that are, by their nature, impossible for the firm to control.  Second, FRS 17 no longer allowed companies to spread scheme surpluses/ deficits over the future lives of scheme members and required the full change in valuation to be accounted for immediately.  Companies also expressed concern about the standard because they were now required to disclose information that had not been available to the public previously (Bezooyen, 2002).  Investors would therefore be able to appreciate, for the first time, the true underlying economic position of a company’s pension scheme, which might, in turn affect a company’s share price (Bezooyen, 2002)​[116]​.  Many commentators in the financial press suggested that several final salary schemes were closed due to the reporting requirements of FRS 17 (Maloney, 2002).  As a result, the ASB were lobbied not to proceed with the full implementation of the standard.  Chapter 1 of this thesis contains a summary of the public reaction to FRS 17 and provides a context within which to understand why some companies might have been reluctant to disclose information in relation to their pension scheme.

In response to the controversy arising from its proposed treatment, the ASB amended FRS 17​[117]​ in November 2002 and rationalised this action as being part of: 
“…the Boards’s programme to bring about convergence in an orderly manner between UK Accounting Standards and the standards of the…[International Accounting Standards Board] IASB” (ASB, 2002, p. 1)​[118]​

In effect, the ASB’s amendment required additional disclosures and delayed the standard’s full implementation until 1st January 2005, the implementation date for all International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Dunne et al., 2008)​[119]​.  Although companies were encouraged to adopt FRS 17 early, most chose not to (Napier, 2009), preferring to continue to use SSAP 24 reporting requirements combined with IAS 19 or FRS 17 transitional disclosures. 

3.8.2 (c) IAS 19 Employee Benefits
Unlike other accounting standards (for example, FRS 12 and IAS 37, the accounting standards that regulate accounting for provisions, contingent assets and contingent liabilities) the ASB and the IASB did not develop FRS 17 and IAS 19 (IASB, 1998) in parallel and they therefore have different requirements​[120]​.  While FRS 17 required immediate recognition of the total actuarial gains or losses in the SORIE, the international accounting standard offered a choice in the amount, timing and presentation of actuarial gains/losses.  Under IAS 19 a company need only recognise a portion​[121]​ of the actuarial gain/ loss to the extent that the net cumulative unrecognised actuarial gain and loss at the end of the previous reporting period exceeds the greater of: (a) 10% of the present value of the defined benefit obligation; and (b) 10% of the fair value of any plan’s assets.  The corridor limit was set at 10% to be consistent with US GAAP (Wilson et al., 2001).  This amount can be recognised immediately in the Income Statement or the SORIE, or smoothed over the remaining working lives of the firm’s employees, thus deferring the gain or loss in the Income Statement.  In December 2004, IAS 19 was amended to permit:
“ …an option similar to the approach in FRS 17… as an alternative to deferred recognition or immediate recognition in the profit or loss” (IASB, 2004, para. IN3) 

This amendment to IAS 19 meant that it was now very similar to the ASB’s FRS 17​[122]​; however, a key remaining difference between FRS 17 and IAS 19 is in the recognition of actuarial gains and losses.  Yet, despite this residual difference in accounting treatment, both UK and international standard setters have demanded an increase in the level of accountability from the sponsoring employer for its pension scheme both in terms of the accounting numbers and the disclosures required​[123]​.  A comparison of the disclosure requirements of the three accounting standards (SSAP 24; FRS 17 and IAS 19) is now discussed in section 3.8.2 (d) below.

3.8.2 (d) A Comparison of the Disclosure Requirements of SSAP 24, FRS 17 and IAS 19

Since 1988, three accounting standards have regulated the accounting treatment of pension schemes in the UK: SSAP 24 (from 1988-2000), FRS 17 (from 2000-2005) and IAS 19 (from 2005​[124]​ to present date).  It is therefore likely that, between 2000 and 2005, many companies have made annual report disclosures under both SSAP 24 and IAS 19.  If companies chose to apply FRS 17 in the transition period and delayed the implementation of IAS 19 until 1st Jan 2005, it is also possible that some disclosures will have been made in accordance with all three accounting standards over this period.

Table 3.2 compares the disclosure requirements of all three accounting standards and demonstrates that, in comparison to SSAP 24, the FRS 17​[125]​ and IAS 19​[126]​ disclosure requirements are onerous.  Table 3.2 reports the disclosure requirements in three categories relating to: (i) general pension scheme information (Panel A); (ii) the Statement of Financial Position (Panel B); and (iii) the Income Statement (Panel C).  This table demonstrates that all three standards required various amounts of information to be disclosed on similar issues; these issues have been identified in the first column of Table 4.2 as: (i) accounting policy; (ii) plan description; (iii) assumptions; (iv) reconciliation of gross assets and liabilities; (v) own assets held as pension scheme assets; (vi) reconciliation of net asset/liability; (vii) total expense; and (viii) actual return.  The following three columns then summarise the disclosure requirements of IAS 19, FRS 17 and SSAP 24 respectively.

A review of Table 3.2 reveals that the disclosures relating to the accounting policy, the plan description, and the assumptions on which the calculation of the pension scheme liabilities are based are fairly consistent across all three accounting standards (see Panel A of Table 3.2).    



Table 3.2: A Comparison of the Disclosure Requirements of SSAP 24, FRS 17, and IAS 19
Panel A: Disclosures not Specific to the Statement of Financial Position or Income Statement 
Characteristic	International GAAP 	UK GAAP
	IAS 19	FRS 17	SSAP 24
AccountingPolicy	The enterprise’s accounting policy for recognising actuarial gains and losses (IASB, 1990, para. 120(a)).		The accounting policy (ASC, 1988, para. 47).
Plan Description	A general description of the type of plan (IASB, 1990, para. 120(b)).	The nature of the scheme; (b) the date of the most recent full actuarial valuation and the relationship (if any) with the actuary; (c) the contribution made and any agreed for future years; (d) closed scheme disclosures (ASB, 2000, para. 76).	An outline of the results of the most recent formal actuarial valuation (ASC, 1988, para. 49).
Assumptions	The principle actuarial assumptions used as at the Statement of Financial Position date, including, where applicable: (i) the discount rates; (ii) the expected rates of return on any plan assets for the periods presented in the financial statements; (iii) the expected rates of return for the periods presented in the financial statements on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A; (iv) the expected rates of salary increases ; (v) medical cost trend rates; and (vi) any other material actuarial assumptions used (IASB, 1990, para. 120(h)).	Each of the main financial assumptions should be disclosed separately including: (a) the inflation assumption; (b) the rate of increase in salaries; (c) the rate of increase for pensions in payment and deferred pensions; and (d) the rate used to discount scheme liabilities (ASB, 2000, para. 78). 	The actuarial valuation method and major actuarial assumptions adopted and an indication of significant changes in future costs that are expected under the actuarial assumptions and methods used (ASC, 1988, para. 47).
Note: this table compares the disclosure requirements of IAS 19, FRS 17 and SSAP 24.



Panel B: Statement of Financial Position Disclosures
Characteristic	International GAAP 	UK GAAP
	IAS 19	FRS 17	SSAP 24
Gross Asset and LiabilityReconciliation 	A reconciliation of the assets and liabilities recognised in the Statement of Financial Position, showing at least: (i) the present value at the year end of DB obligations that are wholly unfunded; (ii) the present value at the year end of DB obligations that are wholly or partly unfunded; (iii) the fair value of any plan assets at the year end; (iv) the net actuarial gains or losses not recognised in the Statement of Financial Position; (v) the past service cost not yet recognised in the Statement of Financial Position; (vi) any amount not recognised as an asset; (vii) the fair value at the year end of any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A; and (viii) the other amounts recognised in the Statement of Financial Position (IASB, 1990, para. 120(c)).	The fair value of the assets held by the pension scheme at the beginning and end of the period should be analysed into the following classes and disclosed together with the expected rate of return assumed for each class for the period and the subsequent period: (a) equities; (b) bonds; and (c) other (ASB, 2000, para. 80).The fair value of the scheme assets, the present value of the scheme liabilities based on the accounting assumptions and the resulting surplus or deficit should be disclosed in a note to the financial statements.  Where the asset or liability in the Statement of Financial Position differs from the surplus or deficit in the scheme, an explanation of the difference should be given.  An analysis of the movements during the period in the surplus or deficit in the scheme should be given (ASB, 2000, para. 88).The analysis of reserves in the notes to the financial statements should distinguish the amount relating to the DB asset or liability net of deferred tax (ASB, 2000, para. 90).	
Own assets	The amounts included in the fair value of plan assets for: (i) each category of the reporting enterprise’s own financial instruments; and (ii) any property occupied by, or other assets used by, the reporting enterprise (IASB, 1990, para. 120(d)).		The market value of scheme assets at the date of their valuation or review and the level of funding expressed in percentage terms (ASC, 1988, para. 49).
Net Asset and LiabilityReconciliation	A reconciliation showing the movements during the period in the net liability (or asset) recognised in the Statement of Financial Position (IASB, 1990, para. 120(e)).		
Note: this table compares the disclosure requirements of IAS 19, FRS 17 and SSAP 24.




Panel C: Income Statement Disclosures
Characteristic	International GAAP 	UK GAAP
	IAS 19	FRS 17	SSAP 24
Expense	The total expense recognised in the income statement for each of the following, and the line item(s) of the income statement in which they are included: (i) current service cost; (ii) interest cost; (iii) expected return on plan assets; (iv) expected return on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A; (v) actuarial gains and losses; (vi) past service cost; and (vii) the effect of any curtailment or settlement (IASB, 1990, para. 120(f)).	The following amounts included within the operating profit should be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements: (a) the current service cost; (b) any past service costs; (c) any previously unrecognised surplus deducted from the past service costs; (d) gains and losses an any settlements or curtailments; and (e) any previously unrecognised surplus deducted from the settlement or curtailment loss (ASB, 2000, para. 82).The following amounts included as other finance costs should be disclosed separately in the notes to the financial statements: (the interest cost; and the expected return on assets in the scheme (ASB, 2000, para. 84).See also the expected rate of return disclosures required under paragraph 80 above.	The cost charged with explanations (ASC, 1988, para. 47).
Actual return	The actual return on plan assets, as well as the actual return on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A (IASB, 1990, para. 120(g)).		
Note: this table compares the disclosure requirements of IAS 19, FRS 17 and SSAP 24.






Perhaps not surprisingly, SSAP 24 does not require any information to be disclosed about the pension scheme surplus/deficit​[127]​ (see Panel B of Table 3.2) whereas IAS 19 and SSAP 24 require extensive disclosures in relation to this issue.  Table 3.2 also demonstrates that SSAP 24 set themes around which it required disclosures to be made, whereas FRS 17 and IAS 19 are much more prescriptive in their disclosure requirements.  For example, in relation to the Income Statement (see Panel C of Table 3.2), SSAP 24 merely required the sponsoring employer to disclose the pension cost charged to the Income Statement and any required explanations (ASC, 1988, para. 47); in contrast FRS 17 and IAS 19 identified lists of specific information to be accounted for and disclosed.  It is detailed prescriptions such as these that are likely to have increased pension scheme disclosures in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer.  Chapter 6 of this thesis uses the publication requirements summarised in Table 3.2 to investigate pension scheme disclosures made in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer between 2000 and 2005; such a technique aims to establish how the changes in SSAP 24, FRS 17 and IAS 19 have impacted on: (i) the nature of the pension disclosures in the annual reports of the sponsoring employer in relation to Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability as described in section 3.5; (ii) the nature of the disclosures; and (iii) the location of the disclosures in the annual reports.  


Some previous studies of UK pension scheme disclosures in the annual report of the sponsoring employer have already been discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis; likewise Section 2.7 summarised the limited research that has been conducted in relation to pension scheme governance.  Despite the lack of UK academic literature, some policy work has been initiated to examine UK pension scheme disclosures made by sponsoring employers.  For example, in 2006, the UK’s Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) investigated the DB pension scheme disclosures made by UK companies under both IFRS and UK GAAP (Financial Reporting Review Panel, 2006).  In this study, the DB pension scheme disclosures of 20 listed companies were analysed as at December 2005 and it was found that there was a high level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IAS 19.  Although the report highlighted the following areas where disclosure could be improved, it also stated that none of these were sufficient enough to require further investigation: (i) fuller disclosure of the uncertainties relating to estimates; (ii) consistent interpretation of the principal assumptions; (iii) more clarity on the nature of the disclosures required; (iv) better explanation of how the expected return on assets has been calculated; (v) more disclosure on any non-standard assets held as an investment; (vi) more disclosure about the maturity of the scheme; and (vii) the disclosure of material amounts only (Financial Reporting Review Panel, 2006).  The report also acknowledged that the pension scheme disclosures of some companies are:
“…vague and there is a danger that such disclosures can become boiler plate.  It is hoped that best practice will evolve in this area” (Financial Reporting Review Panel, 2006. p. 2)​[128]​.

A further study was conducted in 2007, the by Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW); they published a report which investigated the implementation of IFRS in the annual reports of 200 European listed companies (ICAEW, 2007).  This study included a review of the DB pension scheme disclosures of 20 of these companies and it concluded that some of the disclosure requirements of IAS 19 had not been complied with; they noted that disclosures in relation to actuarial assumptions were poor and that: 
“IAS 19’s general requirement to disclose information to enable users of the financial statements to evaluate the nature of the defined benefit plans and the financial impacts of changes in those plans is hindered by lack of consistency in the layout and location of the pension disclosures.  Given the range of accounting options available, the lack of detail provided in the notes in some cases further inhibits the ability of users to evaluate the impact of the companies’ defined benefit plans.”  (ICAEW, 2007, p. 172)

A variety of disclosure practices were also found to exist, not only in the content of the information provided but also in the location of where companies chose to disclose that information in the annual reports.  Such conclusions have potential implications for accountability because they are likely to impact on stakeholders’ ability to hold the accountor to account and thus impede the full implementation of accountability in terms of Figure 3.3.  For example, the report highlighted that the accounting policy notes of these 20 companies varied significantly in length:
“…as some companies used the note to provide details of the plans and also the basis for the selection of assumptions or the assumptions themselves – details which other companies provided elsewhere in the notes to the financial statements”  (ICAEW, 2007, p. 174)

Thus, the ICEAW report also concluded that accountability in this area could be improved.  A similar report commissioned by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) (Dunne et al., 2008) illustrated the significance of the implementation of IAS 19; the ICAS report revealed that the accounting adjustments required by the international standard had had a significant detrimental impact on both the equity and net profit of a sample of UK listed companies and also accounted for a large proportion of the increase in post-IFRS implementation disclosure. 


The current empirical research differs from the work of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (2006), the ICAEW (2007) and Dunne et al. (2008) in several respects: (i) it examines the nature of UK pension scheme accountability relationships using interviews with a variety of stakeholders and attempts to relate these relationships to theoretical models of accountability as suggested in Figure 3.3; (ii) it analyses pension scheme disclosures made in the annual reports of the sponsoring employers and attempts to relate these disclosures to a theoretical model of accountability; (iii) it is longitudinal in nature, examining annual reports from 2000 to 2005 inclusive, and therefore it has the ability to compare corporate pension scheme disclosures made under three different accounting standards to assess whether accountability has improved since 2000; (iv) it almost doubles the size of previous samples​[129]​; and (v) it highlights voluntary disclosures that are being made in addition to those required by current financial reporting standards, for example, disclosures made in relation to scheme governance which should enhance accountability​[130]​. 

3.9	Summary and Conclusion
This chapter provides a context within which to understand complex pension scheme accountability relationships.  First, section 3.2 considered the general nature of accountability and specifically examined the model of accountability developed by Gray et al. (1987); it can be used to analyse ‘who’ is accountable to ‘whom’ and for ‘what’.  Section 3.3 explored a stakeholder approach to accountability whilst Section 3.4 considered the use of annual reports as a common mechanism used to discharge any accountability which might exist.  Section 3.5 examined how important the entity’s organisational context is for an assessment of accountability relationships and specifically introduced Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability which has been used in several studies to illustrate how different levels of accountability can be adopted in different contexts.  In particular, Figure 3.3 proposed a model to illustrate how accountability relationships operate in practice.  Section 3.7 identified potential accountability relationships in UK pension schemes by reference to Figure 2.2 and 3.3, whilst Section 3.8 considered how annual reports might be used to discharge that accountability.  Section 3.8.1 provided evidence to suggest that, unless a pension scheme is administered by a corporate trustee, stakeholders may have no option but to refer to the financial statements of the sponsoring employer for pension scheme information.  As such, section 3.8.2 summarised the accounting standards that have regulated how UK sponsoring employers account for, and disclose information in relation to, their pension schemes.  It also provided a comparison of the disclosure requirements of these standards.  Finally, a summary of the limited volume of prior research into UK pension scheme disclosures in the annual report of the sponsoring employer was provided.  The remainder of this thesis seeks to answer the following research questions:
RQ1	What accountability relationships are evident in the governance mechanisms 
of UK pension schemes? 

RQ2	How is accountability discharged in UK pension schemes?
  
Chapter 4 now provides a summary of the methodology employed to answer these questions.



Chapter 4
Research Design: Methodology and Methods

4.1	Introduction
Chapter 2 of this thesis established how UK pension schemes are regulated and identified similarities between their governance and that of corporate entities.  Chapter 3 summarised the accountability literature and illustrated how the Gray et al. (1987) model of accountability might be used to establish potential UK pension scheme accountability relationships; that chapter also showed how the Stewart (1984) model of accountability could be used to illustrate the different types of accountability discharged within each of these relationships.  The current chapter considers the specific research design that is used to investigate these accountability relationships within the current thesis.  Section 4.2 begins by summarising the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework of philosophical assumptions; these authors argue that the research approach adopted by social scientists is dependant upon a variety of assumptions about “…the nature of the social world and the way in which it may be investigated” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 1).  Based on that framework, Section 4.3 rationalises the choice of research methods used to underpin the analysis in this thesis.  Sections 4.4 and 4.5 explain how interviews and content analysis have been used to gather the empirical evidence for this thesis and Section 4.6 concludes.



4.2	Philosophical Assumptions and Research Methodology: Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979) Framework 

4.2.1	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science
Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that it is possible to classify assumptions about the nature of social science into four categories: (i) ontology; (ii) epistemology; (iii) human nature; and (iv) methodology.  Ontological assumptions relate to whether the phenomena under investigation are external to an individual or the product of their consciousness; these assumptions query whether the:
“…reality to be investigated is external to the individual – imposing itself on individual consciousness; whether “reality” is of an “objective” nature, or the product of individual consciousness; whether “reality” is a given “out there” in the world, or the product of one’s mind” (p. 1)​[131]​.
 
Alternatively, epistemological assumptions are concerned with how the researcher understands the world and communicates that knowledge to others; Burrell and Morgan (1979) describe knowledge as being either capable of identification and communication and thus “…hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form” (p. 1) or “…softer, more subjective, spiritual or even transcendental…based on experience and insight of a unique and essentially personal nature” (p. 2).   

Assumptions about human nature address the relationship between human beings and their environment.  These assumptions are concerned with whether human behaviour is a product of the environment (as such, human behaviour is mechanistic and can be determined) or alternatively, whether the environment is created by human behaviour.  Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that “…different ontologies, epistemologies and models of human nature are likely to incline social scientists towards different methodologies” (p. 2); methodologies are associated with the different ways that one can investigate and obtain knowledge.  These authors also argue that each of these four categories of assumptions has two opposite dimensions resulting in a subjective or an objective approach to social science research.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the polar positions of these basic assumptions.

Figure 4.1: The Subjective-Objective Dimensions of the Assumptions Relevant to Understanding Social Science Research
 Figure 4.1 demonstrates that nominalism is located at the subjective end of the ontology spectrum and that realism is more objective; the nominalist argues that there is no real structure to the world and that the terms used to describe it are merely names, concepts and labels “...for describing, making sense of and negotiating the external world” (p. 4).  At the more objective extreme, the realist believes that the world exists external to the individual, that it is imposed from out-with and is “…made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 4).

In Figure 4.1, anti-positivism is opposed to positivism on the epistemology spectrum; Burrell and Morgan (1979) maintain that the anti-positivist sees everything as relative, the search for underlying laws and regularities is therefore futile and the social world “…can only be understood from the point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 5).  Conversely, the positivist searches for relationships between the component parts of the social world, seeking to explain and predict behaviour and argues that behaviour can be observed.  At the opposite end of the human nature spectrum, Figure 4.1 suggests that voluntarism characterises human nature; Burrell and Morgan (1979) contend that voluntarists believe that an individual is independent of his surroundings, is free-willed and can make autonomous decisions.  Alternatively, the determinists believe that the environment within which an individual operates influences his behaviour and that his activities are a product of that situation.

Burrell and Morgan (1979) claim that the methodologies adopted by researchers are determined by their ontological, epistemological and human nature assumptions and that these methodological assumptions also lie along a subjective-objective spectrum; for example, at the subjective extreme, the ideographic approach addresses: 
“…an understanding of the way in which the individual creates, modifies and interprets the world in which he or she finds himself” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 3).  

Such an approach emphasises the uniqueness of the individual, as opposed to an analysis of relationships and regularities, and suggests that the social world can only be understood by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the research subject.  As such, diaries, biographies and journalistic records are commonly employed in this type of research.  Conversely, the nomothetic approach concentrates on the analysis of relationships and regularities and the ways in which they can be expressed.  Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that:
“…[t]he methodological issues of importance are thus the concepts themselves, their measurement and the identification of underlying themes.  This perspective expresses itself most forcefully in a search for universal laws which explain and govern the reality which is being observed.” (p. 3)

These authors argue that hypothesis testing is very prominent at this extreme and quantitative scientific tests such as surveys, questionnaires, personality traits and other standardised research instruments are commonly utilised.  

4.2.2	Assumptions about the Nature of Society
In addition to the above assumptions, Burrell and Morgan (1979) also suggest that different assumptions exist regarding the nature of society itself, describing these assumptions as the sociology of regulation and the sociology of radical change.  These opposing theories are illustrated in Table 4.1 below:

Table 4.1: Two theories of society: order and conflict
The ‘order’ or ‘integrationist’ view of society emphasis:	The ‘conflict’ or ‘coercion’ view of society emphasis:
StabilityIntegrationFunctional co-ordinationConsensus	ChangeConflictDisintegrationCoercion
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 10)
Burrell and Morgan (1979) note that the labels of order and conflict have some limitations​[132]​ and so replace them with the concepts of regulation and radical change.  These authors maintain that researchers who adopt a sociology of regulation approach seek to explain that society operates in a unified and cohesive manner, is formed from logical processes and is uninfluenced by human actions.  Supporters of this approach believe that the preservation of the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration and cohesion, solidarity, need satisfaction and actuality are important.  Alternatively, researchers who adopt a sociology of radical change approach search for reasons to explain radical change and conflict within society; they assume that society is formed as the result of the conflict of individuals and the emergence of dominant groups.  Supporters of this approach are concerned with radical change, structural conflict, modes of domination, contradiction, emancipation, deprivation and potentiality.

Burrell and Morgan (1979) explore the relationships between these two sets of assumptions by suggesting that both can be thought of along a subjective-objective continuum and can thus be used as a mechanism for analysing social theory as described in Section 4.2.3 below.  

4.2.3	Four Potential Paradigms of Social Theory
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that four distinct paradigms of social theory emerge from their analysis of these assumptions and these are illustrated in Figure 4.2.  These authors describe the four paradigms as functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist and suggest that each paradigm serves as a collection of:
“…very basic meta-theoretical assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate within them.  It is a term which is intended to emphasise the commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded as approaching social theory within the bounds of the same problematic.”  (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 23)

They also argue that the four paradigms are mutually exclusive.

Figure 4.2: Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Classification of Social Science Research












(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 22)

The functionalist paradigm draws on assumptions from both the sociology of regulation and the objectivist perspective.  Those who operate in this paradigm seek to explain the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, solidarity, need satisfaction and actuality, adopting realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic approaches.  Such a perspective is usually “…highly pragmatic in orientation [and] concerned to understand society in a way which generates knowledge which can be put to use” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 26); thus such researchers are problem-orientated and attempt to find practical solutions to real world problems.  Although the functionalist and interpretivist paradigms both share assumptions based in the sociology of regulation, the latter adopts a subjective perspective.  Whilst the interpretivist also seeks to “…understand the world as it is” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 28) such researchers argue that it can only be understood from the perspective of the participant rather than an observer.  Thus, those who operate in this paradigm employ approaches which are nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic seeing the world as “…an emergent social process which is created by the individuals concerned” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 28).

Alternatively, the radical humanist paradigm draws on assumptions from both the sociology of radical change and the subjectivist perspective.  It is dedicated to “…over-throwing or transcending the limitations of existing social arrangements” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 32) by providing a critique of the status quo and using approaches that are nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic.  The radical humanist paradigm is similar to the radical functionalist in that they both share assumptions based in the sociology of radical change, however, the radical functionalist paradigm has an objective perspective.  Therefore, whilst the radical functionalist is also committed to change, emancipation and potentiality, such researchers “concentrate upon structural relationships within a realist social world” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 34).  Thus, those who operate in this paradigm employ approaches which are realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic and argue that political and economic crisis produce radical change.

4.2.4	A Critique of the Burrell and Morgan (1979) Framework
A variety of researchers have presented arguments that challenge the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework presented above.  For example, Chua (1986) criticised several aspects of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework and argued that accounting research has not been influenced by multiple and divergent assumptions as described above, but by a single set of dominant assumptions.  She argued that the use of the mutually exclusive dichotomies does not accommodate certain perspectives of society; for example, those that are “…continually reproduced and transformed by intentional human action” (Chua, 1986, p. 626) or those structures of domination that Habermas (1978) argued are still influenced by “…individuals [that] do act and shape meanings” (Chua, 1986, p. 626).  She also argued that the framework adopted a “…strongly relativistic notion of scientific truth and reason” (Chua, 1986, p. 626) because Burrell and Morgan had misinterpreted the original work of Kuhn (1970).  In doing so, they falsely stated that paradigm choice and evaluation cannot be rationally or scientifically justified.  Finally, she questioned the distinction made between the radical humanist and the radical structuralist paradigms, suggesting that such a separation is not well supported in the sociology literature.  She concluded by identifying three paradigms of accounting research: (i) the mainstream; (ii) the interpretive; and (iii) the critical.  She also suggested that assumptions about accounting perspectives can be classified into the alternative categories of “…knowledge, the empirical phenomena under study and the relationship between theory and the practical world of human affairs” (Chua, 1986, p. 603)​[133]​. 

Likewise, Boland (1989) argued that, although the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework embraced the subjectivist perspective and freed “…discourse from the objectivist corner in which it had been trapped” (p. 592), acceptance of the objective-subjective continuum poses a fundamental problem for subjectivists because it suggests that researchers are either one type or another.  Indeed, Michaelson (2010) argues that, although the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework sets the scene for a model, stereo-typical PhD thesis, alternative frameworks are available and should be encouraged;   researchers should not feel compelled to place their work in the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework, that they need not always “…engage with a qualitative/quantitative dualism…; let alone disentangle method from methodology” (Michaelson, 2010, p. 66).  However, Laughlin (1995)​[134]​ argues that “…theoretical and methodological choices are inevitably made whether appreciated or not” (p. 65).  Despite theses criticisms, the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework is adopted for the purposes of this thesis and the following section demonstrates where the current research is placed in terms of Figure 4.2.  

4.3	Research Objectives and the Selected Research Methods
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the extent of the accountability relationships that exist within UK pension schemes, however, the governance structures that form and regulate these relationships are often opaque (see Chapter 2).  Thus, it is first necessary to clarify how UK pension schemes are governed (see Section 5.3) before the resulting accountability relationships can be examined (see Section 5.5 and Chapter 6).  

To do so, this research assumes that the governance and accountability mechanisms that operate within UK pension schemes, and the people that implement them (see Figure 2.1 for a description of UK pension scheme stakeholders), are real and exist independently from the mind of the participant and the researcher.  This assumption is not unreasonable because UK pension schemes are heavily regulated and so certain activities are expected to, and required, to take place (see Chapter 2).  As the thesis uses stakeholder perceptions to illustrate how these mechanisms operate in practice, Chapter 5 adopts a nominalist approach to report interviews with these stakeholders and produce a qualitative interpretation of the governance and accountability mechanisms that exist in practice within UK pension schemes; further analysis establishes the extent of the identified accountability relationships in terms of both the Gray et al. (1987) and Stewart (1984) models of accountability.  Alternatively, Chapter 6 reports a primarily quantitative analysis of the pension scheme disclosures made in the annual reports of a sample of UK sponsoring employers; further analysis in Section 6.3.3 combines this quantitative analysis with a qualitative interpretation of the extent of the accountability contained therein.  In both Chapters 5 and 6, no attempt is made to predict behaviour and the research adopts an anti-positivist view; thus the research seeks to understand the point of view of the stakeholders who are directly involved in the governance and accountability of UK pension schemes.

Consideration of the assumptions relating to human nature are slightly more complex in the context of UK pension schemes due to their highly regulated nature.  In these circumstances, UK pension scheme stakeholders are not free-willed and, to a certain extent, the environment within which they operate will determine their behaviour.  However, Clark (2008) suggests that UK pension scheme governance operates using many different models (see Chapter 2) and thus it is assumed that UK pension scheme stakeholders have some element of choice in implementing governance and accountability mechanisms in their schemes.  As such, this research adopts a voluntarist approach.  The above discussion demonstrates that the current research adopts subjective ontological, epistemological and human nature assumptions which in turn influence the choice of interviews, an ideographic methodology.  Although content analysis might be considered to be a nomothetic methodology (Neuendorf, 2002) the results are used to interpret the different types of accountability that are discharged in the annual reports of a sample of UK sponsoring employers.  These assumptions, combined with the researcher’s view of the world as “…an emergent social process which is created by the individuals concerned” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 28), places the current research in the interpretive paradigm.  Kvale (2007) suggests that it is difficult to find a common definition of qualitative research but that most have common themes, these include the analysis of: (i) the experiences of individuals or groups; (ii) the interactions and communications between individuals or groups; and (iii) documents.  In this thesis, all three of these themes are addressed by the research methods employed: (i) interviews; and (ii) content analysis which are explained in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. 

4.4	Interviews
Interviews are used extensively by the mass media, professional services and academic researchers, particularly in qualitative research (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008).  Indeed, Bryman (2001) suggests that they are probably the most commonly used research method in qualitative research.  The structure of these interviews can vary in practice (for example, structured or semi-structured​[135]​ face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews or group interviews) (Bryman, 2001; Creswell, 2003).  Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) further classify the different types of interview into three categories: (i) positivist​[136]​; (ii) emotionalist​[137]​; (iii) constructionist​[138]​.  Despite these different formats and classifications, there are common underlying principles and assumptions, the main one being that the purpose of the interview “…is to find out what is in and on someone else’s mind…[and] to access the perspective of the person being interviewed (Patton, 1990, p. 278)​[139]​.

Kvale (2007) identifies seven stages to an interview including (i) thematising; (ii) designing; (iii) interview; (iv) transcribing; (v) analysing; (vi) verifying and (vii) reporting.  Thematising refers to the “…formulation of research questions and a theoretical clarification of the theme investigated” (p. 37)​[140]​.  Erikson and Kovalainen (2008) suggest that the designing stage includes the consideration of the various types of questions that can be asked; these include questions that are: (i) open or closed; simple or complex; (ii) natural or leading; (iii) direct or indirect; and (iv) primary or secondary.  During the interview, Patton (1990) contends that “…the way a question is worded is one of the most important elements determining how the interviewee will respond…asking questions is an art” (p. 295).  

Jankowicz (2005) suggests that the interviews should be recorded systematically and that hand-written notes should also be taken if possible; Erikson and Kovalainen (2008) explain that they may also be videotaped, however, in most cases the interview will also be transcribed for subsequent analysis​[141]​.  Jankowicz (2005) suggests that content analysis may be used on interview transcriptions; alternatively Creswell (2003) maintains that the analysis of interviews is more of a generic process involving reflection, asking analytical questions, developing an analysis from the information supplied by the participants, generating and selecting categories of information to be positioned within a theoretical model and finally “…explicating a story from the interconnection of these categories” (p. 191).  Kvale (2007) explains the verification process as the inclusion of “…reliability and validity checks…throughout the project, including interviewer and scorer reliability, and the validity of interpretations” (p. 37).  

Finally, with regard to way that the findings of interviews are reported, these will differ according to whether a qualitative or quantitative approach has been adopted and, in a qualitative context, the results are likely to be presented in a descriptive form (Creswell, 2003): 
“…the final project will be a construction of the informant’s experiences and the meanings he attaches to them.  This will allow readers to vicariously experience the challenges he encounters and provide a lens through which readers can view the subject’s world.” (p. 205)  

Creswell (2003) identifies several advantages of using interviews including: (i) their use when research participants cannot be directly observed; (ii) historical information can be provided during the interview; and (iii) the researcher can control the questions being asked.  Similarly, he notes the disadvantages: (i) the perceptions of the interviewees are a form of indirect evidence; (ii) the interview is unlikely to take place in the natural setting of the interviewee; (iii) the presence of the researcher may bias the participants’ responses; and (iv) all of the interviewees will not be equally articulate and perceptive (Creswell, 2003). 

The empirical work in this thesis involved interviews with 21 UK pension scheme stakeholders; these interviews had two aims: (i) to clarify the accountability relationships that are evident in the governance mechanisms of UK pension schemes; and (ii) to identify the different types of accountability that are discharged therein.  These aims were achieved by conducting semi-structured face-to-face interviews; details of the interviewees are provided in Table 5.1.  The interviewees were selected to ensure that there was an interviewee from each of the stakeholder groups shown in Figure 2.1​[142]​ and therefore included parties that were both internal and external to the pension scheme.  The selection of topics for discussion during the interviews was informed by the literature review and a review of the PR’s web-based documentation and related to: (i) the profile of both the sponsoring employer and the pension scheme; (ii) the governance structure within the pension scheme and any recent changes or improvements in this process; (iii) the discharge of accountability in the annual report of the pension scheme and/or any other media; and (iv) the stakeholder perceptions of the reporting requirements of FRS 17 and IAS 19.  Thus the first two stages of the interviews (thematising and design) were based around the governance and accountability literature; more detailed questions were subsequently formulated and Appendix 5 contains a detailed description of the questions asked of each stakeholder group​[143]​.  The remaining stages of the interview process were addressed as follows: at the beginning of each interview, the nature of the research was explained and confidentiality guaranteed.  The interviews lasted for about 1 hour and were semi-structured (in terms of the discussion topics) thus allowing some flexibility for the interviewees to explore topics of interest.  All, except two of the interviews (at the request of the interviewees), were recorded and fully transcribed, however, detailed notes were also taken by the researcher during each interview.  For the two that were not transcribed, detailed notes were taken, typed and referred back to the interviewee for confirmation.  All of the interviews were then analysed manually on a grid where each question was allocated its own row and each interviewee his/her own column (the columns were also categorised by stakeholder group).  The interviewee’s answer to each question was then summarised and noted in the relevant cell.  Interesting quotations were also noted at that point.  This process allowed the researcher to get an overall impression of the views of different stakeholders and stakeholder groups on a variety of issues.  The results of these interviews are reported in both Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.  The following section describes content analysis as the second research method used to analyse the accountability of UK pension schemes that is discharged in the annual report of the sponsoring employer. 

4.5	  Content Analysis
According to both Krippendorff (2004) and Bryman (2001), content analysis was first defined by Berelson in 1952​[144]​ this original definition made reference to the objective and systematic quantification of communication.  Krippendorff (2004) further develops and refines Berelson’s (1952) definition to describe content analysis as a research technique which is employed to make “…replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18)​[145]​.  Likewise, Bryman (2001) describes content analysis as:
“An approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner” (p. 180).


Further clarity is provided by Denscombe (2007) who illustrates how content analysis achieves its objectives; these details are reproduced in Table 4.2. 

Table 4.2: Details of how content analysis achieves it objectives
Content analysis
…reveals1 What the text establishes as relevant2 The priorities portrayed through the text3 The values conveyed in the text4 How ideas are related	…by measuringWhat is contained (e.g. particular words, ideas)How frequently it occurs; in what order it occursPositive and negative views on thingsProximity of ideas within the text, logical association
(Denscombe, 2007, p. 238)

Based on selected criteria, a piece of text is counted, categorised, coded and further analysed; the underlying assumption being that the larger the volume of disclosure, the more important the disclosure is to the preparers or users of that text (Gray et al., 1995; Crawford et al., 2008; Dunne et al., 2008; Finningham, 2010).  Krippendorff (2004) argues that to be effective, the content analysis must be reliable​[146]​ and valid​[147]​, however, Dunne et al. (2008) suggest that this research method is always likely to contain some element of subjectivity because data coding and classification involves researcher choice​[148]​.  For example, Milne and Ardler (1999) report the results of a study that tested the inter-coder reliability of the content analysis of corporate social and environmental disclosures; they concluded that, whilst aggregate total disclosure counted by different researchers was reliable, its allocation to sub-categories of disclosure was less reliable.  

Both Bryman (2001) and Krippendorff (2004) maintain that, before a researcher embarks upon content analysis, the research questions must first be specified.  Bryman (2001) explains that this is necessary because the research questions will ultimately guide the selection of the media to be analysed and its subsequent coding; they also tend to address the following issues:
“…who (gets reported); what (gets reported); where (does the issue get reported); location (of coverage within the items analysed); how much (gets reported); …why (does the issue get reported)…[and] how far does the amount of coverage of the issue change over time” (p. 180)​[149]​.

Consequently, there is an element of overlap between these issues and Figure 3.3; for example, both are interested in the parties involved in the production of the information (the accountee and the accountor in Figure 3.3) and what gets reported (Stewart’s ladder of accountability in Figure 3.3).  These issues are also very similar to the notions inherent in the research questions developed in Chapter 3.  Thus, content analysis can be used to address issues of accountability and is an entirely appropriate research method to adopt in the current empirical work.  

Denscombe (2007) describes the procedures associated with content analysis as follows: (i) select an appropriate sample of text or images​[150]​; (ii) disaggregate the data into smaller component parts and identify the unit of analysis​[151]​; (iii) develop relevant categories for analysing the data​[152]​; (iv) code the units of analysis in line with the categories identified; (v) count the frequency with which the units of analysis occur; and (vi) further analysis​[153]​.  

Like Denscombe (2007), Krippendorff (2004) suggests that, subsequent to the establishment of the research questions, data are the starting point for the content analysis; the “…[d]ata are taken as givens - that is, the researcher is not in doubt as to what they are” (p. 30).  In the current empirical work the data consists of the pension scheme disclosures made in the annual reports of a selection of FTSE 100 companies between 2000 and 2005.  A representative sample (Carney, 1971; Kassarjian, 1977; Dunne, 2003; Krippendorff, 2004) of these companies’ annual reports is required and that process is described in Section 4.5.1. 

When determining the unit of analysis, Bryman (2001) suggests three alternatives:  (i) words; (ii) subjects and themes; and (iii) dispositions​[154]​.  In practice, however, many units of analysis can be used (for example, sentences, lines of text, paragraphs or space measures of text such as centimetres) and there is much debate in the extant literature as to which unit of analysis is best (Gray et al., 1995).  The unit of analysis chosen in the current empirical work is the proportion of the page that is dedicated to pension scheme disclosures (see Section 4.5.2.  This unit of measurement was selected for two reasons; first, Unerman (2000), who compared it to the use of sentences as the unit of analysis, suggests that, although sentences provide more accurate measure, the proportion of the page is likely to provide more relevant results​[155]​.  Second, many studies have used it in a reliable way (see for example Gray et al., 1995; Dunne, 2003; Crawford et al., 2008; Dunne et al., 2008; Finnigan, 2010).

Carney (1971) suggests that a framework is required to develop categories for coding the data.  The framework used in the current empirical work is based on the disclosure requirements of IAS 19 (see Section 4.5.2) and consequently, these disclosure categories are pre-determined by the IASB.  Although the use of pre-determined categories of disclosure will help eliminate some subjectivity when it comes to categorising the data (Dunne et al., 2008), it is possible to further minimise subjectivity, and the risk of researcher bias, by completing a pilot study.  Details of the pilot study conducted in the current empirical work are provided in Section 4.5.4.  Finally, the coding and counting exercises were conducted in the first six months of 2008 and an analysis of their findings is reported in Chapter 6.

Brymer (2001) summarises the many advantages of content analysis: (i) it is a transparent method of research and so can be easily replicated; (ii) longitudinal analysis is possible; (iii) it is an unobtrusive research method so far as the participants in the study are concerned; (iv) it is a very flexible method which can be applied to a wide variety of material; and (v) by using content analysis to analyse different types of media, access can be gained to social groups, that otherwise, would be difficult to gain access to.  Similarly, the disadvantages are identified as follows: (i) the results of the content analysis are dependant upon the authenticity, credibility and representativeness of the media upon which it is based; (ii) an element of subjectivity is always likely to exist when material is coded by the researcher; (iii) it is difficult to comment with certainty on the underlying meanings of the media under investigation; (iv) content analysis does not explain why material has been (or has not been) published/written; and (v) some commentators have claimed that content analysis can be atheoretical​[156]​.

Despite these misgivings, content analysis has been widely used as a valid method of conducting research (Krippendorff, 2004), particularly in the last 100 years.  Krippendorff (2004) explains that, although the systematic analysis of text can be traced back to the 1600s, it was the mass production of newsprint at the beginning of the 20th century that motivated the first “…quantitative newspaper analysis” (p. 5).  In the 1930s the emergence of behaviour and social sciences, combined with concerns about the economic and political information communicated by the mass media, initiated a “…second phase in the intellectual growth of content analysis” (p. 6); it was also extensively used during World War II to analyse propaganda.  Since then, content analysis has been used in numerous academic disciplines and computer software has been employed in text analysis​[157]​ (Krippendorff, 2004).  

Content analysis has also been used to investigate many different aspects of accounting.  Jones and Shoemaker (1994) provide a critical analysis of 68 studies of accounting narratives; 36 of them focus on themes that are produced within a text and such studies were found to include:
 “…managements’ attitudes, correlations between narrative disclosures and financial reporting, predictions of key variables in tax court cases, the impact of comment letters in response to FASB exposure drafts, and the assessment of compliance with prescribed standards” (p. 175).

The other 32 studies relate to the readability of accounting narratives from which the authors conclude:
“…accounting narratives, particularly in corporate annual reports, are difficult/very difficult to read.  Wider conclusions about the understandability of accounting narratives are, however, problematic as the exact relationship between readability and understandability has yet to be determined” (p. 175).

More recently, Beattie et al. (2004) explain how accounting researchers have increasingly focused their interests on the determinants of disclosure and the capital market consequences; these authors categorise content analysis studies into those that use: (i) subjective ratings​[158]​ (see for example Lang and Lundholm, 1993); (ii) disclosure indices​[159]​ (for example see Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Camfferman, 1997; Schleicher, 1998; Robb, Single and Zarzeski, 2001); (iii) thematic analysis (see for example Rutherford, 2002) (iv) an assessment of the readability of the narratives; and (v) linguistic analysis (for example see Roseberry, 1995; Sydserff and Weetman, 1999).  Thus, content analysis has been widely used as a valid method in accounting research and the following sections explain how it has been adopted in the current empirical study.   

4.5.1	Sample Choice and Sampling Unit
The current empirical work seeks to investigate the nature and magnitude of changes made in the pension disclosures in the annual reports of a sample of FTSE 100 sponsoring employers between 2000 and 2005.  It might be argued that an increase in disclosure might also be associated with an increase in accountability and this suggestion is further investigated in Section 6.3 of the thesis.  Table 4.3 gives details of the sample which was drawn from an original population of the FTSE 100 at 31st December 2005.

Table 4.3: Content Analysis Sample Details

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
Total Population	100	100	100	100	100	100	600
Companies excluded because: 							
annual reports not available 	(24)	(24)	(24)	(24)	(24)	(24)	(144)
merger/de-merger	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(42)
Population available to sample	69	69	69	69	69	69	414
Routinely excluded from sample	(35)	(35)	(35)	(35)	(35)	(35)	(210)
Routinely selected sample	34	34	34	34	34	34	204
Re-introduced to the sample	2	2	2	2	2	2	12
Subsequently excluded		(1)					(1)
Total sample	36	35	36	36	36	36	215
Note: This table shows sample selection details

The websites of all 100 companies were visited to identify the annual reports that were available electronically for all six years.  Where this was not the case, the missing year was noted and the procurement of a hard copy of the annual report for that year was investigated.  Twenty four companies were excluded because a copy of the annual reports could not be obtained for all six years.  A further seven companies were also excluded because, during the relevant time period, they had participated in a merger or a de-merger.  The remaining 69 companies were then available for sample selection and it was decided to sample every second company, resulting in the selection of 34 companies.  Chapter 5 reports the results of 21 interviews with a variety of pension scheme stakeholders, seven of which were associated with a FTSE 100 sponsoring employer (Table 5.1).  The routine sampling exercise described above resulted in the inclusion of five of these seven FTSE 100 employers in the content analysis.  For the sake of completeness, it was therefore decided to re-introduce the other two companies, thereby increasing the number of sampled companies to 36.  In total, 215 annual reports produced by 36 companies (with the exception of 35​[160]​ in 2001) were analysed for the purposes of this research​[161]​, details of which are provided in Table 4.4.  

The first column of this table provides the company name and the second column shows the sector allocated to that company by the stock exchange industry level 2 classifications (nine sectors in total).  To ensure that each sector contained a reasonable number of companies, these nine sectors (column two of Table 4.4) were further re-classified into five (see column three of Table 4.4): (i) the financial sector; (ii) extractive industries; (iii) consumer goods; (iv) consumer services; and (v) industrials and utilities.  
 



Table 4.4: Description of companies included in the Sample
Company	Stock Exchange Industry Level 2 Classification	Sector	EmployeeNumbersin 2005	NetAssets (£m)at 2005
Alliance & Leicester	Financials	1	7,296	1,901
Barclays	Financials		92,800	24,430
British Land Company	Financials		715	5,579
Friends Provident 	Financials		4,968	3,940
HSBC Holdings	Financials		265,285	57,217
Legal & General Group	Financials		9,273	4,936
Lloyds TSB Group	Financials		70,000	10,195
Man Group	Financials		2,888	2,424
Northern Rock	Financials		4,569	1,576
Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group	Financials		25,292	3,134
Anglo American	Basic Materials	2	195,000	16,064
Johnson Matthey	Basic Materials		7,532	869
Rio Tinto	Basic Materials		27,824	7,507
BG Group	Oil and Gas		5,363	6,280
BP Group	Oil and Gas		96,200	47,046
Shell	Oil and Gas		109,000	57,041
Associated British Foods	Consumer Goods	3	42,375	3,696
Cadbury Schweppes	Consumer Goods		58,581	3,035
Diageo	Consumer Goods		22,966	3,834
Imperial Tobacco Group	Consumer Goods		14,910	140
Reckitt Benckiser	Consumer Goods		20,300	1,856
Scottish & Newcastle	Consumer Goods		15,600                  	3,046
Unilever	Consumer Goods		212,000	8,361
GlaxoSmithKline	Healthcare		99,503	7,570
Shire	Healthcare		2,090	4,083
Kingfisher	Consumer Services	4	64,320	4,924
Pearson	Consumer Services		32,203	3,733
Reuters Group	Consumer Services		15,864	570
Tesco	Consumer Services		242,980	9,057
Whitbread	Consumer Services		53,484	2,208
WPP Group	Consumer Services		70,936	3,986
Sage Group	Technology		8,686	858
Corus Group	Industrials	5	48,600	3,378
Smiths Group	Industrials		28,509	1,205
Centrica	Utilities		35,410	2,442
United Utilities	Utilities		15,935	3,119
Note: This table provides the name of the sampled companies, their sector classification, employee numbers (in 2005) and net assets (£m at 2005).  The stock exchange industry level 2 classifications were used to re-categorise the sample companies into five sectors where 1 represents the financial sector; 2 represents extractive industries; 3 represents consumer goods; 4 represents consumer services; and 5 represents industrials and utilities. 

These five sectors are represented by the numbers 1-5 respectively; columns four and five of Table 4.4 report the number of employees and net assets for each company in 2005​[162]​ in that order.
4.5.2	The Proportion of a Page as a Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis utilised in the content analysis was the proportion of a page used to disclose pension scheme information.  An A4 grid, which was divided into one hundred boxes, was reproduced onto acetate (Appendix 6​[163]​) and placed over the text.  It was then possible to calculate the proportion of the text that was devoted to pension disclosures; these disclosures were then categorised and recorded on a template/record sheet (Appendix 7).  The total number of pages in the annual report was also noted which allowed the percentage of the total annual report to be calculated.  

4.5.3	Categorisation of the Data: IAS 19 Disclosure Requirements
IAS 19 requires the disclosure of the following categories of information: (i) the accounting policy; (ii) a general description of the plan; (iii) a reconciliation of the assets and liabilities recognised in the Statement of Financial Position​[164]​; (iv) the amounts included in the fair value of the pension plan’s assets for the enterprises’ own financial instruments or any property occupied by the sponsoring employer; (v) a reconciliation showing the movements during the period in the net liability/asset recognised in the Statement of Financial Position; (vi) an analysis of the total expense; (vii) the actual return on the pension plan’s assets; and (viii) the principal actuarial assumptions employed by the scheme.  As the empirical work involves the categorisation of the pension scheme disclosures in accordance with the requirements of IAS 19, the content analysis decision rules (see Appendix 8) describe how this is done in practice.  Whilst a pilot study is required to enhance the objectivity and academic rigour of the content analysis, it is also required because the process of developing the decision rules is iterative; the first pilot study researcher is likely to refine and hone the decision rules during the pilot study.  Consequently, when the second pilot study researcher embarks on the pilot study, the finalised decision rules are likely to be more robust, thus contributing towards the reliability and validity of the empirical work.  A description of the pilot study used in the current thesis is described in Section 4.5.4.
  
4.5.4	Pilot Study
A pilot study was used to determine the appropriateness of the unit of analysis and the categories of disclosure.  Two comparative companies from outside the sample were used for this purpose (The Pilkington Group and British Airways).  During the pilot study, it was recognised that pension scheme disclosures were not made exclusively in the notes to the financial statements.  Typically, companies made disclosures throughout the annual report including the non-financial statement section of the annual report (for example the Chairman’s Report, the Operating and Financial Review and the Director’s Report), the financial statements, the accounting policy note and the other notes to the financial statements.  Therefore, the full content of the annual report were analysed for the purposes of this research.

Using the decision rules described in Appendix 8, the pilot study was replicated by a second researcher and the decision rules refined; for example, the decision rules that explain how disclosures are allocated to the above categories when a company produces one table that relates to several of the above items were added.  Subsequent to the agreement of the decision rules and the completion of the pilot study, the main sample of annual reports was analysed.  

4.6	Conclusion
This chapter examined methodological issues and ultimately explained why the research design adopted in this thesis was chosen to analyse the accountability relationships that exist in UK pension schemes.  The Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework was summarised and its limitations noted.  Despite these limitations, the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework was deemed appropriate for the current empirical work explanations were provided as to why it was placed in the interpretive paradigm.  This chapter also demonstrated why the research methods of (i) interviews and (ii) content analysis are appropriate to answer the main research questions of this thesis.  Consequently, a selection of extant literature relating to both interviews and content analysis was provided.  That literature helped explain: (i) the nature of these research methods; (ii) their advantages and disadvantages; and (iii) how they were employed in the current research.  The following chapters now report the results of the empirical analysis that used these research methods to answer the following research questions:
RQ 1: What accountability relationships are evident in the governance mechanisms of UK pension schemes? 

RQ 2: How is accountability discharged in UK pension schemes?




Chapter 5
Understanding UK Pension Scheme Governance and Accountability 

5.1	Introduction 
In an attempt to make the governance of UK pension schemes more transparent, this chapter investigates stakeholder perceptions of UK pension scheme governance processes and assesses the extent of the accountability relationships contained therein.    Before an assessment of the accountability relationships can be made, an awareness of the governance processes that regulate them is considered necessary.  Specifically, the chapter reports the results of 21 semi-structured interviews with representatives from each of the stakeholder groups as shown in Figure 2.2; these interviews were conducted between January 2006 and May 2007.  The selection of discussion topics was informed by the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis and a review of the PR’s web-based documentation.  The topics discussed​[165]​ included: first, the profile of the interviewees and, where appropriate, the characteristics of their associated sponsoring employer and/or pension scheme; second, the existing governance structure within each pension scheme including: (i) the nature and composition of the board of trustees; (ii) the operation of the board of trustees; and (iii) the governance roles of each of the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.2​[166]​; and third, any recent changes or improvements in UK pension scheme governance as described by the interviewees.  These results are reported in section 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.  Thus, the first half of this chapter establishes the governance mechanisms that operate in practice in UK pension schemes; once these governance practices have been clarified, it is then possible to establish the resulting accountability relationships (RQ1) in accordance with the first component established in Figure 3.3.  The second half of this chapter analyses how the interviewees perceive that their accountability has been discharged (RQ2) in accordance with the second component in Figure 3.3 and the results of the empirical work are reported in section 5.5.  Section 5.6 offers a discussion of the findings and concludes.

5.2	Interviewees, Sponsoring Employers and their Pension Schemes
Table 5.1 provides a short description of each of the interviewees.  Panel A of Table 5.1 shows that seven of the interviewees had a direct association with a pension scheme, including three trustees​[167]​ and four pension scheme officers.  The official titles of the pension scheme officers were: (i) an Investment Director; (ii) a Financial Director; (iii) a Pensions and Shares Manager; and (iv) a Chief Financial Officer.  

Six of the interviewees worked for the sponsoring employer of a UK pension scheme (one Human Resource Director and five finance officers) as described in Panel B of Table 5.1.  The remaining eight interviewees (Panel C) are external pension scheme stakeholders (two auditors, two fund managers, a pensioner, a pension fund advisor, a regulator and an actuary).  With the exception of the two multi-employer schemes​[168]​, the sponsoring employer associated with the interviewees was either a FTSE 100 or FTSE 250 company and the interviewees worked in a variety of locations throughout the UK.  
Table 5.1: A Profile of the Interviewees and their Associated Sponsoring Employers
Code	Job Title	Sponsoring Employer	Location
Panel A: Stakeholders Directly Associated with a Pension Scheme
TE1*	Employer Nominated Trustee	FTSE 100	London
TE2	Independent Trustee (Professional)	n/a	Perth
TE3*	Employer Nominated Trustee	FTSE 100	London
PO1*	Pension Fund Investment Director	FTSE 100	London
PO2*	Finance Director of pension scheme	Multi-employer Scheme	London
PO3*	Group Pensions and Shares Manager	FTSE 100	Edinburgh
PO4*	Chief Financial Officer of pension scheme	Multi-employer Scheme	Liverpool
Panel B: Stakeholders Associated with the Sponsoring Employer 
HR1*	Human Resource Director	FTSE 100	Edinburgh
FO1*	Accounting Principles Manager	FTSE 100	London
FO2*	Financial Accountant	FTSE 100	London
FO3*	Financial Accountant	FTSE 250	London
FO4*	Chief Financial Officer	FTSE 250	London
FO5*	Finance Director	FTSE 250	Glasgow
Panel C: External Pension Scheme Stakeholders 
AU1	Pensions Assurance Director (Big 4)	n/a	Glasgow
AU2	Pensions Manager (Big 4)	n/a	Glasgow
FM1	Fund Manager	n/a	Edinburgh
FM2	Fund Manager	n/a	Edinburgh
UP1	Pensioner	n/a	London
ADV1	Pension Scheme Advisor	n/a	London
RG1	Strategy Team Member	n/a	London
ACT1	Actuary	n/a	London
Note: a number of codes are used to distinguish the interviewees: where TE represents trustee, PO represents pension scheme officer, HR represents human resources manager, FO represents finance officers within the sponsoring employer, AU represents auditor, FM represents fund manager, UP represents user/pensioner, ADV represents pension scheme advisor, RG represents regulator and ACT represents actuary.  Those interviewees whose codes have been appended by * have significant dealings with the eleven pension schemes described in Table 5.2.  


In total, twelve of the interviewees in Table 5.1 had significant dealings with eleven different pension schemes as a trustee, a pension scheme officer or a sponsoring employer representative; an asterisk (*) is appended to the interviewee codes of these individuals to identify them in Table 5.1 and they included two of the trustees​[169]​, the four pension scheme officers, the Human Resource Director and all five finance officers associated with the sponsoring employer.  Table 5.2 provides a description of the eleven pension schemes associated with these interviewees.  

Table 5.2: Information Relating to the Pension Schemes Associated with the Interviewees
Scheme	Code	Industry Classificationof Sponsoring Employer	Date DB scheme closed to new members	% Employees as DB members	No. of activeDB members
1	TE1	Utilities	2007	100	1,600
2	TE3/FO2	Industrials	2004	90	7,000
3	PO1	Financials	2003	50	65,600
4	PO2	Consumer Services (MES)	Variety of dates(see note below)	46	160,000
5	PO3	Consumer Goods	2002	77	5,000
6	PO4	Education (MES)	n/a	100	116,000
7	HR1	Financials	2004	76	6,500
8	FO1	Health Care	n/a	100	9,000
9	FO3	Industrials	2005	95	3,500
10	FO4	Financials	1999	50	60
11	FO5	Consumer Goods	2002	30	80
Note: a number of codes are used to distinguish the interviewees: where TE represents trustee, PO represents pension scheme officer, FO represents finance officers within the sponsoring employer, AU represents auditor, FM represents fund manager, UP represents user/pensioner, HR represents human resources manager, RG represents regulator and ACT represents actuary.  Defined benefit schemes and multi-employer schemes are represented by DB and MES respectively.  The industry classifications are based on those defined by the Industry Classification Benchmark Database.  Interviewee TE3 and FO2 were associated with the same pension scheme, one as a trustee, the other as a finance officer within the sponsoring employer.  There were a variety of DB pension schemes associated with interviewee PO2 that had been closed on a number of different dates.

An analysis of Table 5.2 shows that, the sponsoring employers of these eleven schemes were from a variety of different sectors; the views of the interviewees that are reported in the following empirical analysis should not, therefore, be unique to one particular sector.  Table 5.2 also shows that, at the time of the interviews, the majority of these DB schemes had been closed to new members, one as early as 1999; only two remained open – those associated with PO4 and FO1.  Consequently, the majority of these schemes had made other pension provisions for new employees and therefore less than 100% of the employees of the sponsoring employer were members of a DB scheme​[170]​.  Finally, Table 5.2 describes these DB pension schemes in terms of the number of active members they had at the date of interview.  

An inspection of these numbers suggests that the interviewees were involved with a wide range of pension schemes; the smallest membership was 60 while the largest was 160,000.  Overall, the information described in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggests that a wide range of stakeholders from a variety of different-sized pension schemes were interviewed for this thesis.  The findings should therefore offer some interesting insights into the issues being considered.  

Section 5.3 now explores the governance structures of the eleven pension schemes identified in Table 5.2 and Section 5.4 summarises the interviewees’ perceptions of recent changes that have occurred in UK pension scheme governance processes; together, both of these sections permit the identification of the resulting accountability relationships that exist in UK pension scheme and these are further analysed in Section 5.5 using the technique explained in Section 3.6, and specifically in Figure 3.3.  

5.3	Understanding UK Pension Scheme Governance
5.3.1	The Nature and Composition of the Trustee Board 
This section describes the governance mechanisms that operate in the pension schemes describe in Table 5.2; from these governance mechanisms, accountability relationships are confirmed​[171]​ (RQ1) in accordance with the first component part of Figure 3.3.  In doing so, this section considers the nature and composition of the trustee board and its operation including the use of committees and the role of each of the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.2.  An analysis of the eleven trustee boards suggested that their compositions were varied, sometimes complex and very often opaque.  Six of the eleven pension schemes (schemes 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in Table 5.2) used corporate trustees (a limited company) to administer the pension scheme.  In the case of the two multi-employer schemes (schemes 4 and scheme 6), the trustee company was owned by a holding company which was comprised of the sponsoring employers who acted as guarantors.  The 2005 annual report of the multi-employer scheme (scheme 4) explain that:
“The trustee company is owned by…a company limited by guarantee…[That] company is owned equally by its members irrespective of size.  Each member…is committed to contribute a maximum of £1 to its liabilities if it is wound up”.

In comparison to their multi-employer counterparts, the ownership structures of the single employer corporate trustees were far more opaque; despite an extensive review of their web-based literature, and where possible their annual report, it was difficult to establish the identity of the members or guarantors of the corporate trustee.  

Interviewee RG1 suggested several reasons why a pension scheme might wish to use a corporate trustee as opposed to the more traditional board of trustees.  First, he pointed out that, where the sponsoring employer is a member of the trustee company, it has some control over the process of appointing trustees.  Second, he noted that the corporate trustees have limited liability which therefore reduces the financial risk of the corporate members/guarantors.  Finally, for multi-employer arrangements, administration processes can be streamlined when a corporate trustee is used.  For example, one corporate trustee can administer several DB schemes and so efficiency savings can be made on administrative procedures.  

Table 5.3 shows that the number of corporate trustee directors in these schemes ranged from seven to sixteen; Panel A provides details of the directors of the single employer corporate trustees and Panel B shows the equivalent information for the two multi-employer schemes.  


Table 5.3: An Analysis of the Composition of the Corporate Trustee Boards 
Scheme(Interviewee)	Number of TrusteeDirectors	Number (%) of MNDs	Number (%) of ENDs	Number (%) of TrusteesNominated by other means
Panel A: Single Employer Corporate Trustee Companies
1 (TE1)	7	3(42.8%)	3(42.8%)	1(14.4%) independent
3 (PO1)	9	3(33.3%)	3(33.3%)	3(33.4%) independent
8 (FO1)	14	7(50%)	7(50%)	n/a
9 (FO3)	9	4(44%)	4(44%)	1(12%) independent
Panel B: Multi-employer Corporate Trustee Companies
4 (PO2)	16	n/a	8(50%)	8(50%) trade association
6 (PO4)	11	n/a	5(45%)	5(45%) trade union1(10%) independent
Note: the interviewees and their schemes are described in Table 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.  Member Nominated Directors and Employer Nominated Directors are represented by MND and END respectively.

Scheme 8, one of the single employer corporate trustees, has the highest proportion of MNDs; its directors are split evenly between MNDs and those directors that are nominated by the employer ENDs.  Schemes 1 and 9 have just under 50% of both MNDs and ENDs (42.8% and 44% respectively) and one independent trustee and scheme 3 comprises of one-third ENDs, one-third MNDs and one-third independent trustee directors.  Schemes 4 and 6, the two multi-employer schemes, have a total of sixteen and eleven directors respectively.  The nomination of the trustees in both of these cases was split between representatives of the sponsoring employers (50% and 45% respectively) and a variety of other sector-related constituent parties, for example, a trade union or a funding body (scheme 9 also had an independent trustee director as a member of its board).  Thus, these schemes show evidence of adopting principles similar to those in corporate governance where the membership of the board is diversified to introduce an element of independence to the board members​[172]​.  As described in Chapter 3, the composition of the board of trustees is addressed in Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c)) which recommends that one-third of the board should be comprised of MNT​[173]​; thus, there is evidence to suggest that corporate trustee pension schemes are complying with the PR’s guidance.  Also, there is evidence to suggest that these schemes are making good use of independent trustees; presumably these schemes would argue that the engagement of the services of an independent trustee improves their governance in a similar way to that of non-executive directors enhancing the governance of corporate entities.   


The remaining five schemes (schemes 2, 5, 7, 10 and 11 in Table 5.2) operated using the more traditional board of trustees and details of the trustees associated with these schemes are shown in Table 5.4.  The number of trustees in these cases ranged from only 3 to 8.  Schemes 2, 5 and 7 had between 33% and 43% MNTs, thus complying with the PR’s recommendation of one-third MNT board membership.    




Table 5.4: An Analysis of the Composition of the Unincorporated Trustee Boards 
Scheme(Interviewee)	Number of Trustees	Number (%) of MNTs	Number (%) of ENTs	Number (%) of Independent Trustees
2(TE3&FO2)	7	3(43%)	3(43%)	1(14%)
5(PO3)	8	3(38%)	5(62%)	n/a
7(HR1)	3	1(33%)	2(67%)	n/a
10(FO4)	4	n/a	4(100%)	n/a
11(FO5)	3	n/a	3(100%)	n/a
Note: the interviewees and their schemes are described in Table 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.  Member Nominated Trustees and Employer Nominated Trustees are represented by MNT and ENT respectively.


However, the trustee boards of the two smallest schemes (schemes 10 and 11) had no MNTs and comprised entirely of ENTs.  Interviewee RG1 alluded to a debate within the PR whereby it had been suggested that MNT membership of the board be increased to 50%; he argued that such a requirement might be “problematic” as trustee roles had become so onerous​[174]​ and suggested that it was not difficult to see why some of the smaller schemes found the one-third MNT requirement difficult to achieve.  Table 5.4 also shows that, in comparison to Table 5.3, there is less use of independent trustees in the un-incorporated trustee boards associated with the interviewees.  

Thus, the nature and composition of these trustee boards differs in terms of: (i) the ownership of the scheme and whether it is administered by a corporate trustee or the more traditional board of trustees; (ii) the number of trustees on the board​[175]​; (iii) the proportion of MNT (MND) and ENT (END) board members​[176]​; and (iv) the use of independent trustees​[177]​.  These findings substantiate the suggestion by Clark (2000 and 2006) that the UK model of pension scheme governance presents itself in a variety of forms.  These differing governance structures are also likely to impact on the resulting accountability relationships that are formed between the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.2 and these are analysed in Section 5.4.  However, regardless of whether not the board of trustees operates as a corporate trustee, it is likely that, in terms of Figure 3.3 the trustees act as both accountees and accountors in a variety of relationships.  Thus, an analysis of how these trustee boards operate and the identification of any further implications that they might have for UK pension scheme governance and accountability relationships is also useful and follows in Section 5.3.2.  

5.3.2	The Operation of the Trustee Board 
This section examines the operation of the eleven boards of trustees and their sub-committees.  The interviewees confirmed that the nature of the board, its composition and its use of sub-committees, is determined by the trust deed.  Each of the eleven schemes operated very differently from the number of meetings they had per year to their use of sub-committees and support staff; the remainder of Section 5.3.2 considers these differences.

As explained in Chapter 2, the PR requires trustees to have regular meetings​[178]​.  However, there is no quantification of what the PR considers to be regular and different pension schemes have different interpretations of this requirement; the number of trustee meetings which took place in the eleven schemes ranged from two to 17 per year.  The trustee board of one of the multi-employer schemes met 17 times a year (pension scheme 4 in Table 5.2), while the other (pension scheme 6 in Table 5.2) met seven times per annum.  Seven of the boards, including the board for one of the smallest schemes, met quarterly; the trustee board of the other small scheme (scheme 11) met just three times a year and the board of the last remaining scheme met only twice a year.  The independent trustee (TE2) believed that the frequency of trustee board meetings was generally inadequate:
“If you have trustee bodies that only meet, in some cases, two or three [times] a year, and these are not full day meetings, then clearly issues are not being considered enough.”

Clearly, a lack of board meetings, which is a governance issue, could ultimately have serious implications for trustee accountability.  If trustees are not fully involved in the governance of their schemes, their roles as both accountee (the accountability role adopted in their relationship with fund managers for example) and accountor (the accountability role that they adopt in their relationship with scheme members) might be seriously compromised; in the former situation they might not know what types of questions to ask of the accountor and in the latter they might have to rely heavily on the advice of others if they are unable to answer the questions posed by the accountee.  

Interviewee TE2 went on to argue that one way to counteract the difficulties caused by infrequent meetings of the board of trustees was to use sub-committees:
“The trustee board is where the strategy lies…[and] because we did not want…there to be...any loss of power…we left the ultimate decisions there.  But, so that we could be more flexible, we gave the investment sub-committee fairly wide powers to implement, to act, to move on things.  Some of the funds we invest in are open for relatively short periods of time and if we only had a trustee meeting every four months on average, we might miss some of these opportunities.” 

Three of the eleven schemes chose not use any sub-committees (schemes 7, 10 and 11).  When asked, these interviewees were confident that their trustee boards were already at an optimum size to make efficient decisions and that sub-committees were not required.  Regardless of what might be a valid reason for not using sub-committees​[179]​, the interviewees agreed that appropriate documentary evidence (such as minutes of meetings) still existed to prove the discharge of accountability between the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.2.
 
The interviewees associated with the remaining eight schemes that chose to operate sub-committees all claimed that their investment strategy sub-committee was the committee that met most frequently (in most cases, more often than the trustee board); the number of meetings of this sub-committee ranged from twice per month in the larger schemes to four times per annum in the smaller schemes.  Often, internal and/or external personnel were co-opted onto this sub-committee for their investment expertise.  Such personnel typically included a representative from the scheme’s actuaries and/or the pension scheme advisors and/or the pension administration company.  Interviewee TE2 described how: 
“…the investment sub-committee recommends to the trustee board and implements [its] strategic decisions…I, as chairman of the investment sub-committee, report to the trustee board, so [the sub-committee decisions are] recorded.  ”

In some cases the investment strategy sub-committee was also charged with the responsibility for appointing and evaluating the performance of the scheme’s fund managers.  Interviewee FM1 confirmed that each of his client pension schemes held regular “beauty parades” to select fund managers for their scheme.  Interviewee ADV1 concurred stating that it was:
“…rare to see an appointment [of a fund manager]…for less than three years.  But having said that you will always find there is an option to get rid of them more quickly than that!”.

Although the final hire or fire decision in relation to the fund manager rested with the trustees, most interviewees conceded that the trustees usually acted on the advice of the investment strategy sub-committee.  Interviewee TE2 explained how, in his pension scheme, the performance review of the fund managers used to be conducted by the trustee board but that, due to time pressures, the investment sub-committee had recently adopted that role: 
“…if that sub-committee meets four times a year, over the course of four meetings we’d expect to have seen each fund manager once [per year].  So it’s a way of making fund managers annually accountable…” 

All of the interviewees agreed that it would be very unusual for the trustee board to reject a recommendation of the investment sub-committee and this evidence suggests that the delegation of the trustees’ authority over investment responsibilities makes the investment sub-committees very powerful.  However, provided these decisions are fully minuted and the sub-committee concerned is held accountable to the board of trustees, then the use of a sub-committee should not have any serious governance implications; the minutes of their meetings also provide evidence that some accountability to the board is discharged. 

Regarding the delegation of other trustee duties, there appears to be a contrast between the governance codes of practice for limited companies and those of pension schemes.  The Combined Code (2006) formally requires the board of directors to delegate certain tasks, for example the setting of directors’ remuneration to the Remuneration Committee and the nomination of directors to the Nomination Committee.  This contrasts with the pension scheme codes of practice which do not require the delegation of specific tasks​[180]​.  Even where the PR’s codes of practice acknowledges that some investment tasks may be delegated to sub-committees, there is no detailed guidance as to how these sub-committees should be used by trustees.  

Seven of the eleven pension schemes used sub-committees other than the investment sub-committee including: Administration; Urgent Issues; Operations and Member Communications committees.  One of the multi-employer schemes had eight sub-committees: Investment; Finance and General Purposes; Audit; Remuneration; Joint Negotiating; Advisory; Rules; and Nominations.  In a majority of the larger schemes, dedicated staff supported the trustees and sub-committees in their work.  In the smaller schemes, the administration was handled by three or four individuals in the Human Resource department of the sponsoring employer or by an external pension administration company.  These support staff administered the collection of contributions, the investment and safe custody of assets and the administration of benefits.  In the two multi-employer schemes approximately 200 and 150 support staff respectively administer the scheme.      

Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c)) addresses the record-keeping of trustee decisions; all of the interviewees were confident in the objectivity of their trustee board decisions and the adequacy of their record-keeping and minute-taking, however, the interviewees confirmed that none of their minutes were publicly available.  The independent trustee (TE2) also suggested that the detail of the minutes often varied from scheme to scheme:
“…if there was ever a challenge against something the trustees had done…we would have some oratory to show…[some] minutes are relatively short…and [others] will probably be about 6 or 7 pages.”.  

Thus, to summarise, Section 5.3.2 provides different examples of how UK pension scheme trustee boards can choose to operate.  Each of the eleven trustee boards operated very differently, some meeting more regularly than others and some making greater use of sub-committees than others; the trustee boards of smaller pension schemes met less often than those of larger schemes and also made less use of sub-committees.  Trustees were clearly involved in a wide variety of pension scheme decisions; some of these decisions were taken at the board level by the trustees while others were delegated to sub-committees, which then made recommendations to the main trustee board.  The interviewees suggested that it was unusual for sub-committee recommendations to be rejected, thus making these sub-committees very powerful.  A vast amount of knowledge and understanding is required by trustees, ranging from an appreciation of investment practices to detailed scheme rules.  However, the interviewees were confident that their decision-making processes were formally governed and adequately recorded even though the minutes of their meetings were not publicly available. 

Thus, when sub-committees were used, they reported to the board of trustees and so, in terms of Figure 3.3, adopted the role of the accountor.  During the interview process, several key stakeholders were also identified as playing a significant role in the governance, and therefore the accountability, of UK pension schemes; specifically the fund managers, the actuaries, the auditors and the PR.  The following sections investigate the roles of these stakeholders and their contribution to UK pension scheme governance and accountability; Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 consider (i) trustees and (ii) fund managers, actuaries, auditors and the PR respectively whilst Section 5.3.5 investigates the recent changes in UK pension scheme governance experienced by these stakeholders.  


5.3.3	The Trustee’s Role and Contribution to UK Pension Scheme Governance 

The interviewees confirmed that the two main sources of pension scheme governance regulation were the trust deed and statute​[181]​; they confirmed that the trust deed determined the scheme’s specific relationship between: (i) the trustees and the sponsoring employer; and (ii) the trustees and the members/beneficiaries.  To clarify the role of the trustee, the PR issued Regulatory Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007 (c)) and Code of Practice 7: Trustees Knowledge and Understanding (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a)) (see Section 3.2.2).  Both of these documents were used to provide context about the role of the trustee in advance of the interviews and to inform the interview questions (Appendix 5) that were used to investigate how the trustees role contributed towards the improved governance and accountability of UK pension schemes.

All of the trustee interviewees considered that their knowledge and understanding of financial issues was critical to their role.  The other interviewees supported this view; for example, PO1 confirmed that, in his pension scheme, trustees’ qualifications were considered both before and upon appointment “to ensure that there is an appropriate balance on the board” and that their training needs were identified.  Interviewee PO2 commented that different levels of knowledge and skills existed amongst trustees:
“One of the reps is a [manual worker], and he is given time off by his employer to fulfil his trustee responsibilities.  Another one of them is a full time official of the trade union so I mean, he works for that union’s executive in a full time capacity, and as part of his duties he’s a trustee director rep.  So it varies…[Despite the variation] there’s full engagement.  And in some cases some of them will say, ‘Actually I don’t really understand that.  Can you explain again what you mean?’”
Likewise, PO3 commented:
“…you’ve got people who are doing a [manual worker’s] job 5/6 days a week, you can’t expect them to be professional…as professional as an actuary, as professional as an investment advisor…so I think [the regulators] are expecting a lot of the trustee.”  
A variety of approaches to training were therefore needed and adopted in practice.  For example, PO2 stated that his pension scheme had a two-part strategy for training trustees: the PR’s training material for trustees was used where possible and supplemented by in-house training and manuals:
  “A number of them at the moment are doing the Pensions Regulator e-learning, ploughing their way through that.  We’re looking at how we might best embrace all of them in that, or tailor [the training] to their particular needs”

Interviewee PO4 confirmed that in his pension scheme, the assessment of training needs was an on-going requirement:
“We do formally measure that and it’s monitored.  The Company Secretary has got a file on each individual trustee, and all the training that they’ve [done]… the skills they’ve got…[and t]he training that goes on.  [The trustees completed a questionnaire] last year for the first time… and now we’re taking it further this year.  We’re doing a beauty parade for organisations to come in and actually do a formal assessment of the board, individually and together.”
Interviewee FO4, from one of the smallest schemes stated that his scheme, in contrast to PO4’s scheme, approached trustee training in a more relaxed manner: 
“We do some training.  We probably don’t do enough training…[T]o know that I’m up do date with the regulations and things, I rely on the advisors, quite a lot…I haven’t got time to spend hours reading all the stuff up.”

The interviewees also suggested that the knowledge and training requirements for trustees varied according to the number and complexity of schemes for which trustees were responsible.  Thus, an in-depth knowledge and understanding of specific areas were usually required for each trustee.  For example, interviewee PO1 described his scheme as having 5 different sections: 
“[We have] a defined benefit final salary section, we have a cash balance section which can also be considered to be defined benefit, we have a career average section, then we have a gross defined contribution section and we have an open defined contribution section…From a governance perspective all the sections fall within one scheme, you have one set of trustees looking after all the sections”.  

Consequently, interviewee PO1 acknowledged that trustees required more support now than previously due to their increased levels of responsibility.  He described how, in his organisation, there was “a separate team providing governance support and secretarial support to the trustees and all [their sub-committees]”.  Indeed, he had been employed by his pension scheme as a Pensions Governance Manager to specifically support trustees in their role.  

Thus, induction and on-going training was seen as essential for trustees to perform their roles adequately.  However, in addition to their participation in training activities, the interviewees also acknowledged that trustees were involved in a wide variety of other tasks including: the assessment of the employer’s covenant; benchmarking the performance of their pension scheme against others; developing and implementing performance measurement processes for advisors and delegates; formalising and documenting scheme governance mechanisms; and reviewing and improving internal controls for their pension scheme.  Some scheme trustees also engaged in self-evaluation, as described by interviewee PO1:
“They formally evaluate their own performance on an annual basis…things like did they attend all the meetings they were supposed to…things that you can measure…[it gets] a bit more difficult getting into some of the more subjective things.”

Indeed, interviewee FO5 suggested that trustees also needed to be skilled negotiators: 
“…the advice that the trustees are now getting from actuaries, from the legal advisors is to be very much more robust with companies in terms of how they deal with the deficit…the trustees are actually being told they should act as a creditor or as a bank, a long-term creditor to the company and seek repayment of what is effectively a loan to them, and seek that repayment as quickly as they can, but not to do it in such a way that would prejudice the company in the short term and might therefore prejudice the scheme in the long term…the advice they’re getting is really to try and push the boundaries to see how much they can get the company to pay in”.  

These observations were very similar to those made by one of the auditor interviewees (AU1).  She emphasised that trustees needed to develop their “softer skills where they are able to challenge…and be able to debate and discuss and be able to…ask appropriate questions”.

Interviewee ADV1 described how trustees were also involved in writing their scheme’s Statement of Investment Principles and Statement of Funding Principles.  However, he suggested that they would not be able to undertake these specialised tasks without professional advice.  In relation to legal advice, PO1 argued that: 
“…the trustees have their own external legal advice…[to avoid] conflicts…we don’t want a [sponsoring employer’s] legal advisor on the trustee board”.  

Interviewee PO1 also cited the example of the trustees’ involvement in the compilation of a risk register for the pension scheme.  When asked if this exercise depended upon the experience and knowledge of trustees, he argued that this was not a task that was completed in isolation but that the trustees “… take advice from their legal advisors and from the auditors on what should be in there”.  Further, he suggested that professional advisors and actuaries are used: 
“…to come up with [funding evaluation] assumptions…I mean obviously we don’t have these skills internally, or the trustees don’t have those skills to decide the assumptions, so we rely on external advisors”

Similarly, interviewee FO1 described a process whereby:
“…one of the teams within [the trustee company] is about half a dozen strong, and they do all the sort of fund manager monitoring and research.  So they’re constantly looking at not only our existing managers, but new managers and they bring various parties to the trustees and say, ‘We think we need a new emerging markets manager.  Here’s a shortlist of two.’  And they bring the managers along and say, ‘These are the strengths and weaknesses.  This is who we think you should appoint.’  And sometimes the [trustees] agree with it and others they say, ‘Oh actually, we prefer x.’”
As far as the delegation of trustee duties is concerned, the interviewee associated with one of the multi-employer schemes (PO2), explained that, in the case of scheme discretionary issues, the trustees might involve themselves depending on the complexity of the issues, but that:
“…on various other matters and in fact on investments - on something as critical as investment strategy, or assumptions to use for an actuarial valuation, - [the sub-committees] will have a first stab at what they want and it will be reported to the Trustee.  And it would be unusual for the Trustee to overturn them, in fact, but the Trustee does have right to veto and say, ‘No.  We don’t think…’
Conversely, interviewee FO3 thought that the trustees had less power than they should have:
 “I just think the trustees…are led by advisors.  It’s all at the advisor level…we don’t have independence…and the trustees go to advisors all the time because they’re so frightened of making decisions…[The decision making process] is so slow…because they are so advisor-led and they’ve got to take so many things into account all the time”.

Thus, given this onerous and time-consuming role, it is hardly surprising that interviewee FO5 reported that:
“We would like to appoint additional member nominated trustees and went through an exercise to do that about a year ago, but we had no takers.”


Thus, in summary, although the trust deed determines the scheme specific relationship between: (i) the trustees and the sponsoring employer; and (ii) the trustees and the members/beneficiaries, neither this document, nor statute, provide a detailed description of the trustee’s role.  The interviewees consider training, and keeping their knowledge and understanding up-to-date, to be a large part of the trustees’ role.   Whilst some of the larger schemes have formalised training systems for trustees, others, notably their smaller counterparts, have a more relaxed approach to the issue.  The interviewees also suggested that trustees were involved in a wide variety of tasks that included decision-making at different levels.  However, despite the different approaches to training, and the diverse levels of knowledge and skills that exist amongst trustees, each trustee has the same level of responsibility placed upon them.  

The interviewees described how the trustees relied on a variety of experts (including fund managers, actuaries, auditors and the PR) and this was vital for them to fulfil their responsibilities.  However, the heavy reliance on these experts by trustees raises questions about where, and with whom, the power in pension schemes lies.  Indeed, many recognised that it would be very unusual for the board of trustees to reject the recommendations of these advisors and/or sub-committees.  Consequently, the trustee’s role is highly significant to UK pension scheme governance, it is much more varied and onerous than it used to be and involves interaction with a wide variety of other UK pension scheme stakeholders.  This section demonstrates that, in terms of Figure 3.3 the trustees of UK pension schemes adopt both the role of accountee and accountor in their relationships with various pension scheme stakeholders; this conclusion provides assurance that the potential accountability relationships identified in Table 3.1 exist in practice and these relationships are further analysed in Section 5.5.2.    

Given that a wide variety of UK pension scheme governance structures exist, it is unlikely that the empirical work in this chapter can provide a singular analysis of UK pension scheme governance that is applicable to all pension schemes, however, because the interviewees have been drawn from a wide range of UK pension schemes, it is hoped that the analysis can provide a picture of UK pension scheme governance that is common to many schemes.  That picture will also vary according to the role adopted by pension scheme advisers and regulators and the contribution they make to UK pension scheme governance; thus, these issues are explored in Section 5.3.4 below.  

5.3.4	The Roles of Advisers and Regulators and their Contribution to UK Pension Scheme Governance

Interviewee RG1 suggested that the PR does not have the resources to review every UK pension scheme in order to ensure compliance with statutory regulations.  Consequently, reliance is placed on the ethics, integrity and professionalism of parties such as fund managers, actuaries and auditors to ensure that pension schemes comply with the statutory requirements.  Whilst he verified that it is the PR’s sole responsibility to implement the provisions set out in the Pensions Act 2004, he affirmed the significant role that the aforementioned stakeholders play in aiding the regulator as part of this governance process.  The relationships that the trustees have with the fund managers as well as the actuaries are fundamentally different from those that they have with the auditors and the PR.  This is because the fund managers and the actuaries are employed by the trustees in a professional capacity to provide advice and services to the trustee board.  This contrasts with the statutory responsibilities placed on the auditor and the PR to act as part of explicit governance mechanisms in UK pension schemes.  Despite these differences, the interviewees confirmed that the governance and accountability relationships as suggested in Figure 2.2 and Table 3.1 existed, and were utilised extensively, in practice.

The interviewees confirmed that, once a fund manager had been appointed to a pension scheme, an investment mandate was agreed and a contract signed between the interested parties.  Indeed, the interviewees indicated that the appointment letter and the investment mandate (which is aligned with the Statement of Investment Principles) were used to govern the relationship between the fund manager and the trustee board.  An additional element in the governance of this relationship was also identified by the interviewees; they pointed out that periodic third-party compliance audits were performed at some investment companies on behalf of pension fund clients to evaluate the governance practices of these fund managers.  Thus, a variety of governance mechanisms were used to regulate the behaviour of fund managers which suggests that a high level of accountability might be demanded by the trustees.

One of the fund manager interviewees (FM1) summarised his varied role as follows:
“My departmental involvement with pension funds relates to the training of…pension trustees…in relation to corporate governance.  It relates to voting pension fund client shares…it involves engaging with companies on behalf of pension funds in terms of corporate governance issues.  In doing so, we engage with the [investee] companies to discuss things like boardroom succession to discuss when corporate governance breaks down, to discuss strategy on their behalf but…[in these instances] we do not represent pension funds…my department provides input in terms of accounting to pension fund trustees, we usually do this for our segregated clients and pooled clients on a quarterly basis, as well as regarding our voting and engagement activities ”

The interviewees argued that the role of the fund manager was not only to invest the funds of the pension scheme according to its investment strategy and the resulting client mandate, but also to act as an intermediary between the boards of investee companies and the pension scheme trustees; they had to “explain corporate governance and its dynamics in context” (interviewee FM1).  This wide range of services was not provided to pension scheme clients by one specific department within an investment company but by many.  For example, interviewee FM1 pointed out that:
“It is not that we have a separate silo for pension funds but we deploy our resources as is appropriate to our clients’ needs and also match our internal resource requirements, so there is a degree of mix and match within the narrowness of my department; we don’t have any specific segregation for it; its more done on a functional basis” 

Thus, the governance role of the fund manager is far more significant than that suggested in Chapter 2; rather, the interviewees describe a formal relationship of accountability between the fund managers and the board of trustees where there is formal and frequent reporting; in terms of Figure 3.3, the fund manager adopts the role of the accountor and the trustees that of the accountee. 

The PR’s Regulatory Guidance: Relations with advisors (The Pensions Regulator, 2008 (a)) provides details about the trustees’ relationship with advisors generally and with the actuary in particular​[182]​.  However, this guidance document contains very little detailed information as to what the trustees should expect of the actuary.  Interviewee ACT1 confirmed that such issues would be addressed in the letter of engagement which is used to govern the relationship between the trustees and the actuary.  

The actuary interviewee (ACT1), who worked with schemes that had a membership of between 2 and 5,000, provided a description of the services offered by his firm including:
“…the outsource [of] the administration function, so we … run the payroll for the pensioners, collect contributions, give advice on finances, general consulting. We don’t have any lawyers, we don’t give legal advice, and we don’t have fund managers but we do have investment consultants, specialists who advise on new investments, and we advise both trustees and employers wherever there’s no conflict…we provide deferred member statements, we draft trustee accounts [and] we provide individual member statements”.  

Interviewee FO4 also suggested that his relationship with his actuary went beyond the mere provision of actuarial services:
 “I think you need a good relationship with actuaries, as a trustee…I like somebody I can talk to…and I like him to be able to give me overall broad answers…I don’t like him to…go away and spend two weeks getting me figures and then come back with an answer…so it’s a relationship thing, not a performance thing.”  

The actuary interviewee (ACT1) recognised that his advice to the trustees was crucial and influential in driving the governance agenda:
“…[B]ecause we see the regulations and the codes of practice, we’re taking it on board to inform our clients what they should be doing, so it’s being driven by the consultants rather than by the trustees and so…what we’re telling our clients is what suits us to do, we’ve got our procedures in place and it suits us… what we don’t want is to have each of our clients coming back saying “we want this done this way”…but…when we go to a client to say, ‘We now have this code of practice that requires you to have in place risk-assessment procedures, here is what we’re doing for you’, we’ll get silence back, they will say, ‘Yeah, thanks very much, tell us when it is finished.’”

This view substantiates the earlier suggestion that trustees rely heavily on the expertise of their advisors but contrasts with the opinion of interviewee PO2 who believes that reliance on actuaries has decreased post-2004:
“Well pre-Pensions Act [the actuaries] were probably the key decision-maker.  They would consult very closely with the employers and the trustee, but it was their ultimate shout.  Post-Pensions Act everything has got to be much more done in agreement between the trustee and the employers”

Interviewees PO2 and ACT1 are associated with large and small pension schemes respectively and thus the size of the pension scheme may be a determining factor in terms of how much reliance is placed on actuaries.  However, despite these contrasting views it would appear that, in terms of Figure 3.3, the actuary adopts the role of accountor and the trustees that of the accountee.   

It also appears that the governance relationships that exist between the trustees and: (i) the fund managers; and (ii) the actuaries are established in a different way from that with: (iii) the auditors; and (iv) the PR.  Whilst the former two relationships are governed by a letter of engagement alone, statute has a secondary influence on the trustees’ relationship with the auditor.  Conversely, the relationship between the trustees and the PR is determined by statute alone.  These differences also impact on how these relationships are governed; for example, the trustees can control the content of an engagement letter and can therefore have direct influence over the relationships that they have with their fund managers, actuaries and to some extent their auditors; they cannot however influence that which is required by statute.  Interviewee AU1 confirmed that the terms of reference for the audit of pension schemes are agreed between the trustee board and the auditor and set out in a letter of engagement.  Thus, letters of engagement, in conjunction with the statutory responsibilities of the auditor, are used to govern the trustees’ relationship with the auditor.  

The interviewees observed that auditors contributed to the governance of UK pension schemes beyond their statutory requirements.  For example, one of the auditor interviewees (AUT1) confirmed that, prior to 1995, the audit of pension schemes was seen as an additional piece of work where accounting firms “would tag on two days” to the main assurance process of the sponsoring employer.  Since then, accounting firms have recruited more pension specialists to address their statutory responsibilities.  These specialists are very often qualified actuaries and their input is vital when the auditors need to consider more specialised pension scheme issues such as the verification of actuarial assumptions.

When considering services offered in addition to the audit, interviewee AU1 explained how her firm had set up a discussion forum for trustees over the last five years:   
“…giving people opportunities to discuss and debate issues and share experiences.  And so we will have a different subject every…six to eight weeks we tend to do one of these on topical issues.  And when the trustees come along we do a half an hour presentation, just sort of giving them some background, but through that you might have experiences that they are sharing saying, ‘Well this is how we deal with that in our scheme’.  Challenge that and say, ‘Well this is a problem we have got.  How are others dealing and coping with it?’  So these forums are providing information but at the same time giving an opportunity for others to debate and discuss and share information within their peer group.”
She confirmed that she tried to attend as many trustee meetings as possible in a professional capacity and had supported trustees in benchmarking their pension scheme against others.  Interviewee AU2 explained that his firm had helped some trustee boards to assess their employers’ covenants and conduct risk assessments​[183]​.    Interviewee AU1 argued that having these services available to trustees meant that they could:
“…ask questions around, why is this important?  Why should we do this?  What are the risks for us if we do it?  Who’s going to tell us what the risks are?  How can we therefore substantiate that?  Is there some sort of independent way that we can actually confirm that?  How are we going to monitor things?  How are we going to be in a position to challenge what we have been given?”

The interviewees confirmed that, although the audit was seen as an explicit governance mechanism, the auditor’s role is more important than the mere provision of an audit; the additional services supplied by the auditor also act as important governance mechanisms.  When the trustees’ relationship with the auditor is considered by reference to Figure 3.3, the auditor holds the trustees to account and so adopts the role of the accountee; consequently, the trustees adopt the role of the accountor. 

The interviewees also indicated that the governance relationship that existed between the board of trustees and the PR was very different from that which existed between the trustees and the fund managers and the actuary.  Not only does it differ in how it is established, but it also differs because the level of engagement between the trustees and the PR is minimal.  The two multi-employer schemes were the only schemes that had corresponded with the regulator on matters other than the annual return submission.  In both cases, the extra correspondence related to the ratification of potential corporate transactions that might impact on the pension schemes in a detrimental way.  Both interviewees associated with the multi-employer schemes expressed relief at the facility to discuss prospective transactions and their implications with the PR; one noted that it was “a much improved body” in comparison with its predecessor organisation.  Indeed PO4 was very complimentary of the new regulator:
“…about the only real contact we had with [Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority] OPRA was for unpaid contributions, and that was just a complete waste of time and effort.  OPRA was not concentrating on the things that were important.  Administrative errors!  I mean we have late paid contributions every month.  Administrative errors - maybe a few hundred pounds, a couple of days late – there’s no problem.  And OPRA insisted on these being reported, and really the regulations were drawn up by people who didn’t really understand the implications.  The Pensions Regulator is a much improved body, but it’s also got far wider powers.  There are far wider things now they have to report on.  Again, some of them are over the top.  They are currently doing things very differently in a number of areas, not necessarily for an improvement as far as we’re concerned.  But I’ve got to remember, not everybody is like [this pension scheme].  The Pensions Regulator’s primary objective is to make sure that there are as few claims on the PPF as possible.  That’s really what he’s trying to do and he’s trying to make sure schemes are taking fewer risks.  And that’s not always the best thing, particularly on investment policies.  There are reasons why you might want to take more risks for your investment policy”
 
The other interviewees submitted annual returns and used the trustee toolkit​[184]​ on the PR’s website, however, that was the extent of their engagement with the PR.  Interviewee PO1 suggested that the office bearers in his scheme were “…doing what they have to do, nothing more at this stage”.  This suggests that the PR’s website is used as a training facility and that, for the majority of pension schemes, engagement with the PR is fairly shallow and routine (Collison et al., 2009).  

When interviewee ADV1 was asked about the PR’s contribution to enhancing the governance of UK pension schemes, he was rather indifferent stating that in his opinion:
“…the best way to regulate pension schemes is to have professionally qualified trustees do it, and I think that persisting with this idea that well-meaning amateurs with guidance is a mistake.  I think that the legislators should bite the bullet and say that this is too big a job for people dabbling…I think the best way of doing it is to have people who are professionally qualified through a recognised qualification and have the appropriate authorities, business resources and indemnity insurance in place so that they’re doing it properly as a business.”

Interviewee FO3 confirmed this view stating that he had not experienced much engagement with the PR:
 “…and so [communication is] not really between the trustee and the company, but again it simply goes off to their advisors and then the advisors go after the regulator and [do] the work.”

Interviewee RG1 explained that this might be the case because the PR’s approach was different from that of OPRA, its predecessor.  The PR has adopted a risk-based approach and, based on a risk assessment of the scheme and the number of members it has, will adopt one of the following four strategies: education and support of trustees; intelligence gathering​[185]​; proactive monitoring; and active intervention.  Interviewee RG1 also confirmed that the FRS 17/IAS 19 figures that appear in the financial statements of sponsoring employers were used by the regulator as “triggers” for further investigations.  This suggests that the accountability relationship that exists between many boards of trustees and the PR is restricted to form-filling and return-filing and that the trustees are only held to account when, and if, the PR decides to investigate the pension scheme concerned; consequently, in terms of Figure 3.3 the trustee adopts the role of the accountor and the PR the role of the accountee.
 
Thus, various pension scheme stakeholders are significant in the governance of UK pension schemes; many fund managers, actuaries and auditors go beyond their contractual and statutory responsibilities.  The responsibility for pension scheme governance does not therefore rest with the PR, the auditors and the trustees as statute would suggest, but in practice, is shared amongst these many interested parties.  This conclusion confirms that there are no other potential accountability relationships in UK pension schemes other than those identified in Table 3.1; these relationships are further analysed in Section 5.5.1.  As the PR is a relatively new regulatory regime, an analysis of the changes in UK pension scheme governance experienced by the interviewees in recent years is deemed appropriate and is consequently provided in Section 5.4 below.

5.4	Recent Changes in UK Pension Scheme Governance Processes
The actuary interviewee (ACT1) summarised the stark contrast between pension scheme governance of the late 20th Century and current practices as follows: 
 “I’ve been a qualified actuary for 21 years…when I started advising clients most of the pension schemes had surpluses and therefore the governance of the pension scheme was not seen as a major issue, it wasn’t a drain on company resources, in fact, there were many cases where the pension scheme was raided by the company…but also, pensions law was not well defined and therefore it was never clear to all parties who owned surpluses…I certainly remember having many debates with trustees and companies trying to identify who was making the decisions.  Conflicts of interest were never identified, it was fairly common for the senior executives to be the pension trustees with no member nominated trustees, and therefore, they couldn’t quite see the difference between the pension assets and the company assets - it was all one big pot of money” 

When the above description is compared to the discussion of current practice in Section 6.3 above, it is easy to see why the actuary interviewee believed that pension scheme governance had advanced in recent years.  

All of the interviewees commented that the composition of trustee boards had changed markedly over the last ten years.  For example, among the larger schemes MNTs were now more prominent; historically very few, if any, had existed.  Four interviewees (ACT1, TE3, ADV1 and FM2) commented that a number of senior company executives had departed from the trustee board due to potential conflicts of interest.  They had been replaced by lower level management which had had significant consequences on the skills and knowledge base of the board.  Interviewee ACT1 acknowledged that although conflict of interest was a problem, the withdrawal of senior company executives from trustee boards had presented its own problems:
“The people who contribute to the trustee body’s knowledge [the finance director or chief executive] have been removed from that body.  And I accept all the arguments for the conflict of having senior officers on the trustee body but it does remove quite a pool of knowledge.  I go to too many meetings where [they] are dominated by one or two individuals and you have other people turning up who are afraid to speak.  They might be doing their trustee knowledge and understanding courses, they might be going to trustee seminars, but they don’t have the confidence to speak up”.

Advisor (ADV1) and Trustee (TE3) both agreed with this interviewee arguing that “…the pension experience in a whole trustee board might [now] be measured in months rather then before you had many, many years of it”.

Although fund manager (FM1) made similar observations, he distinguished between large and medium/small pension schemes:
“…better informed trustees with larger pension schemes who are able to ask for and use the…additional reported information, relative to smaller and medium-sized pension schemes who tend to have trustees who may not be so financially-versed or corporately-versed and therefore not asking [the right questions].”

Three interviewees (ACT1, TE3 and ADV1) suggested that this situation might be the result of the increased use of independent trustees by larger schemes.  Indeed, interviewee TE3 commented that the independent trustee/chairman who sat on his trustee board had had a significant impact on its operation.  He claimed that, in general, independent trustees were making a significant contribution to trustee boards as they attempted to match the investment strategy of the pension fund assets to its liabilities and, in particular, they were moving more pension fund assets from equities into bonds for the more mature schemes.  His overall impression was that independent trustees were “marching to a different drumbeat” in comparison to the more traditional trustees.  Whilst recognising the advantages of appointing independent trustees, he also acknowledged that they impacted on the flexibility of the board:
“I made a decision in around 2000 to move £500m or £600m into bonds out of equities because I saw a crash coming. And in 2003 in about May or June when the market was at 3600…I moved all that money back into equities…I looked like a hero.  I couldn’t do that today…The trustees would say, no we’re in bonds and we’re staying in bonds.  That is the difference that you have now with independent Chairmen.  Whereas before, you would have Finance Directors who could make decisions, could make decisions quickly, you know, what you find is that some schemes are moving very slowly.”

Interviewee FM2 concurred observing that trustees had become:
“…a little bit more divorced from the sponsor, whereas, in the past you probably found that it was basically the finance director, there might have been the chief executive…but it was pretty much a fairly closed shop…it was only company people that were actually on the board.”

Interviewee PO1 made similar observations about the relationship between the pension scheme and the sponsoring employer:
 “…we now have more of a separation between bodies and…lines are less blurred…so you do have two formal bodies that have formal contact and not like in the past where the [sponsoring employer] was effectively the trustee and the scheme and everything…So we have clear designated lines of where we have the powers and where they have the powers to make decisions”.


Whilst the trustees of the single-employer schemes went to great lengths to maintain independence from their sponsoring employer, representatives of both the multi-employer schemes claimed that they often experienced the opposite problem and occasionally had difficulties when co-ordinating the views of employers (PO2); both the trustee boards and their advisors were looking at “better ways to engage the employer directors”.  This problem is understandable when put in the context of 16 trustees looking after the interests of 103 sponsoring employers.  The other multi-employer scheme had 12 trustees and 378 sponsoring employers.  Dealing with such large numbers will undoubtedly have implications for trustee accountability; not only are the trustees required to engage with the scheme members but they will also be accountable to the sponsoring employers who are not directly involved in the governance of the scheme as trustees.  

With the exception of the two multi-employer schemes and the two smaller schemes, interviewees from the remaining seven schemes noted that the composition of boards of trustees had changed and governance practices had improved.  Trustee induction and training was the most frequently cited area which exhibited significant improvements. Interviewees reported an increased use of the PR’s web site and the trustee toolkit in particular.  Interviewee TE1 agreed that the PR’s knowledge and understanding code had helped him to “drill down” into the rules and regulations of his own scheme.  Several interviewees also reported that trustees were making increased use of the reading material and references provided on the PR’s website to improve their knowledge and understanding but that this was not their only source of training; they often attended externally-provided professional courses.

Overall, the interviewees believed that scheme governance had improved by: the formal assessment of trustee performance; the formal adoption of risk assessment procedures; the maintenance of risk registers; and the documentation of governance policy.  Interviewee PO1 explained:

“…we have a global governance framework which is a fairly high level document that applies both in the UK and oversees.  And then specifically for the UK they also have their own governance handbook which is based on the governance framework but goes into more detail; it takes into account specifics related to UK legislation and running of a UK scheme.  So yes, it is documented, yes.” 

Trustee TE1 used the establishment of a risk matrix to exemplify the improvements in his scheme:
“We [now] have a risk matrix…we have taken the [sponsoring employer’s] approach to how risk is done…so we are brainstorming the risk but working them out in terms of the probability and the impact, weighing both up.  And what we have actually done is the trustees have got the guy within [sponsoring employer] who is in charge of risk management to come along to the trustees and to show them how they could apply these tools.  So we have really agreed, or tried to agree on, what the risks are and divide them up into different types - obviously investment risk, governance risk, company risk and so on, and then sub categorise each of those risks, and then we rate the risks…we have hot spots – that is risks both of a high probability and high impact.”

Conversely, the multi-employer schemes felt that they already had been at the forefront of governance practices and that the improvements required by Myners (2001), the Pensions Act (2004) and the PR had already been embedded in their schemes.  The interviewees for the two smaller schemes were less certain about whether improvements had taken place in the above areas.  For example, interviewee FO4 reported that it was on the agenda and that “various informal attempts” had been made to improve the governance of his scheme.  Interviewee FO5, who was associated with the other small scheme, agreed with this view and commented:
“Certainly one of the things that they have sought to do recently in terms of assessing the strength of the employer covenant, they have actually asked if I could do the same presentation to them [the trustees] that I do to analysts every half year”.


Thus, Section 5.4 has shown that the interviewees clearly believed that pension scheme governance had experienced notable changes in recent years but that the size of the pension scheme appeared to impact on the interviewees’ views of these changes; interviewees from the larger schemes suggested that these enhanced governance mechanisms had already been employed in their pension schemes for many years and therefore the change had been minimal.  By contrast, the interviewees from smaller schemes suggested that many of the recent governance reforms had passed them by.  Section 5.5 now investigates how these recent changes in UK pension scheme governance have impacted on the accountability relationships that they have created.  Until now, the empirical work has sought to establish how UK pension schemes are governed and the resulting accountability relationships that are generated from these governance mechanisms (RQ1); these accountability mechanisms have thus far been analysed by reference to the first component in Figure 3.3 (Gray et al., 1987).  The following section seeks to provide further analysis of the accountability relationships by reference to how the interviewees believe that accountability is discharged, the second component of Figure 3.3 (Stewart, 1984). 

5.5	Understanding UK Pension Scheme Accountability
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrate that UK pension scheme trustees have multiple governance relationships with many different pension scheme stakeholders and that each of these relationships has experienced some change in recent years.  These sections also confirm the existence of the governance relationships suggested by Figure 2.2 and the accountability relationships described in Table 3.1; consequently, the current section further analyses the identified accountability relationships.

Table 3.1 illustrated that the governance relationships of UK pension schemes can result in different accountability roles for their participants; for example, in the governance relationship between the trustees and the scheme members/beneficiaries, the trustees assume the role of the accountor and the members/beneficiaries assume the role of the accountee.  However, in the governance relationship that the trustees have with the fund manager, the trustees assume the role of the accountee and the fund manager assumes the role of the accountor.  

Therefore, the roles adopted in the accountability relationship are dependent on the type of governance relationship investigated; there will be some instances where the trustee adopts the role of the accountor and other instances where the trustee assumes the role of the accountee.  The approach described in Section 3.6 (and specifically Figure 3.3) is used to analyse each of the accountability relationships confirmed during the interviews (see Table 3.1); the post-interview analysis is reported in Table 5.5.  Table 5.5 expands Table 3.1 and summarises each of these accountability relationships in terms of the component parts specified in Figure 3.3: (i) the parties involved in the accountability relationship (accountee and accountor); (ii) the relationship itself (the rights and responsibilities of both parties); (iii) how the accountability can be discharged; and (iv) if the accountor is held to account.  If all parts of the accountability relationship can be identified, then one can conclude that a full concept of accountability, as described in Section 3.6, exists.  



Table 5.5 A Summary of the Accountability Relationships in UK Pension Schemes
Figure 3.3: Component 1	Figure 3.3: Component 2	Conclusion:Full Accountability
Accountee	Accountor	Regulation of the Accountability Relationship	Discharge of Accountability	Type of Accountability Discharged	Accountor held to account	
Panel A: accountability relationships where the trustees adopt the role of the accountee
Board of Trustees	Sub-committee	Trust Deed	Minutes 	Accountability for probity, legality and process.	yes	yes
			Face-to-face meetings			
Board of Trustees	Fund Manager	Letter of Engagement	Fund Manager performance reports	Accountability for probity, legality and process.	yes	yes
			Face-to-face meetings			
Board of Trustees	Actuary	Letter of Engagement	Stewardship report	Accountability for probity, legality and process.	yes	yes
			Face-to-face meetings			
Panel B: accountability relationships where the trustees adopt the role of the accountor
Auditor	Board of Trustees	Statute and letter of engagement	Face-to-face meetings	Accountability for probity, legality and process.	yes	yes
			The provision of audit evidence			
The PR	Board of Trustees	Statute	Annual Return	Not possible to identify	yes	yes
Sponsoring Employer      	Board of Trustees	Trust Deed	Employer Nominated Trustees.	Not possible to identify	yes	yes
Members/ Beneficiaries  	Board of Trustees	Trust Deed	Pension Scheme annual report	Accountability for probity and legality, process, performance and policy.	no	no
			Statement of Investment Principles			
			Summary Funding Statement			
			Popular Report			
			Scheme booklets			
			Scheme web-site			
			Annual benefit statements			
Note: this table analyses the relationships that UK pension scheme trustees have with the various pension stakeholders identified in Figure 2.2.  Component 1 requires the identification of the parties involved in the relationship and the contract which establishes the accountability relationship; component 2 considers how the accountability is discharged and requires the accountor to be held to account.  If all components exist, then full accountability can also be deemed to exist.



Table 5.5 also provides examples of the mechanisms used to discharge that accountability and classifies them based on Stewart’s (1984) model.  Whilst Table 3.1 suggested potential accountability relationships in UK pension schemes and identified (i) and (ii) above in each of these relationships (similar to the Gray et al. (1987) model of accountability), the remainder of Section 5.5 provides evidence relating to (iii) and (iv) above and, if possible, classifies accountability discharged in terms of Stewarts (1984) ladder.  Thus, Section 5.5.2 (5.5.3) addresses Panel A of Table 5.5 (Panel B of Table 5.5) and those accountability relationships where the trustee adopts the role of the accountee (accountor).


5.5.1	Accountability Relationships Where the Trustee Adopts the Role of the Accountee

The discussion in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 suggested that there were three instances where the trustees adopted the role of the accountee: (i) where sub-committees are used by, and report to, the trustee board; (ii) in the trustee’s relationship with the fund manager; and (iii) in the relationship that the trustee has with the actuary.  These relationships are considered in Sections 5.5.1 (a) – (c) respectively. 

5.5.1 (a) The Sub-committee’s Accountability to the Trustee Board 
Section 5.3.2 demonstrated that the use of sub-committees is governed by the trust deed and that sub-committees reported to the board of trustees on a regular basis in the form of written documents and face-to-face meetings; these reflections confirm that the sub-committees adopt the role of the accountor and the board of trustees the role of the accountee.  Observation of the trustee board meetings might have permitted an assessment of the type of accountability discharged by the sub-committees, however, as this was not part of the research remit, it was hoped that an analysis of the minutes of these meetings might be possible.  When asked if these minutes were publicly available, none of the interviewees confirmed this to be the case and therefore an assessment of the discharge of accountability through the minutes of the sub-committee meetings was also not possible.  Indeed, interviewee FO4 was surprised that anyone might want to have sight of the minutes and stated:
“…Nobody has ever [asked]…if a member was to ask…I’d show them…the auditors normally ask for them, so we give them to the auditors.”

Although the sub-committee minutes were not publicly available, Interviewee TE2 explained that these minutes “…are quite lengthy and tend[ed] to go through [all of the sub-committee] decisions”.  Each of the interviewees who were involved in the board of trustees and/or sub-committees confirmed that the sub-committee decisions were fully discussed and that the sub-committees were held to account; the interviewees confirmed that these meetings often addressed the sub-committees’ remit (for example the investment mandate for the investment sub-committee) and so they are an example of how accountability for probity and legality is discharged.  Indeed, Section 3.5 explained how accounting for probity and legality is one of the most basic forms of accountability on Stewart’s Ladder.  While probity is concerned with the avoidance of misconduct, accountability for legality ensures that any powers given by law are not exceeded; this has also been described as ensuring that funds are used in an authorised manner.  Thus, this level of accountability seeks to ensure that funds have been spent as the accountee and the accountor have agreed or in accordance with any other applicable regulation.    

Despite the private nature of the sub-committee minutes, one public example of the discharge of their accountability was found in the annual report of pension scheme 6 in Table 5.2.  This scheme is one of the multi-employer schemes, and the preamble to the financial statements included a sub-committee report explaining some of their decisions; it explained:
“The majority of questions raised on the application or interpretation of the rules of [the pension scheme] were dealt with by senior officers.  There were three cases which required detailed consideration by the advisory committee during the year.  These cases were all related to members requesting full commutation of their benefits on the grounds of serious ill-health.  In each case the full commutation was granted.  It was necessary for the committee…to meet on four occasions during the year to consider the decision given by the pensions operation manager at stage one of the internal dispute resolution procedure.  The second stage considerations were as follows:
	A member complaining about delays affecting his transfer value into the scheme – the committee recommended an award of £500 as a goodwill gesture.
	A member complaining that they had been missold their AVC contract by the Prudential – the committee decided not to uphold the member’s complaint.
	A member complaining about the distribution of the death benefits when his ex-partner died – the committee decided not to uphold the member’s complaint.
	A member complaining that his benefits had been overstated and that he suffered to his detriment as a result of this statement – the committee acknowledged that maladministration had occurred and upheld the member’s complaint recommending that an award of £4,000 be paid to the member as compensation.”


In terms of Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability (see Section 3.5) it is possible to classify this accountability as Process Accountability which seeks to ensure that adequate procedures are used and that the processes followed by the accountor have been appropriate; the above excerpt from the annual report of the pension scheme is clearly an attempt to illustrate that the sub-committee has done just that.  As, the interviewees were satisfied that all of the component parts of accountability existed in this relationship and that accountability between each of the sub-committees and the board of trustees was fully and adequately discharged, one might therefore conclude that a full accountability relationship exists between the sub-committees and the board of trustees.  

5.5.1 (b) The Fund Manager’s Accountability to the Trustee Board 
Section 5.3.4 suggests that in the trustees’ relationship with the fund manager the parties are governed by a letter of engagement whereby the trustees adopt the role of the accountee and the fund manager assumes the role of the accountor.  Interviewee PO1 confirmed this characterisation stating that, in his pension scheme, regular and official lines of communication existed between the pension scheme investment committee and the fund managers; they met twice a month.  Interviewee FM1 suggested that regular fund manager performance reports​[186]​ were produced which were assessed periodically by both the pension scheme trustees and/or their advisors.  These reports generally had two sections:
“One is the valuation of the performance of the portfolio in an absolute sense; the second is the evaluation of the performance of the fund manager.”

He highlighted that a two-part report was required because one portfolio can have several fund managers.  He went on to explain:
“Generally speaking, our trustees give us, within the broad remit of UK equities or bonds…discretion to invest; sometimes it will be linked to a performance-related target to invest with a view to outperforming a benchmark by X per cent per annum.”

He confirmed that these quarterly reports “tend[ed] to be formal written documents which have a degree of verification attached to them”.  He also noted that some investment companies offered intranet sites which allowed pension scheme officers to view their investment portfolios and their performance in real time; it might be suggested that the provision of such information improves the discharge accountability by fund managers.  Whatever form these reports take, the interviewees agreed that, in the main, they confirm that the fund manager has not exceeded any powers remitted to them by the trustee and consequently they provide evidence of the discharge of accountability for probity and legality.  Interviewee FM1 also suggested that there was evidence of the discharge of process accountability where investment companies undergo compliance audits by external third parties on behalf of their pension fund clients.  

Although interviewee FM1 highlighted that the reporting mechanisms that exist between the fund managers and the board of trustees “vary from pension fund to pension fund”, the interviewees confirmed that the fund manager was held to account by the trustee board and that a full relationship of accountability existed between these parties.

5.5.1 (c) The Actuary’s Accountability to the Trustee Board
Likewise, Section 5.3.4 suggested that, in the trustees’ relationship with the actuary, a letter of engagement regulates the behaviour of the parties and the trustee adopts the role of the accountee, the actuary the role of the accountor.  Interviewee ADV1 confirmed that there were sufficient accountability mechanisms in place between the actuaries and the trustee board.  He described how his accountability was predominantly discharged using a stewardship report​[187]​ which highlighted things that the actuaries believed important, such as unpaid contributions or delays in the payments of benefits to members, as opposed to administrative details.  He also suggested that frequent face-to-face meetings with the trustees served a similar purpose on a more informal basis.  As such, this report is also an example of the discharge of accountability for probity and legality.  Interviewee ACT1 also explained how his firm had a procedure manual for each pension scheme:
“…They might all mirror one another but these documents are often made available to the trustees.  So ‘Here is our internal procedures, here’s what we do…[This] is to protect our business, but also it should mirror a lot of what the trustees require”.

The availability of these procedure manuals to the trustees is an example of process accountability.  With regards to the trustees’ relationship with the actuary, the interviewees confirmed that all of the component parts of the accountability relationship exist in practice; thus it might be concluded that a full accountability relationship exists between the actuary and the board of trustees.     

Therefore, the discussion in section 5.5.1 has shown that the trustees adopt the role of accountee in their relationships with: (i) the board sub-committees; (ii) the fund manager; and (iii) the actuary, and in all three cases, the interviewees believe that a concept of full accountability is discharged.  The remainder of this chapter discusses the instances where the interviewees suggested that the trustees’ role is reversed and the trustees take on the role of the accountor.

5.5.2	Accountability Relationships Where the Trustee adopts the role of the Accountor

The discussions in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 suggest that there are four instances where the trustees adopt the role of the accountor; these occur in the trustees’ relationship with: (i) the auditor; (ii) the PR; (iii) the sponsoring employer; and (iv) the members/beneficiaries of the pension scheme.  

Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 demonstrate that the trustees’ relationships with the above four parties are governed differently: the relationship with the auditor is governed by a letter of engagement and statute; the relationship with the PR is governed by statute alone; and the trustees’ relationships with the sponsoring employer and the members/beneficiaries are governed by the trust deed.  In all of these cases, the interviewees confirmed that the trustees adopted the role of the accountor and the other party the role of the accountee, however, the mechanisms used to discharge that accountability are different in each relationship.  In the case of the auditor, the interviewees confirmed that the trustees’ accountability was discharged in a variety of ways including face-to-face meetings as well as the provision of documentary audit evidence such as share certificates and the minutes of meetings.  However, due to the sensitive nature of these meetings, it was not possible to attend or to assess the extent of the accountability discharged therein.  

One of the auditor interviewees (AU1) confirmed that an unqualified audit report on the financial statements of the pension scheme suggests “…a set of accounts which [are] true and fair”…and provide support for the view that the trustees have “complied with the trustee rules”; thus an unqualified audit report provides some evidence that the trustees have discharged accountability for probity, legality and process to the auditor’s satisfaction.  Despite the inability to directly assess the extent of the accountability discharged from the trustees to the auditor, the interviewees confirmed that the opportunity existed for the auditor to hold the trustees to account​[188]​.  Given the existence of all of the component parts of accountability between the auditor and the trustees, a relationship of accountability can be concluded to exist in this case.

An analysis of the trustees’ relationship with both the PR and the sponsoring employer produces similar conclusions and so are discussed together.  Section 5.3.4 demonstrated that these relationships are regulated by statute and the trust deed respectively and the interviewees confirmed that, in both relationships, the trustees adopt the role of the accountor.  In the case of the PR, the accountability of the trustees is discharged in the form of an annual return and ENTs discharge trustee accountability to the sponsoring employer.  Section 5.3.4 commented on the shallow and routine nature of the communication that existed between the trustees and the PR, however, there was little doubt amongst the interviewees that if the PR decided to investigate a pension scheme then full accountability could be demanded.  

Likewise, one of the trustee interviewees (TE3) and the actuary interviewee (ACT1) suggested that the departure of company executives from the trustee board (as described in section 6.4) had had a detrimental impact on the accountability relationship between the board of trustees and the sponsoring employer.  For example, interviewee PO1 confirmed that the sponsoring employer and the pension scheme were now seen as two “separate bodies” and that the sponsoring employer now relied more heavily on the: (i) FRS17/IAS 19 accounting numbers and disclosures; and (ii) on closer communication with the actuary.  Despite this change, the interviewees intimated that it is still very likely that the sponsoring employer continues to hold the ENTs to account over decisions they have made as trustees of the pension scheme.  Consequently, the interviewees confirmed that, as all of the component parts of accountability existed in both of these relationships, a full relationship of accountability was also deemed to exist.  However, due to the private nature of the accountability mechanisms used to discharge trustee accountability to the PR and the sponsoring employer, it is impossible to analyse these in terms of Stewart’s (1984) model.  

When considering the trustees’ relationship with the scheme members/beneficiaries, the interviewees’ comments in section 5.3.3 clarified that this relationship is regulated by the trust deed and that the trustees adopted the role of the accountor.  The interviewees also intimated that the annual report of the pension scheme was only one of a variety of mechanisms used by the trustees to discharge their accountability.  Other accountability mechanisms used included the Statement of Investment Principles, the Summary Funding Statement, the Popular Report, and other pension scheme media such as pension scheme booklets, the pension scheme web-site and annual benefit statements.  The remainder of this section discusses each of these documents in turn in terms of Stewarts (1984) ladder of accountability.  

5.5.2 (a) The Annual Report of UK Pension Schemes
As discussed in Chapter 2, the SORP (PRAG, 2007) requires that the annual report of the pension scheme should include: (i) a trustees’ report; (ii) an investment report; (iii) a compliance statement; (iv) statements by the actuary and the auditor; (v) the financial statements; and (vi) other disclosures in the annual report.  However, these financial statements do not require the liabilities of the pension scheme, in respect of its future pension payments to members, to be brought onto the Statement of Financial Position and this was clearly an issue for some of the interviewees.  Several of them commented that the pension scheme financial statements, as a list of assets alone, did not provide all of the information that members wanted to see.  For example, interviewee AU1 argued that:
“…In theory [the financial statements of the pension scheme] should be easy to follow…[and] if you’re just looking at investment performance, there should be enough to indicate…what the value of the fund at the beginning and at the end of the year is.  I think what is missing [is the] liabilities not being shown within the pension scheme accounts…these accounts are not fit for purpose…and [if they were] they would be used more”.

As Chapter 2 has already discussed, the trustees have a statutory responsibility to make the annual reports of the pension scheme available to members, however, there is no requirement to automatically distribute them; if a member wishes to see these documents, they need to be proactive and contact the trustees to request a copy.  Many of the interviewees declared that it was very unusual for the pension scheme to receive a request for a copy of its annual report, as evidenced by one of the auditor interviewees (AU1):
 “… [the members] actually don’t ask for the accounts at all.  The trustees themselves don’t always see the importance of the accounts either.  And this is sometimes where we have a real issue because, obviously...we want to make sure that they do disclose best practice…we spend a lot of time on these accounts…And yet the trustees are saying, ‘Why are you so bothered about this, that and the next thing? Nobody looks at them!’”.
Interviewee PO4 confirmed that this perception was widely held.  He suggested that members may use the pension scheme financial statements: 
“…to prop up the tables…if they even go to the length of that!  We don’t send many to members.  They don’t ask for them!”​[189]​

According to the SORP (PRAG, 2007), the users of the annual report of the pension scheme are deemed to be: (i) the trustees; (ii) its members and prospective members; (iii) the deferred pensioners; (iv) pensioners; (v) spouses and beneficiaries; (vi) participating employers; (vii) regulators; and (viii) professional advisors.  However, the interviewees suggested that, in practice, members or prospective members do not use the information produced in the annual report of the pension scheme.  Several of the interviewees suggested that the reason for this apathy was that members of a DB pension scheme find the accounting numbers reported in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer more useful.  As interviewee ACT1 explained:   
 “So I think [there needs to be] consistency in terms of what [information is given to] members, and they can go to one source and say, “This is what I need to know”, and…it is important [to send] information that’s complete and is not misleading. We don’t have that right now…. The pension scheme accounts have very little information about the liabilities…and if it’s a final-salary pension scheme then you only get half the picture…At least under [FRS 17 and IAS 19] you get an asset figure and a liability figure and therefore you can compare apples with apples.  So I would suggest that the information in the company accounts is much more valid to members of final-salary schemes than simply the trustee report and accounts… It is vitally important I think to members of final-salary pension schemes that they have an up-to-date and consistent measure of the funding position. And I don’t think at present we have that.”
Interviewee AU1 concurred: 

 “…one of the main reasons why I don’t think members necessarily look at pension scheme accounts [is because they are] stewardship [accounts] saying, ‘What have we done with the money?  How has the pension scheme performed over the course of the year…?  What’s gone out, and how are we holding your money at year end?  Where’s your money being held?’.  What members really want to know is, am I going to get a pension… I think the members actually tend to look at the corporate accounts and get the FRS17 figures.”
Likewise, interviewee FO5 stated:
“Where I think the pension scheme accounts fall down is that it is simply saying here’s the pot of money that we’ve got and it doesn’t actually tie into the liabilities which IAS19 does and that’s why you’re more likely to get questions in relation to the future of the pension scheme from someone who has actually read the disclosures in the [company] accounts, gosh, there’s a whopping big deficit there, what are we doing about it, because that isn’t really covered in the pension scheme [accounts] I guess at all. Now, I think that is quite a deficiency.”
Similarly, interviewee TE1 suggested that that the annual report of the sponsoring employer had a significant role to play in providing stakeholders with useful information about a scheme:
“So at the end of the day, all they [the members] really want to know as members is, is my pension safe?  Am I going to be paid?  In other words, how strong is the sponsoring employer and they can do that from reading the newspapers and from reading the analysts’ reviews of this company and having a look at the [company] accounts and see what’s said up front about the company and then after the results come out seeing what the papers are saying about this company, how safe it is etc.”

Despite the reservations that the interviewees had about the use of the annual report of the pension scheme, it is an example of how the trustees discharge accountability for the probity and legality of their actions.  It is now very common for annual reports of the pension scheme to contain a report that describes the trustees’ responsibilities​[190]​, one of which is to administer the pension scheme in accordance with the trust deed while complying with the trustee rules.  Therefore, the annual report is very explicit that the trust deed and the trustee rules have been complied with; in doing so it confirms that there has been no misconduct and the trustees’ powers have not been exceeded. 

Interviewee AU1 also suggested that the annual report of the pension scheme provided some examples of process accountability.  Section 3.5 explains that process accountability seeks to ensure that adequate procedures are used and that the processes followed by the accountor have been appropriate.  Interviewee AU1 suggested that trustees’ discharged that accountability by:
“…[putting] in the accounts how many trustees meetings there were.  Some of them even go as far as to say how many hours have been spent on training.  So they will explain that [their] trustees have had all this training, they’ve all met this number of times during the year.  So that will be then indicating to the members about them taking their work seriously.”  

5.5.2 (b) The Statement of Investment Principles
The Statement of Investment Principles (SIP) is a second document identified by the interviewees as a mechanism whereby accountability is discharged by trustees; this is an internal document that is required by the Pensions Act 1995 and its main aim is to describe the principles governing the investment policy adopted by the trustees.  As the SIP is an internal document, it is not automatically distributed to stakeholders, however, the researcher discovered evidence that some pension schemes have made their SIP available online while others have included them as part of their annual report​[191]​.  The SIP is therefore a document that is used in conjunction with the trust deed to regulate the investment practices of UK pension schemes.  The SIP addresses issues such as: (i) the types of investment held; (ii) the balance between different types of investment risk; (iii) the expected return on investments; (iv) the realisation of investments; and (v) the extent to which social, environmental or ethical considerations effected the investment decisions taken.  Interviewee ACT1 explained how the SIP is used as a governance tool:
“…defined benefit schemes [have] the statement of investment principles where the trustees have set clear objectives, having taken advice on what they’re trying to achieve, and put in place the appropriate mechanism for doing that, and they…will quiz the [investment] manager regularly about the ability to do that and whether it’s been achieved and if not, the reasons for it. So I do think [good governance practices] happen in terms of investment of the assets.”

Interviewee AU1 explained that the SIP is also used as an auditing tool and is reviewed each year to ensure that actual investment practices comply with the stated goals.  

Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the SIP is used as a mechanism to discharge both process and policy accountability; firstly, it allows stakeholders to evaluate whether trustees are acting in accordance with good governance procedures, and whether there are processes in place to ensure that an appropriate investment policy is being followed by the scheme.  Secondly, it includes the goals and policy objectives set by the trustees for their scheme investments.  However, it should be noted that the contents of the relate to the governance of investments, not to the governance of the pension scheme itself. 

5.5.2 (c) The Summary Funding Statement
The Summary Funding Statement (SFS) was a third document identified by the interviewees as a mechanism used by trustees to discharge accountability to stakeholders.  The Pensions Act 2004 requires all schemes that have at least 100 members to issue a SFS​[192]​ to existing members and beneficiaries and the PR states that it must include:
“…a summary of the funding position of the scheme based on its last ‘ongoing’ actuarial valuation.”
   
Interviewee FO4 explained:
“I think the summary funding statement is a good thing…[it] is an attempt to explain more to the sort of lay member what’s happening in the scheme…it’s not [audited] before it’s sent out, the regulator just says you’ve got to do it.  And you’re given a lot of freedom on how you do it.”
Similarly, interviewee PO4 suggested:
“Well, the Trustees’ funding statement…[is] supposed to be…completely open.  This is what’s going on.  And in the past…we had a tri-annual valuation report which had a lot of information in it and that was sent out.  But in the interim years, we just sent out…an incredibly bland statement from the actuary, which recommended no change to the contribution rate.  It didn’t tell you anything, whereas a lot more detail went to the Trustees on the fluctuations in the funding level, in the three years in between.  And the law was changing to make everybody more open about that, so we kind of jumped the gun and said, ‘Well let’s draft what we think it should be.’  So that’s what we did.”
However, interview AU1 explained that this document, far from providing an account was potentially very confusing for members because the SFS is calculated on a Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) basis which is very different from the basis used to calculate the FRS 17/IAS 19 accounting numbers.  He added that:
“…under the MFR basis where you have the minimum funding regime, they might say yes, it’s fully funded on that basis, but actually if the scheme were to close that day and wind up, that isn’t going to provide what you need.  So I think there is probably an argument that by having more information regarding say wind up liabilities or something like that”.

Interviewee FO3 also commented on the variety of methods that could be used to calculate the funding position of the pension scheme including: an actuarial valuation (which is calculated every 3years); a buy-out basis; a MFR basis; and a FRS 17 and IAS 19 basis.  He declared:
“It must be very confusing for the lay person.  I mean it’s hard enough to explain to a board of directors for, you know a PLC, the different methods and of course they’re all guesses at the end of the day.”

Despite these misgivings, many of the interviewees suggested that the SFS played a role in discharging accountability to scheme members.  For example, they argued that it showed if the objectives of the pension scheme had been met - whether there were enough funds in the pension scheme to pay the members’ future pensions.

Consequently, the SFS is an example of an accountability mechanism that discharges performance accountability; in the larger schemes it is distributed to all members and is concerned with: (i) whether the output meets the required standards; (ii) if an evaluation of the performance of the officers of the organisation can be made; and (iii) whether management (in this case the trustees) have achieved the goals that were delegated to them such as whether there are enough funds in the pension scheme to pay the members’ future pensions.  

5.5.2 (d) The Popular Report  
The Popular Report was a fourth document that was cited by the interviewees as being a mechanism used to discharge trustee accountability.  Interviewee PO4 explained that the Popular Report produced by his pension scheme is: 
“… [a] four page document… [and is] a summary of [the] trustee account and reports, it'll be sent out to members…that is one of the more important [documents] as far as members are concerned.”
This document typically contains: (i) highlights of the Members’ Report from the trustee; (ii) a report on the funding of the pension scheme and its funding position; (iii) a report on how the risk of the fund is spread; (iv) details of the fund’s investments; (v) information on the trustee directors; (vi) a description of how the fund is valued; and (vi) details of the scheme’s membership.  Interviewee PO1 explained that the Popular Report produced by the pension scheme that he was associated with was also:
  “…a summary of [the] trustee account and reports, [that is] sent out to members…[it] gives some information about the trustee body, they have information about the trustee board, and it’ll give information about administrators, [and where to get] personal finance advice.”

Interviewee FO5 reported that his pension scheme produced a similar type of document for communication with members but did not call it a Popular Report: 
“…previously they used to get an annual statement that wasn’t even a half page of A4, now its something that runs to two or three pages. The summary accounts [is] a small card that effectively freezes what’s in the accounts. And [it reports] different things that occur in…each year…So there’s quite a lot more accountability to the membership...And that covers…pensioners as well as deferred [members]...rather than give everyone a full copy of their accounts we produce a small card that gets sent out to the membership and that tries to paraphrase as much that is there as possible and cover things like ‘if you want a transfer value request here’s where you go’, ‘if you want to see a statement of accounting principals here’s where you go’, ‘if you actually want a full copy of the accounts here’s who you get in touch with’ and all that”
Likewise, interviewee FO2 indicated that a similar document had recently been sent to the members of his associated pension scheme: 
“…it gives you the details of who the trustees are, because some of them are from the company and some of them [are not]…a photo of them all smiling at the camera, you know, what their backgrounds are and…It tells how many times they have met and all that sort of stuff.  I guess it’s an attempt at the sort of stuff that you get in the accounts...”

Although the Regulatory Guidance: Effective Member Communication (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(b)) advises trustees about communication with members, it is interesting to note that Popular Reports (and similar documents) are not required by any regulatory authority which suggests that the pension schemes associated with interviewees PO1, PO4, FO2 and FO5 are producing member documentation which goes beyond the statutory minimum.  The evidence would also suggest that both the larger and smaller schemes appear to be engaging in active communication with their members as interviewees PO1, PO4, FO2 and FO5 are associated with pension schemes that have memberships of 65,600, 116,000, 7000 and 80 respectively (see Table 5.2).

Whilst interviewee PO4 was very positive about the content of the Popular Report, he was less positive about the extent to which it was used:
“Whether they read it or not I don’t know… I suppose the employers, the finance directors will look at it.  I don’t know.  I don’t know that many people read it.”
His suspicion that these communications were not extensively used by members was confirmed by interviewee FO2 who, in his capacity as a pension scheme member, described his apathy to such documentation:
 “I honestly…and this is probably a bit naughty, I don’t pay huge amounts of attention to the stuff they send through because at the moment its early days and I’m not that bothered….Yes so I didn’t read it, it arrived and I probably spent two minutes looking through it and then I put it in my file… I think my view will probably change as time goes on I think.   At the moment I have only been here two years so my investment in the pension fund isn’t huge but you know the more reliant I get on it I guess I probably would value it more.”

Given that interviewee FO2 has a financial background, and still choose not to engage with his pension scheme at this level, it is difficult to imagine that the attitude of a non-financial pension scheme member would be any different. 

Given that the annual reports of the pension scheme are an example of the discharge of accountability for probity and legality and that the Popular Report is a summary of these annual accounts, then it is reasonable to conclude that the Popular Report also discharges a measure of accountability for probity and legality.  However, there is also some evidence to suggest that an additional level of performance accountability is also being discharged in the Popular Report.  For example, as interviewee PO1 explained “…we’ve also included this time…a summary funding statement [in the Popular Report]…[though] you don’t have to include it in that document”.

5.5.2 (e) Other Pension Scheme Media
Other media such as pension scheme websites, pension booklets and annual benefit statements were also cited as potential sources of information for interested stakeholders; the provision of these sources of information provides some evidence of  the discharge of the trustees’ accountability to stakeholders.  However, the interviewees did not refer to these media very many times during the interviews and certainly not as often as the other publications above.  Interviewee FO1 explained his pension scheme’s use of booklets:
 “I suppose when they issue…one of these annual booklets, it says what the fund is; it says you’re putting in more money to secure all the benefits.  It gives them a sort of feeling of reassurance that the company is standing behind the pension fund.”

Communication with members also appears to take place outwith the annual reporting cycle, for example, when the pension scheme associated with HR1 had decided to make some changes to the scheme, that information was made available on the pension scheme website “for staff to raise questions and issues of concern”.  Interviewee HR1 commented:
“We’ve gone from a pretty closed approach to consultation in the past, i.e. here’s what we are doing, are you okay with that, to here’s the problem, what do you think you can do with it.   It’s a massive improvement, absolutely massive improvement [in scheme governance and accountability].”

However, interviewee PO1 commented that “it’s difficult getting the right balance between giving too much and too little information”.  In an effort to address this issue, interviewees PO4 and PO1 reported that their pension schemes had set up a communications committee.  Conversely, interviewee TE2 explained how some of the large schemes that he was involved with out-sourced member communication.  However, he contrasted this with one of his other schemes which relied “on the employee representative trustees going to pension committees and being contacted by members of the scheme to bring up grievances”.

Evidently, a variety of mechanisms are used to discharge trustee accountability to varying degrees; a combination of the annual report of the pension scheme, the SIP, the SFS, the Popular report, scheme booklets, the website and annual benefit statements discharge accountability for probity and legality, process, performance and policy.  However both Dunsire (1978) and Stewart (1984) argue that the accountor must be held to account for full accountability to exist.  In this regard, the interviews showed that that some pension schemes produce a number of documents in addition to the statutory minimum requirement, however, like the financial statements of the pension scheme, there is little evidence to suggest that members engage with any of these documents and consequently full accountability may not be achieved.  

Thus, Section 5.5.2 has demonstrated that the trustees adopt the role of accountor in their relationships with: (i) the auditor; (ii) the PR; (iii) the sponsoring employer; and (iv) the members/ beneficiaries.  In the first three cases, the interviewees believe that a full concept of accountability is discharged, however, in the latter, full accountability is impeded by an apparent lack of engagement by the pension scheme members/beneficiaries with the trustees’ accountability mechanisms; consequently the members/beneficiaries lack the ability to hold the trustees to account.  

5.6	Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter reports on the results of 21 interviews with a variety of pension scheme stakeholders in an effort to understand the complex governance and accountability relationships that exist in the UK pension scheme context.  First, it describes UK pension scheme governance in accordance with the views of the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.1 and confirms the existence of the governance relationships suggested by Figure 2.2.  In practice, a variety of governance models are used, including corporate trustees and the more traditional boards of trustees; each also uses a different mix of ENTs, MNTs and independent trustees.  The pension schemes included in the sample use sub-committees to varying extents and trustees rely heavily on expert advice.  As it is very uncommon for the trustees to refuse the recommendations of these sub-committees or experts, these sub-committees and experts are very powerful.  These observations substantiate the varied model of UK pension scheme governance suggested by Clark (2000 and 2006).  The role of the trustee and various other pension scheme stakeholders were explored and their contribution to UK pension scheme governance is identified.  It was found that, in addition to the trustees, fund managers, actuaries, auditors and the PR make a substantial contribution to the governance of UK pension schemes.  The chapter goes on to report the interviewees’ perceptions of recent changes in the governance processes where it was found that a number of the schemes reported improvements in their governance practices including better trustee induction and training, enhanced risk assessment procedures and improved governance documentation.  Having confirmed the existence of the governance relationships suggested in Figure 2.2, the final section of this chapter analyses the resulting accountability relationships which are proposed by Table 3.1 in accordance with the technique described in Section 3.6.

Table 5.5 summarises the accountability relationships that were found to exist, thus addressing RQ 1.  It shows that there are three relationships where the trustees assume the role of the accountee: in their relationship with: (i) the sub-committees; (ii) the fund manager; and (iii) the actuary.   The former relationship is governed by the trust deed whereas the latter two are governed by the letter of engagement.  As the accountability between these parties is often in the form of private communication, it is very difficult to analyse the type of accountability discharged, however the interviewees provided some evidence of accountability for probity, legality and process.  The trustees actively hold (i) the sub-committees; (ii) the fund manager; and (iii) the actuary to account and thus a full relationship of accountability is deemed to exist in practice.

Table 5.5 also shows that there are four relationships where the trustee adopts the role of the accountor: in their relationship with (i) the auditor, (ii) the PR, (iii) the sponsoring employer, and (iv) the members/beneficiaries.  While the first of these relationships is governed by statute and a letter of engagement, the second is governed by statute alone and the latter two by the trust deed.  An unqualified audit report provides some assurance that the trustees have discharged accountability for probity, legality and process, whereas, due to the private nature of the accountability discharged to the PR and sponsoring employer, it is not possible to categorise it in terms of Stewart’s (1984) model.  Despite the inability to examine this evidence in any depth, the evidence suggests that the trustees are held to account by the auditor, the PR and the sponsoring employer and thus a full relationship of accountability is deemed to exist in practice.  Conversely, the interviewees were able to identify a plethora of both public and private documents that discharge trustee accountability to the members/beneficiaries of UK pension schemes and, arguably, other stakeholders.  These included the annual reports of the pension scheme the SIP, the SFS, the Popular Report, pension scheme booklets, the pension scheme web-site and annual benefit statements.  The interviewees then illustrated how these documents evidenced the discharge of a variety of different levels of accountability in Stewart’s (1984) model for probity and legality, process, performance and policy accountability.  However, the interviewees were critical of the annual reports of the pension scheme, stating that the liabilities in respect of future pension payments are not included in these accounts, that the documents are never requested and therefore were unlikely to be used.  If the financial statements of the pension scheme are, as the interviewees suggest, rarely requested by the members/beneficiaries, then their ability to discharge trustee accountability must surely be questionable​[193]​.  This latter criticism questions the existence of an evaluation of the trustees’ accountability whereupon praise or blame can be dispensed (Dunsire, 1978) and that a judgement is being made upon the information rendered such that trustees are being held to account (Stewart’ 1984); thus full accountability may not be achieved.  

Additionally, this chapter has demonstrated that an analysis of UK pension scheme accountability relationships using the model proposed by Figure 3.3 is entirely appropriate.  This analysis has indeed added empirical flesh to Gray et al.’s  (1987) skeletal model of accountability as suggested by Laughlin (1990); it has painted a fuller picture of the governance and accountability mechanisms that operate in the organisational context of UK pension schemes than that which existed before.  The analysis also supports Laughlin’s (1990) conclusion; in that paper he concludes that models similar to Figure 3.1 assume:
 “…a certain economic power to the [Accountee]: the assumption is that those with resources and with the power to transfer these to others can dictate terms, information etc.  What the Church of England study does is to ‘muddy’ this simple model – it is actually much more complex than this”. (p. 111)

Likewise, the current analysis demonstrates the complexity of the accountability relationship between UK pension schemes trustees and the scheme members/beneficiaries; although in theory UK pension scheme members/beneficiaries have the power to hold trustees to account, there is little evidence to suggest that trustee accountability mechanisms are used for that purpose in practice. 

The interviewees in this chapter suggested that the pension scheme accounting numbers and disclosures in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer were far more useful than those of the pension scheme itself; consequently, Chapter 6 now reports the interviewees’ perceptions of the sponsoring employers’ post-retirement disclosures and a content analysis of these disclosures in the annual reports of a sample of sponsoring employers from 2000 to 2005.  As these disclosures have been prepared under SSAP24, FRS 17 and IAS 19, an analysis of the differences under all three reporting regimes can be made. 


Chapter 6
A Content Analysis of Sponsoring Employers UK Pension Scheme Disclosures 

6.1	Introduction
Chapter 2 summarised the existing regulation of UK pension scheme governance whilst Chapter 3 examined accountability theory and the accounting and disclosure requirements for both the annual reports of UK pension schemes and their sponsoring employers​[194]​.  Chapter 5 reported the results of 21 semi-structured interviews that were conducted with a variety of pension scheme stakeholders to establish how these governance and accountability mechanisms are used in practice by UK pension schemes; these interviewees suggested that the annual report of UK pension schemes were inadequate for the use of pension scheme stakeholders and that these stakeholders often referred to the annual report of the sponsoring employer instead.  Thus, it is suggested that the annual report of the sponsoring employer also has a role to play in discharging the accountability of UK pension schemes.  The following empirical analysis investigates the accountability that UK employers discharge in their annual report for the pension schemes that they provide for their employees and how that accountability has changed in recent years.  It could be argued that an increase in disclosure might also be associated with an increase in accountability, however, this suggestion does not take the content and quality​[195]​ of these disclosures into account.  Whilst Appendix 9 addresses the location and format of these disclosures​[196]​, the current chapter considers their content, analyses these disclosures using Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability, and investigates the factors that might have influenced any changes experienced.  In doing so, it provides further analysis to help answer how accountability is discharged in UK pension schemes (RQ2). 

To provide further context, Section 6.2 of this chapter begins by summarising the views that the stakeholders interviewed in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.1) expressed regarding FRS 17 and IAS 19 disclosures.  Thereafter, Section 6.3 reports the results of a content analysis performed on the annual reports of a sample of 36 FTSE 100 sponsoring employers between 2000 and 2005.  Specifically the empirical analysis in this chapter: (i) examines the type of post-retirement benefit information disclosed between 2000 and 2005; (ii) analyses these disclosures according to Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability and provides examples of that information; (iii) investigates any changes in the provision of this information between 2000 and 2005; (iv) identifies when these changes happened; and (iv) using a general linear model, analyses why these changes might have occurred.  This analysis is conducted over a six year time frame which provides a longitudinal dimension to the investigation to see how these disclosures have changed as reporting requirements have varied.  Finally, Section 6.4 offers some conclusions.

6.2	The Interviewees’ Perceptions of the FRS 17 and IAS 19 Disclosures

Under FRS 17 and/or IAS 19, the sponsoring employer must account for the pension scheme surplus/deficit in the Statement of Financial Position and make extensive disclosures in the notes to the accounts.  Although FRS 17 was not fully implemented until 2005, a few companies in the sample decided to adopt its provisions early - mainly to ease the impact on the Income Statement.  For example, one early adopter, interviewee FO1, commented:
“SSAP 24  had become totally discredited and we were publishing the FRS 17 numbers anyway so there was no blasted reason why not to use them…We realised that if we stayed on SSAP 24, the hit to our P&L in the next year following the amortisation of the deficit would have been even bloody larger.  So it made sense to take the one off hit when we were on a better footing”.

A number of the interviewees suggested that some sponsoring employers were more reluctant to adopt FRS 17 and IAS 19 early because of the impact that it could have on the behaviour of analysts and shareholders; they believed that once all companies reported similar numbers, the impact on the individual companies would be far less. For example, interviewee ACT1 commented that:
“…in the very early days I heard many analysts talk and say, ‘Well, as long as we have a figure in the [The Statement of Financial Position] we will know how to value the deficit.  We don’t really care about the assumptions as long as we’re told what the assumptions are’, so the shareholders, potential shareholders, analysts, ought to have been asking the question about pension scheme liabilities well in advance of FRS 17 being developed…So, yeah, I think it has influenced the way that officers, investors, analysts, have operated but because it was signalled well in advance…many of them would have been taking the appropriate action well in advance…As I said earlier, it’s…really important to measure the liabilities…in a consistent way and companies are being compared in a like-for-like manner, and you get that, I think, through IAS 19 and FRS 17.”

Interviewee ACT1 suggested that the change in accounting numbers had resulted in changes in corporate behaviour and investment decisions.  For example, he noted the influence it had had on the decisions of acquiring companies when identifying take-over targets​[197]​, arguing that it was a “big issue” and that potential buyers were keen to establish the “off-balance sheet liabilities in pension schemes”.  Interviewee FO3 agreed stating:
“…when people buy, or want to a buy a business from us they want it clean from day one…They just want a clean business and to be able to run it forward so [they are not] going to be left with the liabilities for those pensions for ever.”
  
Only one interviewee (PO4) believed that FRS 17 had played a key role in the recent closure of so many DB pension schemes:
“…it has contributed to the demise of DB schemes, which I don’t think is a good thing overall.  Having said that, people are now treating their pension schemes much more seriously and funding them better.  So it’s had a positive impact as well.”
Other interviewees did not believe that the new reporting requirements had been the sole reason for the closure of DB schemes, but many believed that they been a contributing factor.  Most attributed the closure of DB schemes to the underlying costs associated with providing such pension entitlements and many argued that the main objective of sponsoring employers was to mitigate the risks of higher future contributions associated with such schemes, however, most agreed that FRS 17 and IAS 19 had highlighted these costs. Yet, despite these negative economic consequences, most interviewees agreed that the FRS 17/IAS 19 reporting requirements were far superior to those mandated under SSAP 24; all of the interviewees suggested that the information disclosed under FRS 17/IAS 19 was preferable.  For example, interviewee FO5 suggested that these reporting standards had increased awareness of previously undisclosed deficits: 
 “In terms of increasing awareness and getting people ready and getting them to look at things in advance, yes [FRS 17] increased awareness… I think the reporting though just made it more evident. I mean it was there anyway but having to quantify it and put it on the balance sheet [meant] it was more transparent so you understand better what the issue is, but the issue was there anyway so it did sort of crystallise action to manage it and I suppose it was the first thing a lot of companies did to manage it.”.  
The institutional investor interviewee (UI1) agreed with this comment:
“I think it is reasonable to suggest that the disclosures under FRS 17 have sharpened the awareness of sponsoring companies to the cash flow implications of funding the deficits at a time when markets and other factors that we were discussing were impacting upon asset allocations and such like.” 

Indeed, interviewee PO4, who was associated with one of the large multi-employer schemes, suggested that his pension scheme had disclosed the FRS 17 liability, even when it was not required to do so:
“FRS 17 is a useful number for comparison across organisations, so lots of finance directors said, ‘Well what is your FRS 17 liability number?’  And actually we said, ‘Well we don’t need to do it so we’re not going to work it out.  Why would you want to know?’ And they said, ‘Because we want to compare you with other schemes.’  So now we do tell them.”
However, interviewee FO1 vented his frustration with individuals who, he believed, paid too much attention to the FRS 17/IAS 19 accounting numbers:
“…if you look at our accounts, the pension number, the liability is about twenty billion for pensions and the assets are about fourteen or fifteen billion.  And they’re very big numbers in our accounts but when you look at the goodwill number that’s about the same sort of size and who says the goodwill numbers are right to the last couple of million.”

These comments demonstrate that the accounting numbers and disclosures required by FRS 17 and IAS 19 are deemed by the interviewees to be mechanisms used to discharge accountability.

Chapter 3 suggested that accountability can be discharged in a variety of ways while Chapter 5 indicated that, in the case of UK pension schemes, trustees choose to communicate with scheme members/beneficiaries using formal reporting mechanisms (such as the annual report of the pension scheme) in preference to those that are less formal (for example face-to-face meetings).  Chapter 5 also indicated that pension scheme members/beneficiaries consult the annual report of the sponsoring employer​[198]​ as an indirect source of trustee accountability​[199]​.  Likewise, the current discussion suggests that other corporate stakeholders also use the accounting numbers and disclosures made in the annual report of the sponsoring employer to make decisions​[200]​.  Thus, the content and format of these disclosures is important because they are used to discharge accountability which ultimately may result in economic consequences both for businesses and individuals; an understanding of these disclosures is therefore useful.  

The Stewart (1984) model of accountability can be used to foster a better understanding of the FRS 17/IAS 19 disclosures made in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers.  Stewart (1984) suggests that annual report is an example of the discharge of accountability for legality and probity; consequently, when a sponsoring employer complies with the FRS 17/IAS 19 disclosure requirements, it might be suggested that such accountability is discharged.  An analysis of these disclosures in terms of Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability would certainly confirm, or reject, this suggestion.  However, the sponsoring employers of UK pension schemes are also likely to make pension scheme disclosures in addition to those required by the FRS 17/IAS 19; a similar analysis of these voluntary disclosures is also feasible and now follows in section 6.3.  
  
6.3	      A Content Analysis of the Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures of UK                         
Sponsoring Employers

6.3.1	Categories of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the UK accounting requirements for pension schemes have experienced radical reform between 2000 and 2005.  For many companies, pension scheme information over this period will have been disclosed under the provisions of three different accounting standards: SSAP 24, FRS 17 (if adopted in 2002) and IAS 19 when adopted in 2005.  Where companies chose to delay the implementation of FRS 17, the pension surplus/deficit would not have impacted on the Statement of Financial Position until the implementation of IAS 19 in 2005.  However, for accounting periods ending after the 22nd June 2002, the transitional disclosures would still have been shown in the notes to the financial statements.  There is evidence to suggest that some companies chose to delay the implementation of FRS 17​[201]​ whilst simultaneously adopting IAS 19, however, from 1st January 2005, all EU listed companies were required to apply IFRS (Fifield et al., 2011), and therefore IAS 19, to their consolidated financial statements.  Consequently, the forthcoming analysis uses the disclosure requirements of IAS 19​[202]​ to categorise the type of post-retirement benefit information published in the annual report of the sponsoring employer because all of the companies included in the sample would have been required to apply the international standard by the end of 2005.  Since IAS 19 refers to post-retirement benefits as opposed to pension schemes, this terminology is adopted for the remainder of the current chapter.

A sample of 36 companies (see Table 4.4) was selected and their annual report from 2000 to 2005 were obtained and reviewed for post-retirement benefit disclosures in accordance with IAS 19 (a detailed description of this process is provided in Chapter 4).  IAS 19 requires the disclosure of the following categories of information: (i) the accounting policy; (ii) a general description of the plan; (iii) a reconciliation of the assets and liabilities recognised in the Statement of Financial Position​[203]​; (iv) the amounts included in the fair value of the pension plan’s assets for the enterprises’ own financial instruments or any property occupied by the sponsoring employer; (v) a reconciliation showing the movements during the period in the net liability/asset recognised in the Statement of Financial Position; (vi) an analysis of the total expense; (vii) the actual return on the pension plan’s assets; and (viii) the principal actuarial assumptions employed by the scheme.  

These categories of information were coded as 1-8 in the Content Analysis Template reproduced in Appendix 7 and likewise in Tables 6.2-6.5.  However, companies also reported certain items of information that were impossible to classify under the above categories; for example, information that related to the calculation of the SSAP 24 accounting numbers.  Such information was coded as category 9 in the Content Analysis Template reproduced in Appendix 7 and likewise in Tables 6.2-6.5.  Information equivalent to the above was also collected for other post-retirement benefits such as health care plans and was coded as items 11-19 in Appendix 7 and items 10-18 in Tables 6.2-6.5​[204]​.

In addition to the above disclosures, companies also reported information that was not required by IAS 19 and, in such circumstances, this information was analysed as other and the theme of the disclosure noted.  This was a residual category that was added to pick up voluntary pension-related information that was supplied by different companies but which was not mandated by the accounting standards.  Disclosures in this panel were grouped into six categories: (i) Other GAAP (mainly US) information; (ii) IFRS details​[205]​; (iii) DC information; (iv) information about Governance and Risk; (v) details about the Trustees; and (vi) data about the percentage split of pension scheme assets.  These voluntary disclosures were coded as item 20 in Appendix 7 and as items 19-24 in Tables 6.3-6.6.  

The data collected on the Content Analysis Template (Appendix 7) were classified in a number of different ways; the first classification was based on how the information was disclosed, whether it was narrative, monetary quantitative or purely quantitative (see Chapter 4).  The second classification was based on its location in the annual report (see Chapter 4); for example, the non-financial statement section of the annual report, the main body of the financial statements, the accounting policy note and the other notes to the financial statements.  The results of this analysis are reported in Appendix 9.  The page number of the disclosure was also noted on the record sheet reproduced at Appendix 7 so that the information could easily be sourced at a later date if necessary.  Finally, in line with previous studies (Gray et al., 1995; Dunne et al., 2003; 2004; 2008; Crawford et al., 2009), information was gathered regarding the auditability​[206]​ of the disclosure and whether the public disclosure conveyed good, bad or neutral reflections on the company (classified as news).  Due to the regulated nature of the information provided in annual reports, all of the disclosure classified under the latter two headings was deemed to be capable of audit and neutral in tone respectively.  These classifications therefore did not convey any useful information and were consequently excluded from the subsequent analysis.  The memo field in the record sheet reproduced in Appendix 7 was used to collect any additional information such as a short description of those voluntary disclosures not required by IAS 19.  

After the completion of a pilot study (see Chapter 4) the contents of the Content Analysis Templates were transferred onto 2 types of spreadsheet: one related to how the post-retirement benefit information was disclosed and the other related to where the post-retirement benefit information was disclosed.  The summarised data was then extracted and analysed statistically using both Minitab and SPSS.



6.3.2	Descriptive Statistics of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures
Table 6.1 summarises the results of the content analysis of the sponsoring employers’ post-retirement disclosures from the sample of 36 FTSE 100 companies from 2000 to 2005.  Panel A of this table highlights the descriptive statistics for the absolute amount of disclosure (in pages) of post-retirement benefit information in the annual reports of the sample firms.  In particular, the average number of pages of disclosure in an annual report is shown (MEAN) as well as the standard deviation (SD) around the average value.  The range of disclosures made by the sample firms is apparent from the minimum (MIN) and maximum (MAX) number of pages devoted to post-retirement benefit information among the sample firms.  Because the average may be distorted by a few large disclosures, the median number of pages of post-retirement information (MEDIAN) is also given.  Finally, a measure of skewness (SKEW) and kurtosis (KURT) is supplied to determine whether the amount of disclosure made by the companies is normally distributed; if the amounts of disclosure are not normally distributed, the median value is a better guide to the disclosure practices of the sample firms than the mean.

A number of findings emerge from the results in Panel A of Table 6.1.  First, the mean number of pages devoted to post-retirement benefit information was relatively low in 2000; only 1.631 pages of the typical annual report related to this topic.  Second, over the six year period covered by this investigation, the average amount of disclosure increased dramatically.  For example, by 2005, some 5.292 pages of the annual report were devoted to information relating to post-retirement benefits.    


Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures (2000-05)
YEAR	NO	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX	MEDIAN	SKEW	KURT
Panel A: Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures - Number of Pages
2000	36	1.631	1.281	0.100	4.680	1.140	1.126*	0.129
2001	35	2.378	1.676	0.160	7.170	2.090	1.217*	1.381
2002	36	3.697	2.233	0.110	9.820	3.235	0.991*	0.690
2003	36	4.898	2.769	0.210	12.320	3.915	0.836*	0.141
2004	36	4.994	3.155	0.180	11.990	3.920	0.882*	-0.083
2005	36	5.292	3.304	0.150	12.660	4.355	0.805*	-0.304
Panel B: Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures – % of the Annual Report
2000	36	1.622	0.962	0.179	5.113	1.515	1.422*	3.716*
2001	35	2.272	1.164	0.291	6.115	2.203	0.666	2.218*
2002	36	3.441	1.492	0.190	7.481	3.729	-0.036	0.670
2003	36	3.909	1.481	0.328	7.182	3.994	-0.105	0.701
2004	36	3.744	1.456	0.217	6.352	3.875	-0.623	0.487
2005	36	3.412	1.477	0.231	5.995	3.148	-0.125	-0.515
Note: Panel A reports the absolute number of pages in the annual report devoted to post-retirement benefit disclosures.  Panel B reports the absolute number of pages in the annual report devoted to post-retirement benefit disclosures expressed as a percentage of the total number of pages in the annual report.  YEAR represents the year in which the company’s financial period ends; NO represents the number of companies analysed in that year; MEAN represents the average number of pages (percentage) of post-retirement benefit disclosure in an annual report of the sponsoring employer; SD represents the standard deviation around which the average value varies; MIN represents the minimum number of pages (percentage) allocated to post-retirement benefit disclosures in the sample; MAX represents the maximum number of pages (percentage) allocated to post-retirement benefit disclosures in the sample; MEDIAN represents the median number of pages (percentage) of post-retirement information: SKEW measures the skewness of the sample and finally; KURT measures the kurtosis of the sample.  The statistical significance of the skewness and kurtosis of the sample at the 5% level is denoted by *.  

Third, not only did the average amount of disclosure increase between 2000 and 2005, but the variability in disclosure among the sample firms rose too.  For instance, the standard deviation increased from 1.281 pages in 2000 to 3.304 pages in 2005 suggesting that a wide range of disclosure practices existed.  Indeed, by 2005, one firm (HSBC) devoted 12.660 pages of its annual report to the disclosure of post-retirement benefit information.  Finally, an analysis of Panel A of Table 6.1 reveals that the disclosure amounts were positively skewed but had no significant amount of kurtosis; thus, the use of the mean value may not be appropriate; surprisingly, however, the median figures tell a similar story to their mean counterparts in terms of disclosure. 

Figure 6.1 shows the mean number of pages of the annual report devoted to the total post-retirement benefit disclosures plotted against each of the six years; showing that these disclosures increased from an average 1.631 pages in 2000 to 5.292 pages in 2005.  Undoubtedly, many companies experienced an increase in the size of their annual report and accounts during the period 2000 to 2005 due to the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 (Dunne et al., 2008).  Indeed, one company (HSBC) in the sample published 249 pages in its annual report in 2000 compared to 421 pages in 2005.  So, in order to examine the relative change in the post-retirement benefit disclosures, the absolute amounts were expressed as a percentage of the total number of pages in the annual report and accounts; these percentages are reported in Panel B of Table 6.1.   

Panel B of Table 6.1 shows that in 2000, the average post-retirement benefit disclosures accounted for 1.622% of the content in the annual report and accounts.  This figure increased steadily until 2003 where it peaked at 3.909% and then decreased slightly in 2004 and 2005 to 3.744% and 3.412% respectively​[207]​; for example, one of the companies (Friends Provident) in the sample experienced a 187% increase in the number of pages in its annual report between 2000 and 2005.  Figure 6.2 uses the percentage information to illustrate the data in Panel B of Table 6.1 in a similar way to Figure 6.1.          


Figure 6.1: Mean Pages of the Total Disclosure Analysed by Year 



Thus, the overall trend in pension disclosures identified in Panel A is muted slightly when the growth in the size of the annual report is taken into account; nevertheless, the trend is still present in both the mean and the median percentage figures.  The trend identified in Figure 6.1 therefore does not seem to have been a spurious artefact associated with an increase in the total size of the typical annual report​[208]​.  Consequently, the evidence provided by Table 6.1 suggests that there has been an overall increase in the total amount of post-retirement benefit disclosures made in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers between 2000 and 2005 and the statistical significance of this increase is tested in Section 6.3.3 below.  

6.3.3	An Analysis of the Type of Disclosures made Across the Years 
Section 6.3.2 demonstrated that there was an increase in both the mean and the median amount of post-retirement benefit disclosures over the whole time period.  Table 6.2 expands on this finding by reporting the mean number of pages of the different categories of post-retirement benefit disclosure (where it is assumed that the data is normally distributed) for each year studied; Table 6.3 reports the median equivalent (where it is assumed that the data is not normally distributed).  Such an analysis is useful because it provides more details of the post-retirement benefit information disclosed by the companies included in the sample and allows an investigation of how these disclosures have changed between 2000 and 2005.  

An F-test (H-test) of the null hypothesis that the reported mean (median) levels of disclosure are equal across the six different years is also provided; the F-test and its associated p-value are included in the final two columns of Table 6.2, while the H-test and its p-value are reported in the final two columns of Table 6.3.  Both of these tables have four panels: Panel A highlights the total disclosure of pensions-related information in the annual reports (the final row of the Record Sheet reproduced in Appendix 7 while Panels B, C and D supply more disaggregated data.  The categorisation of this data  is described in detail in Section 6.3.1; Panel B shows the eight separate categories of IAS 19 pension scheme disclosures and a ninth category of disclosures that relate specifically to SSAP 24.  Panel C focuses on Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures using the same nine categories that were employed in Panel B.  Finally, Panel D reports on other disclosures not required by IAS 19 that were grouped into six categories: (i) Other GAAP (mainly US) information; (ii) IFRS details; (iii) DC information; (iv) information about Governance and Risk; (v) details about the Trustees; and (vi) data about the percentage split of pension scheme assets.

A number of points emerge from a detailed analysis of Tables 6.2; first, whilst the data in Panel A confirms the descriptive statistics described in Table 6.1, it also convincingly rejects the null hypothesis that the mean number of pages devoted to the total amount of post-retirement benefit disclosures was equal in every year; the F-statistic was 13.09 while its p-value was 0.000​[209]​.    



Table 6.2 An Analysis of the Mean Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Annual Reports of the Sponsoring Employer
Type of Disclosure (number of pages) 	MEAN2000	MEAN2001	MEAN2002	MEAN2003	MEAN2004	MEAN2005	F test	P value
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	1.631	2.378	3.697	4.898	4.994	5.292	13.09**	0.000
Panel B: Pension Scheme Disclosures
1 Accounting Policy	0.192	0.294	0.418	0.424	0.453	0.493	7.50**	0.000
2 Plan Description	0.254	0.317	0.441	0.517	0.508	0.601	6.06**	0.000
3 GrossAsset/LiabilityReconciliation	0.136	0.439	0.633	0.782	0.781	0.696	16.87**	0.000
4 Own Assets	0.016	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.009	0.026	0.43	0.830
5 Net Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.038	0.042	0.144	0.174	0.189	0.248	17.70**	0.000
6 Expense	0.126	0.212	0.685	0.997	1.053	1.031	31.29**	0.000
7 Actual Return	0.000	0.010	0.130	0.211	0.263	0.283	22.58**	0.000
8 Assumptions	0.117	0.242	0.316	0.396	0.399	0.507	8.22**	0.000
9 SSAP 24	0.098	0.061	0.062	0.058	0.041	0.027	1.15	0.338
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
10 Accounting Policy	0.018	0.014	0.023	0.022	0.022	0.008	0.57	0.725
11 Benefit Description	0.044	0.037	0.039	0.055	0.039	0.032	0.54	0.745
12 GrossAsset/LiabilityReconciliation	0.018	0.050	0.081	0.090	0.088	0.041	2.07*	0.071
13 Own Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.99	0.422
14 Net Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.011	0.010	0.013	0.026	0.027	0.018	0.74	0.597
15 Expense	0.011	0.018	0.049	0.076	0.076	0.039	1.68	0.142
16 Actual Return	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.013	0.016	0.006	1.45	0.180
17 Assumptions	0.011	0.031	0.033	0.033	0.039	0.030	0.68	0.640
18 SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	1.000
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
19 Other GAAP (mainly US)	0.485	0.533	0.558	0.951	0.790	0.764	0.73	0.600
20 IFRS	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.106	0.241	5.83**	0.000
21 DC	0.022	0.019	0.021	0.023	0.019	0.035	0.41	0.839
22 Governance and Risk	0.028	0.031	0.024	0.038	0.051	0.104	2.89**	0.015
23 Trustee	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.009	0.006	0.31	0.906
24 % Split of  Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.054	5.15**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).
Table 6.3 An Analysis of the Median Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Annual Reports of the Sponsoring Employers
Type of Disclosure (number of pages)	MEDIAN2000	MEDIAN2001	MEDIAN2002	MEDIAN2003	MEDIAN2004	MEDIAN2005	H test	P value
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	1.140	2.090	3.235	3.915	3.920	4.355	63.54**	0.000
Panel B: Pension Scheme Disclosures
1 Accounting Policy	0.130	0.270	0.400	0.405	0.390	0.415	41.40**	0.000
2 Plan Description	0.225	0.230	0.330	0.470	0.470	0.560	31.70**	0.000
3 GrossAsset/LiabilityReconciliation	0.100	0.370	0.615	0.740	0.675	0.615	69.16**	0.000
4 Own Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.99	0.702
5 Net Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.000	0.000	0.125	0.130	0.165	0.220	72.12**	0.000
6 Expense	0.080	0.170	0.655	1.025	1.020	0.930	113.52**	0.000
7 Actual Return	0.000	0.000	0.150	0.200	0.220	0.210	116.80**	0.000
8 Assumptions	0.100	0.210	0.275	0.320	0.375	0.360	51.21**	0.000
9 SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.95*	0.052
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
10 Accounting Policy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.61	0.900
11 Benefit Description	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.80	0.877
12 GrossAsset/LiabilityReconciliation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.87	0.432
13 Own Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.97	0.419
14 Net Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.37	0.498
15 Expense	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.66	0.341
16 Actual Return	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.13	0.149
17 Assumptions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.58	0.764
18 SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	1.000
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
19 Other GAAP (mainly US)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.07	0.840
20 IFRS	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.055	66.70**	0.000
21 DC	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.26	0.660
22 Governance and Risk	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.37	0.272
23 Trustee	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.63	0.898
24 % Split of  Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	30.09**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the H test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*). 

Second, an analysis of the remaining Panels of Table 6.2 reveals that most of the increase in the total disclosure related to disclosures about the pension scheme itself (Panel B) as opposed to other post-retirement benefits (Panels C and D).  Although two of the nine disclosure categories in Panel B (Own Assets and the SSAP 24 category) did not experience any significant change between 2000 and 2005 (the F-statistics were 0.43 (p=0.830) and 1.15 (p= 0.338) respectively), the remaining seven categories had F-statistics that were higher than the critical value, allowing the null hypothesis that the mean numbers of pages in these categories were equal to be rejected​[210]​.  In four of these seven categories (Accounting Policy, Net asset/Liability Recognition, Actual Return and Assumptions) there was an increase in the mean number of pages devoted to these aspects of pension scheme disclosures for each of the years investigated.  For the other three categories (Plan Description, Gross Asset/ Liability Reconciliation and Expense), the mean number of pages increased for some but not for all of these years.  The Corus Group and HSBC are good examples of how the quantity of some of these detailed disclosures changed between 2000 and 2005.  In 2000, the Corus Group dedicated one fifth of a page of its annual report to the explanation of the accounting policy for its pension scheme.  This disclosure was split between the Financial Review and the Accounting Policy Note.  By 2005 it was publishing one and a half pages relating to the same topic and the disclosure location also included the notes to the accounts other than the Accounting Policy Note.  In 2005 HSBC devoted over 2 pages of its annual report to an explanation of the assumptions underlying the calculation of each of its pension scheme liabilities, this had increased from the one tenth of a page reported in 2000.  An extract from the 2005 annual reports of Corus and HSBC can be found at Appendix 11(i) and (ii) respectively. 

Third, the quantity of disclosures relating to post-retirement benefits other than pension schemes is relatively small.  The mean numbers in columns 2 to 7 for Panel C of Table 6.2 are much lower than the comparable figures in Panel B of the same table; for example, in 2000, they ranged from a high of 0.044 of a page for plan description to 0.000 for own assets, actual return and SSAP24​[211]​.  These other post-retirement benefit disclosures are also relatively “static” in nature; the average number of pages devoted to different aspects of other post-retirement disclosures did not change markedly over the years 2000 to 2005 and for eight of the nine categories being analysed in Panel C, the F-statistic was small and the p-value was greater than 0.10 allowing the null hypothesis of equality among the means to be accepted.  The only slight exception to this generalisation related to the Asset/ Liability Reconciliation category where the F-statistic was 2.07 but even here, the null hypothesis was only rejected at the 10 per cent level of significance.

Fourth, Panel B of Table 6.2 indicates that the category of post-retirement benefit disclosure to produce the largest number of pages in the annual reports of the sample companies between 2002 and 2005 was that relating to the expense of the pension scheme (0.685, 0.997, 1.053 and 1.031 pages for 2002 to 2005 respectively).  For example, in 2005 BP produced nearly three pages of information relating to the pension scheme expense; this compared to the third of a page that was published in its annual report for 2000.  The majority of this information was published in tabular format and an example is reproduced at Appendix 11(iii).  It is also interesting to note that disclosures relating to other GAAP (mainly US​[212]​) ranked top for 2000 and 2001 (the mean was 0.485 and 0.533 pages respectively); in 2002 it ranked 3rd and for the other three years, 2002 to 2005, the average number of pages in this category was ranked second behind the disclosures relating to the pension scheme expense​[213]​.  A comparison of the mean numbers in Panel D of Table 6.2 with their counterparts in Table 6.3 reveals that these average numbers for other GAAP (mainly US) disclosures were influenced to a great extent by a small number of the sample firms with US-listings (see Section 6.3.5); the amount of disclosures required to comply with US GAAP was sizeable and this clearly raised the average for the whole sample.  It is no surprise then that when the median figures in Table 6.3 are analysed, and the influence of these companies is reduced, the typical firm devoted 0.000 pages of their annual report to this type of disclosure.  A third category of post-retirement benefit disclosure which accounted for a large number of pages in the annual reports of the sponsoring employer was that which related to the reconciliation of gross pension scheme assets and liabilities.  For example Imperial Tobacco devoted 1.26 pages of its annual report to this topic; again, the majority of this information was produced in tabular format and an example of this has been reproduced in Appendix 11(iv).      

Fifth, although some of the largest mean levels of disclosure about post-retirement benefits related to other GAAP (mainly US), there was no statistical increase in this information during the time frame being studied; the F-statistic for this category of disclosure was only 0.73 and its p-value was only 0.600​[214]​.  By contrast, the F-statistics for three of the other categories in Panel D of Table 6.2 (IFRS, Governance and Risk, % Split of Assets) were large and had p-values less than 0.05.  In each case, the average number of pages devoted to these categories started off very small in 2000 (at either 0.000 or 0.028) and rose during the six years; while the number of pages devoted to these categories in 2005 was still tiny in absolute terms (at 0.241, 0.104 and 0.054 respectively) it had increased by a sizeable amount relative to the disclosures in 2000.  Further investigations showed that eleven companies were producing information relating to governance and risk in 2000 whereas this had increased to eighteen companies by 2005.  Indeed by 2005, HSBC was producing nearly a page of information related to these topics followed by Barclays which produced nearly half a page.  Examples of these disclosures can be found at Appendix 11(v) and (vi) respectively.    

A final point to emerge from this part of the investigation is that the median findings generally reinforce the results for the mean analysis.  The median level of total disclosure increased each year between 2000 and 2005 such that the null hypothesis that the median total disclosure was identical in every year is convincingly rejected (H = 63.54, p-value = 0.000).  As with the mean results in Table 6.2, most of the total median disclosures relate to pension scheme information; a majority of the non-zero median numbers in Table 6.3 are in Panel B; in fact all of the median numbers in Panel C and all except one of the median numbers in Panel D are equal to zero.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the only significant changes in the median number of pages of disclosure relate to pension scheme information in Panel B.  The H statistics are sizeable for seven of the nine categories of information with p-values of less than 0.05.  In fact, the two categories where the H-statistics were not significant at the five per cent level (Own Assets and SSAP24) are the same as those for whom the null hypothesis could not be rejected in Table 6.2.  

Figure 6.3 shows the mean number of pages of the annual report devoted to the different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures plotted against each of the six years; the different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures are described in detail in Section 6.3.1 and are based on the 24 classifications reported in Tables 6.2 to 6.5. Figure 6.3 graphically illustrates that the categories of post-retirement benefit disclosures that experienced the most obvious increases, were those that related to the pension scheme itself (as opposed to other post-retirement benefits such as healthcare plans) and specifically those relating to:  (i) the pension scheme expense; (ii) the gross asset/liability reconciliation; (iii) the plan description; (iv) the accounting policy; and (v) the assumptions.  




Figure 6.3: Mean Pages of the Disclosure Type Analysed by Year


Note: The different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures are described in detail in Section 6.3.1 and are based on the 24 classifications reported in Tables 6.2 to 6.5. 

Although Figure 6.3 shows that the disclosures relating to other GAAP (mainly US) appear to be the highest ranking category of post-retirement benefit disclosures in 2000 and the second ranking category in 2005, the results in Table 6.2 demonstrated that this increase was not statistically significant​[215]​.  

Thus, the categories of post-retirement benefit disclosures in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers to experience the largest amount of change between 2000 and 2005 related to: (i) the pension scheme expense (disclosure item (6)); (ii) the reconciliation of gross pension scheme assets and liabilities (disclosure item (3)); (iii) the plan description (disclosure item (2)); (iv) the accounting policy (disclosure item (1)); and (v) the assumptions (disclosure item (8)).  

When considering these disclosures in terms of Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability, with the exception of disclosure items (5) and (14)​[216]​, categories 1 to 18 in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are examples of information that discharges accountability for probity and legality; their disclosure provides some assurance that funds have been spent as agreed between the accountee (in this case the sponsoring employer) and the accountor (various corporate stakeholders) or in accordance with any other applicable regulation.  For example, providing that the sponsoring employer has an unqualified audit report, disclosures relating to: (i) the accounting policy (disclosure items (1) and (10)) confirm that the appropriate accounting standards have been complied with; (ii) the principle actuarial assumptions (disclosure items (8) and (17)) provide some assurance that the reported figures are in accordance with actuarial norms; and (iii) the calculation of the SSAP 24 accounting numbers (disclosure items (9) and (18)) discharge accountability for probity and legality because they verify that the requirements of SSAP 24 have been complied with.  Excluding disclosure items (5) and (14), an analysis of these disclosures demonstrated that none of them provided information about process, performance, programme or policy accountability.  Alternatively, the net pension scheme surplus or deficit which is shown in the Statement of Financial Position and its reconciliation (disclosure items (5) and (14)) both provide a measure of performance accountability; these accounting numbers and disclosures specifically address whether the output meets the required standards and evaluates the performance of the trustees because they estimate whether or not there are enough funds in the pension scheme to meet the ultimate pension promise. 

Likewise, the increase in the disclosures relating: (i) to the governance and the risk of the pension scheme; and (ii) the % split of its assets are also interesting. Section 6.3.4 demonstrates that the majority of this information increased between 2004 and 2005.  At this time, these types of disclosure were not mandated by any accounting standard, however, in 2007 the ASB published a Reporting Statement: Retirement Benefits – Disclosures (ASB, 2007)​[217]​.  It suggests that the annual report of the sponsoring employer should disclose, amongst other things, information that will allow the users to understand: (i) the relationship between the sponsoring employer and the trustees of the pension scheme; (ii) the risks associated with the pension scheme; and (iii) specifically the risks associated with the pension scheme assets (ASB, 2007).  Thus, companies in the sample were disclosing this kind of information before its recommendation; some as early as 2000.  For example in 2005, Tesco made the following disclosure in relation to its pension scheme:
“During the year ended 26 February 2005, the Trustee board comprised nine directors including three nominated by the members.  Mr V Benjamin retired as the Chairman of the Trustees was replaced by Mr R S Ager.  Management of the assets is delegated to a number of independent fund managers.  These fund managers have discretion to invest in shares of Tesco PLC providing they do not exceed the proportion of the shares in the total market.”  (p. 16)

This might be considered to be an example of accountability for process in terms of Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability as it describes some of the procedures associated with the trustee board.  In 2005, Barclays made the following disclosure in relation to the risk connected with its pension scheme:
“The ability of the Pension Fund to meet the projected pension payments is maintained through investments.  Market risk arises because the estimated market value of the pension fund assets might decline or their investment returns might reduce or because the estimated value of the pension liabilities might increase.  In these circumstances, Barclays might be required or might choose to make extra contributions to the pension fund.” (p. 71)

Again, the sponsoring employer is attempting to explain the process involved in managing the pension scheme deficit and how market risk impacts on that deficit; consequently, it is deemed to be another example of Stewart’s (1984) process accountability.  Likewise, Unilever, in its 2005 annual report provided a further example of the discharge of process accountability in relation to governance and risk of its pension scheme:

“The Group’s investment strategy in respect of its funded pension plans is implemented within the framework of the various statutory requirements of the territories where the plans are based.  The Group has developed policy guidelines for the allocation of assets to different classes with the objective of controlling risk and maintaining the right balance between risk and long-term returns in order to limit the cost to the company of the benefits provided.  To achieve this, investments are well diversified, such that the failure of any single investment would not have a material impact on the overall level of assets.  The plans invest the largest proportion of the assets in equities, which the Group believes offer the best returns over the long term commensurate with an acceptable level of risk.  The Group also keeps a proportion of assets invested in property, bonds and cash.  Most assets are managed by a number of external fund managers with a small proportion managed in-house.  In December 2005, Unilever launched a pooled investment vehicle (Univest) which will offer its pension plans around the world a simplified investment solution to implement their strategic asset allocation models initially for equities.  The aim is to provide a high quality, well diversified risk controlled solution” (p. 25)

Whilst Unilever has touched on the diversification of its pension scheme portfolio of assets in the above paragraph, some companies chose to disclose more specific information in this regard; for example, in 2004, Diageo produced a table that analysed the 2004 and 2003 percentage of pension scheme assets between: (i) equities; (ii) bonds; (iii) property; and (iv) other and whether these investments were held in: (i) the UK; (ii) Ireland; or (iii) the United States (Appendix 11(vii)).  Similarly, Pearson in its 2005 annual report chose to disclose comparatives for three years of the percentages of the same categories of assets analysed between: (i) the UK group scheme; and (ii) other funded plans (Appendix 11(viii)).  In 2005, Corus took a similar approach to Pearson but disclosed the percentage split of assets allocated between each of its three pension schemes (Appendix 11(ix)).  Whilst, these examples do not provide much narrative information or explanation, they provide some evidence of the process of the diversification of the pension scheme’s portfolio of assets and so are deemed to discharge process accountability in terms of Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability.    
  
Such increased disclosure might be evidence of the fact that companies have recognised that a wide range of pension scheme stakeholders use the annual report of the sponsoring employer for a variety of reasons (as confirmed by the results reported in Chapter 5).  Alternatively, it might simply be that companies increasingly view their employee pension schemes as a high risk element of their business and that the disclosure of such information is made to assure the users of the annual reports that all was being done to contain this risk.

Thus, the majority of the mandated post-retirement disclosures made in the annual report of the sponsoring employer were used to discharge accountability for probity and legality; disclosure and reconciliation of the post-retirement net assets and liabilities can be used as an example of trustee performance accountability.  Other examples of process accountability were found to exist in the voluntary disclosures made, particularly in the disclosures made in relation to the governance and risk of the pension scheme and the percentage split of the assets.  Overall, the analysis suggests that many different types of post-retirement benefits disclosures of sponsoring employers were not constant around the time when FRS 17 and IAS 19 were introduced​[218]​ and this finding is further investigated in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 where the year-on-year changes in these disclosures are examined statistically.

6.3.4	An Analysis of the Year-on-year Changes in the Type of Disclosures 

Tables 6.4 and 6.5 report the mean and median year-on-year changes in disclosure from 2000-2005 respectively. Specifically, the first column of these tables lists the same categories of information as those reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 to facilitate comparison.  The next fifteen columns provide information for 2001 compared to 2000 (2001/00), 2002 compared to 2001 (2002/01), 2003 compared to 2002 (2003/02), 2004 compared to 2003 (2004/03) and 2005 compared to 2004 (2005/04); specifically, the mean (median) difference for each category of information, the standard deviation around this mean difference (the W-test statistic) and the p- value associated with a one-sample test of the null hypothesis that this mean (median) difference is statistically significant are all shown in Table 6.4 (Table 6.5).

One of the main findings to emerge from Tables 6.4 and 6.5 is that changes in the post-retirement benefit disclosures of the sample firms were not uniform across the time horizon considered.  For example, a quick scan of Table 6.5 indicates that there are many more starred items on the left-hand side of the table rather than on the right-hand side suggesting that many of the significant changes occurred in the three years after 2000; most of the significant mean changes therefore took place in 2001/00, 2002/01, and 2003/02.  Indeed, an analysis of the 41 significant changes that occurred in Table 6.4 reveals that 30 of them arose in these first three columns​[219]​.  

Table 6.4 A Year-on-year Comparison of the Mean Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Annual report of the Sponsoring Employer
Disclosure Type(number of pages)	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Meanchange	SD	Pvalue	Meanchange	SD	Pvalue	Meanchange	SD	Pvalue	Meanchange	SD	Pvalue	Meanchange	SD	Pvalue
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	0.755	0.870	0.000**	1.373	0.912	0.000**	1.201	1.482	0.000**	0.096	1.311	0.663	0.298	1.322	0.184
Panel B: Pension Fund Disclosures
1 Accounting policy	0.096	0.189	0.005**	0.137	0.234	0.002**	0.007	0.214	0.853	0.029	0.265	0.522	0.040	0.261	0.362
2 Plan description	0.063	0.180	0.046**	0.130	0.214	0.001**	0.076	0.264	0.091*	-0.009	0.233	0.815	0.093	0.303	0.075*
3 Gross Recon.	0.308	0.314	0.000**	0.201	0.339	0.001**	0.149	0.313	0.007**	-0.001	0.243	0.984	-0.085	0.325	0.126
4 Own assets	-0.006	0.042	0.428	0.000	0.010	1.000	-0.001	0.007	0.230	0.000	0.003	0.571	0.018	0.093	0.266
5 Net Recon.	0.010	0.041	0.170	0.099	0.100	0.000**	0.030	0.084	0.039**	0.015	0.077	0.239	0.059	0.179	0.055*
6 Expense	0.101	0.203	0.006**	0.483	0.317	0.000**	0.313	0.348	0.000**	0.056	0.292	0.256	-0.022	0.430	0.761
7 Actual return	0.010	0.054	0.270	0.123	0.096	0.000**	0.081	0.088	0.000**	0.053	0.171	0.073*	0.020	0.208	0.573
8 Assumptions	0.133	0.160	0.000**	0.068	0.215	0.070*	0.079	0.200	0.023**	0.003	0.158	0.900	0.108	0.334	0.061*
9 SSAP 24	-0.040	0.216	0.283	0.003	0.090	0.838	-0.005	0.073	0.699	-0.016	0.075	0.203	-0.014	0.133	0.519
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
10 Accounting policy	-0.002	0.031	0.747	0.008	0.032	0.131	-0.001	0.047	0.889	-0.001	0.010	0.751	-0.014	0.051	0.109
11 Benefit description	-0.007	0.086	0.642	0.002	0.050	0.813	0.016	0.045	0.044**	-0.016	0.040	0.018**	-0.006	0.041	0.359
12 Gross Recon.	0.031	0.104	0.085*	0.033	0.133	0.145	0.009	0.081	0.529	-0.002	0.061	0.870	-0.048	0.114	0.017**
13 Own assets	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.001	0.008	0.324
14 Net Recon.	-0.001	0.011	0.763	0.003	0.032	0.640	0.013	0.041	0.060*	0.001	0.013	0.702	-0.009	0.077	0.495
15 Expense	0.007	0.024	0.109	0.032	0.100	0.069*	0.027	0.065	0.017**	0.000	0.027	0.950	-0.038	0.169	0.190
16 Actual return	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.012	0.037	0.071*	0.001	0.014	0.629	0.003	0.011	0.090*	-0.010	0.049	0.225
17 Assumptions	0.020	0.062	0.063*	0.002	0.042	0.778	0.000	0.028	0.953	0.006	0.030	0.222	-0.009	0.081	0.526
18 SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
19 US	0.034	0.221	0.369	0.041	0.255	0.350	0.393	0.814	0.006**	-0.160	0.733	0.198	-0.026	0.789	0.844
20 IFRS	0.002	0.010	0.324	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.001	0.003	0.324	0.104	0.297	0.043**	0.135	0.560	0.158
21 DC	-0.006	0.037	0.368	0.005	0.025	0.267	0.002	0.033	0.764	-0.004	0.022	0.327	0.016	0.058	0.096*
22 Gov & Risk	0.002	0.034	0.770	-0.007	0.050	0.389	0.014	0.043	0.054*	0.013	0.068	0.254	0.053	0.133	0.023**
23 Trustee	-0.001	0.026	0.745	0.001	0.012	0.777	-0.003	0.014	0.257	0.006	0.024	0.140	-0.003	0.011	0.124
24 % Asset Split	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.016	0.062	0.142	0.039	0.084	0.009**
Note: Where Mean change is the difference in the means between years and the statistical significance of the H test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).

Table 6.5 A Year-on-year Comparison of the Median Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Annual report of the Sponsoring Employer
Disclosure Type(number of pages)	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Medianchange	WScore	Pvalue	Medianchange	WScore	Pvalue	Medianchange	WScore	Pvalue	Medianchange	WScore	Pvalue	Medianchange	WScore	Pvalue
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	0.773	565.0**	0.000	1.323	627.0**	0.000	0.960	634.0**	0.000	0.040	355.5	0.730	0.170	376.0	0.322
Panel B: Pension Fund Disclosures
1 Accounting policy	0.095	465.5**	0.001	0.103	446.5**	0.003	0.000	329.0	0.956	0.000	321.5	0.922	0.030	336.0	0.326
2 Plan description	0.060	409.5**	0.022	0.095	465.5**	0.001	0.080	426.5*	0.069	0.005	288.0	0.900	0.060	393.0	0.104
3 Gross Recon.	0.290	448.5**	0.000	0.220	481.0**	0.002	0.100	454.5**	0.007	0.010	302.5	0.477	-0.085	164.0*	0.063
4 Own assets	0.000	4.0	0.855	0.000	6.0	0.855	0.000	0.0	0.371	0.000	2.0	0.789	0.000	23.0	0.151
5 Net Recon.	0.000	70.0	0.286	0.090	347.0**	0.000	0.020	318.0**	0.031	0.015	308.5	0.120	0.040	301.5*	0.071
6 Expense	0.070	441.0**	0.000	0.490	624.0**	0.000	0.295	580.0**	0.000	0.020	326.0	0.632	-0.055	208.5	0.201
7 Actual return	0.000	3.0	0.371	0.125	300.0**	0.000	0.080	489.5**	0.000	0.015	254.0	0.250	0.005	249.0	0.742
8 Assumptions	0.120	510.5**	0.000	0.045	398.0**	0.037	0.055	429.0**	0.008	0.005	297.0	0.775	0.055	339.0*	0.076
9 SSAP 24	0.000	49.5	0.570	0.000	62.0	0.932	0.000	54.0	0.755	0.000	32.5	0.382	0.000	19.0	0.415
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
10 Accounting policy	0.000	14.0	0.624	0.000	24.5*	0.091	0.000	16.5	0.889	0.000	10.0	1.000	0.000	3.0	0.142
11 Benefit description	0.000	42.5	0.861	0.000	62.5	0.910	0.000	96.5**	0.041	0.000	7.5**	0.015	0.000	51.0	0.394
12 Gross Recon.	0.000	46.0*	0.067	0.000	63.0	0.235	0.000	61.0	0.295	0.000	40.5	0.937	0.000	8.5**	0.019
13 Own assets	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a 	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	1.0	1.000
14 Net Recon.	0.000	2.0	0.789	0.000	9.0	0.787	0.000	27.0** 	0.035	 0.000	8.0	1.000 	0.000	16.5	0.515
15 Expense	0.000	15.0*	0.059	0.000	30.5*	0.093	0.000	60.5** 	0.016	 0.000	41.0	0.906 	0.000	30.0	0.505
16 Actual return	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	10.0*	0.100	0.000	3.5 	1.000 	 0.000	10.0	0.100 	0.000	4.0	0.418
17 Assumptions	0.000	41.5**	0.028	0.000	14.0	1.000	0.000	18.5 	1.000 	 0.000	31.5	0.314 	0.000	26.5	0.594
18 SSAP 24	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a 	n/a	 0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a 	n/a
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
19 US	0.000	48.0	0.197	0.000	66.0	0.162	0.030	108.0**	0.007	0.000	36.0	0.315	 0.000	36.5	0.790 
20 IFRS	0.000	1.0	1.000	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	1.0	1.000	0.000	55.0**	0.006	 0.060	137.5* 	0.091
21 DC	0.000	15.0	0.726	0.000	22.0	0.205	0.000	32.0	0.286	0.000	9.0	0.447	 0.000	57.5	0.158 
22 Gov & Risk	0.000	22.5	1.000	0.000	26.0	0.919	0.000	72.0*	0.069	0.000	63.0	0.887	 0.000	92.5**	0.013
23 Trustee	0.000	7.5	1.000	0.000	13.0	0.675	0.000	3.0	0.281	0.000	19.5*	0.075	 0.000	0.0	0.181 
24 % Asset Split	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a 	n/a 	0.000	6.0	0.181	 0.000	35.0**	0.021
Note: Where Mean change is the difference in the means between years and the statistical significance of the H test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).

Such a result is perhaps not surprising; one might expect that the implementation of FRS 17 for accounting periods ending after the 22nd June 2002 would have given rise to variations in disclosure patterns in 2002/3.  

An analysis of Table 6.4 indicates that a lot of the sample firms prepared for this change by increasing their disclosure of post-retirement benefit information in the years leading up to the introduction of this new standard; the mean number of pages devoted to this issue started to rise as early as 2001.  This pattern of increased disclosure was not common to all of the categories of information reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.  For example, in four categories of disclosure (plan description, reconciliation of gross assets and liabilities, the pension scheme expense and assumptions) the mean changes for 2001/00, 2002/01 and 2003/02 were all significant, whereas in three of the other disclosure categories (Accounting Policies, Reconciliation and Actual Return) the p-values were less than 0.10 in only two of the three years leading up to the introduction of FRS 17​[220]​.  The majority of these significant changes in the post-retirement benefit disclosures were positive and the number of pages devoted to this material increased.  However, Table 6.4 also reports two significant decreases of other post-retirement benefit disclosures (Panel C) when 2004 is compared to 2003 (benefit description) and likewise 2005/2004 (gross asset/liability reconciliation).  The disclosure in these categories of post-retirement benefit information decreased following the introduction of FRS 17 in 2003, however, despite an extensive investigation there was no obvious reason why this might be the case​[221]​.  Perhaps companies were trying to make more efficient use of the space available to them in their annual reports, given the increased disclosures required in other categories of post-retirement benefit information.  For example, Pearson in its 2004 annual report, provided three years comparatives (2004, 2003 and 2002) for its other post-retirement benefit gross asset/liability reconciliation; by 2005 the information was for 2004 and 2005 only.  Likewise, in Pearson’s annual report for 2004, the pensions note was split into two parts: (i) pensions; and (ii) other post-retirement benefits; by 2005 the information for both pensions and other post-retirement benefits was disclosed as one note and not separated into two parts as it had been the year before. A much smaller number of significant changes were documented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 for Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures (Panels C) and Other Disclosures not required by IAS 19 (Panels D).  Only sixteen of the seventy-five mean changes in these two panels of Table 6.4 were significant – half of them only at the 10 per cent level​[222]​.  

Another striking feature of the information contained in Panels C and D of Table 6.4 is that a majority of the significant changes in these panels (twelve out of the sixteen) occur in the later years of the time period studied​[223]​.  The increasing disclosure of information relating to post-retirement benefits other than pension schemes may simply be due to their increased use as a significant component of employee remuneration packages; thus there has been a corresponding increase in their disclosure.  It is more likely, however, that the companies in the sample have recognised that IAS 19 is more explicit in its definition of post-retirement benefits​[224]​ than FRS 17​[225]​ and thus the required disclosure in relation to these elements of employee remuneration is more demanding; it would appear that IAS 19 disclosure requirements in relation to other post-retirement benefits have been adopted early.  

It is also perhaps not surprising that IFRS disclosures experienced a significant increase between 2004 and 2003 as this time-frame preceded the implementation of IFRS; as Napier (2009) suggested, prior to 2005, the majority of companies had not fully implemented FRS 17 and therefore the pension scheme surplus/deficit was not recorded in The Statement of Financial Position - evidently, in 2003, companies were signalling that this situation would change in 2005 and indicated what the changes might be.  The provision of this information varied from company to company depending on how closely aligned the existing accounting policy for post-retirement benefits was to IFRS; for example, Diageo in its 2005 annual report disclosed the following:
“Diageo’s accounting for pensions and other post employment benefits under IFRS will be substantially the same as that already applied under UK GAAP.  There are however a number of minor differences that give a slight variation in the valuations of assets and liabilities in the schemes.  These include the use of bid prices rather than mid-market prices to value the assets in the schemes, and a different actuarial method for valuing certain risk benefits (death in service and ill health benfits) representing the liabilities of the schemes.  In addition, under UK GAAP, the costs of administering the schemes were charged as service costs and included in operating profit.  Under IFRS, these costs are included in the expected rate of return assumption and, as a consequence, are included in finance charges in the Income Statement.” (p. 149)

Alternatively, some companies provided several pages​[226]​ of IFRS post-retirement benefit information.  To some extent, Section 6.3.3 has already discussed the increases in the disclosures relating to: (i) the governance and the risk of the pension scheme; and (ii) the % split of assets; no further analysis is considered necessary other than to note that the former category of disclosure experienced a significant increase (at the 10% level) between 2002 and 2003 and both categories experienced a significant increase (at the 5% level) between 2004 and 2005.

A study of the median changes in Table 6.5 reveals that the numbers were typically smaller and that fewer of the change values were statistically significant. This finding confirms the observation from the descriptive statistics in Table 6.1 where a subset of companies have a large number of pages of information about this topic in their annual reports and this pulls up the average values.  Thus, Tables 6.4 and 6.5 suggest that, for certain categories of disclosure, it is possible to identify the year in which the significant increase in disclosure occurred​[227]​.  

Thus, it would appear that companies started to increase their disclosure in relation to the plan description, the reconciliation of gross pension scheme assets and liabilities, the pension scheme expense and assumptions as early as 2001 and that these increases were being influenced by the forthcoming implementation of FRS 17.  There is also evidence to suggest that the companies in the sample adopted the disclosure requirements of IAS 19 one year early.  The results in Section 6.3.3 also show that the companies in the sample latterly reported information that was not mandated by any accounting standard, for example information relating to the governance and risk of the pension scheme and its percentage split of assets.  Thus, the type of post-retirement benefit disclosure and the year in which it is made are both significant factors in determining the overall level of post-retirement benefit disclosure.  The following section examines the interaction of these and other factors (such as size and sector) in explaining the post-retirement benefit disclosures of the sample companies. 

6.3.5	An Analysis of the Factors that Determine the Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures

To investigate any variability of disclosure practices in a comprehensive fashion, a General Linear Model (GLM) was fitted to the data (Middleton, 2007) and the results are reported in Table 6.6. The results in Panel A of Table 6.6 relate to the total number of pages devoted to post-retirement benefit disclosures made in the annual reports of the sampled companies and are based on the following equation:

Dis(i,j,k) =  + (Si) + (Ij) + (Yk) + (Ii x Yk) +  i,j,k 			           [6.1]

where Dis(i,j,k) is the mean number of pages of post-retirement benefit information disclosed by company i in sector j (Ij) for the year k (Yk);  is the overall mean disclosure for all companies in all sectors in all years; S represents the size of each company based on the net assets; Ij is the sector for each company, where j varies from 1,2…5 with 1=The financial sector, 2=the extractive industries, 3=consumer goods, 4=consumer services and 5=industrial and utilities sectors;  Yk is the main effect for the year, where k varies from 1,2…6 with 1=2000, 2=2001, 3=2002, 4=2003, 5=2004 and 6=2005; and (Ii x Yk) is the interaction effect for disclosure across year Y and sector I.  The random error term is represented by . 

A GLM was also used to analyse the data for the total disclosure when analysed into the different disclosure categories; this model took the form of:
Dis(i,j,k,l) =  + (Si) + ( Ii) + (Yk) + (Ti,l) + ( Ii x Yk)  + ( Ii x Tl) + 
     (Yk x Tl) +  (Ii x Yk x Tl) +  i,j,k,l		          		          [6.2]

Where Tl is the type of post-retirement benefit disclosure, where l varies from 1,2…24 according to the classifications reported in Tables 6.2 to 6.5; (Ij,I x Ti,l) is the interaction effect for sector I and the post-retirement benefit disclosure type ; (Yk x Ti,l) is the interaction effect for year Y and the post-retirement benefit disclosure type  ; and finally, (Ij,i x Yki x Ti,l) is the three-way interaction effect for the sector I, the year Y and the post-retirement benefit disclosure type .  

These models attempt to explain total disclosure levels (and total disclosure when analysed by disclosure type) in terms of two (three) main effects: Year and Sector (and Disclosure Type). Size is added as a covariate since it is a continuous, rather than a discrete, variable. Finally, interaction terms are included to see how the main effects interact with one another when explaining the number of pages of post-retirement information that are included in an annual report.  The results of equation [6.1] for the total disclosure Dis(i,j,k) are provided in Panel A of Table 6.6, while the results of equation [6.2], the total disclosure analysed by the type of disclosure Dis(i,j,k,l) are shown in Panel B of Table 6.6. 

Table 6.6 General Linear Model for the Total and Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures
Variable	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	FRatio	P Value
Panel A: Total Disclosure
Corrected Model	30	703.99	23.47	4.16	0.00
Intercept	1	1328.10	1328.10	235.51	0.00
Size	1	172.00	172.00	30.50	0.00
Sector	4	99.15	24.79	4.40	0.00
Year	5	317.64	63.53	11.27	0.00
Year x Sector	20	35.51	1.78	0.315	1.00
Error	184	1037.61	5.64		
Total	215	4881.72			
Panel B: Total Disclosure Analysed by Type
Corrected Model	720	384.06	0.53	5.46	0.00
Intercept	1	55.34	55.34	565.93	0.00
Size	1	7.17	7.17	73.29	0.00
Sector	4	4.13	1.03	10.56	0.00
Year	5	13.24	2.65	27.07	0.00
Disclosure Type	23	224.19	9.75	99.68	0.00
Year x Sector	20	1.48	0.07	0.76	0.77
Year x Disclosure Type	115	40.44	0.35	3.60	0.00
Sector x Disclosure Type	92	39.81	0.43	4.43	0.00
Year x Sector x Disclosure Type	460	16.78	0.04	0.37	1.00
Error	4439	434.05	0.10		
Total	5160	948.95			
Note: this table details the analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of the number of pages of the annual report of 36 UK companies devoted to post-retirement benefit disclosure over a six year time period from 2000 to 2005.  The P value denotes the significance of the F-ratio. 

An analysis of Panel A of Table 6.6 reveals that Size, Sector and Year, are significant in explaining the total number of pages of post-retirement benefit disclosed. These three have F ratios of 30.50, 4.40 and 11.27 respectively and all have p-values of 0.00.  This suggests that there is a significant difference in the total disclosure patterns across companies depending on the net assets of the company, the sector to which it belongs and the year in which the disclosure was made.  It is interesting to note that the interaction (Year x Sector) reported in Panel A of Table 6.6 was not significant suggesting that disclosure did not vary across companies in different industries for specific years.  Overall, equation [6.1] had an R² of 0.787 suggesting that nearly 79 % of the cross sectional differences in disclosures could be explained by this model based upon the three main effects and the one interaction term examined.  

Panel B of Table 6.6 reports the results of equation [6.2]; this GLM examines the total post-retirement benefit disclosures when analysed by the type of disclosure using the following factors: Sector, Year, Disclosure Type, three 2-factor interactions – (Year x Sector), (Year x Disclosure Type) and (Sector x Disclosure Type) and finally, one 3-factor interaction – (Year x Sector x Disclosure Type).  Like equation [6.1], size is added as a covariate since it is a continuous, rather than a discrete, variable. An analysis of these results reveals that Size, Sector, Year and Disclosure Type all have significant explanatory power in the model; the F-ratios for these variables all have p-values less than 0.00.  More importantly, two of the two-factor interactions also have F-ratios which were higher than their critical value and are therefore deemed to be significant: (Year x Disclosure Type) and (Sector x Disclosure Type).  Thus, the total post-retirement benefit disclosure when analysed by type seems to vary according to the sector to which the company belongs and the year being studied.  It is also interesting to note that two of the interactions (Year x Sector) and (Year x Sector x Disclosure type) reported in Panel B of Table 6.6 were not significant suggesting that Disclosure type did not vary across companies in different industries for specific years.  Overall, equation [6.2] had an R² of 0.543 suggesting that nearly 54 % of the cross sectional differences in disclosures could be explained by this model based upon the four main effects and the two interaction terms.  

Thus, both Panels A and B of Table 6.6 show that company size is a significant factor that determines both the total post-retirement benefit disclosure and when that disclosure is analysed by the type of post-retirement benefit disclosure.  It might be hypothesised that larger companies, measured in terms of net assets (£s), produce larger annual reports; the results of a Pearson correlation support this suggestion​[228]​.  Because all of the companies included in the sample are FTSE 100 and might therefore be deemed to be large, Appendix 10 re-estimates equations [6.1] and [6.2] using data which expresses the post-retirement benefit disclosure as a percentage of the total number of pages in the annual reports.  Appendix 10 reports that the effect of size is lost when the data is expressed as a percentage, thereby supporting the view that large companies produce large annual reports and thus more post-retirement benefit disclosures.

Panels A and B of Table 6.6 also show that sector (as defined in Chapter 4) is a significant factor that determines both the total post-retirement benefit disclosure and when that disclosure is analysed by its disclosure type.  An analysis of the impact that the sector might have on the overall level of post-retirement benefit disclosure is represented by Figure 6.4.  






Figure 6.4: Mean Pages of the Total Disclosure Analysed by Sector

Note: The various sectors are represented as follows: 1. The Financial sector; 2. Extractive Industries; 3. Consumer Goods; 4. Consumer Services; and 5. Industrials and Utilities.

Figure 6.4 shows the mean number of pages of the annual report devoted to the total post-retirement benefit disclosures plotted against each of the five sectors and illustrates that companies in the Consumer Goods sector devote the largest number of pages in their annual reports to information about post-retirement benefit disclosures followed by companies in the Industrials and Utilities sector, then the Financial sector, the Extractive Industries, and finally the Consumer Services sector.  

Similar to size, it might be that companies that have a large number of employees (employee intensive companies) will disclose more post-retirement benefit information than companies with a smaller number of employees (that are perhaps more capital intensive) because they have a larger number of pension scheme stakeholders to discharge that accountability to.  Indeed, this was found to be the case​[229]​.  Thus, when considering sectors, it might be suggested that employee intensive sectors will produce more post-retirement benefit disclosures in their annual reports to discharge accountability than capital intensive sectors.  However, this does not appear to be the case; the average number of employees for all 5 sectors was as follows: 73,487 (sector 2 - extractive industries), 69,782 (sector 4 - consumer services), 59,091 (sector 3 - consumer goods), 48,309 (sector 1 - the financial sector) and 32,114 (sector 5 - industrials and utilities).    This does not correspond with the pattern illustrated in Figure 6.4.  Alternatively, Figure 6.5 provides evidence to suggest that the sectoral effect represented in Figure 6.4 is being driven by the post-retirement benefit disclosures made under the requirements of other GAAP (mainly US).  

Figure 6.5 shows the mean number of pages of the annual report devoted to the different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures plotted against each of the five sectors; the different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures are described in detail in Section 6.3.1 and are based on the 24 classifications reported in Tables 6.2 to 6.5.  Figure 6.5 illustrates that there is a relatively stable pattern of disclosure between all five sectors for the different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures with the exception of disclosures relating to other GAAP (mainly US).  


Figure 6.5: Mean Pages of the Disclosure Type Analysed by Sector

Note: The various sectors are represented as follows: 1. The Financial sector; 2. Extractive Industries; 3. Consumer Goods; 4. Consumer Services; and 5. Industrials and Utilities.  The different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures are described in detail in Section 6.3.1 and are based on the 24 classifications reported in Tables 6.2 to 6.5. 

It shows that companies in the Consumer Goods sector devoted the largest number of pages in the annual report to other GAAP (mainly US) post-retirement benefit disclosures; the Industrials and Utilities sector was second, while the Financial sector, Extractive Industries and Consumer Services were ranked third, fourth and fifth respectively. This pattern is identical to that produced in Figure 6.4, suggesting that the post-retirement benefit disclosures required under other GAAP (mainly US) are driving the sectoral findings.  Indeed, further analysis showed that the consumer goods sector (which had the highest level of other GAAP disclosures relating to post-retirement benefits) had five companies that had a US listing​[230]​, compared to the consumer services sector (the lowest producer post-retirement benefit disclosures under other GAAP) which only had two companies with a US listing​[231]​.

Finally, Panels A and B of Table 6.6 show that the year is a significant factor that determines both the total post-retirement benefit disclosure provided in the annual reports of sponsoring employers between 2000 and 2005 and when that disclosure is analysed by the type of post-retirement benefit disclosure. The effect that the year has on both the total level of post-retirement benefit disclosure and the different types of post-retirement benefit disclosure in the sample companies between 2000 and 2005 has been examined in great detail by the empirical analysis conducted in sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4; it is also illustrated graphically in Figures 6.1 and 6.3 respectively.  Thus, the results reported in Panels A and B of Table 6.6 for the effect of the year and its various interactions support the empirical analysis that has been conducted in the earlier part of this chapter.   

Thus, it would appear that the size, sector and year influence the total post-retirement benefit disclosures (Dis(i,j,k)) made in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers; in addition, these factors also appear to influence the total disclosure when it is analysed by disclosure type (Dis(i,j,k,l)).  More importantly, the analysis suggests that it is not just these factors on their own that influence both the total post-retirement benefit disclosure and this disclosure when analysed by disclosure type; the interactions of (year x sector) and (year x disclosure type) and (sector x disclosure type) also seem to explain the decisions that companies make about the level of post-retirement benefit disclosures in their annual reports.  

6.4	Summary, Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical analysis in this chapter has provided a number of insights into how companies account for the post-retirement benefits they provide to their employees, first, there has been a significant increase in the total amount of post-retirement benefit disclosures made in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers between 2000 and 2005 both in terms of the number of pages disclosed and when that disclosure is reported as a percentage of the annual report.  Second, the categories of disclosure to have experienced the largest amount of change are those relating to: (a) the pension scheme expense; (b) the gross asset/liability reconciliation; (c) the plan description; (d) the accounting policy; and (e) the assumptions.  Third, in terms of Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability, the majority of the mandated disclosures discharge accountability for probity and legality, however, there is also some evidence of the discharge of process and performance accountability.  Fourth, the increases in disclosure appear to be associated with the early adoption of FRS 17 and IAS 19.  Finally, that size, sector and year influence the total level post-retirement benefit disclosures made in the sample companies annual reports between 2000 and 2005 and when the total disclosure is analysed by disclosure type.

Appendix 9 complements the current analysis by investigating: (a) where in the annual report post-retirement benefit disclosures are made; and (b) how they have been presented.  Four possible locations in the annual report of the sponsoring employer were used: (i) the narrative section; (ii) the financial statements; (ii) the accounting policies note; and (iv) the remaining notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note).  Three possible methods of making these post-retirement benefit disclosures were also used: (i) narrative; (ii) monetary; and finally (iii) quantitative.  The results in Appendix 9 suggest that, over the six year period, companies used the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) to disclose monetary information relating to their employee post-retirement benefits and examples of these disclosures have been provided throughout the current chapter and Appendix 11.  

Although an increase in the quantity of accounting information can provide prima-facia evidence that there has been an improvement in accountability, it does not provide absolute evidence of it.  The empirical work in the current chapter has demonstrated that the quantity of post-retirement benefit information disclosed in the annual reports of the sponsoring employers of UK pension schemes has increased between 2000-2005, however, the issue of quality has not yet been addressed.  Much academic research has addressed the quality of narrative disclosures (see for example Marston and Shrives 1991; Beattie et al., 2004) and the IASB has identified quality accounting information as being that which is comparable, verifiable, timely and understandable (IASB, 2008).  Indeed, much accounting research has attempted to relate the quality of accounting information to corporate governance (Liguo, 2003; Sheridan et al., 2006), institutional arrangements (Feng, 2001; Shenglan and Minghai, 2006), and accounting standards (Feng, 2004).  Other research has attempted to relate the quality of accounting information to earnings quality and value-relevance (Minghai, 2005).  Appendix 9 reports that much of the post-retirement benefit information disclosed between 2000 and 2005 was presented in tabular format which would ultimately require an element of interpretation by the user.  Likewise, Figures A9.4(a) A9.4(b) suggest that the different sectors used the same location to disclose post-retirement benefit information in the same way.  It is therefore possible that companies are bench-marking themselves against others in their sector and replicating their disclosure practices.  Whilst this might be useful for the purposes of comparability, if an interpretation of these tables is still required by users then there might still be scope for improving the quality of this information and thus the accountability it discharges.  Also, until the understandability of these lengthy disclosures can be measured, little progress can be made – perhaps it is the complexity of these disclosures that prohibits any debate between the pension scheme members/beneficiaries because they do not have the confidence to engage in dialogue about disclosures that they do not understand.  Disclosures that are understandable would enhance members and beneficiaries’ ability to ask appropriate questions and hold the accountor to account (see Figure 3.3); only then can accountability, and thus, governance be improved.    
  
Despite these concerns, it would appear that some sponsoring employers of UK pension schemes take their accountability responsibilities very seriously and go so far as to publish post-retirement benefit information in their annual reports that they are not required to disclose; for example information relating to the governance, risk and the percentage split of assets of their pension schemes.  However, whilst the annual report of the sponsoring employer contains information that the annual report of the pension scheme does not​[232]​, there is still little evidence of the required engagement of pension scheme members/beneficiaries to permit the discharge of full accountability​[233]​.  As far as institutional investors are concerned, this apparent apathy and lack of dialogue does not appear to exist between shareholders and company directors in the corporate context.  Chapter 5 highlighted that one of the main roles of the fund manager is to act as an intermediary between the boards of investee companies and the pension scheme trustees; likewise, if individual shareholders in a company decide that they have an issue to raise with the directors of a company, providing they have sufficient mandate, they can call an Extra-ordinary General Meeting (EGM) or question the directors at the Annual General Meeting (AGM).  Perhaps pension scheme members/beneficiaries require the services of an intermediary who is both professional and independent to liaise with the trustees on their behalf; some may argue that this is the role of the professional or member nominated trustee but, in practice, one cannot hold oneself to account, some element of independence is required.  Likewise, unless the UK pension scheme is administered as a corporate trustee, there is no equivalent forum to the EGM or AGM, therefore there is little opportunity for the members/beneficiaries to meet as a stakeholder group.  It might be suggested that, unless UK pension scheme members/beneficiaries have an opportunity to make a judgement upon the information rendered, (and thus hold the pension scheme trustees to account) full accountability cannot be achieved.  

Chapter 5 provided evidence of the many formal reporting mechanisms used by trustees to discharge their accountability, likewise, the current chapter has verified the increased disclosure of post-retirement benefit information in the annual reports of the sponsoring employer; consequently, there does not appear to be a lack of publicly available post-retirement benefit information.  On the contrary, it seems that, in some cases, there is almost too much post-retirement benefit information available and a full relationship of accountability is prohibited by the inability of members/beneficiaries to hold trustees to account.  Such issues are important if UK pension scheme members/beneficiaries do not wish to see a further erosion of the benefits associated with their DB schemes; since 2000, many companies have changed their pension scheme provision; in January 2009, The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) reported that the UK faced the prospective closure of 1,000 of the existing 2,240 DB schemes over the next five years (NAPF, 2009) and by February 2010, only 23% of all UK pension schemes remained open to new members compared to 88% ten years ago (NAPF, 2010).  It is therefore interesting to note that the information relating to the pension scheme expense and the reconciliation of its assets/liabilities were the categories to experience the largest increases in disclosure according to 6.2 and 6.3.  It may be coincidental that as these disclosures have increased, scheme benefits have changed.  Alternatively, perhaps management were unaware of their pension scheme costs and liabilities prior to the implementation of FRS 17 and IAS 19, or could no longer defend their companies continued participation in these schemes due to the public disclosures of their costs and liabilities post FRS 17 and IAS 19; whatever the reason for these scheme changes/closures, UK pension scheme members/beneficiaries have not had much success in resisting them.  If they intend to resist any such future changes/closures, it might be that they may need to be much more proactive in the governance of their schemes, including actively holding the trustees to account and allowing their accountability to be fully discharged.      



Chapter 7
Conclusion

7.1 Introduction
This chapter integrates the conclusion from the different analyses undertaken as part of the current doctoral research.  It highlights the main findings which emerge from the thesis and outlines the responses to the various research questions that were posed in the introduction.  More importantly, the current chapter provides a platform for reflecting on the process that the researcher has gone through in conducting the research; it allows me to highlight some of the key lessons that have been learned about the governance and accountability of pension schemes within the UK whilst acknowledging the areas where further work is needed.  Different researchers might have tackled the same research questions differently and arrived at alternative conclusions.  However, I believe that the current approach provides an important study of an area where there is a dearth of published academic research.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 outlines the main findings in the thesis and discusses how they answer the research questions which were proposed in Chapter 1.  Section 7.3 includes the main limitations of the work in this thesis and highlights where further work might be required.  Finally, Section 7.4 supplies an overall conclusion to this chapter.




7.2 Main findings
Chapter 1 established that the governance and accountability of UK pension schemes is a topic worthy of investigation and proposed the following two research questions:
RQ1	What accountability relationships are evident in the governance mechanisms 
of UK pension schemes? 

RQ2	How is accountability discharged in UK pension schemes?

To answer RQ 1, the thesis shows that the model of governance suggested by the PR’s documentation, and the small amount of literature in this area, was generally supported by the interviewees.  Indeed, the model proposed in Figure 2.2 was confirmed as being representative of the key stakeholders in UK pension scheme governance.  Likewise, the potential accountability relationships identified in Table 3.1 were also deemed to be complete.  For example, the interviewees agreed that the main stakeholders who held the trustees to account included: (i) auditors; (ii) the PR; (iii) the sponsoring employer; and (iv) members/beneficiaries.  Likewise, the interviewees confirmed that the trustees could hold the following stakeholders to account: (i) sub-committees to the trustee board; (ii) fund managers; and (iii) actuaries.  In addition, they highlighted the pivotal role played by certain of these stakeholders in the governance and accountability of the pension funds.  In particular, the role of auditors, fund managers and actuaries was singled out for special mention by a number of the interviewees consulted; they highlighted how the trustees relied heavily on these advisors and sometimes lacked the expertise to question any advice that was given.  This finding seemed to apply to all of the pension schemes studied suggesting that the size or type of scheme did not have any significant impact on the importance of advisors in the governance process.  However, there was a general agreement that the PR was improving the situation by supplying trustees with online help and tutorials to enable them to discharge these responsibilities for the pension schemes under their control.  Consequently, it would appear that whilst the governance of UK pension schemes is opaque to many people, it is not so to the stakeholders identified in Figure 2.2 (perhaps with the exception of members/beneficiaries); these stakeholders were very clear about how their pension scheme should be governed and how the resulting accountability relationships operate in practice.  Thus, in terms of Figure 3.3, the interviews confirm that each of the UK pension scheme stakeholders adopt the role suggested by Table 3.1.   

To answer RQ 2, it appears that many different types of accountability were being discharged by (and to) the trustees (see Table 5.5).  The interviewees were satisfied that: (i) sub-committees to the trustee board; (ii) fund managers; and (iii) actuaries discharged accountability to the trustee board for probity, legality and process in terms of Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability.  The interviewees also confirmed that these stakeholders, in practice, were often held to account by the board of trustees, suggesting that a full relationship of accountability existed.  Due to the private nature of the communication between the trustee board and: (i) the sponsoring employer; and (ii) the PR, it was not possible to apply the same analysis to these relationships.  Despite this drawback, the interviewees still concluded that a full relationship of accountability existed and that, in practice, the trustees were often held to account by these stakeholders.  Likewise, the interviewees believed that a full relationship of accountability existed between the trustees and the auditor and that the trustees discharged accountability for probity, legality and process in terms of Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability.  

With regards to the accountability that the trustees discharged to the pension scheme members/beneficiaries, the interviewees cited many documents that collectively discharged accountability for probity, legality, process, performance and policy; these included annual reports of the pension scheme the SIP, the SFS, the Popular Report, pension scheme booklets, the pension scheme web-site and annual benefit statements.   For example, the SIP included the principles underpinning the investment processes employed by the pension fund.  In addition, the SFS reported on the performance of the investments which the trustees channelled member’s contributions into.  Thus, in terms of Stewart’s ladder, all of the various levels of accountability appeared to be discharged although there was an emphasis on the lower rungs of legality and probity.  In addition, for the higher rungs on Stewart’s Ladder, although there was no official requirement to distribute the SIP or SFS amongst members/beneficiaries, there was evidence to suggest that some pension schemes made these documents available via their website, or included them in their annual report.  The trustee interviewees confirmed that very few requests, if indeed any, were received for the annual report of the pension scheme from members/beneficiaries.  Thus, the interviewees suggested that, although mechanisms existed for members to hold the trustees to account, there was very little interest in this accountability process among members, and thus full accountability may not be achieved in this relationship.  This lack of interest might imply that the members were satisfied with the probity, legality and process accountability that the auditors monitored and saw no need to hold trustees to account for performance and policy of the pension scheme.  Alternatively, it might suggest a lack of awareness on the part of the members/beneficiaries that the documents discharging process and performance accountability were available for scrutiny.  Instead they may have been relying on other information when evaluating the performance of their pension scheme and the investment decisions of the trustees.  As described in Section 3.5, Laughlin (1990) experienced difficulties in categorising some examples of accountability in terms of Stewart’s ladder where the relationship was unstructured.  Such difficulties were not experienced in the current study as all of the relationships were well defined as demonstrated by Table 3.1.   

One of the more surprising conclusions to emerge from an analysis of the governance of UK pension schemes is that the interviewees believe that stakeholders (including the members/beneficiaries) use the information supplied in the annual report of the sponsoring employer of the scheme to assess accountability; this is interesting because this information is not provided by the trustees of the pension scheme but, instead, is supplied by the sponsoring employer – essentially a third party.  This may explain why there seems to be little or no demand for the documents produced by the trustees among the members/beneficiaries of the scheme.

An analysis of the pension scheme-related disclosures in the annual report of sponsoring employers indicates that the accounting regulatory bodies may have indirectly helped in holding trustees to account for their decisions.  In particular, by requiring more information in the annual reports of sponsoring employers, it seems that greater accountability is discharged.  Indeed, an analysis of the post-retirement benefit disclosures in the financial statements of a sample of 36 sponsoring employers documented an increase in the volume of disclosure over the years 2000 to 2005 as new accounting standards became effective.  Not only did the volume of disclosure increase but a content analysis revealed that the type of information provided also changed.  In particular, information about the expense and the liabilities of the pension scheme has increased in the sponsoring employer’s annual report; this information is not supplied elsewhere - even by the trustees.  Over the 6 years examined (2000-2005), these disclosures rose by an average 3.661 pages of the annual report (an increase of 224%) for the sample of annual reports examined in this thesis.  In addition, a small amount of other information about the governance of pension schemes is now being published in the notes to the sponsoring employer’s financial statements.  In terms of Stewart’s (1984) model of accountability, the majority of the mandated disclosures of IAS 19 discharge accountability for probity and legality, however, there is also some evidence of the discharge of process and performance accountability.  All of this information helped hold the trustees to account according to the interviewees that were consulted; indeed, all recognised that the annual report of the sponsoring employer was a significant piece of pension scheme information for members as well as other stakeholders.

Thus, the analysis demonstrates that many different accountability relationships exist in UK pension schemes and that each is affected by its context and structure (see Table 3.1).  This conclusion is very similar to that offered by Laughlin (1990) who also calls for more studies to be conducted into the way that accountability relationships function in particular situations before the future development of skeletal theories (such as that in Figure 3.1) can take place.

As suggested by Section 1.4, this thesis contributes to existing knowledge in three different ways.  First, it contributes to the topic of pension scheme governance and accountability by describing and illustrating the pension scheme governance and accountability mechanisms that operate in practice in the UK (Chapter 5).  In that sense, it adds empirical flesh to theoretical models as required by Laughlin (1990) and makes them more apparent. Second, from a theoretical perspective, Chapter 5 demonstrates that the methodological approach described in Section 3.6 is entirely can be appropriately used to investigate accountability relationships and conclude if ‘full accountability’ (see Section 3.6) has been discharged; it also permits the identification of different types of accountability that are discharged.  Finally, Chapter 6 of the thesis makes an empirical contribution to knowledge by using content analysis to examine the different types of accountability that are discharged in the annual report of the sponsoring employer and how it has changed since 2000.

7.3 Limitations of the Current Research and the Potential for Future Research
No piece of research is fully complete or can addresses a research topic in such a comprehensive fashion that future work is not needed; the current thesis is no exception.  In fact, there are a number of limitations to the research in the current thesis that need to be highlighted so that the contribution of the work can be evaluated.  

One of the key limitations, was the extent to which the governance of UK pension schemes is opaque.  Although this was suggested by several authors (Epstein, 2001; Clark, 2004; Evans et al., 2008) in Chapter 1, it was quite astounding how difficult it was to access any public documentation that described how individual pension schemes were governed.  Very little information was available on the majority of the pension scheme websites that were consulted and consequently, direct contact with UK pension scheme stakeholders proved necessary to conduct this investigation.  For example, the researcher could not get a lot of access to the annual reports of the pension schemes themselves.  These documents were rarely made available to the public and had to be requested by the researcher.  Even when requested, only 4 were supplied for the 11 pension funds analysed; two of these were from the large multi-employer schemes investigated and these were already available on the website of the pension scheme.  Thus, the ability to examine the annual reports of the smaller pension schemes investigated was limited by a willingness on the part of the interviewees to supply the documents.  Yet such documents might have provided useful details about how the pension scheme trustees discharged their accountability to various stakeholder groups – especially the members/beneficiaries​[234]​.  If copies of the annual reports of UK pension schemes could be obtained, and their current content established, a decision-useful framework could be employed to establish: (a) if the current content is of use to members/beneficiaries; and (b) what additional information might they need.  If such issues could be identified, it might encourage the use of the annual report of the pension scheme as a practical decision-making tool and may also foster and improve dialogue between pension scheme members/beneficiaries and the trustees.

A further limitation of this thesis is that it analyses the governance and accountability of DB schemes only.  Many of the interviewees agreed with the view that disclosures about pension scheme governance could be improved, however, this issue will become of increasing importance to DC schemes as their numbers increase​[235]​.  To date, little attention has been paid to the governance and accountability of DC schemes, most likely because they have been relatively small in number, however, as this situation reverses, and their performance becomes important to a growing number of the population, so too will their governance and accountability.  Consequently, it would be useful to know what type of information the member/beneficiaries of DC schemes would need to encourage their engagement and debate with DC trustees.   

Another limitation of the current research relates to the interviews that were conducted in Chapter 5; that chapter reported the interviewees’ beliefs about what is happening in a pension scheme rather than what might actually be happening.  The researcher was not able to sit in on meetings or observe discussions between trustees and their advisors. Perhaps any following investigation in this area might adopt an ethnographic approach to address this problem.  In addition, future researchers might be able to secure access to a small number of pension schemes and conduct some longitudinal case studies in the area. 

A further limitation with the interviews was that only a relatively small number of people were consulted for their views.  Obviously, every pension scheme is slightly different so that the findings of the current research only explicitly relate to the schemes with which the interviewees were associated.  Tentative implications for other similar schemes might be drawn by the reader but this limitation would need to be borne in mind when such implications are being considered.

Of course the interpretive paradigm within which the current research is located does not promote the generalisation of findings since it suggests that the work is specific to the context in which it is located.  Nevertheless an attempt was made to interview individuals from a mix of pension schemes in order to get a range of perspectives: interviewees had experience of (i) big as well as small schemes; (ii) DB as well as DC schemes; and (iii) single employer and multi-employer schemes.  However, most of the interviewees experiences related to relatively large schemes.  Even the small schemes considered in thesis might be thought of as fairly large within the context of the population of all pension schemes within the UK.  The selection of interviewees was done on pragmatic grounds; access to these individuals was difficult to arrange and the final group who took part in this research agreed to give up some of their valuable time in order to discuss issues with me – I would like to take this opportunity to thank them.  Another group of interviewees might have offered differing insights into the issues of governance and accountability in UK pension schemes.

A final limitation is that the current research was conducted during a period when the area of pensions was experiencing a great deal of change.  Both the nature of the pensions promise and the reporting of scheme performances in the annual reports of sponsoring employers witnessed a great deal of flux while this research took place. For example, Figure 1.1 demonstrates the volatility of UK pension scheme deficits which have undoubtedly encouraged many schemes to contemplate switching from DB to DC.  Further, the years 2000 to 2005 saw three different accounting standards in operation.  While some might view this dynamic environment as a difficulty, I believe that it highlights the importance of the topic being researched in this thesis as well as providing an interesting research site for analysis.



7.4	Some Concluding Thoughts
This study has confirmed to me that the governance and accountability of UK pension schemes are indeed inherently complex issues.  However, although at first it might appear that UK pension scheme governance is less than transparent, most of the interviewees who participated in this thesis were very keen to talk about their pension schemes and were proud of their recent governance and accountability developments.  The interviewees verified that, in practice, UK pension scheme governance practices were mixed, but in the main, mirrored practices that existed in the corporate governance context; these governance processes appeared to generate rational accountability relationships between the various stakeholders which, predominantly, worked very well in practice and discharged varying levels of accountability.  The main exception to this generalisation was the poor level of engagement that existed (or indeed did not exist) between the scheme members/beneficiaries and the trustees.  Whilst the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010) encourages company directors to engage with their shareholders and make the most of company AGMs, members and beneficiaries of UK pension schemes do not have an equivalent forum.  This was also the conclusion of a discussion paper issued by the NAPF Pension Scheme Governance – Fit for the 21st Century (NAPF, 2005).  The document concluded that this situation was a governance omission that needed to be addressed in the near future.  However, there are no assurances that, if in fact such a forum existed, members/beneficiaries would make use of it.  Thus, it may be that, in certain circumstances, a concept of ‘full accountability’ is impossible to achieve; although the concept of ‘full accountability’ (See Figure 3.3) was useful in analysing the accountability relationships that existed in UK pension schemes, it might be that ‘full accountability’ can only be achieved if there is an inherent interest by the Accountee to hold the Accountor to account.  Perhaps many people do not think about retirement issues until they get closer to retirement age, however, it has become clear to me that, if individuals wish to preserve their pension benefits, they need to find a voice; this is especially true as John Hutton​[236]​ embarks on a government commission to review the provision of public sector pensions in 2010.  



Appendix 1
The Development of UK Corporate Governance Codes of Practice

The UK system of corporate governance has developed rather haphazardly, resulting in the existence of both formal and informal mechanisms of governance.  Keasey and Wright (1993) suggest that these hybrid systems are most commonly found in Anglo-American models and consist of a mixture of law, self-regulation, best practice (Macdonald and Beattie, 1993) and market-based sanctions (Keasey and Wright, 1993).  This Appendix describes the development of corporate governance codes of practice in the UK.

Cadbury (2000) reports that, during the 1950’s and 1960’s, companies in the developed world performed well; however, he suggested that economic growth masked corporate weaknesses.  Generally, managers were in control of their companies and where this was not the case, investors who had lost confidence in the managers’ ability to manage, simply sold their shares and permitted boards to “slumber”.  Cadbury (2000) suggests that the market response to “slumbering boards” in the US, the UK and countries like Australia was to encourage takeovers.  However, he goes on to argue that the outcome was a costly and disruptive way of changing top level management.  Whilst the frequency of corporate scandals and collapses in the latter part of the twentieth century was a worry, there were also concerns regarding: the setting of senior executives’ remuneration (Forbes and Watson, 1993); protests about the ineffectiveness of boards (Cadbury, 2000); disquiet over the perceived poor levels of confidence in financial reporting​[237]​; and criticism of external auditors’ ability to provide safeguards for investors (Cadbury, 1992).  Investors, boards and financial markets responded by requesting guidelines to clarify the responsibilities for performance and accountability.
“The underlying factors were seen as the looseness of accounting standards, the absence of a clear framework for ensuring that directors kept under review the controls in their business, and competitive pressures both on companies and on auditors which made it difficult for auditors to stand up to demanding boards”.  (Cadbury, 1992, para. 2.1)

The Cadbury Committee was, therefore, commissioned to produce a set of best practice guidelines and the resulting report, called the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: Final Report (hereafter referred to as the Cadbury Report), was published in December 1992.  The Cadbury Committee claimed that this Report was based on the principles of openness, integrity and accountability​[238]​; it made recommendations with regard to: (i) the composition, structure and procedures required of the board of directors​[239]​; (ii) duties and responsibilities of the board members; (iii) nomination committees; (iv) internal controls; (v) audit committees; (vi) internal audit; (vii) board remuneration; (viii) financial reporting practices; (ix) external audit; (x) accountability of boards to shareholders; and (xi) communication practices between these parties.  The London Stock Exchange gave the Cadbury Report its support and introduced a form of exception-reporting requiring all UK listed companies to include a statement of compliance, or reasons for non-compliance, in their annual reports.  The majority of these recommendations were capable of immediate implementation​[240]​ and Conyon and Mallin (1997) suggest that the Cadbury Report is viewed to be the most far-reaching corporate governance publication in the world​[241]​.

Since then, the development of corporate governance regulation has been determined by the publication of a series of other influential reports.  Some of these reports have made new recommendations, whilst others have taken the opportunity to consolidate various aspects of best practice that were proposed by their predecessors.  The first to follow the Cadbury Report was the Greenbury Report (1995) which sought to examine the size of directors’ remuneration packages and the inconsistent and incomplete disclosure practices regarding remuneration issues in company annual reports.  It aimed to strengthen the accountability relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders and enhance the performance of directors (Mallin, 2004).  In October 1995 and June 1996, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) amended its Listing Rules to take account of these recommendations (Wilson et al., 2001).  The Hampel Committee was established in 1996 to review the implementation of the proposals of both the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports.  In January 1998, it published its final report which consolidated the proposals of Cadbury, Greenbury and its own work (Wilson et al., 2001).  Based on the work of Hampel, the LSE published its Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice (the 'Combined Code’) together with revisions to the listing rules in June 1998.  The Combined Code (1998) was aimed at both companies and institutional investors and re-enforced the principle of exception-reporting.  Wilson et al. (2001) commented that the Combined Code’s requirement to report to shareholders on the effectiveness of internal controls marked the greatest improvement in corporate governance.  It recommended that:
“The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and the company’s assets…the directors should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the group’s system of internal control and should report to shareholders that they have done so.  The review should cover all controls, including financial, operational, and compliance controls and risk management” (The Combined Code, 1998, Part D.2.1)

The Turnbull Committee (1999) subsequently supplied directors with guidance on the implementation of the internal control requirements of the Combined Code.  It confirmed that it was the responsibility of directors to ensure that their companies had “sound” systems of internal control and that these controls worked as they should; that the effectiveness of the internal controls should be assessed and that a report on that assessment should be included within the annual report.  It also confirmed that boards were required to ensure that the internal control systems could be adapted to take account of any new risks, from either the outside environment, or as a result of decisions that the board made (Mallin, 2004).  One of the major contributions of the Turnbull Report was the emphasis that it placed on the role played by the audit committee (ICAEW, 1999).  Wilson et al. (2001) report, however, that it was in the area of the audit committee’s role that most companies, particularly smaller firms, did not comply.  Subsequently, HM Treasury issued the Myners Report (2001) with the aim of raising standards in trusteeship of institutional investors and promoting greater shareholder activism (Mallin, 2004).  The recommendations of the Myners Report (2001) are discussed in greater depth in Section 2.4.

The Higgs Review reported in January 2003 on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors.  Whilst Higgs supported the Combined Code, it also made some additional, and more stringent, recommendations:
“The additional recommendations included stating the number of meetings of the board and its main committees in the annual report, together with the attendance records of individual directors; a chief executive director should not also become chairman of the same company; non-executive directors should meet as a group at least once a year without executive directors being present, and the annual report should indicate whether such meetings have occurred; chairmen and chief executives should consider implementing executive development programmes to train and develop suitable individuals in their companies for future director roles; the board should inform shareholders as to why they believe a certain individual should be appointed to a non-executive directorship and how they may meet the requirements of the role; there should be a comprehensive induction programme for new non-executive directors, and resources should be available for ongoing development of directors; the performance of the board, its committees and its individual members, should be evaluated at least once a year, the annual report should state whether these reviews are being held and how they are being conducted; a full-time executive director should not hold more than one non-executive directorship or become chairman of a major company; and no one non-executive director should sit on all three principal board committees (audit, remuneration, nomination).”  (Mallin, 2004, p. 24)

The Smith Review also published its report in January 2003 reiterating the importance of the role of the audit committee.  By acting independently of the executive management team, an audit committee could ensure that the financial reporting processes and internal controls of a company protected the interests of its stakeholders.  Following previous practice, a consolidation of all the previous reports was now necessary and another, revised version of the  Combined Code was published in July 2003 which toned down the requirements of the Higgs Report (Mallin, 2004); instead of being prescriptive about the board membership of non-executive directors, it simply stated that:
“…undue reliance should not be placed on particular individuals.  The Combined Code also clarifies the roles of the chairman and the senior independent director (SID) emphasizing the chairman’s role in providing leadership to the non-executive directors and in communicating shareholders’ views to the board; provides for a ‘formal and rigorous annual evaluation’ of the board’s performance, the committees’, and the individual directors’ performance; and at least half the board in larger listed companies are to be independent non-executive directors.” (Mallin, 2004, p24) 

Since 2003, a further three versions of the Combined Code have been issued​[242]​ (2006, 2008 and 2010); the name of the most recent version, issued in May 2010, has been changed to the UK Corporate Governance code (Financial Reporting Council, 2009(b)).  


Appendix 2
The Principles and Provisions of the Combined Code (2006)

This appendix summarises the principles and detailed code provisions of the Combined Code (2006); this version of the code is summarised because the majority of the interviews which are analysed in Chapter 5 took place between January 2006 and May 2007​[243]​.  The provisions of the Combined Code (2006) are not mandatory, however, the Listing Rules of the LSE require that listed companies should confirm in their financial statements that they have complied with its provisions and, if not, provide an explanation as to why not; the financial statements should also describe how the code’s principles have been applied (Combined Code, 2006).  Some of the provisions do not apply to companies outside the FTSE 350, however, the code encourages these companies to adopt its approach where appropriate.

The code is organised into two parts: the first contains principles that apply to companies and the second contains principles that apply to institutional shareholders.  Therefore, the following analysis relates to the contents of the first part of the Combined Code (2006) as it has been suggested that it is the principles in this section which have influenced the regulation of UK pension scheme governance (Clark et al., 2008).  This first part of the combined code is divided into four sub-sections that relate to: (A) Directors; (B) Remuneration; (C) Accountability and Audit; and (D) Relations with Shareholders.  Each of these sub-sections has a number of main principles, the detail of which is provided in supporting principles and/or detailed code provisions.  The remainder of this appendix summarises these principles and provisions in the above order.

Section 1 A: Directors
Section A of the Combined Code (2006) relates specifically to directors and is divided into seven main principles that address: (i) the board; (ii) the chairman and chief executive; (iii) the balance and independence among board members; (iv) appointments to the board; (v) information and professional development of the board; (vi) performance evaluation; (vii) and re-election of board members.  The first main principle of sub-section A which relates to the board states that:
“Every company should be headed by an effective board, which is collectively responsible for the success of the company.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 3)
The supporting principles specify that it is the board’s role:
“…to provide entrepreneurial leadership…set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the necessary…resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives …review management performance…set the company’s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to shareholders and others are understood and met.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 3)
The supporting principles further state that directors’ decisions must be objective and in the interests of the company.  They also clarify the role of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) stating that they:
“…should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy…scrutinise the performance of management…satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible…[determine] appropriate levels of remuneration of executive directors…have a prime role in appointing, and where necessary removing, executive directors, and in succession planning.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 3)
These principles are supported by five detailed code provisions that relate to: (i) the regularity and record-keeping of board meetings; (ii) the publication of the membership of various committees and attendance at their meetings; (iii) the appraisal of the chairman’s performance; (iv) the raising and debate of any concerns that directors and NEDs might have; and (v) insurance cover for legal action against the directors.  The main principle, supporting principles and detailed code provisions of sub-section A1 are summarised below in Panel A of Table A2.1.

The second main principle of sub-section A relates to the chairman and the chief executive and states that:
“There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of company business.  No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 4)
The supporting principle clarifies the role of chairman stating that s/he is responsible for the:
“…leadership of the board, ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role and setting its agenda…ensuring that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear information…[ensuring] effective communication with shareholders …[facilitating] the effective contribution of non-executive directors …[and ensuring] constructive relations between executive and non-executive directors.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 3)




Table A2.1: A Summary of sections 1.A.1 – 1.A.3 of the Combined Code (2006)
Main Principle	Supporting Principles	Code Provisions
Panel A: Section 1.A.1 The Board
The collective responsibility of the board.	The role of the board.	A.1.1 Sufficient regularity of board meetings with formal record-keeping.  The annual report should contain disclosures relating to board operations and the types of decisions it will take or delegates.
	The objectivity of directors’ decisions.	A.1.2 The annual report should identify members of the board, the nomination committee, the audit committee and the remuneration committee and record their attendance at meetings.
	The role of NEDs.	A.1.3 The chairman’s performance should be appraised by NEDs.
		A.1.4 Any concerns of directors should be minuted and NEDs should provide a written statement on resignation detailing any concerns.
		A.1.5 There should be Insurance cover for legal action against the directors.
Panel B: Section 1.A.2 Chairman and Chief Executive
Clear division of responsibilities for running the board and running the company.	The role of the chairman.	A.2.1 The role of chairman and chief executive should be mutually exclusive.  The division of responsibilities must be agreed by the board.
		A.2.2 On appointment, the chairman should meet certain independence criteria.  The chief executive should be prohibited from progressing to the role of chairman.
Panel C: Section 1.A.3 Board Balance and Independence
The balance of executive and non-executive directors.	The acknowledgement of the disadvantages of a large number of board members and the need for an appropriate balance of their skills and knowledge.	A.3.1 The identification and declaration of the independence of NEDs in the annual report..
	The presence of both executive directors and NEDS.	A.3.2 The required proportion of NEDs on the board..
	Refreshing the membership of the board.	A.3.3 The appointment of a senior independent director from the NED membership and their communication with shareholders..
	The entitlement of board members to be present at meetings of the nomination, audit and remuneration committees.	
These principles are supported by two detailed code provisions that focus on: (i) the mutual exclusivity of the role of chairman; and (ii) the chief executive and the independence criteria required of the chairman on appointment.  The main principle, supporting principle and detailed code provisions of sub-section A2 are summarised in Panel B of Table A2.1.

The third main principle of sub-section A relates to the balance of the board and its independence.  It states that:
“The board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 5)
The supporting principles clarify the issue stating that the:
“The board should not be so large as to be unwieldy…[and] should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate…[T]hat changes to [its] composition can be managed without undue disruption…[T]here should be a strong presence…of both executive and non-executive directors…[C]ommittee membership [should be] refreshed…undue reliance [should not be] placed on particular individuals…No one other than the committee chairman and members is entitled to be present at a meeting of the nomination, audit or remuneration committee, but others may attend at the invitation of the committee.”  ((Combined Code, 2006, p. 5)
These principles are supported by three detailed code provisions that address: (i) the identification​[244]​ and declaration of the independence​[245]​ of NEDs in the annual report; (ii) the proportion of the board that should comprise of NEDs ​[246]​; and (iii) the appointment of a senior independent director.  The main principle, supporting principles and detailed code provisions of sub-section A3 are summarised in Panel C of Table A2.1.

The fourth main principle of sub-section A relates to appointments to the board and states that:
“There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 7)
The supporting principles state that:
“Appointments…should be made on merit and against objective criteria…appointees should have enough time available to devote to the job…[There should be plans] in place for orderly succession…so as to maintain an appropriate balance of skills and experience within the company and on the board.  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 7)
These principles are supported by six detailed code provisions that relate to: (i) the role and membership of the nomination committee; (ii) the evaluation of the skills, knowledge and experience of the board; (iii) the chairman’s job specification and disclosure of other commitments; (iv) the terms and conditions of NED appointments; (v) other commitments of full time directors; and (vi) the disclosure in the annual report of information relating to the nomination committee.  The main principle, supporting principles and detailed code provisions of sub-section A4 are summarised below in Table A2.2 below.




Table A2.2: A Summary of Section 1.A.4 of the Combined Code (2006): Appointments to the Board
		Main Principle	Supporting Principles	Code Provisions
Formal, rigorous and transparent procedures for appointment to the board.	Appointments made on merit and against objective criteria.	A.4.1.The membership of the nomination committee, its role and the availability of its terms of reference.
	Appointees should have enough time to devote to the job.	A.4.2 The evaluation of the balance of skills of the board members and identification of any training requirements.
	There should be plans for orderly succession to the board and senior management.	A.4.3 The chairman’s job specification, disclosure of other commitments, reporting any changes in these commitments and the prohibition of another FTSE 100 chair appointment.
		A.4.4 The availability of terms and conditions of NED appointments, the provision of a letter of appointment, disclosure of other commitments and reporting any changes in these commitments.
		A.4.5 The prohibition of a full-time directors holding more than one NED post or a chairman’s post in another FTSE 100 company.
		A.4.6 Disclosure in the annual report of the role of nomination committee.

The fifth main principle of sub-section A relates to information provided to the board and the professional development of its members and states that:
“The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties.  All directors should receive induction on joining the board and should regularly update and refresh their skills and knowledge.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 8)

The supporting principles clarify that the chairman is responsible for:
“…ensuring that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear information…[and] should ensure that the directors continually update their skills and knowledge…The company should provide the necessary resources…[T]he company secretary’s responsibilities include ensuring good information flows within the board…as well as facilitating induction and assisting with professional development…The company secretary  should be responsible for advising the board through the chairman on all governance matters.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 8)
These principles are supported by three detailed code provisions that focus on: (i) the induction of new directors to the board; (ii) access of directors to independent professional advice; and (iii) their access to the company secretary.  The main principle, supporting principles and detailed code provisions of sub-section A5 are summarised in Panel A of Table A2.3 below.

The sixth main principle of sub-section A focuses on performance evaluation requiring that:
“The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees and individual director.”  (Combined Code, 2006. p. 9)

The supporting principle requires that;
“Individual evaluation should aim to show whether each individual director continues to contribute effectively and to demonstrate commitment to the role.  The chairman should act on the results…by recognising strengths and addressing weaknesses.” (Combined Code, 2006. p. 9)

These principles are supported by only one detailed code provision that addresses the disclosures made in the annual report about the performance evaluation and the NEDs’ responsibility for the performance evaluation of the chairman.  The main principle, supporting principle and detailed code provision of sub-section A6 are summarised in Panel B of Table A2.3.


Table A2.3: A Summary of sections 1.A.5 – 1.A.7 of the Combined Code (2006)
		Main Principle	Supporting Principles	Code Provisions
Panel A: Section 1.A.5 Information and Professional Development
The provision of information to the board and the induction and the professional development of its members.	The chairman’s role to provide information to the board.	A.5.1 Induction training for all board members and a meeting between major shareholders and NEDs.
	The chairman’s responsibility to provide resources to refresh directors’ knowledge and skills.	A.5.2 Director access to independent professional advice.
	The company secretary’s role.	A.5.3 Director access to, appointment and removal of the company secretary.
Panel B: Section 1.A.6 Performance Evaluation
Performance evaluation of the board, its committees and individual directors.	Criteria for evaluation and the chairman’s response to the evaluations.	A.6.1 Disclosure in the annual report of the performance evaluation of the board.  The NEDs should evaluate the performance of the chairman.
Panel C: Section 1.A.7 Re-election
Regular re-elections of directors to the board and planned refreshing of its membership.	n/a	A.7.1 Election (and re-election) of directors and provision of their biographical details to shareholders.
		A.7.2 The provision of reasons for NED nomination and the rigorous review required where term extends beyond 6yrs.

The seventh, and final, main principle of sub-section A focuses on the re-election of directors to the board stating that:
“All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to continued satisfactory performance.  The board should ensure planned and progressive refreshing of the board.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 10)

In this instance, there are no supporting principles, however, there are two detailed code provisions to support the main principle which relate to: (i) the election and re-election of directors and the provision if their biographical details; and (ii) the provision of information to shareholders on the election/re-election of NEDs and the requirement for a review when the appointment of a NED extends beyond six years.  The main principle and detailed code provision of sub-section A7 are summarised in Panel C of Table A2.3.

Therefore, section 1.A of the Combined Code (2006) is somewhat prescriptive about the responsibilities of the board, its role and the role of its members, its administrative procedures, the disclosures made in the annual report in relation to the board, the balance of the board, the required knowledge and skills of its members and their professional development, the election and appointment of its members, the required assessment of their performance and the provision of information to its members.

Section 1 B: Remuneration
Section B of the Combined Code (2006) relates specifically to directors’ remuneration and is divided into two main principles that focus on: (i) the level and make-up of directors’ remuneration; and (ii) the required procedure to set such remuneration.  The first main principle of sub-section B which relates to the level and make-up of remuneration states that:
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose.  A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 11)

The supporting principle clarifies the role of the remuneration committee maintaining that it should:
“…judge where to position their company relative to other[s]…[and] be sensitive to pay and employment conditions elsewhere in the group.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 11)

These principles are supported by six detailed code provisions that address: (i) the performance related elements of remuneration; (ii) share options for executive directors; (iii) remuneration for NEDs; (iv) disclosures regarding other posts they may hold; (v) compensation to be paid on the early termination of a director’s contract; and (vi) the requirement for notice periods of one year or less.  The main principle, supporting principle and detailed code provisions of sub-section B1 are summarised in Panel A of Table A2.4 below.

The second main principle of sub-section B relates to the level and make-up of remuneration and states that:
“There should be a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors.  No director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 12)

The supporting principles assert that the remuneration committee should:
“…consult the chairman and/or chief executive about their proposals relating to the remuneration of other executive directors…[and] be responsible for appointing any consultants in respect of executive director remuneration…The chairman of the board should ensure that the company maintains contact as required with its principal shareholders about remuneration in the same way as for other matters.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 12)

These principles are supported by four detailed code provisions that relate to: (i) the membership of the remuneration committee and the availability of its terms of reference; (ii) the responsibilities of the remuneration committee; (iii) those responsible for setting the remuneration of NEDs; and (iv) shareholder approval of long-term incentives.  The main principle, supporting principles and detailed code provisions of sub-section B2 are summarised in Panel B of Table A2. 4.

Table A2.4: A Summary of Section B of the Combined Code (2006)
		Main Principle	Supporting Principle	Code Provisions
Panel A: Section 1.B.1 The Level and Make-up of Remuneration
Level and performance-related element of directors’ remuneration.	Directors’ remuneration should be comparable to remuneration both inside and outside the company.	B.1.1 The performance related elements of ED remuneration.
		B.1.2 The restricted offer of discounted share options.
		B.1.3 NED remuneration based on time, commitment and responsibilities.
		B.1.4 Disclosure of ED’s remuneration from another NED appointment.
		B.1.5 Consideration of the compensation to be paid on early termination of a director’s appointment.
		B.1.6 The period of notice to terminate a director’s contract should be less than 1yr.
Panel B: Section 1.B.2 Procedure
A formal and transparent procedure for setting directors’ remuneration.	Consultation between the Remuneration Committee and the chairman/chief executive re directors’ remuneration.	B.2.1 Membership of the remuneration committee and the availability of its terms of reference.
	The use of remuneration consultants.	B.2.2 The responsibilities of the remuneration committee.
	Contact with principle shareholders re directors’ remuneration.	B.2.3 Setting the remuneration of NEDs.
		B.2.4 Shareholder approval of long-term incentives.


Therefore, section 1.B of the Combined Code (2006) regulates the component parts of directors’ remuneration and how it is set.  It also details the responsibilities of the remuneration committee, its members and the procedures they must follow.

Section 1 C: Accountability and Audit
Section C of the Combined Code (2006) relates specifically to accountability and audit and is divided into three main principles that focus on: (i) financial reporting; (ii) internal controls; and (iii) the audit committee and auditors.  The first main principle of sub-section C which relates to financial reporting states:
“The board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and prospects.” (Combined Code, 2006, p. 14)

The supporting principle describes the board’s responsibility as extending:
“…to interim and other price-sensitive public reports to regulators as well as to information required to be presented by statutory requirements.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 14)

These principles are supported by two detailed code provisions that address: (i) the disclosure of directors’ responsibilities; and (ii) disclosures relating to the company as a going concern. The main principle, supporting principle and detailed code provisions of sub-section C1 are summarised in Panel A of Table A2.5 below.

The second main principle of sub-section C relates to internal controls and requires the board to:
“…maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and company assets” (Combined Code, 2006, p. 14)

In this case, there are no supporting principles but the main principle is supported by a single code provision that specifies the types of internal controls to be reviewed and the requirement to report the review to shareholders.  The main principle and detailed code provisions of sub-section C2 are summarised in Panel B of Table A2.5.

The third main principle of sub-section C relates to the audit committee and the auditors and states that the board should:
“…establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering how they should apply the financial reporting and internal control principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 15)



Table A2.5: A Summary of Section C of the Combined Code (2006)
		Main Principle	Supporting Principle	Code Provisions
Panel A: Section 1.C.1 Financial Reporting
Presentation of a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and prospects.	The extension of the accountability to the interim and other public and regulatory reports.	C.1.1 The disclosure of directors’ responsibilities.
		C.1.2 Going concern disclosures.
Panel B: Section 1.C.2 Internal Controls
Maintenance of a sound system of internal control by the board.	n/a	C.2.1 Board assessment of internal controls and report to shareholders.
Section 1.C.3 Audit Committee and Auditors
The establishment of formal and transparent arrangements for considering the application of financial reporting and internal control principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company auditors.	n/a	C.3.1 Establishment of the audit committee, its members and their experience.
		C.3.2 The role and responsibilities of the audit committee.
		C.3.3 The availability of the audit committee’s terms of reference and disclosure of how the responsibilities are discharged.
		C.3.4 Arrangements by which company staff can raise concerns.
		C.3.5 The monitoring and review of the internal audit function.
		C.3.6 Recommendations of the audit committee.
		C.3.7 In relation to non-audit services, the disclosure and maintenance of auditor objectivity and independence.


Again, there are no supporting principles but the main principle is supported by seven detailed code provisions that relates to: (i) the membership of the audit committee; (ii) its roles and responsibilities; (iii) the disclosure of its terms of reference; (iv) the committee’s review of whistle-blowing procedures; (v) the requirement for it to review the effectiveness of internal audit activities; (vi) its involvement in the appointment and removal of auditors; and (vii) the annual report disclosures in relation to non-audit services.  The main principle and detailed code provisions of sub-section C3 are summarised in Panel C of Table A2.5.  Therefore, section 1.C of the Combined Code (2006) clarifies the accountability of the board, summarises its responsibilities in relation to internal controls and confirms the requirement to establish the audit committee, detailing its role and responsibilities. 

Section 1 D: Relations with Shareholders
Section D of the Combined Code (2006) relates specifically to Relations with Shareholders and is divided into two main principles which focus on: (i) the dialogue with institutional shareholders; and (ii) constructive use of the AGM.  The first main principle of sub-section D which relates to dialogue with institutional shareholders requires that:
“There should be a dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives.  The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 17)

The supporting principles maintain that it is the chairman’s responsibility to:
“…maintain sufficient contact with major shareholders to understand their issues [and that] [t]he board should keep in touch with shareholder opinion in whatever ways are most practical and efficient.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 17)

These principles are supported by two detailed code provisions that that address: (i) the roles of the individual members of the board; and (ii) the disclosure in the annual report of the steps taken by the board to enhance shareholder engagement.  The main principle, supporting principles and detailed code provisions of sub-section D1 are summarised in Panel A of Table A2.6 below.

The second main principle of sub-section D relates to constructive use of the AGM and requires the board to:
“…use the AGM to communicate with investors and encourage their participation.”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 18)

Table A2.6: A Summary of Section D of the Combined Code (2006)
		Main Principle	Supporting Principles	Code Provisions
Panel A: Section 1.D.1 Dialogue With Institutional Investors
The board’s responsibility to ensure a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place.	The chairman’s responsibility to maintain sufficient contact with major shareholders.	D.1.1 The chairman’s responsibility to engage shareholders, the discussion of governance and strategy and the involvement of NEDs and senior independent directors.
	The board’s responsibility to keep in touch with shareholder opinion in practical and efficient ways.	D.1.2 Disclosure of the mechanisms of shareholder engagement.
Panel B: Section 1.D.2 Constructive use of the AGM
The use of the AGM to communicate with investors and encourage participation.	n/a	D.2.1 Resolutions at the AGM.
		D.2.2 Proxy appointments and the provision of information re resolutions.
		D.2.3 Attendance of the chairmen of the audit, remuneration and nomination committees at the AGM.
		D.2.4 Notice of the AGM and the distribution of papers.

In this case, there are no supporting principles but the main principle is supported by four detailed code provisions that relates to: (i) the required procedures to propose and pass resolutions; (ii) the procedures required where proxy appointments have been made; (iii) the attendance of the chairs of the audit, remuneration and nominations committees at the AGM; and (iv) the notice of the AGM and distribution of its papers.  The main principle and detailed code provisions of sub-section D2 are summarised in Panel B of Table A2.6 and prescribes how companies should interact with their shareholders and use the AGM to produce a constructive two-way dialogue.


Appendix 3
Global Perspectives of Corporate governance

A variety of factors can influence the corporate governance framework adopted by a company (Wanyama et al., 2009) and these often depend on the country from which they originate (Mallin, 2007).  These factors include: (i) history and culture (Turnbull, 1997; Macdonald and Beattie, 1993); (ii) the financial and legal systems (Forker and Green, 2000); and (iii) the political context in which the firm operates (Keasey and Wright, 1993).  Therefore, the models of corporate governance that exist in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK and the US, are often different from those that exist in mainland European countries, for instance Germany, and countries from the Far East like Japan (Turnbull, 1997; Macdonald and Beattie, 1993)​[247]​.  Macdonald and Beattie (1993) suggest that the principles underlying the classical UK model of corporate governance are enshrined in company law and, beyond the duties that statute imposes on them, directors are free to decide on how best to run the company.  Forker and Green (2000) argue that this narrow style of governance in the UK corresponds to the “shareholder-based model of the reporting entity” (p. 376).  Mallin (2007) also argues that the corporate governance systems that exist in both the UK and US emphasise the relationship between shareholders and the board whilst other relationships remain unaddressed​[248]​.  Alternatively, continental European and Japanese countries are less dependent on equity financing (Rutherford, 1985) and, consequently, a wider group of stakeholders are involved in the governance process.  For example, in Germany, the governance style includes the interests of lenders, shareholders and employees (Mallin, 2007).  There, a two-tier board system, consisting of a Supervisory Board and a Management Board, has been adopted.  The former is elected by shareholders and employees, but it has no executive powers and appoints, approves and removes members of the Management Board (Macdonald and Beattie, 1993).  Solomon (2007) suggests that the German system is “far more in keeping with a stakeholder…approach to corporate governance” (p. 206).  Alternatively the Japanese model is based on a system of mutual interdependence between banks and companies (Macdonald and Beattie, 1993; Mallin, 2007, Solomon, 2007).  In contrast to the UK equity markets, the banks often hold shares in Japanese companies, are represented on company boards and are often also involved in their major investment decisions (Mallin, 2007).  Thus, some corporate governance regulations, such as those in the UK, are implemented from a shareholder perspective whereas others have a wider stakeholder perspective.

Due to these variations in global corporate governance trends, the OECD first published its Principles of Corporate governance in 1999.  In its most recent 2004 version of the principles, the OECD suggests that they had become an “international benchmark” and are:  
“… a living instrument offering non-binding standards and good practices as well as guidance on implementation, which can be adapted to the specific circumstances of individual countries and regions” (OECD, 2004, p. 4)

Whilst the Combined Code in the UK is predominantly shareholder-focused, the OECD’s principles have been written to incorporate those corporate governance models that are based on wider stakeholder participation.  Although the OECD principles acknowledge the central role of the relationship between shareholders and management, they also highlight other participants in the corporate governance system such as creditors, employees and other stakeholders​[249]​.  As well as addressing obvious issues such as the responsibilities of the board, the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and disclosure as well as transparency, the OECD principles (2004) specifically highlight the role of stakeholders in corporate governance claiming that:
“The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises” (OECD, 2004, p. 21)

This issue is not specifically addressed in the UK’s Combined Code.


Appendix 4
A Comparison of the Combined Code (2006) and the PR’s Governance Guidance

Chapter 2 demonstrated that, in the UK, corporate entities can refer to the Corporate Governance Code (2010) for detailed guidance in relation to the governance mechanisms that should be employed in these companies​[250]​; in the pension scheme context, there is no equivalent document and the provision of detailed pension scheme governance guidance is one of the responsibilities of the PR.  This appendix compares the Combined Code (2006)​[251]​ with the PR’s codes of practice and regulatory guidance to assess if similar corporate governance mechanisms exist in the pension scheme context and, perhaps more importantly, if there are any gaps.  Chapter 2 also established similarities between those personalities required to administer both corporate and pension scheme governance and these are summarised in Table 2.5; these comparisons are also used in the analysis that follows.  The current appendix adopts a structure similar to that of the Combined Code (2006) (see Appendix 2): (A) Directors; (B) Remuneration; (C) Accountability and Audit; and (D) Relations with Shareholders.  In each section, the code’s main provisions are summarised (see Appendix 2 for more details) and equivalent PR guidance is offered (or not, as the case may be); each section concludes with a table which establishes similarities and any gaps that might exist between these two governance frameworks.  



Directors (Pension Scheme Trustees)
Section A of the Combined Code (2006) provides guidance for directors.  More specifically, it addresses the operations of the board, the rights and duties of the chairman and chief executive, the balance of the board and its independence, appointments to the board, the provision of information to members of the board and their professional development, performance evaluation of members of the board and finally, their re-election.  The following discussion examines the content of the PR’s codes of practice and guidance that is deemed to be similar in nature to the principles in section A of the Combined Code (2006).

The main principle of code A.1 of the Combined Code (2006) considers the effectiveness of the board and its collective responsibility.  The supporting principles detail the role of the board and its members, the requirement for their decisions to be objective, the disclosures relating to the board and its decisions and more specifically, the role of NEDs.  In December 2007, the PR produced regulatory guidance Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c)) (hereafter referred to as the guidance document).  That document provides an overview of the role of trustees and explains that:
“[they] have ‘joint and several liability’.  This means [that trustees] can be held responsible for a breach of trust committed by another trustee.  That is why clear communication and regular trustee meetings are important to keep abreast of developments of the scheme.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 14).

The guidance document addresses the collective responsibility of the board of trustees in terms similar to that used in the Combined Code (2006).  It explains that the trustee’s fiduciary duties are to: (i) act in line with the trust deed and rules; (ii) act in the best interests of the scheme beneficiaries; and (iii) to act impartially, prudently, responsibly and honestly.  It confirms that the trust deed will usually give the trustee power to: (i) accept contributions into the scheme; (ii) decide the investment strategy and invest the scheme’s assets; (iii) amend the rules of the scheme; (iv) admit members on special terms; (v) increase members’ benefits; (vi) deal with a funding surplus; and (vii) wind up a scheme​[252]​.  Therefore, like the Combined Code (2006), the guidance document describes in detail, the role, duties and powers of trustees, whether ENTs, MNTs or professional trustees.  Indeed, it might be argued that the guidance document is more prescriptive and provides more detail than the equivalent CG regulation.  Where the Combined Code (2006) addresses the objectivity of the decisions made by directors, similarly the PR’s guidance document states that trustees’ decisions should be impartial, recorded and well-informed​[253]​.  However, where the Combined Code (2006) distinguishes between the roles of directors (specifically executive directors and NEDs) the same roles, duties and powers apply to all trustees of a pension scheme regardless of how they are appointed (see Chapter 2).

The guidance document addresses many of the detailed code provisions of Section A.1 of the Combined Code (2006).  It focuses on the formal records of meetings that trustees are required to keep (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p.38), it advises trustees to take legal advice on any matters that concern them (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p.12), it refers trustees to the trust deed for the scheme-specific procedures to be followed on their resignation (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 17) and it explains the personal liability of the trustee, advising them to get employer indemnity or insurance cover against a potential breach of trust.  As UK pension schemes do not distinguish between the different types of trustees, there is no trustee guidance that describes the equivalent role of a non-executive director; likewise, as there is no equivalent pension role to the company chairman (see Table 3.2), there is no trustee guidance to suggest the assessment of the chairman’s performance.  Finally, principle A.1 of the code also requires annual report disclosures relating to board decisions, committee members and their attendance at meetings; whilst this information is not specifically required by the SORP (see Chapter 4), it does require:
 “…a Trustees’ Report, which provides a review of the management of the scheme…[and]…a separate list of Trustees…with a contact name and address.” (FRC, 2007, pp. 8. and 12.).

Therefore, although parts of the guidance document have been written in the same spirit as principle A.1 of the combined code, it is not possible to apply all of the supporting principles and code provisions in the context of pension schemes.  Table A4.1 summarises where the principles and code provisions identified in section A.1 of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.   






Table A4.1: A Comparison of Combined Code Principle A.1 and Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle A.1, Supporting Principles and Code Provisions	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the collective responsibility of the board.		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees
The supporting principles detail:
the role of the board,the objectivity of directors’ decisions,and the role of NEDs.		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees
		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees
	X	n/a
The code provisions require:
A.1.1: regular board meetings and formal records,and annual report disclosures re board decisionsA.1.2: annual report disclosures of committee members and attendanceA.1.3: The Chairman’s performance appraisalA.1.4: The documentation of directors’ concernsA.1.5: Insurance cover for legal action against directors		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees
		SORP
		SORP
	X	n/a 
		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees
		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.

Principle A.2 of the Combined Code (2006) distinguishes between the roles of the chairman and the chief executive in the corporate context.  Chapter 2 explains that there is no direct equivalent to these roles in the context of pension schemes​[254]​. As all trustees have the same duties and responsibilities, the PR does not require any one trustee to have specific responsibility to steer the board or ensure effective communication with scheme beneficiaries.  It would appear that these responsibilities are bestowed on all trustees equally.  Therefore, there are no pension scheme governance mechanisms that are equivalent to those found in section A.2 of the combined code​[255]​.

The main principle in Section A.3 of the Combined Code (2006) addresses the balance of executive and NEDs on the board.  Chapter 2 established that NEDs may be deemed to be comparable to professional trustees or MNTs in the pension scheme context (see Table 2.5).  Although the PR does not attempt to regulate the use of professional trustees, the guidance document clarifies when MNTs should be used.  It states that MNTs must represent at least one-third of the trustee board and “…be nominated by at least the active and pensioner members of the scheme and selected by some or all of the members.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p.16).

These requirements are detailed further in the Code of Practice: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (b)), which confirm the nomination and selection processes for the appointment of MNTs and the required implementation period for these processes.  Where the Combined Code (2006) requires a balance of skills and knowledge amongst the members of the board in a corporate context, it would appear that the PR requires a very high level of knowledge and understanding from each of the trustees of a pension scheme:  

“The law requires that trustees have knowledge and understanding of (among other things) the law relating to pensions and trusts as well as the principles relating to the funding of pension schemes and the investment of scheme assets.  The law also requires [trustees] to be familiar with certain scheme documents including the trust deed and rules, the statement of investment principles and the statement of funding principles.  Certain exemptions apply to trustees of schemes with fewer than 12 members.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 3).

The PR’s Code of Practice: Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a)) further clarifies that trustees require knowledge and understanding to enable them to:

“increase their own confidence in their ability to carry out their roles; know about their powers as well as their duties and responsibilities; understand their own schemes, how they work, and in the case of DB schemes, the importance of the employer covenant; understand the advice they are given, enter into discussion with their advisors and participate fully in decision making; be able to question or even challenge advise when the need arises; recognise when they need to consult their own or other advisers for particular specialist advice or when they need to consider reselection, recognise conflicts of interest and be able to deal with them and recognise the need for policies and procedures for dealing with them; have a working knowledge of the most important parts of the documentation which sets out the rules governing their scheme and other scheme policies; and select a learning regime which is delivered with the precise needs of the individual trustee in mind and making full use of recent educational developments and/or specific training skills”​[256]​  (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a), p. 3).

Therefore, it might be suggested that, in comparison to the Combined Code (2006), the PR is much more demanding when it comes to the knowledge and understanding required of pension scheme trustees; the PR does not merely require an appropriate spread of such knowledge and understanding but requires a very high standard of each trustee. 


Table A4.2: A Comparison of Combined Code Principle A.3 and Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle A.3, Supporting Principles and Code Provisions	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the balance of executive and non-executive directors.		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees and Code of Practice: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place
The supporting principles detail:
the necessity for the appropriate balance of skills and knowledge, the presence of both executive and non-executive directors on the board,the requirement to refresh the membership of the board andthe entitlement of board members to be present at meetings of the nomination, audit and remuneration committees.		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees and Code of Practice: Trustee Knowledge and Understanding
		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees and Code of Practice: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place
		Trust deed
	X	n/a
The code provisions require:
A.3.1: the identification and declaration of independence of NEDs in the annual report.A.3.2: the required proportion of NEDs on the boardA.3.3: the role of the senior independent director.	X 	
		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees and Code of Practice: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place
	X	n/a
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.

Although the supporting principles in section A.3 of the Combined Code (2006) address the need to refresh the board in the corporate context, no specified term of office is placed on directors.  Likewise, in the pension scheme context, a specified term of office is not fixed for trustees, however, the trust deed is capable of addressing such issues (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 17).  Finally, as the last supporting principle relates to the operation of the nomination, audit and remuneration committees, and the equivalent of these committees do not formally exist in the pension scheme context, no PR regulation in this respect was found.  Likewise, with regards to the Combined Code (2006) requirement to identify a senior independent director from amongst the NEDs, the PR does not require an equivalent appointment.  The code provisions of section A.3 of the Combined Code (2006) require the identification and declaration of independence of NEDs in the annual report; the SORP does not require trustees to disclose equivalent information in the annual report of the pension scheme.  Table A4.2 summarises where the principles and code provisions identified in section A.3 of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.

The main principle of section A.4 of the Combined Code (2006) makes reference to a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of directors to the board.  In the context of pension schemes, the equivalent nomination and selection process can only be applied to MNTs, as ENTs will be appointed to the board of trustees at the employer’s behest in accordance with the trust deed​[257]​.  Therefore the following discussion relates to MNTs only.  The PR’s code of practice: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (b)) provides clarification of the nomination process stating that existing trustees should choose who to involve​[258]​.  The PR further states that if selection of trustees is made by a panel or group, such a panel must include some scheme members (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(b), p. 19).  Therefore, although no formal nomination committee is necessary as required in the Combined Code (2006), the trustees are required to apply formal, rigorous and transparent procedures in the appointment of trustees.  Scheme members are eligible for nomination and selection as MNTs and, in certain circumstances, so too are non-members (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(b), p.19)​[259]​.  Otherwise, the PR does not require specific criteria to be met, or formulated, before the appointment a trustee can be made.

Unlike directors in the corporate context, the trustee’s post, other than that of a professional trustee, is rarely remunerated (see Chapter 2).  It is therefore widely acknowledged that those who participate on the board of trustees will do so on a part-time basis and not at the exclusion of their full-time job (see Chapter 2).  The PR therefore does not specify the amount of time that trustees should spend on scheme business and, as the trustee post does not preclude that the holder should have any other post, there is not the same need to plan for an orderly succession to the board as there is in the corporate context.  Similarly, where the Combined Code (2006) calls for (i) the availability of a NED’s terms of appointment and disclosure of other commitments and (ii) the prohibition of full-time directors holding other posts, no such requirement exists in the pension scheme context for the reasons stated above.  


Table A4.3: A Comparison of Combined Code Principle A.4 and Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle A.4, Supporting Principles and Code Provisions	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the formal, rigorous and transparent procedures for appointment to the board.		Trust deed, Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees and Code of Practice: MNT/MND – putting arrangements in place
The supporting principle details that:
appointments should be made on merit and against objective criteria appointees should have enough time to devote to the job there should be plans for orderly succession to the board and senior management.	X	n/a
	X	n/a 
	X	n/a 
The code provisions require:
A.4.1: the nomination committee, its role and availability of its terms of reference.A.4.2: the evaluation of the balance of skills of the board members and identification of training requirements.A.4.3: the chairman’s job specification and disclosure of other commitmentsA.4.4:the availability of NED terms of appointment and disclosure of other commitmentsA.4.5: The prohibition of full-time directors holding more than one NED chairman’s post.A.4.6: the nomination committee and disclosure of its role in the annual report	X	n/a
		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees and Code of Practice: Trustee Knowledge and Understanding
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.

Table A4.3 summarises where the principles and code provisions identified in section A.4 of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.

In the corporate context, principle A.5 of the Combined Code (2206) discusses the chairman’s responsibility to ensure that directors receive accurate, timely and clear information.  As there is no equivalent of the chairman in the pension scheme context, the PR does not delegate this responsibility to any one individual.  The induction of new trustees, on the other hand is an area on which the PR provides a great deal of guidance.  The PR has developed a ‘toolkit’ to help trustees meet the requirements for their knowledge and understanding, as stipulated by the Pensions Act (2004).  The tool-kit is an on-line, interactive learning and self-assessment tool and, although trustees are not required to work through it, it is highly recommended.  The PR acknowledges that, whilst it should be sufficient for most trustees, it might not be sufficient for “trustees of large or complex schemes [who] may feel they need to supplement this with further learning of their own” (The Pensions Regulator, 2009).  Code of practice: Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a)) also confirms that trustees must have an appropriate level of knowledge and understanding and that it is their responsibility to keep themselves up to date (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (a)).  Unlike the Combined Code (2006), it is not the responsibility of one individual to ensure that the knowledge and understanding of board members is continually updated.  Code of practice: Trustees Knowledge and Understanding (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a)) makes it the responsibility of the individual trustee​[260]​.

Although the PR does not make specific reference to the provision of resources for training, effectively, the PR’s website provides these resources and potential training facilities.  Where the Combined Code (2006) makes the company secretary responsible for advising the board on all governance matters, as discussed earlier, the PR has acknowledged that the promotion of good pension scheme governance is essential to the fulfilment of its statutory objectives.  Finally, the code provisions of principle A.5 require a meeting between major shareholders and NEDs; the PR has no equivalent requirement for new trustees to meet scheme members.

In 2008, the PR published Regulatory Guidance: Relations with Advisers (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(a)).  This document guides trustees in their relationship with advisers generally, and more specifically the scheme actuary, auditor, legal adviser, scheme administrator, independent financial adviser and benefit consultant.  Although not specifically mentioned, it is assumed that the relationship with the fund manager would also be guided by the contents of this document.  It provides trustees with issues to consider in each of these relationships with the overall aim of helping trustees to understand the contribution of each advisor and maintain a good working relationship with them​[261]​.







Table A4.4: A Comparison of Combined Code A.5 and Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle A.5, Supporting Principles and Code Provisions	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the provision of information to the board, and the induction and professional development of its members.	X	n/a
		The Pensions Act (2004) and the Trustee toolkit
The supporting principles detail:
the chairman’s role to provide information to the boardthe provision of resources to refresh directors’ knowledge and skillsthe company secretary’s role 	X	n/a
		The PR website
		The PR
The code provisions require:
A.5.1:The chairman’s responsibility to ensure the induction of new directors and a meeting between major shareholders and NEDsA.5.2:Directors access to independent professional adviceA.5.3: Directors access to, and the appointment and removal of the company secretary		The PENSIONS Act 2004 and the Trustee toolkit
	X	n/a
		Regulatory Guidance: Relations with Advisers
	X	n/a
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.


Therefore, not only does the PR require that trustees maintain a relationship with professionals that are independent to the scheme, the regulation is very prescriptive as to how this should be done.  As there is no pension scheme equivalent to the company secretary and thus access to such an individual is not addressed by the PR.  Table A4.4 summarises where the principles and code provisions identified in section A.5 of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.

Principle A.6 of the Combined Code (2006) considers the performance evaluation of the board members.  Whilst there is no statutory requirement for trustees to be assessed or to self-assess, a PR working group, the Investment Governance Group (IGG), has produced six principles for the governance of institutional investment​[262]​.  In that document, principle 4 requires that “[t]rustees should…periodically make a formal policy assessment of their own effectiveness as a decision-making body and report on this to members” (The Pensions Regulator, 2009 (b))  These principles require the process to be formal, that the trustees should be able to demonstrate an effective contribution (possibly measured by participation at meetings), where the chairman is required to address the results of the performance evaluation and state how the performance evaluations were conducted.  (The Pensions Regulator, 2009 (b)).  Therefore, the PR’s documentation addresses similar issues to principle A.6 of the Combined Code (2006), using criteria that are almost identical for the evaluation of performance and requiring the chairman to respond and report the results of this evaluation.  It does not however require a separate evaluation of the performance of the chairman.  Table A4.5 summarises where the principles identified in section A.6 of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.




Table A4.5: A Comparison of Combined Code A.6 and Pension Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle A.6, Supporting Principle and Code Provisions	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the performance evaluation of the board, its committees and individual directors.		IGG’s principles for the governance of institutional investment.
The supporting principle details the criteria for evaluation and the chairman’s response to the evaluations.		IGG’s principles for the governance of institutional investment.
The code provision A.6.1 requires disclosure in the annual report of the above process, andthe NEDs should evaluate the performance of the chairman.		IGG’s principles for the governance of institutional investment.
	X	n/a
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.

Principle A.7 of the Combined Code (2006) concerns the frequency and planning for the re-election of directors in the corporate context, specifically addressing the provision of their biographical details to shareholders and reasons for the NED nomination.  Despite an extensive search, it would appear that there are no pension scheme governance mechanisms that are equivalent to those found in section A.7 of the Combined Code (2006).

Overall, a comparison between the principles in section A of the Combined Code (2006) and pension scheme governance regulations illustrates that, where possible, the majority of these principles have been applied in the pension scheme context.  It would appear however that the principles in A.1, A.2 and A.6 which relate to the company chairman, and those in A.7, which relate to the frequency of the re-election of directors, have not been applied in the pension scheme context.  Also, while the combined code requires a balance of skills and knowledge from the board of directors as a whole in principle A.3, the PR requires a very high level of knowledge and understanding from each of the trustees.

Remuneration 
The main principles in section B of the Combined Code (2006) relate to directors’ remuneration, and the processes that are required to set that remuneration at an appropriate level.  As the role of trustee is, with the exception of a professional trustee, a voluntary one, the issue of trustee remuneration is irrelevant to pension schemes, and therefore there are no pension scheme governance mechanisms that are equivalent to those found in section B of the Combined Code (2006).

Accountability and Audit 
Section C of the Combined Code (2006) addresses issues of accountability and audit.  More specifically it considers financial reporting, internal control and the relationship that the company should have with its auditors via the audit committee.  The principles of section C.1 of the Combined Code (2006) apply to the presentation of a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and extend the directors’ accountability to the interim and other public as well as regulatory reports; thus the code provisions require the disclosure of associated information in the financial statements.  The SORP similarly requires that:
“…the [trustees’] annual report should, as far as possible, be written in plain English so that it is clear to the reader why particular disclosures are being made and what they mean.  However, it is impractical to avoid established pensions and other accounting terminology completely.” (FRC, 2007, p. 7)

Likewise, it is a statutory responsibility of the trustees to register the pension scheme with the PR and submit the scheme’s annual return​[263]​.  Therefore, the trustees’ accountability has been extended to regulatory reports similar to that of corporate directors.  The provisions of C.1 of the 2006 code also require disclosures in relation to directors’ responsibilities and going concern issues; whilst the SORP requires disclosures in relation to the former issue​[264]​, it fails to mandate on the latter.  Table A4.6 summarises where the principles identified in section C.1 of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.

Table A4.6: A Comparison of Combined Code C.1 and Pension Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle C.1, Supporting Principle and Code Provisions	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the need for the presentation of a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and prospects.		SORP
The supporting principle details the extension of the accountability to the interim and other public and regulatory reports.		The PR Website
The code provisions require:
C.1.1 The disclosure of directors’ responsibilities.C.1.2 Going concern disclosures		SORP
	X	
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.

Principle C.2 of the Combined Code (2006) relates to the maintenance of a sound system of internal control by the board.  In 2006, the PR published the code of practice: Internal Controls (The Pensions Regulator, 2006 (c)) to help trustees comply with The Occupational Pension Schemes (Internal Control) Regulations (2005) which required trustees to establish and operate adequate internal controls.  This code of practice provides trustees with guidance as to what internal controls are, why they are needed, how to assess risk, and how to adopt a proportionate approach; it gives examples of key risks and the type of internal controls that might be appropriate in these circumstances.  It states that trustees may wish to comment in the annual report that they have assessed the key risks and have implemented appropriate internal controls to deal with them (The Pensions Regulator, (2006(c)).  In relation to any service providers to the pension scheme, the PR states that: 
“A number of third party administrators are obtaining independent reviews of their internal controls and are actively providing their clients with copies of the assurance reports…There is no explicit statutory requirement to report a lack of adequate internal controls.  However, persistent failure to put in place adequate internal controls may, for example be a contributory cause of an administrative breach or, in more extreme cases, result in the reduction or loss of scheme assets.”(The Pensions Regulator, (2006(c)), p. 11).

Therefore, not only does the PR require the board of trustees to maintain a sound system of internal control but is very prescriptive as to how this should be done.  Table A4.7 summarises where the principles identified in section C.2 of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.


Table A4.7: A Comparison of Combined Code C.2 and Pension Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle C.2 and Code Provision	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the maintenance of a sound system of internal control by the board.		Code of Practice: Internal controls
The code provision requires:
C.2.1 Board assessment of internal controls andreport to shareholders.		Code of Practice: Internal controls
		Code of Practice: Internal controls
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.

Principle C.3 of the Combined Code (2006) considers the establishment of formal and transparent arrangements to apply the financial reporting and internal control principles (see Tables A4.6 and A4.7 respectively) and to maintain an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditor.  Most large companies will normally use the audit committee as a vehicle to do this and hence the code provisions in C.3 are very prescriptive regarding its membership, its role, its responsibilities and its operational procedures.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no direct requirement of the audit committee in the pension scheme context and, likewise, the PR makes little reference to the internal audit function of the pension scheme.  Instead, the relationship between the trustees and the auditor is addressed in the regulatory guidance: Relations with Advisers (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(a)).  This document offers guidance on the appointment and review of the current auditor and on getting the best service from the chosen firm.  In doing so, it addresses issues such as the audit fee structure, the firm’s experience and qualifications, understanding the firm’s audit plans and processes, how the audit firm should manage conflicts of interest if it is also the audit firm of the sponsoring employer, the scope of the audit, ensuring that the auditor is well briefed on the scheme’s circumstances and consideration of the audit tender process.  Consequently, as most pension schemes do not have audit committees, with the exception of provision C.3.4, many of the C.3 code provisions are inappropriate in the pension scheme context and this is reflected in Table A4.8 below.  


Table A4.8: A Comparison of Combined Code C.3 and Pension Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle C.3 and Code Provision	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the establishment of formal and transparent arrangements for considering the application of financial reporting, internal control principles, and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditor.		Code of Practice: Internal Controls and Regulatory Guidance: Relations with Advisers
The code provisions require:
C.3.1 Establishment of the audit committee, it’s members and their experience.C.3.2 The role and responsibilities of the audit committee.C.3.3 The availability of the audit committee’s terms of reference and disclosure of how the responsibilities are discharged.C.3.4 Arrangements by which company staff can raise concerns.C.3.5 The monitoring and review of the internal audit function.C.3.6 Recommendations of the audit committee.C.3.7 In relation to non-audit services, the disclosure and maintenance of auditor objectivity and independence.	X	n/a
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
		Regulatory Guidance: Reporting breaches
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.

Code provision C.3.4 of the Combined Code (2006) states that there should be internal arrangements in place whereby staff may raise concerns in confidence and these concerns can be investigated and addressed.  Whilst the PR does not make recommendations on similar internal procedures, its does stipulate that, in certain circumstances, suspected breaches of the law must be formally reported.  Indeed, the first code of practice to be issued by the PR in 2005 was Code of Practice 1: Reporting Breaches of the Law (The Pensions Regulator, 2005) (see Table 2.4).  In this document the PR acknowledged that whistleblowing is an important part of the regulatory framework.

Those responsible for the administration of UK pension schemes also have a duty to report misdemeanours which include: 
“…breaches … of any legislation or rule of law concerning the administration of pension schemes.  There is no requirement to report every breach.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2005, p. 7)

Thus, such duties will normally therefore lie with trustees (or managers of those schemes not established under a trust) and persons otherwise involved in the administration of a scheme including insurance companies, third party administrators, the sponsoring employer and pension scheme advisors (The Pensions Regulator, 2005).  These individuals who run the scheme are required to report to the PR where they have reasonable cause to believe that a breach in the law has taken place and where that breach is likely to be of material significance to the PR.  Where the informal and internal whistleblowing arrangements that are required in the corporate context cover all concerns, regardless of their materiality, those arrangements for pension schemes only relate to material breaches of the law and require the breach to be reported to the PR, a regulatory body that is external to the pension scheme.

To summarise, whilst the majority of principles and code provisions in C.3 of the Combined Code (2006) have been applied in the pension scheme context, they have been applied without the requirement to establish an audit committee.  Code provision C.3.4 has been addressed in the context of pension schemes but covers formal whistleblowing procedures only, and not the more informal ones recommended by the combined code.



Relations with Shareholders (Pension Scheme Members/beneficiaries)
Finally, section D of the Combined Code (2006) focuses on the board’s relations with shareholders and the constructive use of the AGM.  In the context of pension schemes, this translates to the board of trustees’ relationship with scheme members and beneficiaries.  The guidance document (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c)) provides details on the provision of information to others.  It clarifies that it is the trustee’s duty to provide information that is requested; it establishes who is entitled to request information and when the information must be supplied​[265]​.  The guidance document also specifies the content of the annual report however there is no requirement to disclose mechanisms of shareholder engagement.  

The Regulatory Guidance: Effective Member Communication (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(b)) addresses the issue in more depth, although it argues that effective member communication is perhaps more important in DC schemes where many decisions that affect members’ benefits are made by the members.  The guidance highlights areas of good practice and attempts to help those who wish to communicate with members think about what they are trying to achieve and whether their communications are successful.  In doing so, it considers what makes communication successful, the identification of the objectives of the communication, the advantages of having a clear communication plan, identifying the best ways to communicate, tailoring the communication to the audience, taking into account the needs of all groups, the need to be open and honest, the avoidance of jargon and the choice of the best time to get members to engage.  Although this document suggests that two-way communication is the preferred option, the guidance document leans towards the guidance of written communication and all of the examples provided are that of a narrative nature.  

Where, in a corporate context, the board of directors can use the AGM to communicate with shareholders on a face-to-face basis, unless the pension scheme is administered by a corporate trustee, there is no equivalent of the AGM in the pensions scheme context.  This was also the conclusion of a discussion paper issued by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) Pension Scheme Governance – Fit for the 21st Century (NAPF, 2005).  This document concluded that this was a governance omission that needed to be addressed in the near future.  Therefore, where the Combined Code (2006) attempts to promote face-to-face meetings between directors and shareholders and suggests that the responsibility for the maintenance of that communication should rest with the chairman, the guidance document makes it the responsibility of each trustee and the regulatory guidance: Effective Member Communication concentrates on written communication.  Tables A4.9 and A4.10 summarise where the principles identified in section D of the Combined Code (2006) have been similarly applied in the context of pension schemes.


Table A4.9: A Comparison of Combined Code D.1 and Pension Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle D.1 and Code Provision	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the board’s responsibility to ensure a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place		Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for trustees
The supporting principles detail:
the chairman’s responsibility to maintain sufficient contact with major shareholdersthe board’s responsibility to keep in touch with shareholder opinion.	X	n/a
		Regulatory Guidance: Effective Member Communication
The code provisions require:
D.1.1 The chairman’s responsibility to engage shareholders, the discussion of governance and strategy and the involvement of NEDs and senior independent directors.D.1.2 Disclosure of the mechanisms of shareholder engagement.	X	n/a
	X	
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.


Table A4.10: A Comparison of Combined Code D.2 and Pension Governance Regulation
Combined Code Principle D.2 and Code Provision	Pension Scheme Governance Regulation
The main principle addresses the use of the AGM to communicate with investors and encourage participation.	X	n/a
The code provisions require:
D.2.1 Resolutions at the AGM.D.2.2 Proxy appointments and the provision of information re resolutions.D.2.3 Attendance of the chairmen of the audit, remuneration and nomination committees at the AGM.D.2.4 Notice of the AGM and the distribution of papers.	X	n/a
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
	X	n/a
Note: Where  represents that principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; X means that no principles similar to those found in the combined code have been applied in the pension scheme context; and n/a signifies that a similar personality does not exist in the pension scheme context and thus the application of the code provision or principle in that context is not applicable.


Appendix 5(i)
Interview Questions for Trustees
General:
1.	How many pension schemes are you involved with and what is the nature of these schemes?  Is this a full-time role for you?  
2.	Can you explain your role within these various pension schemes?
3.	Do these schemes have a common governance structure?

Governance of Pension Funds:
4.	Since being involved in this sector, have you witnessed an improvement in the governance of pension schemes?  If so, in what areas and over what time periods?  Do the schemes that have demonstrated an improvement in their governance have particular characteristics (for example size, maturity)?  Do you think any improvements are a direct result of recent regulatory instruments such as the Myners report (2001) and the Pensions Act 2004?
5.	“The rigor of debate” has been identified as being the “linchpin of good governance”.  For that to happen, it is likely that trustees would participate in the decision-making process attend regular meetings and be prepared for them.  Do you believe that this process has improved in the last few years?
6.	Trustees/managers of occupational pension schemes are required to implement sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms.  The objective of these is to ensure that the scheme is administered and managed in accordance with (a) the scheme rules and (b) pensions and any other legislation.  How do you ensure that this is the case?
7.	Can you give examples of where you have adopted a risk management approach to arranging the existence or adequacy of key internal controls?  
8.	The code of practice states that systems and controls should not focus solely on financial and administrative procedures.  Can you provide examples of other potential areas of risk that you have considered in relation to your pension scheme?
9.	The code of practice states that the approach trustees are expected to take should be risk based and proportional.  Can you think of an instance where an internal control has been moderated in proportion to the risk?
10.	Codes of practice are not statements of the law and there is no penalty for failing to comply with them.  Do you think this approach is appropriate to promote the good governance of pension schemes, or should the regulator have taken a more mandatory approach?
11.	The code states that the core objective of trustees include (a) safeguarding of assets (b) maintaining suitable funding levels (c) ensuring members receive benefits to which they are entitled and (d) ensuring the scheme operates within the laws and in accordance with the scheme's trust deed and rules What internal controls are in place in your scheme to ensure that these objectives are met?
12.	What procedure do trustees adopt to identify the risks associated with the pension scheme and can you give examples of such risks?
13.	Is the procedure, including the identified risks, documented anywhere? Are these documents publicly available, and if so can we get a copy?
14.	The code states that the effectiveness and efficiency of managing and administering a pension scheme relies on trustees using scheme resources in the most appropriate way.  Can you provide any examples of the trustees’ assessment of this?
15.	Have any weaknesses been identified by risk mitigation procedures/internal controls?  If so, how were they reported and dealt with?
16.	Do the trustees follow the ‘scheme risk management cycle’?  If so, is there any evidence available to demonstrate the procedure?
17.	Do many schemes display evidence that feedback from scheme members to trustees is followed up?
18.	Is there regular correspondence with the Pension Fund Regulator and do you see this relationship changing in the future?
19.	The following actions have been identified as improving the governance of pension schemes, do you seek evidence to ensure that trustees engage in such activities and if so, can you give examples:
	Benchmarking their scheme against best practice in governance
	Developing a governance policy for their schemes, reflecting the specific characteristics of the scheme,
	Determining the skills and knowledge required to carry out their role effectively,
	Undertaking the assessment of the skills and knowledge of the trustees individually and collectively.  This should cover both technical skills, and analytical and decision making skills,
	Developing a learning and development programme to close any identified skills and knowledge gaps,
	Introducing objectives and performance assessment for trustees,
	Developing and implementing a performance measurement process for advisors and delegates
	Developing principles for recognising and addressing conflicts of interest
	Formalising and documenting changes to scheme governance
	Self-assessment by trustees of their own performance and that of the fund.

The Nature of the Accountability:
20.	There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example.  Have you found any evidence to suggest that trustees discharge accountability in the following areas (and if so, in what media was it disclosed) :
	the proper use of funds in the manner authorised and that money has been spent as agreed between the principals (scheme members) and agents (trustees) or in accordance with any other applicable regulation
	that adequate procedures are used, or that the processes followed by the agent (trustees) are appropriate, or that adequate systems have been put in place to achieve the identified tasks
	whether the output (the management of the pension fund) meets the required standards (codes of practice)
	whether or not the output (the management of the pension fund) has achieved its objectives (settlement or likely settlement of the pension promise) 
	ensure that those who pursue certain policies are accountable for them, as well as policies that they do not pursue, addressing whether or not the course of action taken by the agent (the trustees) was the best one available. 
21.	If you are unable to recall any evidence to suggest that trustees discharge accountability in the above areas, do you believe that it should be disclosed and what would be the most appropriate media? 
22.	Do you believe that the pension fund information disclosed, both in the financial statements of the scheme and the sponsoring employer:
	enhances users understanding of the performance of the fund, the trustees and the sponsoring employer; 
	is used in a particular way (by either members or shareholders of the sponsoring employer); 
	permits interaction between the scheme members and shareholders of the sponsoring employer and the agent trustees; 
	addresses the needs of all stakeholders (if not, which are neglected) 
	appears adequate in terms of the forms and languages to permit understanding. 
23.	Do you believe that it is appropriate to disclose pension fund information in media other than the financial statements?  If so, should it be audited/reviewed?

Increased Accountability (benefits and costs of FRS 17 and IAS 19):
24.	Do trustees have much interaction with stakeholders about the new FRS17/IAS19 information?  If so, who and what was the extent/nature of that interaction?
25.	Do you know if there were any problems experienced when implementing FRS 17/ IAS 19 and how were they overcome?
26.	Do you know if Pension Funds/ sponsoring employers were worried about the pension fund surplus/deficit having economic consequences such as affecting the share price, squeezing dividends, impeding takeover bids?
27.	Other than the above, do you know if there have been any other costs of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 information?
28.	What do you think have been the main benefits of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 for the various stakeholders?
29.	Do the new FRS 17/IAS 19 numbers/disclosures provide a better predictive ability for the various stakeholders than the SSAP 24 numbers/disclosures?
30.	In your opinion have these benefits outweighed the costs?


Appendix 5(ii)
Interview Questions for Pension Officers and those Stakeholders Associated with the Sponsoring Employer

Company Profile :
1.	Company details, sector etc
2.	Employee numbers
3.	Date of last/next actuarial valuation

The Scheme:
4.	How many employees are in pensionable employment?
5.	What proportion of these are in defined benefit and defined contribution plans?
6.	How many pension schemes are there and what are the provisions of the main schemes? 
7.	Have there been any recent changes to main pension scheme (for example, closure to new members, changes to pension benefits?
8.	Can you provide a summary of the pension fund surpluses/deficits over the last five years?

Governance Questions:
9.	What is the governance structure of the pension scheme?  For example, the number of trustees and their profiles, the committee structure and their meeting strategy, the derivation/development of the investment strategy 
10.	Are the minutes of these meetings publicly available?  If not, is it possible to summarise the issues discussed and how decisions are reached (for example, the assumptions used to value the pension fund obligation, the contributions paid into the pension fund each year)? 
11.	Is there regular correspondence with the Pension Fund Regulator and do you see this relationship changing in the future?
12.	Would it be possible to forward us a copy of the pension fund accounts of the main schemes?
13.	The Myners report (2001) and the Pensions Act 2004 made certain recommendations with regards to the governance of pension funds.  Since the publication of these documents, have you witnessed an improvement in the governance of the company pension scheme?  If so, in what areas and over what time periods?  
14.	Is there any evidence that many trustees make a formal attempt at risk assessment and management?  How comprehensive is that process?
15.	The following actions have been identified as improving the governance of pension schemes, do trustees/their advisors engage in such activities and if so, can you give examples:
	Benchmarking their scheme against best practice in governance
	Developing a governance policy for their schemes, reflecting the specific characteristics of the scheme,
	Determining the skills and knowledge required to carry out their role effectively,
	Undertaking the assessment of the skills and knowledge of the trustees individually and collectively.  This should cover both technical skills, and analytical and decision making skills,
	Developing a learning and development programme to close any identified skills and knowledge gaps,
	Introducing objectives and performance assessment for trustees,
	Developing and implementing a performance measurement process for advisors and delegates
	Developing principles for recognising and addressing conflicts of interest
	Formalising and documenting changes to scheme governance
	Self-assessment by trustees of their own performance and that of the fund.


Pension Fund Accounting Questions:
16.	There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example.  Do trustees discharge accountability in the following areas:
	the proper use of funds in the manner authorised and that money has been spent as agreed between the principals (scheme members) and agents (trustees) or in accordance with any other applicable regulation
	that adequate procedures are used, or that the processes followed by the agent (trustees) are appropriate, or that adequate systems have been put in place to achieve the identified tasks
	whether the output (the management of the pension fund) meets the required standards (codes of practice)
	whether or not the output (the management of the pension fund) has achieved its objectives (settlement or likely settlement of the pension promise) 
	ensure that those who pursue certain policies are accountable for them, as well as policies that they do not pursue, addressing whether or not the course of action taken by the agent (the trustees) was the best one available. 
17.	Are the goals and the processes within your pension fund are defined and certain?
18.	Does pension fund information, both in the financial statements of the scheme and the sponsoring employer:
	enhance users understanding of the performance of the fund, the trustees and the sponsoring employer; 
	are used in a particular way (by either members or shareholders of the sponsoring employer); 
	permit interaction between the scheme members and shareholders of the sponsoring employer and the agent trustees; 
	address the needs of all stakeholders (if not, which are neglected) 
	appear adequate in terms of the forms and languages to permit understanding. 
19.	Do you disclose pension fund information in media other than the financial statements?  





Accountability Questions:
20.	Can you provide a summary of the pension accounting standards that have been applied over the last 5 years (SSAP 24, FRS 17, IAS 19, FAS 87)?
21.	Accounting under IAS19 permits three choices of accounting for pension funds in the accounts of the sponsoring employer.  Which option did your company adopt for the most recent year end and what factors influenced that choice?
22.	Have the annual disclosures in relation to the pension fund increased as a result of the application of FRS 17/IAS 19?
23.	Do you believe that the FRS 17/ IAS 19 accounting requirements (i.e. bringing the pension fund surplus/deficit on balance sheet) provide more meaningful information for the various stakeholder groups?
24.	 Do you believe that the FRS 17/ IAS 19 disclosure requirements provide more meaningful information for the various stakeholder groups?
25.	Have the new reporting requirements directly resulted in changes to the pension scheme (for example closure to new members)?
26.	Pension fund surpluses and deficits are now seen as company assets and liabilities.  As such, FRS 19 has resulted in new information is being given to the equity markets.  Do you believe that your share price has been effected by the disclosure of such information?


Appendix 5(iii)
Interview Questions for Auditors, Actuaries and Advisors
General:
1.	Can you explain the activities of your department and, more specifically, your role within these activities.
2.	Does your firm have a separate department that audits pension funds? If so, does it audit all types of funds (for example in terms of size, maturity, no of members etc)?  
3.	For what proportion of these clients do you also audit the financial statements/FRS 17/IAS 19 information of the sponsoring employer?  
4.	Does auditing both the pension fund and the financial statements of the sponsoring employer facilitate the audit of the FRS 17/ IAS 19 information?
5.	How did you plan for the implementation of FRS 17/IAS 19 and have you made any changes (for example systems, audit procedures or staff) as a result?

Increased Accountability (benefits and costs of FRS 17 and IAS 19):
6.	Did you advise your clients regarding the early adoption of FRS 17 or IAS 19 i.e. prior to Jan 2005?  Of the early adopters, were these companies already reporting under US/IFRS GAPP?
7.	Did you consult with other big 4/ICAS/ICAEW/APB/IASB/FRC/Audit forum/any others when deciding how to implement the changes needed to audit FRS 17/IAS 19?
8.	Has there been communication with regulators/ standard setters/ investors etc about the new FRS17/IAS19 information and did you speak to any of these with your clients?
9.	What were the main problems experienced when implementing FRS 17/ IAS 19 and how were they overcome?
10.	Were your clients worried about the pension fund surplus/deficit having economic consequences such as affecting the share price, squeezing dividends, impeding takeover bids?
11.	Other than the above, have there been any other costs of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 information?
12.	Have any of these costs had an effect on the audit fees?
13.	What do you think have been the main benefits of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 for the various stakeholders?
14.	Do the new FRS 17/IAS 19 numbers/disclosures provide a better predictive ability for the various stakeholders than the SSAP 24 numbers/disclosures?
15.	In your opinion have these benefits outweighed the costs?

Governance:
16.	The Myners report (2001) and the Pensions Act 2004 made certain recommendations with regards to the governance of pension funds.  Since the publication of these documents, have you witnessed an improvement in the governance of pension schemes?  If so, in what areas and over what time periods?  Do the schemes which have demonstrated an improvement in their governance have particular characteristics (for example size, maturity)?
17.	Trustees/managers of occupational pension schemes are required to implement sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms.  The objective of these is to ensure that the scheme is administered and managed in accordance with (a) the scheme rules and (b) pensions and any other legislation. Do you review the client to ensure that this is the case?  If so how?
18.	Is there any evidence that many trustees make a formal attempt at risk assessment and management?  How comprehensive is that process?
19.	Do you question your pension fund clients/ or review any documentation for compliance with the Myners Report, other legislative requirements and the Trust Deeds?
20.	The following actions have been identified as improving the governance of pension schemes, do you seek evidence to ensure that trustees engage in such activities and if so, can you give examples:
	Benchmarking their scheme against best practice in governance
	Developing a governance policy for their schemes, reflecting the specific characteristics of the scheme,
	Determining the skills and knowledge required to carry out their role effectively,
	Undertaking the assessment of the skills and knowledge of the trustees individually and collectively.  This should cover both technical skills, and analytical and decision making skills,
	Developing a learning and development programme to close any identified skills and knowledge gaps,
	Introducing objectives and performance assessment for trustees,
	Developing and implementing a performance measurement process for advisors and delegates
	Developing principles for recognising and addressing conflicts of interest
	Formalising and documenting changes to scheme governance
	Self-assessment by trustees of their own performance and that of the fund.
21.	“The rigor of debate” has been identified as being the “linchpin of good governance”.  For that to happen, it is likely that trustees would participate in the decision-making process attend regular meetings and be prepared for them.  Do you conduct any audit procedures to satisfy yourself that this kind of debate takes place (for example a review of the minutes of meetings or representative attendance at these meetings)?
22.	Do many schemes display evidence that feedback from scheme members to trustees is followed up?
23.	Does a representative from your department attend any meetings internal to the pension fund?

The Nature of the Accountability:
24.	There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example.  Have you found any evidence to suggest that trustees discharge accountability in the following areas:
	the proper use of funds in the manner authorised and that money has been spent as agreed between the principals (scheme members) and agents (trustees) or in accordance with any other applicable regulation
	that adequate procedures are used, or that the processes followed by the agent (trustees) are appropriate, or that adequate systems have been put in place to achieve the identified tasks
	whether the output (the management of the pension fund) meets the required standards (codes of practice)
	whether or not the output (the management of the pension fund) has achieved its objectives (settlement or likely settlement of the pension promise) 
	ensure that those who pursue certain policies are accountable for them, as well as policies that they do not pursue, addressing whether or not the course of action taken by the agent (the trustees) was the best one available. 
25.	Are the goals and the processes within your pension fund are defined and certain?
26.	Does pension fund information, both in the financial statements of the scheme and the sponsoring employer:
	enhance users understanding of the performance of the fund, the trustees and the sponsoring employer; 
	are used in a particular way (by either members or shareholders of the sponsoring employer); 
	permit interaction between the scheme members and shareholders of the sponsoring employer and the agent trustees; 
	address the needs of all stakeholders (if not, which are neglected) 
	appear adequate in terms of the forms and languages to permit understanding. 
27.	Do any of your clients disclose pension fund information in media other than the financial statements?  If so, do you audit/review it in any way and can you give an indication of its nature?
28.	Was much time spent at clients’ AGMs on FRS 17/IAS 19 matters?  If so, what issues were discussed?
29.	Have you had to, or do you intend to, implement any new procedures to deal with the new regulatory relationship between the pension fund regulator and the trustees?


Appendix 5(iv)
Interview Questions for Fund Managers
General:
1.	Can you explain the activities of your department and, more specifically, your role within these activities.
2.	Does your firm have a separate department that provides services to pension funds? If so, does it service all types of funds (for example in terms of size, maturity, no of members etc)?  

Increased Accountability (benefits and costs of FRS 17 and IAS 19):
3.	Have the new accounting standards (FRS 17 and IAS 19) affected the information that you provide to your pension fund clients?  If so, how?  Were there any problems and, if so, how were they overcome?
4.	Was additional training provided for the implementation of these new standards?
5.	Has there been communication with regulators/ standard setters/ investors etc about the new FRS17/IAS19 information and did you speak to any of these with your clients?
6.	Were your clients worried about the pension fund surplus/deficit having economic consequences such as affecting the share price, squeezing dividends, impeding takeover bids?
7.	Other than the above, have there been any other costs of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 information?  Have any of these costs had an effect on fees?
8.	What do you think have been the main benefits of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 for the various stakeholders?
9.	Do the new FRS 17/IAS 19 numbers/disclosures provide a better predictive ability for the various stakeholders than the SSAP 24 numbers/disclosures?
10.	In your opinion have these benefits outweighed the costs?

Governance:
11.	The Myners report (2001) and the Pensions Act 2004 made certain recommendations with regards to the governance of pension funds.  Since the publication of these documents, have you witnessed an improvement in the governance of pension schemes?  If so, in what areas and over what time periods?  Do the schemes which have demonstrated an improvement in their governance have particular characteristics (for example size, maturity)?
12.	Trustees/managers of occupational pension schemes are required to implement sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms.  The objective of these is to ensure that the scheme is administered and managed in accordance with (a) the scheme rules and (b) pensions and any other legislation.  Has the implementation of these controls effected how you deal with your clients?  If so how?
13.	Are the goals and processes in relation to your pension fund clients defined and certain?
14.	Do you have any influence on the investment strategy of the pension scheme?
15.	What is the performance assessment process between you and your clients?





The Nature of the Accountability:
16.	What is the reporting process between you and your clients?
17.	What information is contained within these reports?
18.	There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example.  Do you report to your clients to discharge accountability in the following areas:
	the proper use of funds in the manner authorised and that money has been spent as agreed between the principals and agents or in accordance with any other applicable regulation
	that adequate procedures are used, or that the processes followed by the agent are appropriate, or that adequate systems have been put in place to achieve the identified tasks
	whether the output meets the required standards 
	whether or not the output has achieved its objectives 
	ensure that those who pursue certain policies are accountable for them, as well as policies that they do not pursue, addressing whether or not the course of action taken by the agent was the best one available. 
19.	Does pension fund information, both in the financial statements of the scheme and the sponsoring employer:
	enhance users understanding of the performance of the fund, the trustees and the sponsoring employer; 
	are used in a particular way (by either members or shareholders of the sponsoring employer); 
	permit interaction between the scheme members and shareholders of the sponsoring employer and the agent trustees; 
	address the needs of all stakeholders (if not, which are neglected) 
	appear adequate in terms of the forms and languages to permit understanding. 


Appendix 5(v)
Interview Questions for Regulators
General:
1.	Can you explain the activities of your department and, more specifically, your role within these activities.
2.	Can you describe the nature of communication between your organization and pension funds (for example do you communicate with every pension fund, if not, how do you select those with whom you do communicate, how often does the communication take place, what is the substance of that communication).  

Governance of Pension Funds:
3.	Since being involved in this sector, have you witnessed an improvement in the governance of pension schemes?  If so, in what areas and over what time periods?  Do the schemes that have demonstrated an improvement in their governance have particular characteristics (for example size, maturity)?  Do you think any improvements are a direct result of recent regulatory instruments such as the Myners report (2001) and the Pensions Act 2004?
4.	Do you review Pension Funds to ensure compliance with your codes of practice and other legislative requirements such as the Myners Report or the Trust Deeds?  If so, how?
5.	 “The rigor of debate” has been identified as being the “linchpin of good governance”.  For that to happen, it is likely that trustees would participate in the decision-making process attend regular meetings and be prepared for them.  Do you believe that this process has improved in the last few years?
6.	Do many schemes display evidence that feedback from scheme members to trustees is followed up?
7.	Does a representative from your department attend any meetings internal to the pension fund?


The Nature of the Accountability:
8.	There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example.  Have you found any evidence to suggest that trustees discharge accountability in the following areas (and if so, in what media was it disclosed) :
	the proper use of funds in the manner authorised and that money has been spent as agreed between the principals (scheme members) and agents (trustees) or in accordance with any other applicable regulation
	that adequate procedures are used, or that the processes followed by the agent (trustees) are appropriate, or that adequate systems have been put in place to achieve the identified tasks
	whether the output (the management of the pension fund) meets the required standards (codes of practice)
	whether or not the output (the management of the pension fund) has achieved its objectives (settlement or likely settlement of the pension promise) 
	ensure that those who pursue certain policies are accountable for them, as well as policies that they do not pursue, addressing whether or not the course of action taken by the agent (the trustees) was the best one available. 
9.	If you are unable to recall any evidence to suggest that trustees discharge accountability in the above areas, do you believe that it should be disclosed and what would be the most appropriate media? 
10.	Do you believe that the pension fund information disclosed, both in the financial statements of the scheme and the sponsoring employer:
	enhances users understanding of the performance of the fund, the trustees and the sponsoring employer; 
	is used in a particular way (by either members or shareholders of the sponsoring employer); 
	permits interaction between the scheme members and shareholders of the sponsoring employer and the agent trustees; 
	addresses the needs of all stakeholders (if not, which are neglected) 
	appears adequate in terms of the forms and languages to permit understanding. 
11.	Do you believe that it is appropriate to disclose pension fund information in media other than the financial statements?  If so, should it be audited/reviewed?

Increased Accountability (benefits and costs of FRS 17 and IAS 19):
12.	Has there been much communication between you and Pension Funds about the new FRS17/IAS19 information?
13.	Do you know if there were any problems experienced when implementing FRS 17/ IAS 19 and how were they overcome?
14.	Do you know if Pension Funds/ sponsoring employers were worried about the pension fund surplus/deficit having economic consequences such as affecting the share price, squeezing dividends, impeding takeover bids?
15.	Other than the above, do you know if there have been any other costs of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 information?
16.	What do you think have been the main benefits of implementing FRS 17/IAS 19 for the various stakeholders?
17.	Do the new FRS 17/IAS 19 numbers/disclosures provide a better predictive ability for the various stakeholders than the SSAP 24 numbers/disclosures?
18.	In your opinion have these benefits outweighed the costs?


Appendix 5(vi)
Interview Questions for users
General :
1.	This interview has a dual perspective, the first from that of an investor who is interested in the pension fund surplus/deficit of an investee company, the second form that of a pensioner (or prospective pensioner) who reviews the financial statements of his/her pension fund.  Can you explain your involvement in both of these activities.


Governance Questions:
2.	Do you know the governance structure of your pension scheme?  Do you recall having read anything about it and, if so, in what media?  If not, do you believe such information to be necessary/useful and what would be the most appropriate media?
3.	Specifically, what information do you/ would you find useful (for example, do you think that detailed information should be made available (minutes of trustee meetings))? 
4.	The Pensionsor issues Codes of Best Practice, do you think it would be useful to know if these codes are complied with?  Examples include:
	Benchmarking their scheme against best practice in governance
	Developing a governance policy for their schemes, reflecting the specific characteristics of the scheme,
	Determining the skills and knowledge required to carry out their role effectively, P 
	Undertaking the assessment of the skills and knowledge of the trustees individually and collectively.  This should cover both technical skills, and analytical and decision making skills,
	Developing a learning and development programme to close any identified skills and knowledge gaps,
	Introducing objectives and performance assessment for trustees,
	Developing and implementing a performance measurement process for advisors and delegates
	Developing principles for recognising and addressing conflicts of interest
	Formalising and documenting changes to scheme governance
	Self-assessment by trustees of their own performance and that of the fund.


Pension Fund Accounting Questions:
5.	There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example.  Do you know if trustees discharge accountability in the following areas:
	the proper use of funds in the manner authorised and that money has been spent as agreed between the principals (scheme members) and agents (trustees) or in accordance with any other applicable regulation
	that adequate procedures are used, or that the processes followed by the agent (trustees) are appropriate, or that adequate systems have been put in place to achieve the identified tasks
	whether the output (the management of the pension fund) meets the required standards (codes of practice)
	whether or not the output (the management of the pension fund) has achieved its objectives (settlement or likely settlement of the pension promise) 
	ensure that those who pursue certain policies are accountable for them, as well as policies that they do not pursue, addressing whether or not the course of action taken by the agent (the trustees) was the best one available. 
6.	Does pension fund information, both in the financial statements of the scheme and the sponsoring employer:
	enhance users understanding of the performance of the fund, the trustees and the sponsoring employer; 
	are used in a particular way (by either members or shareholders of the sponsoring employer); 
	permit interaction between the scheme members and shareholders of the sponsoring employer and the agent trustees; 
	address the needs of all stakeholders (if not, which are neglected) 
	appear adequate in terms of the forms and languages to permit understanding. 
7.	Do you receive pension fund information in media other than the financial statements and do you find it more, or less, useful?
8.	The financial statements of the Pension Fund merely list assets of the Pension fund and do not attempt to quantify its liabilities – do you find this useful?   


Accountability Questions:
9.	The financial statements of the sponsoring employer bring the pension fund surplus/deficit onto its Balance Sheet – do you find this useful?   
10.	The annual disclosures in relation to the pension funds have changed/increased over the last 10 years – do you find these more useful?


Appendix 6
The Content Analysis Grid
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
Note: The content analysis grid re-produced here is not to scale; it would normally represent the size of a standard A4 sheet of paper before being used in the content analysis  


Appendix 7
Content Analysis Template/Record Sheet



Appendix 8
Content Analysis Decision Rules
The principal content analysis classification categories are taken from paragraph 120 of IAS 19 Employee Benefits prior to the December 2004 amendment​[266]​.  These disclosures relate to defined benefit plans only.

1.	The enterprise’s accounting policy for recognising actuarial gains and losses
2.	A general description of the type of plan.  This may also include the contributions made by the sponsoring employer, the dates of the last actuarial valuation or a description of how it was conducted. 
3.	A reconciliation of the assets and liabilities recognised in the balance sheet, showing at least:
	The present value at the balance sheet date of defined obligations that are wholly unfunded;
	The present value (before deducting the fair of plan assets) at the balance sheet date of defined benefit obligations that are wholly or partly funded;
	The fair value of any plan assets at the balance sheet date;
	The net actuarial gains or losses not recognised in the balance sheet;
	The past service cost not yet recognised in the balance sheet;
	Any amount not recognised as an asset, because of the limit in paragraph 58(b);
	The fair value at the balance sheet date of any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A (with a brief description of the link between the reimbursement right and the related obligation; and
	The other amounts recognised in the balance sheet.
4.	the amounts included in the fair value of the plan assets for:
	each category of the reporting enterprise’s own financial instruments; and
	any property occupied by, or other assets used by, the reporting enterprise
5.	a reconciliation showing the movements during the period in the net liability (or asset) recognised in the balance sheet.
6.	The total expense recognised in the income statement for each of the following, and the line item(s) of the income statement in which they are included:
	Current service cost
	Interest cost
	Expected return on plan assets
	Expected return on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A
	Actuarial gains and losses
	Past service cost
	The effect of any curtailment or settlement
7.	the actual return on plan assets, as well the actual return on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A
8.	the principal actuarial assumptions used as at the balance sheet date, including, where applicable:
	the discount rates
	the expected rates of return on any plan assets for the periods presented in the financial statements
	the expected rates of return for the periods presented in the financial statements on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset under paragraph 104A
	the expected rates of salary increases (and of changes in an index or other variable specified in the formal or constructive terms of a plan as the basis for future benefit increases)
	medical cost trend increases
	any other material actuarial assumptions used

Some companies disclosed SSAP 24 information under an explicit heading.  Where this is the case, that information has been categorised separately (item 9 in Appendix 7).  Alternatively, other companies have disclosed SSAP 24 information though not under an explicit heading. Where it has been possible to categorise that information according to the above rules, then that has been done.  Where the information is obviously a SSAP 24 disclosure but is not explicitly identified as such, it has been allocated to item 9 in Appendix 7.

Companies are required to disclose information relating to the provision of directors’ pensions.  This information is often disclosed in either the directors’ report, the remuneration report or the staff costs note to the accounts and is categorised separately (item 10 in Appendix 7).
 
Often companies will provide their employees with benefits other than a pension, for example healthcare.  Any of the above information that is disclosed for the provision of benefits other than pensions is categorised separately (items 11-18 in Appendix 7).

Often, companies produced one table relating to several of the above items, for example the expected return which is included in item 6 in Appendix 7 (see also item 6 above) and the actual return on investments (item 7 in Appendix 7).  Where this is the case, the paragraph is allocated to the relevant items on a pro-rata basis.



Appendix 9

An Analysis of the Location of UK Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures and How These Disclosures are Made in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer

A9.1	Introduction
Chapter 6 reported the results of a content analysis performed on the financial statements of a sample of 36 FTSE 100 sponsoring employers of a UK pension scheme between 2000 and 2005.  This Appendix uses the same data to examine: (a) where in the financial statements these disclosures are made (location), and (b) how they have been presented (format).  For comparative purposes, the tables and figures in this Appendix have been numbered in accordance with the equivalent tables and figures in Chapter 6 and have been appended with either (a) or (b) respectively.

A9.2	An Analysis of the Location of UK Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
A9.2.1	An Analysis of the Location of the Disclosures Across the Years 
Many of the examples provided in Chapter 6 referred to the fact that the post-retirement benefit disclosures of different companies are reported in different locations in the financial statements.  Tables A9.2 (a) and A9.3(a) report the mean and median amount of post-retirement benefit disclosures according to where the information is reported in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer.  A test of the null hypothesis that the reported mean and median disclosures are equal for each location across the six different years is also provided; the F-test and its associated p-value are included in the final two columns of Table A9.2(a), while the H-test and its p-value are reported in the final two columns of Table A9.3(a).  These tables identify four possible locations: (i) the narrative section of the annual report (this will usually comprise of the first section of the annual report and will include reports such as The Financial Review, the Chairman’s Statement and the Directors’ report); (ii) the financial statements themselves (including the Income Statement, the Statement of Financial Position and the Cashflow Statement); (ii) the accounting policies note (usually the first note to the accounting statements); and finally (iv) the remaining notes to the financial statements (excluding the accounting policies note).     
    
An analysis of Tables A9.2(a) and A9.3(a) produce a number of interesting observations.  First, in Table A9.2(a), the disclosures in three of the possible four locations experienced a significant increase between 2000 and 2005 (two at the 5% level and one at the 10% level); the narrative section of the annual report has an F-statistic of 7.98 and a p-value of 0.00, the financial statements themselves have an F-statistic of 2.16 and a p-value of 0.060 and finally the notes to the accounts (other that the accounting policy note) have an F-statistic of 10.87 and a p-value of 0.000.  In all three cases the null hypothesis that the mean number of pages in these locations are equal across the years can be rejected.  This result is perhaps not surprising given that the overall level of disclosure has increased (see Table 6.2 and 6.3) but it is interesting to note where in the financial statements these increases have been reported.  It would appear that companies used the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) and the narrative section of the annual report to explain the post-retirement benefits that they provided for their employees.  



Table A9.2 (a) An Analysis of the Mean Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHERE: Absolute	MEAN2000	MEAN2001	MEAN2002	MEAN2003	MEAN2004	MEAN2005	F test	P value
Narrative	0.095	0.097	0.251	0.304	0.377	0.440	7.98**	0.000
Financial Statements	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.027	0.027	0.028	2.16*	0.060
Accounting Policy Note	0.139	0.145	0.189	0.260	0.271	0.293	1.65	0.149
Other Notes	1.395	2.130	3.254	4.307	4.319	4.531	10.87**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).



Table A9.3 (a) An Analysis of the Median Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHERE: Absolute	MEDIAN2000	MEDIAN2001	MEDIAN2002	MEDIAN2003	MEDIAN2004	MEDIAN2005	H test	P value
Narrative	0.000	0.040	0.165	0.285	0.280	0.330	37.93**	0.000
Financial Statements	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.51*	0.062
Accounting Policy Note	0.100	0.130	0.145	0.180	0.145	0.225	23.74**	0.000
Other Notes	0.990	1.890	2.825	3.500	3.285	3.780	53.41**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).



The notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) increased steadily from 1.395 pages in 2000 to 4.531 pages in 2005 whereas the narrative section of the financial statements experienced a less dramatic increase from an average one tenth of a page in 2000 to nearly half a page in 2005​[267]​.  Although the financial statements also experienced an increase in use, it was only significant at the 10% level and Table A9.2(a) reports that the levels of disclosure in both 2000 and 2005 were relatively small in comparison to the other possible locations (0.003 pages in 2000 increasing to 0.028 pages in 2005).

Second, Table A9.2(a) shows that the notes to the financial statements (other that the accounting policy note) were the most popular place to make the post-retirement benefit disclosures in all six years.  In 2000 and 2001, the accounting policy note was the second most popular location in the financial statements to make post-retirement benefit disclosures, but from 2002 onwards, many companies started to use the narrative section of the financial statements, for example the financial review or the Chairman’s statement, to explain their treatment of the post-retirement benefits.  On further investigation, many of these disclosures made in the narrative section related to the transitional arrangements of FRS 17 or the implementation of IAS 19​[268]​.

Finally, the median results reported in Table A9.3(a) are even more impressive than the analysis of the mean disclosures in Table A9.2(a); in Table A9.3(a) all four locations experienced significant increases in the quantity of material relating to post-retirement benefits published between 2000 and 2005 and, with the exception of the financial statements, all were significant at the 5% level.  As with the mean results in Table A9.2(a), the majority of the median disclosure was made in the notes to the financial statements (other that the accounting policy note); the disclosure made in that location increased steadily from 0.990 pages in 2000 to 3.780 pages in 2005.  

Thus, this analysis demonstrates that most companies used the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policies note) and the narrative section of the annual report to disclose the increased disclosures relating to their post-retirement benefits; the mean and median disclosure increased significantly for these two locations in the time period under review and the mean and median disclosures for all other locations remained relatively small.  Further analysis in the next section seeks to establish when these increases occurred.

A9.2.2	An Analysis of the Year-on-year Changes in the Location of Disclosures 

Tables A9.4(a) and A9.5(a), report the mean and median year-on-year changes in disclosure location from 2000-2005.  For comparative purposes, the first column of these tables uses the same four possible locations in the financial statements as Tables A9.2(a) and A9.3(a): (i) the narrative section; (ii) the financial statements; (ii) the accounting policies note; and (iv) the remaining notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note).    



Table A9.4(a) A Year-on-year Comparison of the Mean Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer

Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).

WHERE: Absolute	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue
Narrative	-0.001	0.192	0.965	0.160	0.241	0.000**	0.053	0.279	0.260	0.072	0.316	0.179	0.063	0.347	0.283
Financial Statements	0.003	0.015	0.324	0.000	0.010	0.865	0.021	0.066	0.066*	0.000	0.016	1.000	0.001	0.041	0.841
Accounting Policy Note	0.009	0.164	0.758	0.041	0.119	0.047**	0.074	0.476	0.356	0.011	0.127	0.595	0.022	0.611	0.831
Other Notes	0.745	0.820	0.000**	1.171	0.921	0.000**	1.053	1.603	0.000**	0.013	1.114	0.947	0.212	1.253	0.317



Table A9.5(a) A Year-on-year Comparison of the Median Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHERE: Absolute	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue
Narrative	0.005	119.5	0.145	0.135	316.0**	0.000	0.055	299.5*	0.078	0.015	285.0	0.474	0.030	272.0	0.422
Financial Statements	0.000	1.0	1.000	0.000	3.0	1.000	0.000	27.0*	0.035	0.000	14.5	1.000	0.000	53.0	0.625
Accounting Policy Note	0.020	379.5	0.164	0.013	299.0	0.175	0.005	252.0	0.696	-0.005	218.5	0.781	0.068	396.0**	0.040
Other Notes	0.780	568.0**	0.000	1.110	623.0**	0.000	0.818	584.0**	0.000	-0.010	253.5	0.852	0.088	333.5	0.544
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).



The next 15 columns provide information for 2001 compared to 2000 (2001/00), 2002/01, 2003/02, 2004/03 and 2005/04; specifically, the mean (median) difference for each location, the standard deviation around this mean difference (the W-test statistic) and the p-value associated with a one-sample test of the null hypothesis that this mean (median) difference is statistically significant.

One of the main observations to be made from Table A9.4 (a) is that the changes in the disclosures made in the different locations of the financial statements do not appear to have a consistent pattern.  For example, the narrative section of the financial statements and the accounting policy disclosures experience a significant increase between 2001 and 2002 only, whereas the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) experience a statistically significant increase from 2001 to 2003; they increase by 0.745, 1.171 and 1.053 pages for each of these years respectively​[269]​.  

The results reported in Table A9.5(a) support those of Table A94(a)​[270]​, 6.4 and 6.5 suggesting that the increases in post-retirement disclosure took place prior to 2003 and suggest that the majority of these occurred in the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note).


Figure A9.3(a) Mean Pages of the Disclosure Location Analysed by Year

Figure A9.4(a) Mean Pages of the Disclosure Location Analysed by Sector 
Note: The various sectors are represented as follows: 1. The Financial sector; 2. Extractive Industries; 3. Consumer Goods; 4. Consumer Services; and 5. Industrials and Utilities.


Figure A9.3(a) illustrates that the disclosures made in the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) follow a different pattern of increase in disclosure than any of the other three possible locations in the financial statements.  First, they have a higher level of disclosure in both 2000 (1.395 pages) and 2005 (4.531 pages) than any other location and second, they experience a steeper incline between 2000 and 2003 than any other of the possible locations.  These findings confirm the results in both Tables A9.2(a) and Section 6.3.3 respectively.

Figure A9.4(a) demonstrates that the level of post-retirement benefit disclosure made in the notes to the accounts (other than the accounting policy note) is dependent upon the sector in which the company trades; the pattern for the disclosure made in all of the other potential locations is very similar and yet different to that of the notes to the accounts (other than the accounting policy note).  This latter pattern is very similar to that of other GAAP disclosures (mainly US) shown in Figure 6.2; in both diagrams the disclosure is highest in sector 3 (Consumer Goods), lowest in sector 4 (Consumer Services) and somewhere in between for sectors 1 (The Financial Sector), 2 (Extractive Industries) and 5 (Industrials and Utilities).  On further investigation, it was found that post-retirement benefit disclosures required under other GAAP (mainly US) were mainly reported in the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) and thus both Figures A9.4 and A9.4(a) support these findings.  



A9.3	An Analysis of How the UK Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures are made in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer

A9.3.1	An Analysis of the Disclosure Method made Across the Years 
Having considered the type of post-retirement benefit disclosures (Chapter 6) and their location in the financial statements (Section A9.2 above), it is also useful to consider the method, or format, of disclosure that companies used.  Tables A9.2(b) and A9.3(b) follow the same layout as 6.2 and 6.3 (and the equivalent Tables A9.2(a) and A9.3(a)) and report the mean and median amount of post-retirement benefit disclosures according to how they were disclosed in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer for each of the six years​[271]​.  These tables identify three possible methods of disclosing post-retirement benefit information: (i) narrative; (ii) monetary; and finally (iii) quantitative (see Chapter 4).

An analysis of Table A9.2(b) shows that all three methods of disclosure have F-statistics greater than the critical value and associated p-values of 0.000.  In each case, this allows the null hypothesis that companies are using the same levels of disclosure method across all six years to be rejected.  As with Section A9.2.1, this result is perhaps not surprising given that the overall level of disclosure has increased (see Tables 6.2, 6.3, A10.2(a) and A10.3(a)) but it is interesting to note the formats in which the sample companies chose to make these increased disclosures.  

Table A9.2 (b) An Analysis of the Mean Method of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosure made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer 
HOW: Absolute	MEAN2000	MEAN2001	MEAN2002	MEAN2003	MEAN2004	MEAN2005	F test	P value
Narrative	0.636	0.788	0.998	1.266	1.318	1.565	7.53**	0.000
Monetary	0.798	1.190	2.130	2.813	2.792	2.923	13.82**	0.000
Quantitative	0.198	0.399	0.569	0.819	0.884	0.804	10.91**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A9.3 (b) An Analysis of the Median Method of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosure made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer 
HOW: Absolute	MEDIAN2000	MEDIAN2001	MEDIAN2002	MEDIAN2003	MEDIAN2004	MEDIAN2005	H test	P value
Narrative	0.470	0.640	0.870	1.035	1.075	1.185	38.40**	0.000
Monetary	0.430	0.950	1.825	2.250	2.205	2.500	65.79**	0.000
Quantitative	0.160	0.390	0.485	0.640	0.655	0.670	57.46**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).



Table A9.4 (b) A Year-on-year Comparison of the Mean Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
HOW: Absolute	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue
Narrative	0.143	0.289	0.006**	0.230	0.335	0.000**	0.268	0.518	0.004**	0.053	0.569	0.579	0.247	0.690	0.039**
Monetary	0.408	0.491	0.000**	0.962	0.693	0.000**	0.684	0.851	0.000**	-0.021	0.600	0.832	0.131	0.858	0.365
Quantitative	0.204	0.213	0.000**	0.181	0.322	0.002**	0.250	0.380	0.000**	0.064	0.359	0.289	-0.079	0.311	0.135
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).

Table A9.5 (b) A Year-on-year Comparison of the Median Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
HOW: Absolute	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue
Narrative	0.155	485.5	0.005**	0.208	540.0	0.000**	0.210	495.0	0.003**	0.015	334.5	0.756	0.175	447.0	0.031**
Monetary	0.395	556.0	0.000**	0.935	619.0	0.000**	0.523	638.0	0.000**	-0.010	304.5	0.870	0.080	348.0	0.393
Quantitative	0.195	489.5	0.000**	0.150	513.0	0.000**	0.195	545.5	0.000**	0.025	286.5	0.456	-0.035	196.5	0.210
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).



For each year in Table A9.2(b), the monetary format was the most popular method of disclosing post-retirement benefit information; it increased from 0.798 of a page in the 2000 annual reports to 2.923 pages in 2005.  Thereafter, the second most popular format was the narrative method which used 0.636 of a page in 2000; this had increased to 1.565 pages by 2005.  Finally, the quantitative method was the least popular method of disclosing post-retirement benefit information increased from 0.198 pages (2000) to 0.804 pages in 2005​[272]​.  

These preferences for disclosure formats are also confirmed by the median results which are reported in Table A9.3(b); with the exception of 2000​[273]​, companies chose to disclose most of their post-retirement benefit information in a monetary format, followed thereafter by a narrative format and then quantitative method​[274]​.  The following section replicates the analysis in Section 7.3.3 and A9.2.2 and investigates when these increases in disclosure occurred.

A9.3.2	An Analysis of the Year-on-year Changes in the Disclosure Method
Tables A9.4(b) and A9.5(b) follow the same layout as 7.4 and 7.5 (and the equivalent Tables A9.4(a) and A9.5(a) and report the mean and median year-on-year changes in disclosure location from 2000-2005.  For comparative purposes, the first column of these tables uses the same four possible locations in the financial statements as Tables A9.2(b) and A9.3(b): (i) narrative; (ii) monetary; and finally (iii) quantitative.   

Table A9.4(b) shows that the majority of these increases took place before 2003; of the ten significant p-values that are reported in Table A9.4(b), nine of them occur in the first nine columns.  Likewise Table A9.5(b), which considers the median results for the same sample, reports identical results.  Thus, Tables A9.4(b) and A9.5(b) confirm the results of all previous equivalent tables in Chapter 6 and this Appendix that all of the increases in disclosure took place prior to 2003.

Figure A9.3(b) demonstrates that, in accordance with Table A9.2(b), the monetary method of disclosure ranks top in all six years followed by the narrative method and then the quantitative method.  Although, all three methods individually account for less than one page of the post-retirement benefit information in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer in 2000, the monetary method has increased to nearly three pages by 2005, whereas the narrative and the quantitative methods have experienced less dramatic, but similar increases.  A comparison of Figure A9.3(a) and A9.3(b) shows that the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) and the monetary method of disclosure follow a similar pattern of disclosure over all six years.  This suggests that companies used these financial statement notes to disclose monetary information relating to the post-retirement benefits that they provided for their employees.  On further investigation, much of this information was presented in tabular format (see examples provided in Appendix 11) which would require an element of interpretation by the user.




Figure A9.3(b) Mean Pages of the Disclosure Method Analysed by Year

Figure A9.4(b) Mean Pages of the Disclosure Method Analysed by Sector




Note: The various sectors are represented as follows: 1. The Financial sector; 2. Extractive Industries; 3. Consumer Goods; 4. Consumer Services; and 5. Industrials and Utilities.


 Figure A9.4(b) provides a more detailed analysis of the information provided in Figure 7.2 and shows how the use of the different disclosure methods vary according to the sector in which the sponsoring employer operates.  It’s not surprising then that the sectoral patterns in Figure A9.4(b) are very similar to that provided in Figure 7.2, however, it can be seen that the Consumer Goods sector makes more use of the monetary method of disclosure followed by the Industrials and Utilities sector.  The Consumer Services sector makes the least use of the monetary method of disclosing post-retirement benefit information, however this sector continues to follow the same pattern of all other sectors by preferring this method of disclosing post-retirement benefit information in comparison to the narrative and quantitative methods respectively.  A comparison of Figure A9.4(a) and  A9.4(b) reveals that the notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note) have a similar sectoral pattern of post-retirement benefit disclosure to the monetary method of disclosure.  This suggests that the different sectors are using the same location to disclose post-retirement benefit information in the same way.  

A9.4	Summary, Discussion and Conclusion
This Appendix, which has investigated (a) where in the financial statements post-retirement benefit disclosures are made, and (b) how they have been presented, complements the analysis in Chapter 6 which analysed the different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures.  Four possible locations in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer were used: (i) the narrative section; (ii) the financial statements; (ii) the accounting policies note; and (iv) the remaining notes to the financial statements (other than the accounting policy note).  It also used three possible methods of making these post-retirement benefit disclosures: (i) narrative; (ii) monetary; and finally (iii) quantitative.  Given the overall increase in the levels of post-retirement benefit disclosures reported in Chapter 6, it was expected that the results in Tables A9.2(a) (and A9.2(b)) would allow the null hypothesis that companies are using the same levels of disclosure location (and method) across all six years to be rejected.  Indeed this was the case.  The reported findings in Tables A9.4(a) and A9.4(b) are also con-currant with those reported in Table 6.4 that most of these increases took place prior to 2003.  


Appendix 10
The Content Analysis Based on the % of the Annual Report

Chapter 6 and Appendix 9 reported the results of a content analysis performed on the financial statements of a sample of 36 FTSE 100 sponsoring employers between 2000 and 2005.  This analysis was based on the absolute amount of disclosure (in pages) of post-retirement benefit information, however, during that time period many companies experienced an increase in the size of their annual report and accounts due to the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards.  Therefore, to examine the relative change in the post-retirement benefit disclosures, the number of pages of these disclosures was expressed as a percentage of the total number of pages in the annual report of the UK sponsoring employers and the results are reported in this Appendix.  For comparative purposes, the tables and figures in this Appendix have been numbered in accordance with the equivalent tables and figures in Chapter 6 and their results are discussed in the footnotes of Chapter 6 and Appendix 9.  As Appendix 9 refers to: (a) the location of the disclosures; and (b) their format, the relevant tables in this Appendix have been appended with an (a) or (b) accordingly.



Table A10.2 An Analysis of the Mean % Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Financial  Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHAT: % of annual report	MEAN2000	MEAN2001	MEAN2002	MEAN2003	MEAN2004	MEAN2005	F test	P value
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	1.622	2.272	3.441	3.909	3.744	3.412	16.19**	0.000
Panel B: Pension Fund Disclosures
Accounting Policy	0.211	0.300	0.427	0.363	0.378	0.342	4.02**	0.002
Plan Description	0.262	0.300	0.414	0.441	0.399	0.398	3.08**	0.011
GrossAsset/LiabilityReconciliation	0.151	0.457	0.635	0.693	0.626	0.490	13.05**	0.000
Own Assets	0.014	0.010	0.010	0.008	0.008	0.016	0.15	0.979
Net Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.040	0.043	0.145	0.157	0.157	0.166	11.55**	0.000
Expense	0.153	0.228	0.674	0.878	0.873	0.728	24.50**	0.000
Actual Return	0.000	0.012	0.123	0.190	0.218	0.204	23.16**	0.000
Assumptions	0.133	0.248	0.299	0.316	0.298	0.312	6.62**	0.000
SSAP 24	0.107	0.067	0.060	0.050	0.033	0.018	2.01*	0.078
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
Accounting Policy	0.023	0.017	0.028	0.021	0.019	0.007	0.73	0.599
Plan Description	0.049	0.035	0.039	0.042	0.031	0.021	0.92	0.468
Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.020	0.051	0.077	0.075	0.069	0.028	1.57	0.170
Own Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.99	0.422
Reconciliation	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.020	0.020	0.016	0.20	0.964
Expense	0.014	0.019	0.047	0.057	0.054	0.031	0.99	0.426
Actual Return	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.010	0.012	0.003	1.61	0.159
Assumptions	0.014	0.030	0.031	0.027	0.031	0.017	0.55	0.736
SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	n/a	n/a
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
Other GAAP (mainly US)	0.356	0.382	0.352	0.511	0.388	0.377	0.23	0.949
IFRS	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.064	0.122	10.26**	0.000
DC	0.021	0.020	0.022	0.019	0.017	0.024	0.09	0.994
Governance and Risk	0.033	0.036	0.025	0.028	0.029	0.050	0.49	0.784
Trustee	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.003	0.012	0.008	0.36	0.875
% Split of  Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.032	5.65**	0.000
Table A10.3 An Analysis of the Median % Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employers
WHAT: % of annual report	MEDIAN2000	MEDIAN2001	MEDIAN2002	MEDIAN2003	MEDIAN2004	MEDIAN2005	H test	P value
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	1.515	2.203	3.729	3.994	3.875	3.148	66.61**	0.000
Panel B: Pension Fund Disclosures
Accounting Policy	0.146	0.281	0.393	0.346	0.349	0.304	27.08**	0.000
Plan Description	0.252	0.291	0.341	0.363	0.344	0.331	13.39**	0.000
GrossAsset/LiabilityReconciliation	0.125	0.378	0.630	0.649	0.682	0.426	58.12**	0.000
Own Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.92	0.712
Net Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.000	0.000	0.124	0.129	0.151	0.151	61.55**	0.000
Expense	0.092	0.174	0.630	0.833	0.862	0.689	98.27**	0.000
Actual Return	0.000	0.000	0.117	0.181	0.198	0.153	112.8**	0.000
Assumptions	0.103	0.206	0.272	0.301	0.283	0.260	38.93**	0.000
SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	12.66**	0.027
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
Accounting Policy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.71	0.887
Plan Description	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.44	0.786
Asset/Liability Reconciliation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.23	0.517
Own Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.97	0.419
Reconciliation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.89	0.565
Expense	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.87	0.431
Actual Return	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.23	0.144
Assumptions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.56	0.767
SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
Other GAAP (mainly US)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.89	0.864
IFRS	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.043	66.3**	0.000
DC	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.70	0.746
Governance and Risk	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.18	0.394
Trustee	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.59	0.902
% Split of  Assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	30.12**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).

Table A10.4  Year-on-year Comparison of the % Mean Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer 
WHAT: % of annual report	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	0.695	0.770	0.000**	1.198	0.872	0.000**	0.469	0.977	0.007**	-0.165	0.710	0.172	-0.333	0.809	0.019**
Panel B: Pension Fund Disclosures
1. Acc pol	0.085	0.216	0.026**	0.138	0.281	0.006**	-0.064	0.248	0.132	0.015	0.231	0.700	-0.036	0.235	0.363
2. Plan desc	0.038	0.137	0.112	0.122	0.263	0.010*	0.027	0.300	0.592	-0.042	0.226	0.278	-0.002	0.201	0.964
3. Ass/liab recon	0.317	0.342	0.000**	0.181	0.386	0.009*	0.058	0.271	0.208	-0.067	0.265	0.140	-0.136	0.217	0.001**
4. Own assets	-0.004	0.038	0.501	0.000	0.012	0.872	-0.002	0.007	0.183	0.000	0.002	0.453	0.009	0.071	0.474
5. Recon	0.013	0.045	0.107	0.098	0.120	0.000**	0.012	0.099	0.492	0.000	0.082	0.980	0.009	0.106	0.605
6. Expns	0.097	0.233	0.019	0.454	0.310	0.000**	0.204	0.366	0.002**	-0.005	0.249	0.914	-0.146	0.304	0.007**
7. Actual return	0.012	0.064	0.279	0.115	0.096	0.000**	0.067	0.091	0.000**	0.028	0.130	0.199	-0.014	0.125	0.517
8. Assum	0.129	0.161	0.000**	0.040	0.167	0.167	0.018	0.126	0.403	-0.019	0.129	0.396	0.015	0.165	0.599
9. SSAP 24	-0.044	0.204	0.215	-0.004	0.096	0.787	-0.011	0.071	0.369	-0.017	0.069	0.148	-0.014	0.095	0.369
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
11. Acc pol	-0.003	0.042	0.666	0.010	0.039	0.131	-0.007	0.054	0.443	-0.002	0.011	0.325	-0.012	0.044	0.097*
12. Plan desc	-0.012	0.076	0.339	0.004	0.061	0.717	0.003	0.036	0.656	-0.011	0.040	0.101	-0.010	0.038	0.110
13. Ass/liab recon	0.031	0.106	0.095*	0.028	0.127	0.195	-0.002	0.066	0.830	-0.006	0.054	0.511	-0.041	0.098	0.016**
14. Own assets	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.001	0.004	0.324
15. Recon	-0.001	0.011	0.722	0.002	0.035	0.756	0.007	0.023	0.079*	0.000	0.008	0.903	-0.004	0.068	0.718
16. Expns	0.005	0.023	0.250	0.030	0.099	0.084*	0.009	0.039	0.157	-0.003	0.021	0.409	-0.023	0.141	0.343
17. Actual return	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.011	0.037	0.087*	0.000	0.011	0.887	0.001	0.006	0.147	-0.009	0.036	0.131
18. Assum	0.016	0.060	0.116	0.002	0.041	0.816	-0.004	0.029	0.386	0.004	0.018	0.193	-0.013	0.068	0.250
19. SSAP 24	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
US	0.016	0.178	0.605	-0.019	0.231	0.623	0.159	0.415	0.028**	-0.123	0.351	0.042**	-0.010	0.296	0.834
IFRS	0.002	0.010	0.324	0.000	0.003	0.324	0.000	0.002	0.324	0.063	0.166	0.030**	0.057	0.202	0.097*
DC	-0.001	0.031	0.842	0.003	0.029	0.562	-0.004	0.042	0.579	-0.002	0.013	0.438	0.008	0.037	0.233
Gov & Risk	0.002	0.042	0.834	-0.012	0.063	0.272	0.003	0.031	0.523	0.001	0.034	0.849	0.021	0.048	0.013**
Trustee	0.000	0.031	0.976	-0.002	0.015	0.421	-0.004	0.016	0.171	0.009	0.036	0.161	-0.004	0.013	0.081*
% Split of Assets	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.000	0.000	n/a	0.009	0.035	0.131	0.023	0.054	0.014**
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A10.5Year-on-year Comparison of the % Mean Type of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer 
WHAT: % of annual report	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue
Panel A: Total Disclosures
Total	0.691	566**	0.000	1.161	620**	0.000	0.411	535**	0.002	-0.203	213*	0.060	-0.249	191*	0.043
Panel B: Pension Fund Disclosure
1. Acc pol	0.082	528**	0.001	0.080	441**	0.040	-0.047	244	0.164	-0.001	308	0.915	-0.025	258	0.355
2. Plan desc	0.042	399*	0.084	0.078	451**	0.009	0.034	379	0.298	-0.012	287	0.652	-0.001	295	0.973
3. Ass/liab recon	0.297	496**	0.000	0.183	466**	0.004	0.043	400	0.166	-0.030	209	0.132	-0.140	103**	0.001
4. Own assets	0.000	5	1.000	0.000	6	0.855	0.000	0	0.181	0.000	3	1.000	0.000	22	0.205
5. Recon	0.000	73	0.209	0.077	340**	0.000	0.010	314	0.355	0.002	319	0.720	0.002	277	0.815
6. Expns	0.060	488**	0.001	0.453	622**	0.000	0.168	516**	0.004	-0.018	305	0.666	-0.146	129**	0.002
7. Actual return	0.000	3	0.371	0.109	300**	0.000	0.059	516**	0.000	0.010	325	0.432	-0.023	189	0.164
8. Assum	0.122	503**	0.000	0.039	363	0.143	0.007	322	0.682	-0.009	263	0.561	0.005	293	0.830
9. SSAP 24	0.000	51	0.394	0.000	63	0.538	0.000	48	0.514	0.000	36	0.315	0.000	16	0.262
Panel C: Other Post-Retirement Benefit Disclosures
11. Acc pol	0.000	12	0.441	0.000	29	0.141	0.000	20	0.476	0.000	15	0.726	0.000	9	0.234
12. Plan desc	0.000	73	0.887	0.000	77	1.000	0.000	92	0.794	0.000	43	0.118	-0.003	45	0.142
13. Ass/liab recon	0.000	59	0.126	0.000	68	0.346	0.000	51	0.727	0.000	47	0.944	-0.009	5**	0.005
14. Own assets	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	1	1.000
15. Recon	0.000	3	1.000	0.000	9	0.787	0.000	25*	0.076	0.000	14	1.000	0.000	18	0.636
16. Expns	0.000	26	0.294	0.000	37*	0.097	0.000	58	0.147	0.000	30	0.505	0.000	34	0.442
17. Actual return	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	10	1.000	0.000	5	1.000	0.000	10*	0.100	0.000	2	0.178
18. Assum	0.000	47*	0.053	0.000	25	0.505	0.000	21	0.170	0.000	46	0.266	0.000	19	0.230
19. SSAP 24	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a
Panel D: Other Disclosures Not Required by IAS 19
US	0.000	48	0.505	0.000	48	0.889	0.003	103**	0.016	0.000	15**	0.020	0.000	29	0.756
IFRS	0.000	1	1.000	0.000	0	1.000	0.000	1	1.000	0.000	55**	0.006	0.023	137*	0.095
DC	0.000	10	0.944	0.000	22	0.624	0.000	35	0.476	0.000	16	0.477	0.000	60	0.328
Gov & Risk	0.000	29	0.919	0.000	36	0.845	0.000	64	0.490	0.000	58	0.932	0.000	100**	0.025
Trustee	0.000	10	0.590	0.000	6	0.402	0.000	7	0.272	0.000	25*	0.076	0.000	1*	0.059
% Split of Assets	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	n/a	n/a	0.000	6	0.181	0.000	35**	0.021
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A10.6 General Linear Model
Variable	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Ratio	P Value
Panel A: % Disclosure
Corrected Model	30	215.07	7.17	4.16	0.00
Intercept	1	1352.24	1352.24	784.17	0.00
Size	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.96
Year	5	127.04	25.41	14.73	0.00
Sector	4	55.25	13.81	8.01	0.00
Year by Sector	20	11.04	0.55	0.32	0.99
Error	184	317.29	1.72		
Total	215	2559.23			
Panel B: % Disclosure Type
Corrected Model	720	221.93	0.308	7.40	0.00
Intercept	1	56.34	56.34	1,351.46	0.00
Size	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.95
Year	5	5.29	1.06	25.39	0.00
Sector	4	2.30	0.58	13.80	0.00
Disclosure type	23	154.97	6.74	161.62	0.00
Year by Sector	20	0.46	0.02	0.55	0.95
Year by Disclosure type	115	24.31	0.21	5.07	0.00
Sector by Disclosure type	92	21.08	0.23	5.50	0.00
Year by Sector by Disclosure type	460	8.31	0.2	0.43	1.00
Error	4439	185.06	0.04		
Total	5160	491.45			
Note: this table details the analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of the % of pages of the annual report of 36 UK companies devoted to post-retirement benefit disclosure over a six year time period from 2000 to 2005.  The P value denotes the significance of the F-ratio. 




 Figure A10.3: % Pages of the Disclosure Type Analysed by Year


Note: The different types of post-retirement benefit disclosures are described in detail in Section 6.3.1 and are based on the 24 classifications reported in Tables 6.2 to 6.5. 
















Figure A10.4: % Pages of the Disclosure Type Analysed by Sector




Table A10.2(a) An Analysis of the Mean %  Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHERE: % of annual report	MEAN2000	MEAN2001	MEAN2002	MEAN2003	MEAN2004	MEAN2005	F test	P value
Narrative	0.096	0.098	0.260	0.249	0.276	0.289	4.62**	0.001
Financial Statements	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.025	0.023	0.022	1.69	0.139
Accounting Policy Note	0.166	0.153	0.190	0.268	0.268	0.221	0.62	0.684
Other Notes	1.357	2.016	2.986	3.367	3.177	2.880	13.10**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A10.3(a) An Analysis of the Median % Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHERE: % of annual report	MEDIAN2000	MEDIAN2001	MEDIAN2002	MEDIAN2003	MEDIAN2004	MEDIAN2005	H test	P value
Narrative	0.000	0.038	0.160	0.172	0.197	0.263	30.95**	0.000
Financial Statements	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.23*	0.070
Accounting Policy Note	0.115	0.137	0.138	0.147	0.126	0.146	4.18	0.524
Other Notes	1.169	1.904	3.172	3.685	3.406	2.679	55.79**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).

Table A10.4 (a) A Year-on-year Comparison of the Mean % Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHERE: % of annual report	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue
Narrative	-0.001	0.188	0.974	0.167	0.276	0.001**	-0.011	0.297	0.819	0.028	0.239	0.496	0.012	0.278	0.793
Financial Statements	0.003	0.015	0.269	0.000	0.011	0.887	0.021	0.076	0.105	-0.002	0.012	0.266	-0.001	0.042	0.887
Accounting Policy Note	-0.005	0.214	0.881	0.034	0.140	0.161	0.079	0.629	0.459	0.000	0.094	0.997	-0.047	0.648	0.663
Other Notes	0.699	0.739	0.000**	0.997	0.787	0.000**	0.380	1.113	0.048*	-0.190	0.606	0.068*	-0.297	0.927	0.063*
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A10.5 (a) A Year-on-year Comparison of the Median %  Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
WHERE: % of annual report	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue
Narrative	0.000	149.0	0.251	0.111	337.0**	0.000	0.010	240.0	0.634	-0.001	247.0	0.992	0.006	268.0	0.702
Financial Statements	0.000	10.0	0.100	0.000	7.0	1.000	0.000	33.0**	0.042	0.000	8.0	0.353	0.000	54.0	0.950
Accounting Policy Note	0.014	389.0	0.229	0.000	314.0	0.993	-0.011	259.0	0.248	-0.004	309.0	0.712	0.017	380.0	0.291
Other Notes	0.722	564.0**	0.000	0.966	610.0**	0.000	0.443	518.0**	0.004	-0.197	190.0**	0.041	-0.278	138.0**	0.004
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).

Figure A10.3 (a) % Pages of the Disclosure Location Analysed by Year




Figure A10.4(a) % Pages of the Disclosure Location Analysed by Sector 
Note: The various sectors are represented as follows: 1. The Financial sector; 2. Extractive Industries; 3. Consumer Goods; 4. Consumer Services; and 5. Industrials and Utilities.



Table A10.2(b) An Analysis of the % Mean Method of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosure made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
HOW: % of annual report	MEAN2000	MEAN2001	MEAN2002	MEAN2003	MEAN2004	MEAN2005	F test	P value
Narrative	0.656	0.763	0.950	0.992	0.983	1.003	4.11**	0.001
Monetary	0.763	1.118	1.965	2.273	2.123	1.893	17.03**	0.000
Quantitative	0.203	0.392	0.525	0.645	0.639	0.516	13.01**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A10.3(b) An Analysis of the % Median Method of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosure made Across the Years in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer 

HOW: % of annual report	MEDIAN2000	MEDIAN2001	MEDIAN2002	MEDIAN2003	MEDIAN2004	MEDIAN2005	H test	P value
Narrative	0.607	0.790	0.950	0.910	0.910	0.869	21.09**	0.001
Monetary	0.634	1.069	2.151	2.174	2.090	1.668	67.91**	0.000
Quantitative	0.197	0.368	0.458	0.597	0.626	0.476	56.80**	0.000
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A10.4 (b) A Year-on-year Comparison of the % Mean Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer

HOW: % of annual report	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue	Mean	StdDev	Pvalue
Narrative	0.108	0.256	0.018**	0.200	0.367	0.003**	0.042	0.391	0.526	-0.009	0.338	0.869	0.020	0.448	0.790
Monetary	0.391	0.463	0.000**	0.857	0.641	0.000**	0.308	0.636	0.006**	-0.150	0.426	0.042**	-0.231	0.502	0.009*
Quantitative	0.197	0.212	0.000**	0.141	0.258	0.003**	0.119	0.228	0.003**	-0.006	0.212	0.866	-0.122	0.204	0.001**
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).


Table A10.5 (b) A Year-on-year Comparison of the % Median Location of Post-retirement Benefit Disclosures in the Financial Statements of the Sponsoring Employer
HOW: % of annual report	2001/00	2002/01	2003/02	2004/03	2005/04
	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue	Median	WScore	Pvalue
Narrative	0.120	477.0	0.008*	0.140	494.0	0.003**	0.042	390.0	0.375	-0.031	294.0	0.545	0.007	328.0	0.838
Monetary	0.376	532.0	0.000**	0.847	617.0	0.000**	0.241	499.0	0.009*	-0.144	177.0	0.015	-0.169	144.0	0.005**
Quantitative	0.187	517.0	0.000**	0.132	439.0	0.005**	0.116	485.0	0.001**	-0.018	264.0	0.573	-0.127	91.0	0.001**
Notes: The statistical significance of the F test at the 5% (10%) level is denoted by ** (*).




Figure A10.3(b) % Mean Pages of the Disclosure Method Analysed by Year







Figure A10.4(b) % Mean Pages of the Disclosure Method Analysed by Sector


Note: The various sectors are represented as follows: 1. The Financial sector; 2. Extractive Industries; 3. Consumer Goods; 4. Consumer Services; and 5. Industrials and Utilities.
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^1	  The USS annual reports from 2003 to 2005 all referred to an actuarial valuation which took place on 31/3/02 where the funding level was deemed to be at 101% and the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) at 144%.
^2	  See for example the above excerpt from USS’s 2009 annual report.
^3	  For example, some of the numbers reported in the financial press often relate to the FTSE 100 only whilst others relate to the total deficit (surplus) for all UK companies. 
^4	  The deficit (surplus) is calculated on a buy-out basis (assets less s179 liabilities); this amount is based on how much an insurance company would be required to pay to take on the payment of PPF levels of compensation (PPF, 2010).
^5	  This committee was also known as the Goode Committee.
^6	  At July 2009, the Office for National Statistics reported the UK population to be 61.8m; thus, the percentage of the population that have an interest in an occupational pension scheme equates to 45%. 
^7	  Such attention has been directed, not only at the sponsoring employer, but also at the annual report and governance mechanisms of the individual pension schemes.  
^8	  This expected volatility has been attributed to two sources.  First, the valuation of pension scheme assets is dependant on the performance of the capital markets that are, by their nature, impossible to control.  Second, FRS 17 no longer allows companies to spread scheme surpluses/ deficits over the future lives of scheme members and requires the full change in valuation to be accounted for immediately.  Although FRS 17 changed the method used to account for pension schemes, it did not alter the associated cash flows, and should not, therefore, have had an impact on the share prices of the companies concerned.  However, Jin et al. (2004) argue that equity risk, and therefore share prices, reflect the risk of a firm’s pension plan and that this finding is consistent with the information efficiency of the capital markets.  Companies also expressed concern about the standard because they are now required to disclose information that was not previously publicly available.  Investors could therefore appreciate, for the first time, the true underlying economic position of a company’s pension fund, which might, in turn affect a company’s share price (Bezooyen, 2002).
^9	  For example, the deficit in British Airway’s pension scheme has been a contentious issue in its merger negotiations with Iberian Airlines (Mulligan, 2010).  However, this does not appear to have been a problem for only large companies; in 2006, the deficit of Northcliffe Newspapers (which was slightly less then £100m) also proved to be a stumbling block in its takeover negotiations (Terazono and Jopson, 2006).
^10	  For example, the analysis of the use of pension schemes as managerial compensation (Bebchuck and Jackson (2005); Sundaram and Yermack (2007); Gerakos (2007); Kalyta and Magnan (2008)) or the behaviour of pension schemes as institutional investors (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Allen et al., 2000; Hotchkiss and Lawrence, 2003; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).  
^11	  Klumpes (2001) summarises the extensive academic literature relating to the theoretical perspectives used for measuring pension scheme liabilities and identifies four categorises of research: (i) capital market views of corporate pension liabilities; (ii) tests of managerial discretionary behaviour; (iii) tests of managerial discretion over actuarial assumptions; and (iv) research on pension fund terminations.  However, Glaum (2009) argues that the majority of this research is US based (see for example Klumpes, 2001; Fasshauer et al., 2008).
^12	  Some of this research has addressed both the usage of pension scheme disclosures by investors (Landsman and Ohlson, 1990; Scott, 1991) and the value-relevance of these disclosures in relation to pension costs and the funded status of the scheme (Barth et al., 1993; Coronado and Sharpe, 2003; Franzoni and Marin, 2006; Picconi, 2006); other research has validated the decision-usefulness of such disclosures (Klumpes and McMeeking, 2007) or analysed the disclosures relation to the actuarial assumptions underpinning pension schemes (Godwin, 1999; Blankley and Swanson; 1995; Bergstresser et al., 2006; Godwin, et al., 1996).  Alternatively, some researchers have investigated the curtailment of pension schemes by UK employers as a strategy to manage their exposure to risk (Klumpes et al., 2009).  Conversely, Kiosse and Peasnell (2009) argue that, although companies have frozen, terminated or converted DB schemes in a desire to limit contributions, the financial reporting requirements of pension schemes have also played their part.  
^13	  Several professional studies have investigated the governance of UK pension schemes (see for example the survey of UK Pension Scheme Governance conducted by the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008)) whilst others have analysed the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers (see for example the annual publication Accounting for Pensions by the actuarial firm Lane, Clark and Peacock (2010)); however, these reports are factual accounts of what happens in practice and are not grounded in academic theory. 
^14	  These interviewees suggest that the annual report of the pension scheme is not fit for purpose (because it does not show the pension scheme liabilities on the face of the Statement of Financial Position) and consequently, many pension scheme stakeholders refer to the annual report of the sponsoring employer which does show the pension scheme liabilities on the face of the Statement of Financial Position.  
^15	  The Myners Report (2001) suggested that, in 2001, UK institutional investors owned over £1,500 billion of assets which represented more than half of the quoted equity markets at that time.  Evans et al. (2008) suggest that, on a global basis in 2007, pension fund assets amounted to US$23 billion.  
^16	  For example, the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance is the only dedicated academic publication which focuses on the economics and finance of pensions and retirement income and was launched in August 2002 (Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 2009). 
^17	  The OECD has 30 member countries (originally 29) and was first established in 1961 to help its members support sustainable economic growth, boost employment, raise living standards, maintain financial stability, assist other countries' economic development and contribute to growth in world trade (Solomon, 2007).
^18	  The Myners Report (2001) was commissioned by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, to investigate the trustee’s role and responsibilities and how these impact on the investment strategy of institutional investors.
^19	  This issue has often been referred to as the ‘agency problem’ (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Hart, 1995).
^20	  Costs of contracting include the time spent thinking about all the eventualities and how to deal with them, the cost of negotiation and the costs of contract construction (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Hart, 1995). 
^21	  Mallin (2007) argues that whilst corporate collapses undoubtedly impact on shareholders because they potentially lose their investment, they also impact on employees’ jobs (Beckmann and Forbes, 2004) and on the security of employees’ pensions.
^22	  The principles of the Combined Code (2006) are summarised in this Appendix because the majority of the interviews that are analysed in Chapter 5 took place between January 2006 and May 2007.  
^23	  Solomon (2007) suggests that other stakeholders include “…employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, communities in the vicinity of the company’s operations and the general public” (p. 23).
^24	  Mallin (2007) suggests that “[i]n the UK, neither the legal nor the corporate governance systems make any provision for employee representation on the board, nor for representation of other stakeholder groups such as providers of finance, and there has been consistent opposition to representation of stakeholder groups on corporate boards” (p. 57).
^25	  This view of the firm has generated much research and there is evidence to suggest that corporate executives use the stakeholder approach in their strategic planning (Clement, 2005).
^26	  Hart (1995) queried the effectiveness of some of these mechanisms including the involvement of executive directors in their own performance evaluation.  He also questioned the motivation of non-executive directors given that (a) they may not have a significant financial interest in the company; (b) they may not have sufficient time to devote to the company; and (c) they may also owe their positions to management and therefore be unwilling to criticise those that invite them onto the board.  Although many of the recent corporate governance recommendations have changed the structure and administration of company boards, Hart (1995) argues they too are unlikely to solve the governance issues that have been raised in the literature.
^27	  OECD (1998) suggests that such models are likely to exist where ownership is spread among many shareholders and management enjoys a significant level of autonomy such as in the UK and the US.
^28	  Forbes and Watson (1993) maintain that voice rather than exit solutions are required to improve managers’ accountability to shareholders.  
^29	  For example, Hart (1995) queries the effectiveness of proxy fights as a mechanism of replacing poorly performing board members on the grounds that, where shareholdings are dispersed, the costs will be inproportionately high on those shareholders that launch the proxy fight and small shareholders may not vote on the grounds that their vote is unlikely to make a difference.  Similarly, he argues that if a company has one or more large shareholders there is unlikely to be a great deal of separation between ownership and control.  Likewise, Hart (1995) suggests that hostile takeovers, as a mechanism of corporate governance, may not be as profitable as originally thought due to the free-rider problem and competition from other bidders.  Other research investigates the role that financial accounting information plays in corporate governance mechanisms such as takeovers, proxy contests, boards of directors, shareholder litigation, debt contracts and the audit function has been investigated (Bushman et al., 2001), however the results are mixed and, unfortunately, inconclusive.  Likewise, Coles et al. (2001) investigate the impact of organisational monitoring mechanisms and incentive alignments of the chief executive officer (CEO) on company performance but are unable to arrive at a conclusion.
^30	  Clark (2008) maintains that administrative functions include “…the collection, tagging and protection of pension contributions” (p. 13).
^31	  Clark (2008) suggests that benefit adjudication functions may include “…the determination of eligibility against plan criteria, the resolution of difficult cases and the enforcement of procedures regarding the separate interests of plan sponsors and beneficiaries” (p. 13).
^32	  Clark (2008) proposes that asset management functions may include “…asset-liability matching and asset allocation or the evaluation of investment product providers” (p. 13).
^33	  FRS 17 defines a DC scheme as a ‘…pension or other retirement benefit scheme into which an employer pays regular contributions fixed as an amount or as a percentage of pay and will have no legal or constructive obligation to pay further contributions if the scheme does not have sufficient assets to pay all employee benefits relating to employee service in the current and prior periods’ (ASB, 2000, para. 2).
^34	  A DB scheme is defined by FRS 17 as a ‘…pension or other retirement benefit scheme other than a defined contribution scheme’ (ASB, 2000, para. 2).
^35	  Asher (2008) provides a similar diagram to that reproduced in Figure 2.1, suggesting that many of these relationships can often be conflicted due to the complex web of principals and agents.  
^36	  Rather than take a refund of any pension scheme surplus, companies often opted to take a contribution holiday (Napier, 2009).
^37	  Since the PLRC was published in 1993, a number of regulatory bodies have been commissioned to oversee the pensions industry.  The most recent is known as the PR and this body was created by the Pensions Act (2004).  Its main aim is to protect the rights of members, promote good scheme administration and to reduce the risk of any claims being made on the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).  The PR’s requirements in relation to pension scheme governance are analysed in more detail in Section 2.5.
^38	  At that time the BBC reported that “[t]heir funds were largely recovered thanks to a £100m government payout and a £276m out-of-court settlement with City institutions and the remnants of Robert Maxwell’s media group” (BBC, 2009).
^39	  The report maintained that Robert Maxwell’s son, Kevin Maxwell, and some leading City financial institutions, also had some responsibility to bear (Thomas and Turner, 2001).  This was despite Kevin Maxwell, his brother, Ian Maxwell and Larry Trachtenberg being cleared of conspiracy to defraud Mirror Group pensioners in 1996. 
^40	  Stiles and Taylor (1993) also argue that Maxwell’s extensive use of litigation deterred any third party interference.
^41	  Other pension scheme failures that occurred around the same time included: (i) The Lewis’s Group (1991); (ii) Belling (1992); and (iii) Burlington International Group (1992).
^42	  It was suggested that there was a requirement “…to establish and keep in place a funding plan adhering to not less than the 100 per cent level.  In the event of any drop below this level…the trustees should be under a duty to submit a business plan to the regulator providing for restoration of the fund to the 100 per cent level within three years.” (Pension Law Review Committee, 1993, p. 15)
^43	  However, despite the availability of this option, The Myners Report (2001) commented that, at that time “…most occupational pensions [were] organised on a trust basis” (p. 5) and therefore would not be subject to corporate law and corporate governance requirements.  The reasons why trustees might wish to incorporate the pension scheme are discussed in Chapter 6.
^44	  The Myners Report (2001) comments that “Institutional investors – in particular pension and life funds – now manage the savings of millions of people.  They also ‘own’ and control most of British industry.  They have come to play a central – if low key – part in our national economic life” (p. 1).
^45	  Solomon (2007) maintains that the four main types of institutional investors are pension funds, life insurance companies, unit trusts and investment trusts.
^46	  It is therefore interesting to note that several years later Clark (2008) still argues that, although there “…is a supposition that trustees have considerable expertise,...the reality is a world characterized at best by trustee competence and at worst by amateurish confusion.” (p. 10).  
^47	  The purpose of this document was to gauge the opinion of pension scheme stakeholders on the PR’s governance strategy and its stated priorities to improve pension scheme governance
^48	  This document defines governance as “…the systems and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, effectiveness, supervision and accountability of an organisation.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(b), p. 7)
^49	 These were submitted by “…a broad section of the pensions industry including representative bodies, insurers, pension professionals and third party administrators as well as trustees and pensions managers.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007 (c), p. 2)
^50	  Knowledge and understanding relates to the education of trustees and the PR has since issued code of practice (Number 7), practical guidance and an e-learning programme (also known as the trustees’ toolkit) to address this issue.  
^51	  The PR maintains that if conflicts of interest between different stakeholders are not managed appropriately, trustees could make decisions that are not in the interests of members.  The PR recognises that many different stakeholders can be affected by a conflict of interests and has since issued regulatory guidance on this matter (The Pensions Regulator, 2008 (b)).  
^52	  The PR maintains that those trustees who do not monitor the employer covenant will not be in a position to make appropriate funding decisions or decide any recovery plan that might be deemed necessary.  The PR has now issued regulatory guidance on the clearance of company transactions which incorporates guidance on assessing the employer covenant (The Pensions Regulator, 2009(a)).  
^53	  The PR advocates that trustees should have the confidence to ask questions of their advisers and challenge the advice they are given; it suggests that the establishment of clear aims and objectives for meetings with advisers should facilitate such questioning.  In May 2008, The PR issued regulatory guidance identifying some key issues for trustees to consider in their relations with advisers (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(c)).  
^54	  Both code of practice number 7 and the trustee toolkit address the administration of the pension scheme, however, the PR emphasised the need to develop, promote and share good practice in this area by providing examples of good practice and developing “closer relationships with administrators and those who work with them such as auditors” (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a), p. 18).  
^55	  With regards to processes for investment choice, the trustees’ toolkit addresses these issues and identifies the need to provide good examples of effective processes and different approaches in relation to these matters. 
^56	  The PR argues that it aims “…to combine existing initiatives with new initiatives, primarily good practice guidance including case examples”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 4).
^57	  The PR suggests that “…central to the successful delivery of proposals, this included working with the pensions industry, the FSA and the Government in the development of good practice guidance.  It also involves identification of future initiatives and consistency of approach, whilst taking current initiatives and working practices into account”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 4).
^58	  In line with the PR’s risk-based approach it maintains that it “…will focus on areas posing most risk to the regulator’s objectives, and any intervention will be proportionate to the level of risk” (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 4).
^59	  Proponents of a stakeholder theory of accounting would argue that although they might be considered to be the main beneficiaries, they are most definitely not the sole beneficiaries (see for example Freeman, 1984 or Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
^60	  Unlike shareholders, pension scheme members will not receive annual dividends or be able to attend and vote at AGMs etc, however, the objective of the pension scheme is ultimately to meet the pension promise made to its members.
^61	  Despite this difference, the PR requires the same duties and responsibilities of each trustee, regardless of how they are selected and appointed (The Pensions Regulator 2007(a)).
^62	  Despite the collective responsibility of the board of trustees, it is likely that one of them will adopt the role of Chairman at least for administrative purposes, for example, to act as Chair at trustee meetings; this was indeed the case with several of the smaller unincorporated schemes involved in the empirical analysis reported in Chapter 6.  Notwithstanding the adoption of this role, the duties and responsibilities required of that individual are the same that are required of all other trustees. 
^63	  The Myners Report (2001) commented that, at that time “…most occupational pensions [were] organised on a trust basis” (p. 5) and therefore would not be subject to corporate law and corporate governance requirements.  
^64	  Despite the fact that an audit committee is not required in UK pension schemes, the main principles for the latter committee are incorporated in Regulatory Guidance: Relations with Advisers (The Pensions Regulator, 2008(c)).
^65	  It establishes who is entitled to request information and when the information must be supplied.
^66	  It attempts to help those who wish to communicate with members think about what they are trying to achieve and whether their communications are successful.
^67	  Subsequently, Chapter 3 demonstrates the importance of two-way communication between the parties in accountability relationships. 
^68	  Likewise, Hinz and Mataoanu (2005) suggest that differences in pension scheme supervision programmes are a function of the environment in which they operate.
^69	  This category of research also includes two chapters that are not considered relevant to the current study: (i) an empirical investigation that addresses the need for increased member protection in both Argentina and Chile; and (ii) a theoretical chapter that considers conflicting relationships within Australian pension schemes that may lead to increased pension scheme costs.
^70	  The index designed by Ammann and Zingg (2008) was based on prior research that identified best governance practice.  Better governed pension schemes returned a higher value index.
^71	  Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) discover weak evidence to suggest that governance practices influence the administration of fund assets and that investment strategy choices impact on the financial performance of the fund. 
^72	  Impavido (2002) provides a literature review of the relationship between the governance of public pension schemes and their investment performance.  This paper also identifies good practice and the need for further research to support the development of governance guidelines. 
^73	  Helbroner (2005) reviews the legal and financial risks that exist in Canadian pension schemes and argues that governance audits should be used to minimise these risks. 
^74	  NÖcker (2001) compares the governance practices of pension schemes in the UK and Germany and concludes that, although at first sight they appear to be very different, they are many similarities.
^75	  In the 2009 survey, schemes were categorised using the following intervals: 12-29 members; 30-99 members; 100-199 members; 200-999 members; and 1000+ members. 
^76	  The findings of the PR’s surveys are very similar to the results of two questionnaire-based surveys that were administered by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in 2004 and 2006 (PWC, 2004 and 2006).
^77	  Appendix 4 also demonstrated how the PR views accountability as having a major role to play in the governance of UK pension schemes
^78	  Keasey and Wright (1993) also suggest that third parties, such as auditors and non-executive directors, are key players in ensuring the accountability of individuals such as directors and management.
^79	  The mechanisms used to discharge accountability are likely to vary in different circumstances but may sometimes be defined by the contract.
^80	  These authors also argue that the accountee’s ability to enforce the contract is also required.
^81	  This “middle of the road” model is not without its critics (see Tinker et al., 1991).
^82	  Using the Church of England as a case study, he demonstrates that, depending upon the context of the accountability relationship, this is not always the case and that the model is, occasionally, much more complex than this.
^83	  An electronic search resulted in 267 citations of Gray et al. (1987).
^84	  Several perspectives of accountability have, therefore, emerged over the years, the extremities ranging from those based on a right-wing view of the world that endorse accountability in the promotion of a liberal economic democracy to those that have a more left-wing, Marxian, focus (Mouck, 1994).
^85	  Friedman (1993) maintains that only individuals, not companies, have responsibilities and consequently the social responsibilities that are widely debated belong to corporate executives and not to corporations. 
^86	  Friedman (1993) also believes that market and legal forces are sufficient to govern the concerns of stakeholders.  Goodpaster (1993) agrees arguing that any direct consideration of the needs of stakeholders is “…unnecessary, redundant and inefficient, not to mention dishonest” (p. 211).  
^87	  This suggestion is supported by Sinclair (1995) who, having interviewed 15 chief executive officers (CEOs) on their perceptions of accountability, suggests that accountability is chameleon-like.  She argues that one can be accountable to many different constituencies for many different things, that accountability is both multiple and fragmented and is continually being constructed.  This author also suggests that there are many types of accountability including: political, public, managerial, professional and public accountability.
^88	  However, with regards to the general public, Benston (1982b) suggests that standards governing the production of social responsibility accounting are unworkable due to the difficulties associated with the measurement of either personal or public utility.
^89	  Gray et al. (1991) state that ‘stewardship’ is one of the more simple forms of accountability.
^90	  Recently, the IASB issued an Exposure Draft (ED) which addressed the objectives of financial reporting (IASB, 2008); the usefulness of financial reporting in assessing stewardship was given significant consideration in that ED, thus it is likely that this will also feature in the final draft of the conceptual framework. 
^91	  Ijiri (1983) claims that financial statements not only define what needs to be disclosed but also what does not need to be disclosed.
^92	  Boyce (1995) argues that this view is often at the expense of non-economic, unquantifiable issues that are sometimes ignored or treated as secondary.
^93	  They also argue that accountability is a concept driven by information rights and whilst “…financial analysts, future shareholders, and stock-market participants in general cannot lay claim to legitimate information rights … it must appear at least contestable that employees, community and society have no information rights in the organisation” (Gray et al., 1997, p. 28).  Gray (1994) argues that the current conventional orthodoxy of accounting is indefensible in that it fails to acknowledge its social, economic, political and environmental implications.
^94	  Gray et al. (1997) give examples of quasi-law such as standards established by statutory bodies and voluntary codes of practice.
^95	  Informal strategies have been credited with supporting social forms of accountability (Roberts (1991).
^96	  Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) describe managerial accountability as being that applicable to managers who are held accountable for the responsibilities delegated to them.  These authors argue that the accountability placed on management is closed and well-defined. 
^97	  Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) exemplify political or public accountability in governments who are accountable to their electors for the authority granted to them.  These authors argue that political accountability is open-ended and less detailed than managerial accountability.
^98	  Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) suggest that, whilst the first rung of Stewart’s ladder is likely to be relevant to both political and managerial accountability, progression up the ladder (and accountability for process, performance, programme and policy) is more likely to be relevant to political entities only.
^99	  Congregational members’ expectations of spiritual leadership and direction are often declared in an indirect manner.  However, the information demanded - usually budgeted, forward-looking financial information - is often not directly related to the accountors’ agenda.  The reporting process is very unstructured and little attention is paid to it in an accountability context.
^100	  For example the congregational members and the parish.
^101	  This is evidenced in the relationship between the Diocese (principal) and the Church Commissioners (agent).  Much of this accounting is ex-post and the information is delivered through annual reports and accounts and other reports.
^102	  This is evidenced in the relationship between the diocese (principal) and the central board (agent) which also demonstrates evidence of accounting for issues of probity and legality.  Much of this accounting is ex-ante and the information is delivered through partial consultation in budget formation.
^103	  This is evidenced in the relationship between the parish (principal) and the diocese (agent) and demonstrate evidence of accounting for issues of probity and legality.  Much of this accounting is ex-ante and the information is delivered through consultation in budget formation.
^104	  As discussed in Chapter 2, trust deeds are not generally available to the public and therefore it is difficult to determine the issues that they address (Cocco and Volpin, 2005).  However, as many trust deeds regulate the behaviour of the trustees, it is reasonable to assume that most will specify the issues to be accounted for.
^105	  For example, the Pension Law Review (1993) maintained that information is required by members/beneficiaries at various stages: (i) before and immediately after joining the scheme; (ii) periodically during the membership period; (iii) on exit; (iv) during retirement; and (v) when the scheme is wound up.  
^106	  The scheme documentation and explanatory leaflets are unlikely to contain financial information relating to the scheme assets and liabilities; it is also likely that these documents will only be updated when there has been a change in the scheme.  The information relating to individuals is more likely to contain financial information but only to the extent that it might detail their individual entitlements; it is unlikely to provide financial information about the pension scheme as a whole.
^107	  It is not always guaranteed that the pension scheme and the sponsoring employer will have the same year-end and thus the pension scheme might have to produce financial information for incorporation into two sets of financial statements each with different dates.
^108	  The Myners Report (2001) commented that, at that time “…most occupational pensions [were] organised on a trust basis” (p. 5) and therefore would not be subject to corporate law and corporate governance requirements.  
^109	  Wilson et al. (2001) argue that the pension scheme liabilities and related disclosures of the sponsoring employer present a difficult challenge to the accounting profession because “[t]he amounts involved are large, the timescale is long, the estimation process is complex and involves many areas of uncertainty which have to be made the subject of assumptions; in addition the actuarial mechanisms used…are complicated and their selection open to debate” (Wilson et al., 2001, p. 1515).  The situation is further complicated by the fact that the financial statements of pension scheme and the sponsoring employer are not required to have the same financial year-end.
^110	  Specifically, the SORP requires that the trustee report “should include such information as is needed to explain how the scheme is managed” (Pensions Research Accounting Group, 2007, p. 8). 
^111	  The investment report should “outline and explain the trustees’ policies on investments and the strategy for achieving the policies” (Pensions Research Accounting Group, 2007, p. 9). 
^112	  Prior to the adoption of international financial reporting standards on 1st January, 2005, the Statement of Financial Position was known as the Balance Sheet.
^113	  This document also stated that “… while the regulations quoted do not require the inclusion of the actuarial liabilities in the scheme’s accounts, they do not preclude their inclusion should the trustees choose to do so.  There are however no known examples of trustees choosing to disclose the actuarial liabilities directly in the scheme’s financial statements” (PRAG, 2002, p. 2)
^114	  Prior to the adoption of international financial reporting standards on 1st January, 2005, the Income Statement was known as the Profit and Loss Account.
^115	  The constructive obligation is likely to be in accordance with that defined in FRS 12 ‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’.
^116	  Jin et al. (2004) argue that equity risk, and therefore share prices, reflect the risk of a firm’s pension plan and that this finding is consistent with the information efficiency of the capital markets.
^117	  The amendment included the following transitional arrangements: (i) for accounting periods ending on or after 22 June 2001, year end information on company pension scheme valuations (comparatives required) to be given in the notes only; (ii) for accounting periods ending on or after 22 June 2002, opening and closing balances and performance statement information for the period (no comparatives required) on pension schemes to be given in the notes only; (iii) for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005, the standard is fully effective.  In the case of (i) above the detailed disclosures included details of the scheme, assumptions, fair value and expected return on assets and the movement in the surplus or deficit during the year.  In the case of (ii) above retrospective details of the amounts recognised in the STRGL and a note of the movements in reserves were also required (ASB, 2002).
^118	  The amendment included the following transitional arrangements (i) for accounting periods ending on or after 22 June 2001, closing balances on company pension scheme valuations (comparatives required) to be given in the notes only; (ii) for accounting periods ending on or after 22 June 2002, opening and closing balances and performance statement information for the period (no comparatives required) on pension schemes to be given in the notes only; (iii) for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005, the standard is fully effective.  In the case of (i) above the detailed disclosures included details of the scheme, assumptions, fair value and expected return on assets and the movement in the surplus or deficit during the year.  In the case of (ii) above retrospective details of the amounts recognised in the STRGL and a note of the movements in reserves were also required (ASB, 2002).
^119	  “One of the reasons for these transitional arrangements was to give the Board the opportunity to persuade the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) to follow the UK approach and require the immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses…It [the amendment] should avoid mandating two changes in quick succession in accounting for retirement benefits.  It [the Board] has therefore decided to defer the full adoption of the requirements of FRS 17 during the period of the international discussions on IAS 19 (revised)”  (ASB, 2002, p. 1).
^120	  The standard setting body in the US, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and its financial accounting standard (FAS) 87 ‘Employers’ Accounting for Pensions’ were influential in the development of IAS 19.  FAS 87 attributes pension costs over the period of employee service.  Any gains or losses, including actuarial gains and losses, are adjusted through the opening reserves and then amortised through the Income Statement over the average remaining service period of active employees.  FAS 87, using a corridor approach, requires amortisation of any unrecognised net gain or loss that exceeds 10 percent of the greater of the projected benefit obligation or the market-related value of plan assets.   Therefore, under FAS 87, there will be an unamortised asset or liability in the Statement of Financial Position reflecting the losses or gains that have arisen in relation to the pension scheme.  The FASB defended its use of accrual accounting by arguing that: “[a]ccrual accounting goes beyond cash transactions to provide information about assets, liabilities and earnings” (FASB, 1985, p. 4).  In December 2003, FAS 87 was amended by the issue of FAS 132 ‘Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits’.  Although this new standard did not change the US accounting requirements for pension funds, it extended and refined the disclosure requirements.
^121	  IAS 19 offers three alternatives for the recognition actuarial gains and losses, the result being that preparers can defer and smooth the recognition of these gains and losses (Glaum, 2009).
^122	  In April 2010, the IASB issued an exposure draft for further amendments to IAS 19; these proposals include: (i) removal of the corridor approach resulting in immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses; (ii) the presentation of service costs and finance costs should be made in the Income Statement and that remeasurement costs should be presented in the SORIE; and (iii) improvement of disclosure in relation to plan descriptions, amounts recognised in the financial statements, risks and participation in multi-employer schemes.  If these proposals are approved, the reporting requirements of IAS 19 and FRS 17 will become even more alike.
^123	  In January 2008, Pro-active Accounting Activities in Europe (PAAinE) published a further discussion paper The Financial Reporting of Pensions (PAAinE, 2008) to stimulate debate on how best to account for DB pension schemes both in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer and the pension scheme itself.  The discussion paper rejects the use of the “corridor approach” in the financial statements of the sponsoring emplouyer on the basis that it has “…no principled basis, give[s] rise to considerable complexity and impair[s] transparency” (ASB, 2008, p. 4).  Controversially, it also suggests the inclusion of the pension scheme liability in the financial statements of the pension scheme itself. 
^124	  Although the original IAS 19 was published in 1990, it was not mandatory in the UK until 1st January 2005.
^125	  The disclosure requirements of FRS 17 (ASB, 2000) have been analysed in Table 4.2 above as it is these requirements that would have applied to companies between 2000 and 2005.
^126	  The disclosure requirements of IAS 19 (IASB, 1990) have been analysed in Table 4.2 above as it is these requirements that would have applied to companies between 2000 and 2005.
^127	  This is because SSAP 24 did not required the pension scheme surplus/deficit to be accounted for in the Statement of Financial Position whereas both IAS 19 and FRS 17 do mandate its recognition.
^128	  There is a danger that boiler plate disclosures may obscure the individual circumstances of reporting entities (Smith and Taffler, 1992). 
^129	  Both of the aforementioned studies are based on a review of the financial statements of 20 companies whereas the current review is based on a sample of 36 companies
^130	  “For private sector pension funds, accountability over governance functions is particularly important in order to allow the supervisory authority and members and beneficiaries of the plan to sanction or discipline the governance body in the case of bad management” (Impavido, 2002, p. 18).
^131	  Indeed, Morgan (1988), identified six different ways of classifying reality; reality as (i) a concrete structure; (ii) a concrete process; (iii) a contextual field of information; (iv) symbolic discourse; (v) social construction; and (vi) a projection of human imagination.
^132	  For example, they believe that “order” and “conflict” can be an “oversimplification” of reality and “open to the possibility of misinterpretation” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 14).
^133	  For example, Chua (1986) argues that: (i) knowledge relates to epistemological and methodological issues; (ii) empirical phenomena refer to assumptions about ontology, human intention/rationality and societal order/conflict; and (iii) human affairs are associated with the relations between theory and practice.
^134	  Laughlin (1995) also proposes an alternative to the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework, claiming that the “bipolar dualism” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 66) is too simplistic.
^135	  Bryman (2001) maintains that in qualitative research the interview tends to be less structured, thus allowing the participant to give insight into what they see as relevant.  
^136	  Eriksson and Kovalainen, (2008) suggest that these types of interviews are interested in facts.
^137	  These types of interviews are “…a pathway to the participants’ authentic experiences” (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008, p. 79)
^138	  Constructionist interviews concentrate on how the interactions between both parties in the interview create meaning (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008).
^139	  Patton (1990) goes on to argue that interviews are required because one cannot observe feelings thoughts and intentions.
^140	  The interviewer should be concerned with questions of why the interview is being conducted, the subject-matter of the interview and familiarising themselves with how interviews are conducted.
^141	  Erikson and Kovalainen (2008) note that many professionals now offer this service, though it is likely to be costly. 
^142	  Although current pension scheme members are not interviewed as a separate category of interviewee, each of the interviewees identified in Table 5.1 (with the exception of TE2 and UP1) was a member of a UK company pension scheme. 
^143	  Appendix 5 provides details of interview questions that were asked of: (i) pension scheme trustees; (ii) pension officers and those stakeholders associated with the sponsoring employer; (iii) auditors, actuaries and advisors; (iv) fund managers; (v) regulators; and (vi) users. 
^144	  Krippendorff (2004) reports that the term content analysis did not appear in the English language until 1941, however “the systematic analysis of text can be traced back to inquisitorial pursuits by the Church in the 17th century” (p. 3).  This author also claims that there was a second phase in the development of content analysis during the 1930s and 1940s when there was large scale analysis of the content of newspapers.
^145	  Krippendorff (2004) suggests that texts or other meaningful matter might also include: works of art; images; maps; sounds; signs; symbols and numerical records.
^146	  Krippendorff (2004) argues that the “stability, reproducibility, and accuracy” (p. 211) of data can be used to measure reliability. 
^147	  Krippendorff (2004) describes valid research results as those that are “…true [and speak] about the real world of people, phenomena, events, experiences and actions” (p. 313).  He also argues that validity can be categorised into six different types: (i) sampling validity; (ii) semantic validity; (iii) structural validity; (iv) functional validity; (v) correlative validity; and (vi) predictive validity. 
^148	  The use of a pilot study can however minimise the risk of subjectivity.
^149	  Bryman (2001) further argues that many researchers are also interested in what is not reported and as such these “omissions are in themselves potentially interesting, as they may reveal what is and is not important to reporters” (p. 180). 
^150	  In the current research the sample selection process is described in Section 4.5.1. 
^151	  In the current research the unit of analysis is described in Section 4.5.2.
^152	  In the current research the categorisation if the data is described in Section 4.5.3.
^153	  Krippendorff (2004) identifies a similar process though reports it in a slightly different order; he identifies the component parts as: “unitising; …sampling; …recording/coding.; …reducing data to manageable representations; …inferring contextual phenomena; [and]… narrating the answer to the research question” (p. 83).
^154	  Bryman (2001) suggests that researchers may wish to establish if text is reported in either a favourable or hostile manner.
^155	  Unerman (2000) argues that many companies provide photographs and charts that relate to a particular theme and that “[i]f volume were measured in terms of words, sentences, paragraphs, the volume measured in respect of this disclosure would be limited to the photograph’s caption, whereas measuring as a proportion of the page enables both the photograph and its caption to be included in the analysis.  Any quantification method ignoring such graphics risks capturing an incomplete picture” (p. 676) 
^156	  Bryman (2001) counters this suggestion by providing examples of prior research that have been based on theoretical frameworks; the content analysis reported in chapter 6 of this thesis is based on the accountability theory described in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
^157	  For example, NVivo and ATLAS.
^158	  The majority of these studies are based in the US because the UK does not have similar rankings (Beattie et al., 2004)).
^159	  These disclosure indices assume that the amount of disclosure proxies for its quality (Beattie et al., 2004)). 
^160	  Having selected the sample, it was later discovered that the annual report for one company was not available for 2001.  Rather than reduce the sample to 35 companies, it was decided that the statistical analysis could still be conducted taking into account the one missing value.
^161	  Some companies produced their annual report and accounts in one complete document whilst others published them separately.  In the latter case both documents were analysed to ensure consistency.
^162	  The information relating to employee numbers and net assets was extracted from the 2005 annual report for each company. 
^163	  Two A4 grids were used in the current empirical work; Appendix 6 contains an example of a grid used for companies that printed their annual reports using a portrait page set-up.  However, a small minority of companies in the sample chose to print their annual reports using a landscape page set-up; a landscape grid, similar to that reproduced in Appendix 6, was used in the content analysis for the purposes of these companies.  
^164	  The following information is required to be disclosed under this category:  “(i) the present value at the balance sheet date of defined benefit obligations that are wholly unfunded; (ii) the present value (before deducting the fair value of plan assets) at the balance sheet date of defined benefit obligations that are wholly or partly funded; (iii) the fair value of any plan assets at the balance sheet date; (iv) the net actuarial gains or losses not recognised in the balance sheet; (v) the past service cost not yet recognised in the balance sheet; (vi) any amount not recognised as an asset...; (vii) the fair value at the balance sheet date of any reimbursement right recognised as an asset…; and (viii) the other amounts recognised in the balance sheet.” (IASB, 1998, para 120 (c)). 
^165	  Appendix 5 contains a list of the interview questions asked of each stakeholder group.  
^166	  Although current pension scheme members are not interviewed as a separate category of interviewee, each of the interviewees identified in Table 5.1 (with the exception of TE2 and UP1) was a member of a UK company pension scheme.
^167	  The trustees included 2 employer-nominated trustees and an independent trustee.  Unfortunately, a member-nominated trustee was not included in the interviews as their contact details were difficult to obtain.
^168	  It should be noted that both FRS 17 and IAS 19 permit sponsoring employers who contribute to a multi-employer scheme to account for the pension scheme as if it were a DC scheme if “…the employer is unable to identify its share of the underlying assets and liabilities in the scheme on a consistent and reasonable basis” (ASB, 2000, para. 9). 
^169	  The independent trustee was excluded because he could not be identified with any one pension scheme.
^170	  An exception to this generalisation is the pension scheme associated with interviewee TE1 which had closed its DB scheme to new members just days before the interview and hence 100% of its employees were still members of the old pension scheme.
^171	  The interviewees were given the opportunity during the interviews to comment on and/or disagree with the governance relationships suggested by Table 5.2.
^172	  Whilst it is acknowledged that trustees would be in breach of their duty if they were not independent, it is not unreasonable to expect that an ENT might be under a subtle, if not direct, influence of the sponsoring employer. 
^173	  The corresponding recommendation relating to the composition of the board of directors of a limited company is contained in principle A.3 in the Combined Code (2006) where at least half the board must comprise of non-executive directors.  
^174	  See Section 5.3.3 below.  
^175	  Tables 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrate that the number of trustees across boards can vary to a large extent; in this case 3 to 16.
^176	  Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that some schemes, noticeably the smaller ones, are not meeting the PR’s requirement to have one-third of the board comprise of MNTs (MNDs).
^177	  Tables 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate that the smaller schemes make less use of independent trustees.
^178	  Regulatory Guidance: Guidance for Trustees (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c)).
^179	  For example, the small number of trustees on these boards makes the establishment of sub-committees impractical and encourages alternative, more informal methods of communication.
^180	  See Chapter 3.
^181	  This observation validates the model of UK pension scheme governance suggested by Clark (2000 and 2006).  
^182	  See Chapter 3 and Appendix 4. 
^183	  Such services were usually offered in addition to the scheme audit and each was likely to have its own letter of engagement.
^184	  The Trustee’s Toolkit is an e-learning programme that is available to trustees of both DB and DC schemes and examines good practices involved in running a trustee scheme (see Chapter 4).
^185	  Intelligence gathering will involve reviews of the financial press, statutory reporting, reliance on whistle-blowers and those reporting notifiable events.
^186	  Due to the sensitive nature of the information contained in the fund manager reports it was not possible to obtain copies and verify the extent of that accountability.
^187	  Like the fund manager reports, it was not possible to obtain a copy of these reports due to their sensitive nature.
^188	  A qualified report on the financial statements of the pension scheme might be an example of the trustees being held to account by the scheme auditor.
^189	  Interview PO4 confirmed that they often received individual enquires from pension scheme members/beneficiaries and if they were not satisfied with the responses they received, they could take their complaint to the PR; in such a situation is likely that the discharge of full accountability in respect of that individual would result. 
^190	  This report is comparable to that which describes the directors’ responsibilities in the corporate context.
^191	  Interviewee PO4 described the SIP of his associated pension scheme as a detailed document that ran to 7 pages in length.
^192	  Pension schemes with at least 100 members are required to issue an SFS from the 22nd September, 2006. 
^193	  There was also little evidence to suggest that the other identified trustee accountability mechanisms were used by the pension scheme members/beneficiaries to any extent either.  
^194	  These included the SORP Financial Reports of Pension Schemes (PRAG, 2007) which regulates the information produced in the annual reports of UK pension schemes and SSAP 24 Accounting for Pension Costs, FRS 17 Retirement Benefits (ASB, 2000) and IAS 19 Employee Benefits (IASB, 2002) that regulate the information produced in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers.
^195	  For example, an increase in disclosures that are of poor quality is unlikely to improve accountability.
^196	  Content analysis is used to collect details of where the pension scheme information is disclosed in the financial statements of the sponsoring employer and the form that these disclosures took; for example, whether these disclosures were in narrative or quantitative form.  These results are reported in Appendix 9 (although they are referred to in the conclusion of this chapter).
^197	  For example, the deficit in British Airway’s pension scheme has been a contentious issue in its merger negotiations with Iberian Airlines (Mulligan, 2010).  However, this does not appear to have been a problem for only large companies; in 2006, the deficit of Northcliffe Newspapers (which was slightly less then £100m) also proved to be a stumbling block in its takeover negotiations (Terazono and Jopson, 2006).
^198	  The annual report of the sponsoring employer is also an example of a formal reporting mechanism.
^199	  This observation confirms that the mechanisms used to discharge accountability for UK pension schemes are complex as suggested by Figure 3.4.; although the Gray et al. (1987) model of accountability is applicable to the individual accountability relationships within UK pension schemes, the bigger picture is far more complex than that.
^200	  This supports the findings of Klumpes and McMeeking (2007) and Cardinale (2007) who suggest that the pension scheme disclosures made in the annual report of sponsoring employers are value-relevant and decision useful.  
^201	  Although companies were encouraged to adopt both FRS 17 and IAS 19 early, Napier (2009) suggests that most chose not to adopt FRS 17 early.  Indeed, in the sample of 36 companies used in the following analysis, only one chose to adopt IAS 19 early in 2004 (Shell).  
^202	  The version of IAS 19 that was used for the empirical analysis in the current chapter was published in February 1998, to be effective for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 1999.  This version of IAS 19 was chosen because the subsequent revision was in 2004, was effective for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2006.  Consequently, the 1998 version was the standard that companies were applying in the period under review.   
^203	  The following information is required to be disclosed under this category:  “(i) the present value at the balance sheet date of defined benefit obligations that are wholly unfunded; (ii) the present value (before deducting the fair value of plan assets) at the balance sheet date of defined benefit obligations that are wholly or partly funded; (iii) the fair value of any plan assets at the balance sheet date; (iv) the net actuarial gains or losses not recognised in the balance sheet; (v) the past service cost not yet recognised in the balance sheet; (vi) any amount not recognised as an asset...; (vii) the fair value at the balance sheet date of any reimbursement right recognised as an asset…; and (viii) the other amounts recognised in the balance sheet.” (IASB, 1998, para 120 (c)). 
^204	  Items 10 and 20 on the Content Analysis Template reported in Appendix 7 were used to gather information about the pension schemes and other post-retirement benefits provided for company directors respectively.  The provision of this information was mandated by The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (HMSO, 2002) and so is not regulated by SSAP 24, FRS 17 or IAS 19; it was consequently discounted from the empirical analysis that follows.
^205	  The IFRS disclosures could have been coded under items 1-20 above, however, it was decided to leave it as a separate category so that it could be seen how companies were using it as a signalling mechanism to explain how IFRS would impact on the accounting numbers which had been calculated under UK GAAP.
^206	  The auditability of the information does not refer to an audit in its professional sense but refers to the ability to confirm a certain disclosure if unlimited access to the organisation was available.  This approach has also been used in prior research studies (for example Dunne et al., 2008).  
^207	  The slight decline in percentage between 2004 and 2005 is due to the fact that the sampled companies experienced a large increase in the total number of pages in their annual reports between 2004 and 2005 (the fraction denominator) relative to the increase in the absolute number of pages devoted to post-retirement benefit disclosures (the fraction numerator). For example, Panel A of Table 6.1 shows that the average number of pages devoted to post-retirement benefit disclosures in 2003, 2004 and 2005 was 4.898, 4.994 and 5.292 respectively; this compares to a total average of 126.53, 132.92 and 157.61 pages in the annual reports of the sampled companies for 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively.
^208	  From this point onwards, the content analysis reported in this chapter is recorded in terms of the absolute number of pages of the annual report that have been dedicated to post-retirement benefit disclosures; a similar analysis based on the percentage of the annual report is reported in Appendix 10.
^209	  Although the results reported in Tables A10.2 and A10.3 of Appendix 10 (which reports the Post-retirement benefit disclosures as a percentage of the annual reports) are very similar to those reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 above, they are not identical, for example, there was an increase in the percentage of post-retirement benefit disclosures made in the annual reports of UK sponsoring employers between 2000 (1.622%) and 2005 (3.412%), however, this increase was not consistent each year.  There was a steady increase in the percentage from 2000 to 2003, where it peaked at 3.909% of the annual report, however it then decreased to 3.744% in 2004 and decreased further in 2005 to 3.423%.  As discussed in section 6.3.1, this decrease in percentage is potentially associated with the increase in the size of annual reports as a result of IFRS implementation.  Despite these fluctuations, the null hypothesis that the mean percentage of pages allocated to post-retirement benefit disclosures are the same each year can be rejected as the F-statistic was 16.19 and its associated p-value was 0.000.
^210	  Likewise, Table A10.2 in Appendix 10 (which reports the Post-retirement benefit disclosures as a percentage of the annual reports) shows that, of the 25 disclosure categories reported, ten categories produce an F-statistic that was significant at the 5% level and one that was significant at the 10% level; eight of these disclosure categories are reported in Panel B of Table A10.2.  
^211	  Similarly, there were no disclosure categories in Panel C of Table A10.2 (which reports the Post-retirement benefit disclosures as a percentage of the annual reports) that produced an F-statistic that was higher than the critical value suggesting that the percentage disclosures relating to post-retirements other than pension schemes experienced little change over the six year period.
^212	  The only other country to which UK GAAP was reconciled was The Netherlands in the annual report of the Shell Group.
^213	  When considering the results as a percentage of the annual report, Table A10.2 reports similar results; in the year 2000, the category that accounted for the highest percentage of post-retirement benefit disclosures related to other GAAP (mainly US) information (0.356%); in 2001 the Gross Asset/Liability Reconciliation achieved that highest percentage disclosure (0.457%).  From 2002 to 2005 this had changed to information relating to the expense of the pension scheme itself; this category reported percentages of 0.674%, 0.878%, 0.873% and 0.728% from 2002 to 2005 respectively.
^214	  Table A10.2 supports this finding; the results based on the percentage of the annual report produce an F-statistic of 0.23 and a p-value of 0.949 confirming that the US GAAP disclosures did not experience a significant increase between 2000 and 2005.
^215	  Figure 6.3 also shows that other categories of post-retirement benefit disclosures experienced an increase between 2000 and 2005, however, theses increases are less obvious because the disclosure in 2000 was negligible (in some cases there was no disclosure at all, for example, in the case of the net asset/liability reconciliation it was 0.028 of a page) and the final level of disclosure in 2005 was, at best, minimal (for example, in 2005 disclosures in relation to the actual return; the net asset/liability reconciliation; IFRS; governance and risk; and finally the % split of assets accounted for 0.283; 0.248; 0.241; 0.104; and 0.054 of a page in the annual report respectively).  These categories of post-retirement benefit information form the collection of data at the bottom for Figure 6.3.  
^216	  Category 5 and 14 reconcile the movements during the period in the net liability/asset recognised in the Statement of Financial Position for the pension scheme and other post-retirement benefits respectively.
^217	  This document is not mandatory but is designed as a formulation and development of best practice and is intended to be persuasive only.
^218	  The analysis of medians reported in Table A10.3 (which reports the Post-retirement benefit disclosures as a percentage of the annual reports) also supports the findings for the mean analysis in Table A10.2.  The median level of total disclosure increased from 2000 (1.515%) to 2003, peaking at 3.994%; it then deceased to 3.875% and 3.148% in 2004 and 2005 respectively.  This pattern of disclosure and the resulting H-statistic of 66.61 (p-value of 0.000) allows the null hypothesis that the median levels of total disclosure are the same between 2000 and 2005 to be rejected.  Similar to Table A10.2, the majority of significant increases in the percentage disclosure related to the pension scheme itself (Panel B) as opposed to other post-retirement benefit disclosures (Panel C); both tables return significant results for the same categories of disclosure in Panel B.  Likewise, the disclosures relating to other GAAP (mainly US) and the % split of assets were the only two other disclosure categories to experienced a significant increase; this result is also similar to Table A10.2.  Thus, Tables A10.2 and A10.3 support the findings in Table 7.2 and 7.3 to confirm that the post-retirement benefit disclosures of UK sponsoring employers experienced an overall increase between 2000 and 2005 both in absolute terms and in terms of the percentage of the annual report that was devoted to these disclosures.  
^219	  When considering these disclosures as a percentage of the annual report, Table A10.4 records only 30 significant changes and of these 19 occur in the first three columns.  These results support the discussion in Section 7.3.3 and suggest that the majority of these significant changes in the percentage of post-retirement disclosures occurred before 2003.  
^220	  The percentage results reported in Table A10.4 show that different categories of post-retirement benefit information, with the exception of the expense category, experienced significant changes; four disclosures in Panel B (Accounting policy, Net asset/ liability reconciliation, expense and actual return) and two in Panel D (Other GAAP (mainly US) and IFRS) of Table A10.4 experienced significant changes in two consecutive years.  The majority of the remaining categories experienced a significant change in one year only, with two categories of disclosure in Panel B (Own Assets and SSAP 24), four in Panel C (Plan Description, Own Assets, Assumptions and SSAP 24) and one in Panel D (DC) experiencing no significant year-on-year change at all.  
^221	  In comparison to Table 6.4, Table A10.4 reports more significant decreases in the percentage disclosures; two of these occur in the last column of Panel B (Asset/Liability reconciliation and the expense), one in the final column of Panel C (Asset/Liability reconciliation) and two in the final two columns of Panel D (other GAAP (mainly US) in 2004/03 and information relating to the trustees of the scheme in 2005/04).  The increased observations of the significant decreases in the percentage of post-retirement benefit disclosures may be due to the overall increase in the size of the annual reports after IFRS implementation as previously discussed in section 7.3.1.
^222	  Likewise, the majority of the significant changes that occurred in Table A10.4 related to pension scheme disclosures (Panel B) as opposed to other post-retirement benefit disclosures; thirteen of the total 26 significant changes (excluding Panel A) are reported in Panel B whereas 6 and 7 are reported in Panels C and D respectively. 
^223	  The results in Table A10.4 support these findings; the majority of the significant changes in pension scheme disclosures, 11 of the 13 significant changes reported in Panel B, occur in the three years after 2000.  Those in relation to other post-retirement benefit disclosures (Panel C) occur fairly consistently throughout the considered time-frame whereas those that relate to voluntary disclosures not required by IAS 19 (Panel D) occur after 2003.   This evidence substantiates the above suggestion that Other Disclosures not required by IAS 19 tended to be published after FRS 17 became effective and possibly as IASs were being mandated for EU-listed companies.   
^224	  IAS 19 defines post-retirement benefits as “…pensions, other retirement benefits, post-employment life insurance and post-employment medical care” (IASB, 1998, para. 2).
^225	  FRS 17 defines retirement benefits as “all forms of consideration given by an employer in exchange for services rendered by employees that are payable after the completion of employment” (ASB, 2000, para 2).  FRS 17 makes no other specific reference to post-retirement benefits other than pension schemes. 
^226	  For example, HSBC provided over 3 pages of IFRS post-retirement benefit disclosures in 2005 and Imperial Tobacco disclosed 1.55 pages of similar information in 2004.
^227	  A study of the median changes in Table A10.5 reveals that eight of the 27 significant changes reported had a median of 0.000 and thus the numbers were smaller than the means reported in Table A10.4. This finding also confirms the observation from the descriptive statistics in Table 6.1 that the disclosures of Post-Retirement Benefits is not normally distributed.  Like Table A10.4 the majority of the significant changes occur before 2003 and the changes occur for the same categories of disclosure as in Table A10.4.  Thus, tables A10.4 and A10.5 report similar results to tables 6.4 and 6.5 suggesting that, for certain categories of disclosure, it is possible to identify the year in which the significant increase in disclosure occurred.  
^228	  The net assets (£s) for each company in 2005 (see Table 4.4) was correlated against both the total post-retirement benefit disclosure in 2005 and the average total post-retirement benefit disclosure from 2000-2005.  The resulting Pearson correlations values of 0.373 and 0.391 had corresponding p-values of 0.025 and 0.019 respectively, confirming that those companies with larger net asset values disclosed more post-retirement benefit information in their annual reports.   
^229	  The total number of employees for each company in 2005 (see Table 4.5) was correlated against both the total post-retirement benefit disclosure in 2005 and the average total post-retirement benefit disclosure from 2000-2005.  The resulting Pearson correlations values of 0.403 and 0.483 had corresponding p-values of 0.015 and 0.003 respectively, confirming that those companies with a larger number of employees disclosed more post-retirement benefit information in their annual reports.   
^230	  Three of these companies (Cadbury Schweppes, GlaxoSmithKline and Unilever) produced US post-retirement benefit disclosures over all 6 years, one company (Diageo) produced similar disclosures over five years and another (Imperial Tobacco) for only four of the six years considered.  
^231	  One of these companies (WPP) disclosed post-retirement benefit information under US GAAP for five years, whereas the other (Reuters) did so for only three years.
^232	  Chapter 5 suggested that the pension scheme members/beneficiaries find the sponsoring employer’s annual report more useful than that of the pension scheme because the former document contains information about the pension scheme’s net surplus/ deficit that is omitted from the latter.  
^233	  Stewart (1984) argues that a full concept of accountability involves both the rendering of an account and making a judgement upon the information rendered (holding to account).  
^234	  Further, an inspection of the few sets of pension scheme annual reports which were obtained indicated that no information about liabilities for future pension payments was included in these accounts.  Thus, even when the annual reports of these pension schemes were secured, some of the crucial information which might have been useful to stakeholders (i.e. the pension liabilities) was not included.
^235	  As more and more DB schemes are closed (see Chapter 1), employers are likely to turn to DC schemes as an alternative.  
^236	  John Hutton is an ex-Labour cabinet minister.
^237	  Mallin (2007) provides summaries of the circumstances surrounding the following global financial scandals: the UK’s Barings Bank (1995), the USA’s Enron (2000), Australia’s HIH (2001), the Dutch retail group Royal Ahold (2003), Italy’s Parmalat (2003) and China’s Aviation Oil (2004).  She argues that, it is because of financial scandals such as these, that there is a perceived lack of confidence in the financial reporting practices of many UK companies.
^238	  “An open approach to the disclosure of information contributes to the efficient working of the market economy, prompts boards to take effective action and allows shareholders and others to scrutinise companies more thoroughly.  Integrity means both straightforward dealing and completeness.  What is required of financial reporting is that it should be honest and that it should present a balanced picture of the state of the company’s affairs.  The integrity of reports depends on the integrity of those who prepare and present them.  Boards of directors are accountable to their shareholders and both have to play their part in making that accountability effective.  Boards of directors need to do so through the quality of the information which they provide to shareholders, and shareholders through their willingness to exercise their responsibilities as owners.” (Cadbury, 1992, para. 3.2)
^239	  Specifically “…there should be a remuneration committee (made up of non-executives) which determines executives’ pay; directors should not be appointed for more than three years without shareholders’ approval; the roles of chairman and chief executive officer should be separated; the emoluments of the chairman and the highest paid UK director should be disclosed; and the computation of performance related pay fully explained (Keasey and Write, 1993).
^240	  Those recommendations relating to internal controls and the going-concern statement required further guidance before compliance was possible.
^241	  Conyon and Mallin (1997) reviewed compliance with some of the committee’s recommendations in relation to board structure, audit, remuneration and nomination committees and executive and non-executive directors.  Prior research indicates that, in 1993 there was a high level of compliance with the Code although 54% of companies surveyed did not comply for various reasons.  By 1994, this had declined to 10% of the top 100 companies (and 14% of the top 250); most companies were complying with the majority of the Code’s recommendations although many expressed unease at having to report on the effectiveness of internal controls.  Conversely, smaller companies had a lower compliance rate of only 26%.  Conyon and Mallin (1997) found that 98% of respondents to their survey had established both Audit and Remuneration Committees by 1995.  However, only 49% had established a Nomination Committee by the same date.  They also found that the size of company boards appeared to be increasing and that larger companies were more likely to have three or more non-executive directors.  For smaller companies however it was unlikely that they would have three, or even two, non-executive directors.
^242	  The Financial Reporting Council now has the responsibility of “…maintaining an effective Combined Code on Corporate Governance and promoting its widespread application; ensuring that related guidance, such as that on internal control, is current and relevant; influencing EU and global corporate governance developments; helping to promote boardroom professionalism and diversity; and encouraging constructive interaction between company boards and institutional shareholders.”  (Financial Reporting Council, 2009, (a)).
^243	  The differences between the 2003, 2006 and 2008 versions of the combined code are not significant.  For example, the main difference between the 2003 and 2006 versions is that the latter provides additional guidance on the constructive use of the Annual General Meeting (AGM).  The main differences between the 2006 and the 2008 versions is that the latter removes the restriction on an individual chairing more than one FTSE 100 company and allows company chairmen of listed companies outside the FTSE 350 to sit on audit committees where they were considered independent on appointment.
^244	  Criteria for making a decision of independence include being a past employee of the company; having a material business relationship with the company either directly or indirectly; being in receipt of additional remuneration from the company (or participating in a performance-related pay scheme or the company pension scheme); having close family ties with company advisors (directors or senior employees); holding cross-directorships or having other significant links; representing a significant shareholder; or having served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election.
^245	  Note: A director will not be deemed to be independent “if the director: has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company; has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee, participates in the company share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme; has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies; represents a significant shareholder; or has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election”  (Combined Code, 2006, p. 6)
^246	  A FTSE 350 company should have 50% of its board as NEDS.  A smaller company should have at least two NEDs on the board.
^247	  These differing national perspectives have undoubtedly influenced calls for a single international model of the reporting entity.  Murphy and Topyan (2005) suggest that it is difficult to compare corporate governance models from different countries due to the different firm structures and characteristics.  Similarly, Turnbull (1997) argues that the lack of a coherent framework of corporate governance to compare different systems has resulted in such research being principally empirically driven.
^248	  Alternatively, Bush (2005) argues that similarities between the US and UK corporate governance models are superficial and that, in reality, they are fundamentally different due to the differences in their company law and hence their financial reporting models.
^249	  The OECD principles also acknowledge that the roles and interactions of these stakeholders will vary widely amongst OECD members and non-member countries (OECD, 2004).
^250	  The Corporate Governance Code (2010) is based on the OECD’s Principles for Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999).
^251	   This version of the code is summarised because the majority of the interviews which are analysed in Chapter 5 took place between January 2006 and May 2007.
^252	  The trust deed may also have discretionary powers relating to, for example, the pension of a dependant or the recipient of a lump-sum death benefit.
^253	  “When deciding whether to exercise a power [trustees] must consider the circumstances impartially, take account of all the relevant facts and reach a reasonable decision.  It may be appropriate to announce that decision to the members concerned promptly.  It is usually good practice to record the factors that influenced [the] decision.  [Trustees] should take professional advice on any matters which [they] do not understand and on technical issues which may affect the scheme.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 11).
^254	  Despite the collective responsibility of the board of trustees, it is likely that one of them will adopt the role of Chairman at least for administrative purposes, for example, to act as Chair at trustee meetings; this was indeed the case with several of the smaller unincorporated schemes involved in the empirical analysis reported in Chapter 6.  Notwithstanding the adoption of this role, the duties and responsibilities required of that individual are the same that are required of all other trustees.
^255	  The detailed code provisions of Section A.2 of the combined code require that chairmen should meet certain independence criteria prior to their appointment.  Although the guidance document does not have a similar requirement, it does state that an individual can be prohibited from becoming a trustee and provides guidance on the prohibition of certain individuals to act as trustee.
^256	  The scope of knowledge required includes: the law relating to trusts; the law relating to pensions; and an understanding of investment funding and fund management (for both DB and DC schemes); contributions and strategic asset allocation (for DB schemes); and investment choices (for DC schemes).  (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a), p. 9).
^257	  “The trust deed normally gives the employer or the existing trustees the power to appoint trustees (subject to the requirement for member-nominated trustees).  The first trustees of the scheme are named in the trust deed.  Any later appointments will usually be made by an amending deed or deed of appointment…Provided that some basic requirements are met, trustees will have the flexibility to design arrangements for nomination and selection which best suit their scheme.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2007(c), p. 16)
^258	  “…trustees should consider and decide who to involve in the nomination process.  The process may comprise combinations of individuals and organisations…Trustees may choose to include others…When making this decision, the trustees should have regard to the principles of proportionality, fairness and transparency.”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(b), p. 15)
^259	  In the case of MNTs who are not members, a criterion for eligibility may be employer approval.  
^260	  “This code is designed to help trustees by setting out:...how trustees might approach the task of determining the elements of knowledge and understanding which are appropriate for them; how trustees might acquire the knowledge and understanding they need and how they might feel confidence that they have done so; [and] how they might update their knowledge and understanding” (The Pensions Regulator, 2006(a), p. 3).
^261	 The PR maintains that this should help trustees understand “…what specific tasks the trustees themselves are responsible for.  Be confident in [their] understanding of what each adviser is doing so that [they] can assess whether it’s being done adequately and whether it represents good value for money.  Ensure that [they] have an excellent working relationship with the advisers [they] employ.  Characteristics of a good working relationship are: mutual trust, open and honest dialogue, and productive communication”  (The Pensions Regulator, 2008, p. 4).
^262	  This working group was formed to implement the principles formulated in the Myners Report (2001), to improve the way pension schemes are governed and to share good practice.  
^263	  Whilst previously this used to be a paper-based exercise only, the PR now offers an online submission facility called Exchange.
^264	  “Trustees are required to prepare an annual report in accordance with pensions regulations in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.  It generally comprises the following: …A statement of Trustees’ Responsibilities (as required by APB Practice Note 15 – The Occupational Pension Schemes in the United Kingdom (Revised) which sets out the trustees’ key responsibilities in relation to the preparation of financial statements, monitoring of contributions, keeping of books and records and prevention and detection of fraud.” (FRC, 2007, p. 7)
^265	  This will depend on the type of information requested which may be general information about the scheme, information specific to individuals, or the scheme’s trust deed and rules, actuarial valuations, the scheme’s schedule of contributions or payment schedule, the scheme’s statement of investment principles, or its annual report.
^266	  The December 2004 amendment has not been taken into account because it is applicable to annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2006.
^267	  When considering these locations as a percentage of the annual report, Table A10.2(a) reports similar results with the notes to the accounts (other than the accounting policy note) experiencing an increase from 1.357% in 2000 to 2.88% in 2005 (F-statistic is 13.10, p-value 0.000) and the narrative section increases less strikingly from 0.096% in 2000 to 0.289% in 2005 (F-statistic is 4.62, p-value 0.001).
^268	  The results in Table A10.2(a) support these findings with the exception of 2003 where the Accounting Policy note remains the second most popular location of disclosure.
^269	  Tables A10.4(a) and A10.5(a) show that the notes to the accounts (other than the accounting policy note) is the only location to experience significant changes year on year.   Between 2001/00, 2002/01 and 2003/02, this location experiences increases of 0.699%, 0.997% and 0.380% respectively, albeit the latter increase is significant at the 10% only.  Between 2004/03 and 2005/04 the information reported in this location decreases by 0.190% and 0.297%, however this is not a decrease in absolute disclosure but, as discussed in Chapter 6, is probably due to the overall increase in the size of annual reports due to IFRS implementation.  The only other location to experience a significant increase is the narrative section in the financial statements which increased by 0.167% in 2002/01.
^270	  Likewise the median results reported in Table A10.5(a) generally support those reported in A10.4(a).
^271	  A test of the null hypothesis that the reported mean and median levels of disclosure are equal across the six different years is also provided; the F-test and its associated p-value are included in the final two columns of Table A9.2(b), while the H-test and its p-value are reported in the final two columns of Table A9.3(b).  
^272	  The results reported in Table A10.2(b) produce similar conclusions.  The most common method of disclosure in all six years is the monetary method; this increased from 0.763% of the annual report in 2000 to 1.893% in 2005, peaking at 2.813% of the annual report in 2003.
^273	  In 2000, Table A9.3(b) suggests that companies chose to disclose the majority of their post-retirement benefit information in a narrative format (0.470%), followed by monetary (0.430%) and the quantitative disclosures (0.160%).
^274	  The Median results reported in Table A10.3(b) also confirm the results in Table A9.3(b) with all years rejecting the null hypothesis and the monetary method of disclosure being the most popular in all years.
